December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:21 AM 11/24/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: > >> > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >> > > diGriz >> > >> > Use an anon. remailer and sign your posts. Brilliant. Just brilliant. > >Actually, rather clever if you're trying to estlablish reputation. Just >make sure you use the right key. Reputation is not the only reason to use a "name" with an anon remailer. Sometimes you want to post (and have a reputation) that is entirely seperable from your "real life" persona. Maybe you have a job where being involved with "The Evil Cypherpunks(tm)" could result in hastles at work (or even firing) if known. (I recieved flack from one company I worked with for posting here... Until they needed a remailer set up and someone to explain how their software worked... But that is another story.) Cypherpunks is gated to a number of Usenet News servers. (Teleport is a good example.) It is also archived in a number of search engines. (Altavista if I remember correctly, is one of them.) Someone who does not want their words to come back any byte them might just use such a method to protect themselves. --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: kickouts done the Cypherpunks way...
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

killfiles work fine with me too. that was not the point. i was not really interested in the practical problem that this list just had, but rather was wondering whether it was theoretically possible to identify and exclude one untrusted person from a trusted list. igor lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote: > > ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes: > > > Hi, > > > > Suppose Mr. X, owner of foobarpunks mailing list, wants to kick out Mr. Y, > > for his obnoxious letters to the mailing list. > > > > Mr. X, however, is concerned that Mr. Y would subscribe through some > > proxy address and would continue replying to messages to foobarpunks. > > > > It is assumed that the only person out of the whole universe, Mr. Y, > > cannot be trusted. The problem is that X does not know which of the > > subscribers is Mr. Y. > > > > The question is, is there a technical way to disable Mr. Y from > > reading the list, or detect which subscription address is a proxy for Y? > > The answer is no. Plenty of sites gate mailing lists to local > newsgroups, and allow open or relatively open NNTP access. It's also > silly to assume every other person in the universe is trustworthy. > > If Mr. Y sends lots of obnoxious mail to a mailing list or news group, > the proper thing to do is to put Mr. Y in your killfile and encourage > others to do so. That way you don't get bothered by his annoying > messages, and if enough people follow suit, people stop responding to > Mr. Y's messages. This can be even be extended to cover anonymous > posts using NoCeM-like systems. > > If you try to boot Mr. Y off the mailing list using technical means, > several bad things will happen: First of all you will fail, which > will give Mr. Y a great deal of satisfaction. Second of all, you will > drive Mr. Y to start posting under different names, making him > considerably harder to killfile. Third of all, you will double the > traffic on the mailing list by starting flamewars about whether this > failed booting attempt was ethical, legal, intelligent, homosexual, > scatological, or just plain useless. Since at this point tons of > people will be replying to threads, a killfile becomes even harder to > manage. > > So don't look for convoluted technical solutions to Mr. Y's > personality problems. Just use a little basic common sense. If you > don't like the way someone behaves on a mailing list, just ignore the > damn person. Anything else is just going to make matters worse, as > recent history clearly demonstrates. > - Igor.

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Virus-Hoax
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Date: Sat, 23 Nov 1996 18:43:18 -0800 > From: "David Crawford by way of Fence-Walker(UNCL clicking in fm home)" <crawford(a)eek.llnl.gov> > Subject: CIAC Bulletin H-05: Internet Hoaxes > X-Digest: Volume 9 : Issue 230 > > - ----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > __________________________________________________________ > > The U.S. Department of Energy > Computer Incident Advisory Capability > ___ __ __ _ ___ > / | /_\ / > \___ __|__ / \ \___ > __________________________________________________________ > > INFORMATION BULLETIN > > Internet Hoaxes: PKZ300, Irina, Good Times, Deeyenda, Ghost > > November 20, 1996 15:00 GMT Number H-05 > ______________________________________________________________________________ > PROBLEM: This bulletin addresses the following hoaxes and erroneous > warnings: PKZ300 Warning, Irina, Good Times, Deeyenda, and > Ghost.exe > PLATFORM: All, via e-mail > DAMAGE: Time lost reading and responding to the messages > SOLUTION: Pass unvalidated warnings only to your computer security > department or incident response team. See below on how to > recognize validated and unvalidated warnings and hoaxes. > ______________________________________________________________________________ > VULNERABILITY New hoaxes and warnings have appeared on the Internet and old > ASSESSMENT: hoaxes are still being cirulated. > ______________________________________________________________________________ > > > Introduction > ============ > > The Internet is constantly being flooded with information about computer > viruses and Trojans. However, interspersed among real virus notices are > computer virus hoaxes. While these hoaxes do not infect systems, they are > still time consuming and costly to handle. At CIAC, we find that we are > spending much more time de-bunking hoaxes than handling real virus incidents. > This advisory addresses the most recent warnings that have appeared on the > Internet and are being circulated throughout world today. We will also address > the history behind virus hoaxes, how to identify a hoax, and what to do if you > think a message is or is not a hoax. Users are requested to please not spread > unconfirmed warnings about viruses and Trojans. If you receive an unvalidated > warning, don't pass it to all your friends, pass it to your computer security > manager to validate first. Validated warnings from the incident response teams > and antivirus vendors have valid return addresses and are usually PGP signed > with the organization's key. > > PKZ300 Warning > ============== > > The PKZ300 Trojan is a real Trojan program, but the initial warning about it > was released over a year ago. For information pertaining to PKZ300 Trojan > reference CIAC Notes issue 95-10, that was released in June of 1995. > > http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/notes/Notes10.shtml > > The warning itself, on the other hand, is gaining urban legend status. There > has been an extremely limited number of sightings of this Trojan and those > appeared over a year ago. Even though the Trojan warning is real, the repeated > circulation of the warning is a nuisance. Individuals who need the current > release of PKZIP should visit the PKWARE web page at http://www.pkware.com. > CIAC recommends that you DO NOT recirculate the warning about this particular > Trojan. > > Irina Virus Hoax > ================ > > The "Irina" virus warnings are a hoax. The former head of an electronic > publishing company circulated the warning to create publicity for a new > interactive book by the same name. The publishing company has apologized for > the publicity stunt that backfired and panicked Internet users worldwide. The > original warning claimed to be from a Professor Edward Pridedaux of the > College of Slavic Studies in London; there is no such person or college. > However, London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies has been > inundated with calls. This poorly thought-out publicity stunt was highly > irresponsible. For more information pertaining to this hoax, reference the > UK Daily Telegraph at http://www.telegraph.co.uk. > > Good Times Virus Hoax > ===================== > > The "Good Times" virus warnings are a hoax. There is no virus by that name in > existence today. These warnings have been circulating the Internet for years. > The user community must become aware that it is unlikely that a virus can be > constructed to behave in the manner ascribed in the "Good Times" virus > warning. For more information related to this urban legend, reference CIAC > Notes 95-09. > > http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/notes/Notes09.shtml > > Deeyenda Virus Hoax > =================== > > The "Deeyenda" virus warnings are a hoax. CIAC has received inqueries > regarding the validity of the Deeyenda virus. The warnings are very similar > to those for Good Times, stating that the FCC issued a warning about it, > and that it is self activating and can destroy the contents of a machine > just by being downloaded. Users should note that the FCC does not and will > not issue virus or Trojan warnings. It is not their job to do so. As of this > date, there are no known viruses with the name Deeyenda in existence. For a > virus to spread, it must be executed. Reading a mail message does not execute > the mail message. Trojans and viruses have been found as executable attachments > to mail messages, but they must be extracted and executed to do any harm. CIAC > still affirms that reading E-mail, using typical mail agents, can not activate > malicious code delivered in or with the message. > > Ghost.exe Warning > ================= > > The Ghost.exe program was originally distributed as a free screen saver > containing some advertising information for the author's company (Access > Softek). The program opens a window that shows a Halloween background with > ghosts flying around the screen. On any Friday the 13th, the program window > title changes and the ghosts fly off the window and around the screen. Someone > apparently got worried and sent a message indicating that this might be a > Trojan. The warning grew until the it said that Ghost.exe was a Trojan that > would destroy your hard drive and the developers got a lot of nasty phone > calls (their names and phone numbers were in the About box of the program.) > A simple phone call to the number listed in the program would have stopped > this warning from being sent out. The original ghost.exe program is just cute; > it does not do anything damaging. Note that this does not mean that ghost > could not be infected with a virus that does do damage, so the normal > antivirus procedure of scanning it before running it should be followed. > > History of Virus Hoaxes > ======================= > > Since 1988, computer virus hoaxes have been circulating the Internet. In > October of that year, according to Ferbrache ("A pathology of Computer > Viruses" Springer, London, 1992) one of the first virus hoaxes was the > 2400 baud modem virus: > > SUBJ: Really Nasty Virus > AREA: GENERAL (1) > > I've just discovered probably the world's worst computer virus > yet. I had just finished a late night session of BBS'ing and file > treading when I exited Telix 3 and attempted to run pkxarc to > unarc the software I had downloaded. Next thing I knew my hard > disk was seeking all over and it was apparently writing random > sectors. Thank god for strong coffee and a recent backup. > Everything was back to normal, so I called the BBS again and > downloaded a file. When I went to use ddir to list the directory, > my hard disk was getting trashed again. I tried Procomm Plus TD > and also PC Talk 3. Same results every time. Something was up so I > hooked up to my test equipment and different modems (I do research > and development for a local computer telecommunications company > and have an in-house lab at my disposal). After another hour of > corrupted hard drives I found what I think is the world's worst > computer virus yet. The virus distributes itself on the modem sub- > carrier present in all 2400 baud and up modems. The sub-carrier is > used for ROM and register debugging purposes only, and otherwise > serves no othr (sp) purpose. The virus sets a bit pattern in one > of the internal modem registers, but it seemed to screw up the > other registers on my USR. A modem that has been "infected" with > this virus will then transmit the virus to other modems that use a > subcarrier (I suppose those who use 300 and 1200 baud modems > should be immune). The virus then attaches itself to all binary > incoming data and infects the host computer's hard disk. The only > way to get rid of this virus is to completely reset all the modem > registers by hand, but I haven't found a way to vaccinate a modem > against the virus, but there is the possibility of building a > subcarrier filter. I am calling on a 1200 baud modem to enter this > message, and have advised the sysops of the two other boards > (names withheld). I don't know how this virus originated, but I'm > sure it is the work of someone in the computer telecommunications > field such as myself. Probably the best thing to do now is to > stick to 1200 baud until we figure this thing out. > > Mike RoChenle > > This bogus virus description spawned a humorous alert by Robert Morris III : > > Date: 11-31-88 (24:60) Number: 32769 > To: ALL Refer#: NONE > From: ROBERT MORRIS III Read: (N/A) > Subj: VIRUS ALERT Status: PUBLIC MESSAGE > > Warning: There's a new virus on the loose that's worse than > anything I've seen before! It gets in through the power line, > riding on the powerline 60 Hz subcarrier. It works by changing the > serial port pinouts, and by reversing the direction one's disks > spin. Over 300,000 systems have been hit by it here in Murphy, > West Dakota alone! And that's just in the last 12 minutes. > > It attacks DOS, Unix, TOPS-20, Apple-II, VMS, MVS, Multics, Mac, > RSX-11, ITS, TRS-80, and VHS systems. > > To prevent the spresd of the worm: > > 1) Don't use the powerline. > 2) Don't use batteries either, since there are rumors that this > virus has invaded most major battery plants and is infecting the > positive poles of the batteries. (You might try hooking up just > the negative pole.) > 3) Don't upload or download files. > 4) Don't store files on floppy disks or hard disks. > 5) Don't read messages. Not even this one! > 6) Don't use serial ports, modems, or phone lines. > 7) Don't use keyboards, screens, or printers. > 8) Don't use switches, CPUs, memories, microprocessors, or > mainframes. > 9) Don't use electric lights, electric or gas heat or > airconditioning, running water, writing, fire, clothing or the > wheel. > > I'm sure if we are all careful to follow these 9 easy steps, this > virus can be eradicated, and the precious electronic flui9ds of > our computers can be kept pure. > > ---RTM III > > Since that time virus hoaxes have flooded the Internet.With thousands of > viruses worldwide, virus paranoia in the community has risen to an extremely > high level. It is this paranoia that fuels virus hoaxes. A good example of > this behavior is the "Good Times" virus hoax which started in 1994 and is > still circulating the Internet today. Instead of spreading from one computer > to another by itself, Good Times relies on people to pass it along. > > How to Identify a Hoax > ====================== > > There are several methods to identify virus hoaxes, but first consider what > makes a successful hoax on the Internet. There are two known factors that make > a successful virus hoax, they are: (1) technical sounding language, and > (2) credibility by association. If the warning uses the proper technical > jargon, most individuals, including technologically savy individuals, tend to > believe the warning is real. For example, the Good Times hoax says that > "...if the program is not stopped, the computer's processor will be placed in > an nth-complexity infinite binary loop which can severely damage the > processor...". The first time you read this, it sounds like it might be > something real. With a little research, you find that there is no such thing > as an nth-complexity infinite binary loop and that processors are designed > to run loops for weeks at a time without damage. > > When we say credibility by association we are referring to whom sent the > warning. If the janitor at a large technological organization sends a warning > to someone outside of that organization, people on the outside tend to believe > the warning because the company should know about those things. Even though > the person sending the warning may not have a clue what he is talking about, > the prestigue of the company backs the warning, making it appear real. If a > manager at the company sends the warning, the message is doubly backed by the > company's and the manager's reputations. > > Individuals should also be especially alert if the warning urges you to pass > it on to your friends. This should raise a red flag that the warning may be > a hoax. Another flag to watch for is when the warning indicates that it is a > Federal Communication Commission (FCC) warning. According to the FCC, they > have not and never will disseminate warnings on viruses. It is not part of > their job. > > CIAC recommends that you DO NOT circulate virus warnings without first > checking with an authoritative source. Authoritative sources are your computer > system security administrator or a computer incident advisory team. Real > warnings about viruses and other network problems are issued by different > response teams (CIAC, CERT, ASSIST, NASIRC, etc.) and are digitally signed by > the sending team using PGP. If you download a warning from a teams web site or > validate the PGP signature, you can usually be assured that the warning is > real. Warnings without the name of the person sending the original notice, or > warnings with names, addresses and phone numbers that do not actually exist > are probably hoaxes. > > What to Do When You Receive a Warning > ===================================== > > Upon receiving a warning, you should examine its PGP signature to see that it > is from a real response team or antivirus organization. To do so, you will > need a copy of the PGP software and the public signature of the team that > sent the message. The CIAC signature is available from the CIAC web server > at: > > http://ciac.llnl.gov > > If there is no PGP signature, see if the warning includes the name of the > person submitting the original warning. Contact that person to see if he/she > really wrote the warning and if he/she really touched the virus. If he/she is > passing on a rumor or if the address of the person does not exist or if > there is any questions about theauthenticity or the warning, do not circulate > it to others. Instead, send the warning to your computer security manager or > incident response team and let them validate it. When in doubt, do not send > it out to the world. Your computer security managers and the incident response > teams teams have experts who try to stay current on viruses and their warnings. > In addition, most anti-virus companies have a web page containing information > about most known viruses and hoaxes. You can also call or check the web site > of the company that produces the product that is supposed to contain the virus. > Checking the PKWARE site for the current releases of PKZip would stop the > circulation of the warning about PKZ300 since there is no released version 3 > of PKZip. Another useful web site is the "Computer Virus Myths home page" > (http://www.kumite.com/myths/) which contains descriptions of several known > hoaxes. In most cases, common sense would eliminate Internet hoaxes. > > - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer > security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy > (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National > Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore > National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding > member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a > global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination > among computer security teams worldwide. > > CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC > can be contacted at: > Voice: +1 510-422-8193 > FAX: +1 510-423-8002 > STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 > E-mail: ciac(a)llnl.gov > > For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, > and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - > 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, > or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two > Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC > duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC > Project Leader. > > Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are > available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. > > World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ > Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53) > Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) > +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) > > CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic > publications: > 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical > information and Bulletins, important computer security information; > 2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles; > 3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector > (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and > availability; > 4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the > use of SPI products. > > Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package > called ListProcessor, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To > subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the > following request as the E-mail message body, substituting > CIAC-BULLETIN, CIAC-NOTES, SPI-ANNOUNCE or SPI-NOTES for list-name and > valid information for LastName FirstName and PhoneNumber when sending > > E-mail to ciac-listproc(a)llnl.gov: > subscribe list-name LastName, FirstName PhoneNumber > e.g., subscribe ciac-notes OHara, Scarlett W. 404-555-1212 x36 > > You will receive an acknowledgment containing address, initial PIN, > and information on how to change either of them, cancel your > subscription, or get help. > > PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing > communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these > communities, please contact your agency's response team to report > incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of > Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide > organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their > constituencies can be obtained by sending email to > docserver(a)first.org with an empty subject line and a message body > containing the line: send first-contacts. > > This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an > agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States > Government nor the University of California nor any of their > employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any > legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or > usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process > disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately > owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, > process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or > otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, > recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the > University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed > herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States > Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for > advertising or product endorsement purposes. > > LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) > > G-43: Vulnerabilities in Sendmail > G-44: SCO Unix Vulnerability > G-45: Vulnerability in HP VUE > G-46: Vulnerabilities in Transarc DCE and DFS > G-47: Unix FLEXlm Vulnerabilities > G-48: TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks > H-01: Vulnerabilities in bash > H-02: SUN's TCP SYN Flooding Solutions > H-03: HP-UX_suid_Vulnerabilities > H-04: HP-UX Ping Vulnerability > > RECENT CIAC NOTES ISSUED (Previous Notes available from CIAC) > > Notes 07 - 3/29/95 A comprehensive review of SATAN > > Notes 08 - 4/4/95 A Courtney update > > Notes 09 - 4/24/95 More on the "Good Times" virus urban legend > > Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability > in S/Key, EBOLA Virus Hoax, and Caibua Virus > > Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators, > America On-Line Virus Scare, SPI 3.2.2 Released, > The Die_Hard Virus > > Notes 12 - 9/12/95 Securely configuring Public Telnet Services, X > Windows, beta release of Merlin, Microsoft Word > Macro Viruses, Allegations of Inappropriate Data > Collection in Win95 > > Notes 96-01 - 3/18/96 Java and JavaScript Vulnerabilities, FIRST > Conference Announcement, Security and Web Search > Engines, Microsoft Word Macro Virus Update > > - ----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.1 > Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.3, an Emacs/PGP interface > > iQCVAwUBMpN8qrnzJzdsy3QZAQHpZgP/V+NTN7AwEtWCM46sSBMFnEuz0NxmN9X2 > DMOFnATcUSNvukXBPAMc3LMYmnjhp+CrqDyfQCWVBUaHDTmb3yKTTsexYev5alyd > cSR4uZjQrMjO1pu16HG7BS+faxaP+E/FVEcbAof9a+tjX4aj9LTOM/Nt8Hb6Aazo > eRHTBH+AYy4= > =fBQM > - ----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > ------------------------------ > >

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[Noise] Re: Thanks/was:This is your last warning
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 24 Nov 1996, aga wrote: > > > Not really, I had an I.Q. of 149, and a perfect 4.00 from > > > two different colleges, before I did my Doctorate in Law. > > > > 149 puts you at the low end of the scale, or used to, around here. > > > > True, they say genius only starts at 150; but I think I have > improved since then. This betrays your ignorance. I.Q. is scaled according to age. One does not "improve." > > The fact (if true) that you bothered to get a Doctorate in Law, rather > > than a Juris Doctor, tends to disprove the above however. > > > > Look dude, a Juris Doctor IS a Doctorate of Law. Incorrect. One can obtain a Doctorate in Law, (As in Dr.) but it is generally a pointless endeavor except in some civil law jurisdictions. (Liechtenstein is a good example, where many attornies have a Dr.Iur. (Dr.) while others merely have a Lic.Iur. (J.D.) ). A J.D. requires no dissertation. A Doctorate in Law does. I submit you know too little about any of these to have attained either one. > Do not confuse it with a L.L.D. which is a "Doctorate > of Legal Letters" A J.D. is the only current valid > Doctorate that you can do in plain "Law." Incorrect. A J.D. is not a true Doctorate, and even if it were, it would not be the only current valid "Doctorate" that you can "do" in "plain Law." Georgetown, as an example, offers a Doctorate in Law degree which requires a J.D., an LL.M. and three years of legal teaching experience simply to qualify for the program. A Doctor of Judicial Science program is also available with many of the same requirements. Both programs require a dissertation and a defense of same. San Marcos University is also known for an exceptional Doctor of Laws program. Incidently, LL.D.s are rare and generally useful only in European circles. As usual, you have overextended your bounds and now find yourself swimming in water over your head. > > > > > > > Go to law school. In the meantime, shut up. > > > > > > > > > > Go and eat your swiss cheese, as that is apparently all you > > > are good for. My mercenaries are too busy to go to europe > > > right now. > > > > I prefer Chedder. > > > > Be careful who you threaten. It might get you in trouble. > > > > Threatening to wipe out your location on the InterNet is > not against ANY law whatsoever, and I can mailbomb you, do > a DOS attack, fork-bomb attack and virus attack against you, > all of which are perfectly legal. Actually, they are not. Unauthorized access of a computer system is a crime. Anyone who had a "doctorate" in law would know this. I doubt your reference to mercenaries was merely a threat to my system, but keep pushing if you like. > > > Look asshole, I graduated from Law School with a Doctorate > > > in 1975. Now just go away and stop interfering with our > > > American Net. Which law school? And did you do a dissertation? What is its title? Do you practice? What state are you licensed in? > Face the real fact of life though dude. There is absolutely NO LAW > which prevents me from attacking and/or eliminating any address > outside of the USA, that is, even if there were any law which would > prevent me from doing the same thing to any non-government > computer right here, which there is not. Ok, do it. We'll see. > Your only protection on this Internet is to have a dozen different > addresses to access from. I can put a dozen computers up on > a dozen different T1's right now, if need be. I suggest a hobby which entails more physical activity. -- Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern Vote Monarchist Switzerland

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Re: GELP/was:Word List
by Sven 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>That should be a "what" is GELP. It's a type of sea weed. GOAT |__ |--> SVEN: a.k.a. Chris Blanc Internet consulting/Web design [ http://www.loop.com/~sven/ ] Some only sample the dark wine of life's blood...

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Photobuster to beat radar...
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Nov 24 18:19:39 1996 At URL: http://www.havenofhope.org/photobuster/photob2.html Photobuster is a spin off from a specialty electronics company (Grand Systems) who saw the need for a system to foil the photo radar picture. We realize that people like your selves don't usually speed on purpose and can't afford to pay hundreds of semolies just because you look away from the speedometer from time to time. Our easily installed electronic Photobuster unit is a an electronically triggered device that mounts in the rear window with a satellite unit that mounts at the license plate. It watches the right side of the road for a photo radar setup. If you are driving at speeds in excess of the operators setting on the photo radar, it will attempt to photograph your car. When it does this the Photobuster senses the attempt and triggers a return response rendering the radar photo useless. It has an audible warning and a visual light to let you know each time you save 100 bucks. This unit only triggers if the photo radar attempts to photograph your car. NOTE: Photobuster has nothing covering your plate as is with other filter, poleroid and lenticular optical devices. We are told it is not legal in most areas, to install any kind of plastic cover over the plate, see through or not. ************************************************************ Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Survive; http://www.dueprocess.com | - Go to bed." ************************************************************ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMpjYDD5A4+Z4Wnt9AQGEiwP+OwSodqT2IMQJIFxf/OPFIr7JSJJY7uWc tBfpskpydWvpcKe49PZMbflNOsTgjuW/MyRXLwu8j/mMIEKqwe7KvYPEVUIHNjx3 by3dLMglaihuObbAViewOTS2mjat2bWtB24cGwHI1/94gc8trLlXS3VTtCQYcnkl Btw1KpGDCek= =pfBU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:16 PM 11/24/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: >> I thought Shannon proved one-time-pads to be unbreakable using information >> theory. > >Different ball game. OTP isn't "unbreakable" . OTPs are secure because >no matter what key you use, it _will_ decrypt, so your plaintext is still >hidden simply because it could decrypt to whatever the person trying to >decrypt it wants it to. Its not that its unbreakable, its that its >breakable in _so many ways_. I think we differ on the definition of "unbreakable". A quick stab at my (admittedly very vague) definition includes the inability of the analyst to determine (by the structure of the plaintext) that he has a correct decryption. When I look in AC2, Schneier uses "break" in many ways. Let me evaluate OTP against his taxonomy of attacks: Ciphertext-only: Unbreakable Known-plaintext: Unbreakable, since the pad is never reused Chosen-plaintext: Unbreakable, ditto Adaptive-chosen-plaintext: Unbreakable, ditto Chosen-ciphertext: This attack doesn't seem to apply Chosen-key: This attack requires that the OTP doesn't have 1-bit-of-entropy/bit which implies it isn't an OTP. Rubber-hose: Since any decryption is equally plausable, OTPs are resistant to this attack. OTOH, it means they may keep beating you even after you've given them the correct decryption. Purchase-key: This attack seems the only way to break an OTP. If you accept Purchase-key as a valid attack, and it certainly has worked in many real-life situations, then no system is "unbreakable" and there is not any point in using the term. If you leave it out of the valid forms of attack, because all systems are vulnerable to it so it doesn't help in selecting a cryptosystem, then the OTP is "unbreakable". How do you want to define "unbreakable"? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Aga is talking to himself
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:15 AM 11/24/96 -0500, aga <aga(a)dhp.com> wrote: >On Sun, 24 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: actually the message was from lucifer(a)dhp.com: >> aga <aga(a)dhp.com> writes: ... messages suppressed It looks like our juvenile "friend" is talking to himself. I am truely sorry that he feels a need to harass ladies who have actually made something of their lives. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The algorythm cannot be considered secure until it has been > peer-reviewed. They refuse to release the algorythm for review, simply saying > that "you can't break the code" therefore "it is secure". This isn`t strictly true. Don Wood (spit) has actually released the algorithm details for review. It`s just that no-one considers it even worthy of looking at. I wearily downloaded the details then realised I had better things to do than sift through pages of pompous self important drivel about "software one time pads." Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Killfiling stupid faggots
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

abostick(a)netcom.com (Alan Bostick) writes: > > In article <199611220304.VAA02832(a)manifold.algebra.com>, > ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) wrote: > > > Dr. John Martin Grubor is the most harmless and most entertaining > > among all kooks. > > > > His posting volume is a bit high, but other than that DrG never > > got anyone in trouble. > > I dunno about "harmless". Publishing lists of "known homosexuals" > can have repercussions that outweigh their entertainment value. Yes. John Gilmore met Alan Bostick through Grubor's list. They fucked each other in the ass (how's that for entertainment!) but now John Gilmore has AIDS. P.S. Whoever said Gilmore is bi and eats pussy is a fucking liar. Gilmore is 100% queer. He hasn't touched pussy since he was born. diGriz

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