December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "Forward Privacy" for ISPs and Customers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:08 PM 10/10/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 11:42 AM -0700 10/10/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >>At 10:13 AM 10/9/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >>>Something ISPs could do--and may do if there is sufficient customer >>>pressure--is to adopt a policy of "forward secrecy" (to slightly abuse this >>>technical term). That is, to have an explicit policy--implemented in the >>>software--of _really_ deleting the back messages once a customer downloads >>>them to his site. This means that _backups_ must be done in a careful >>>manner, such that even the backup tapes or disks are affected by a removal. >> >>One technical approach is described in: >> >>"A Revocable Backup System", dabo(a)cs.princeton.edu (Dan Boneh) and >>rjl(a)cs.princeton.edu (Richard J. Lipton) in The 6th USENIX Security >>Symposium Proceedings. >> >>Basically the idea is to encrypt the file on the backup (tape) and then >>lose the encryption key when you want to "forget" the file. > >Given that keys = data, this just transfers the problem from one set of >data to another set of data. (Wanna bet a lot of ISPs would keep backups of >the disk with the keys on it?) Agreeded. I was assuming some degree of competence on the part of the ISP. Since it is a service they are offering, they are responsible for its correct operation. Reducing the size of the data you must lose is quite valuable. It means you don't have to pass large amounts of tape to stomp on the file. The article offers some solution to this problem, as I remember, but I don't really have time to re-read it and summerize (unless you want to outbid my current client :-). ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Cave softly, cave safely, | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | and cave with duct tape." | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Marianne Russo | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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"Internet II" and Clinton
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clinton has unveiled his plans, such as they are, for what he calls "Internet II," combining in his announcement $100 million in funding for school links, "an Internet account for every high school student," and (unspecified) speed improvements to the Internet. (I wonder if he thinks the Internet belongs to the U.S., or is controlled by the U.S.?) The implications for our list are as we have long talked about. Potentially: * a government attempt to reassert some sort of control over the Internet, a la the "we paid for the Arpanet, so we can control what it's used for." (Of course, the Internet is no longer what it once was, and it is not a specific network the USG can claim to own or control. It's more of a "protocol," a set of agreements on how packets, messages, newsgroups, etc. will be carried. I'm using the term "Internet" in its largest sense, as "the Net.") * all of these schoolchildren are gonna need to be protected from filthy Web sites, unrestricted free speech, pedophiles, money launderers (and moneychangers), Hemlock Society advocates, gay and lesbo rights groups, the NRA< and other assorted Horsemen. Look for increased school purchases of filter software, various laws tightening up what U.S. sites carry (depending on how the CDA gets resolved). * my prediction from a few years ago: "the Internet Driver's License." Or, worse, all packets must have True Names attached in some way. (The smallest packets, a la ATM, may be too small to carry IDs, but larger-granularity packets may have to carry IDs, digital sigs, etc.) Of course, it may be that Clinton is just posturing for the upcoming election, and the "Internet II" will be a trivia question a few years from now. But now that the politicians have well and truly discovered the Net, look out. --Tim May "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Why not PGP?
by Geoff Klein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: liberty(a)gate.net, rollo(a)artvark.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 11 15:08:41 1996 On 10 Octt Rollo Silver wrote: > 2. Suppose someone writes a program Z that has no expicit crypto code > in it, but has hooks for installing one or another version of PGP. Given > a copy of Z, someone in this country could install PGP he got from MIT, > whereas someone in Europe could install the international version. Pronto Secure is an e-mail client which pretty much fits Z. > Would export of Z violate ITAR restrictions? Good question. Anyone know if exporting Z has been tested ? Commtouch does not currently export Pronto Secure from the US :) - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager http://www.commtouch.com, Tel: 972-9-963445 (ext 130), Fax: 972-9-961053 For my PGP public key send mail with subject: Get Key - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMl44zELv5OMYFK1FAQES/AQApuvGj1DFHOhSkUVJ4tyaQpHUYapC8cDA I3HOd9Ic5hS4u/NCHFbHPlvbe+kFN8jBDlwtLcyOtbFiWcfOTJJcvJAWQgSadjjf zvdfxFs5DXzIIepijQoGBSOtcPKn8F4UtxQ47G/7SViEUob1OkCrFUxmOtpkuFDh 5Yd720FJEnI= =NdPu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: MISTY Algorithm
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:41 AM 10/10/96 -0700, you wrote: >Perhaps they are referring to > >Mitsuri Matsui, ``New Structure of Block Ciphers with Provable >Security against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis'', >Fast Software Encryption '96, LNCS 1039, Springer-Verlag, 1996. > >which provides specifications, test vectors, analysis, etc. of >a new cipher from Matsui? ----- That is surely accurate: a c'punk linked Matsui to MYSTY a while back. Below is a year-old announcement on Mitsubishi's MISTY encryption algorithm. We have requested information on the October 8 announcement that the algorithm is to be released for third-party evaluation along with a sample program for doing so (see E-mail address below for inquiries). ----- http://www.melco.co.jp/rd_home/new/crypt_e.html Mitsubishi Electric Develops New Encryption System "MISTY", More Powerful Than DES (Data Encryption Standard) for Communication Networks -- Security Strictly Evaluated in World's First Practical Block Ciphers -- Tokyo, October 27, 1995 -- Mitsubishi Electric has developed a new block cipher algorithm for an encryption system, which is essential technology for protecting the privacy of individuals and confidential information in communication networks, that makes both strength and speed compatible. The encryption algorithm is based on a cipher strength evaluation index, which applies the "linear cryptanalysis", a powerful decoding method unique to Mitsubishi Electric, and the "differential cryptanalysis", considered to be an effective decoding method next to the linear cryptanalysis. Mitsubishi Electric has succeeded in strictly evaluating the security of this encryption algorithm against these decoding methods. Background: Using ciphers on wide-area networks requires a method to maintain security as long as its encryption key (password commonly shared by a sender and a receiver) is kept secret, even if the mechanism of the encryption is made public. However, possibilities of unauthorized access will increase when the encryption mechanism is made public. In fact, several encryption algorithms, whose specifications were made public, have been compelled to make specification changes, and to sacrifice their encryption speed in return for an increased cipher strength to protect against recent decoding methods. This is why an encryption system whose security against these decoding methods is strictly evaluated at the design stage has been required. Security of encryption is formulated as the lower limit of the number of calculations needed for decoding. A powerful decoding method leads to a stricter safety index in that it reduces the number of calculations needed for decoding. At present, the "linear cryptanalysis" is considered to be the most effective general-purpose decoding method. A decoding method called the "differential cryptanalysis" is another widely known decoding method next to the "linear cryptanalysis". A evaluation based on the linear and differential cryptanalysis is therefore considered to be the most reliable among strength indexes of block ciphers.*1 *1 Block ciphers : Plain texts and cipher texts that are processed by being grouped into units called blocks; most widely used at present. Outline of Development: Since announcing the linear cryptanalysis, Mitsubishi Electric has been making efforts to develop encryption technology backed by adequate security. In January 1994, Mitsubishi Electric performed the first successful experiment to decode the Data Encryption Standard (DES), an American standard commercial encryption system, to quantitavely evaluate its strength using this linear cryptanalysis. Using this evaluation technology, Mitsubishi Electric has developed an encryption algorithm that quantitavely provides sufficient security to linear and differential cryptanalysis and achieves a practical encryption speed. The encryption algorithm can clarify the relationships between encryption speed and strength and allow users to use an encryption that meets their security needs. Mitsubishi Electric plans to develop software tool products and hardware products (LSIs) using this encryption algorithm. Mitsubishi Electric will make the specification of this encryption algorithm public and will also promote its use. Address questions or comments to: www-rd(a)hat.hon.melco.co.jp [End of announcement] Note: Mistubishi is developing LSI chips at two specialty laboratories at Itami. Sparse information is available by links from Mitsubishi's home page at: http://www.melco.co.jp An inscrutable (^^) image of an LSI encryption chip is at: http://www.melco.co.jp/rd_home/map/j_s/item/pat1/uf1-7-e.html

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PLEDGES
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Just got a private pledge for another $50. With Ray's $50 and my $100, we are making a big dent in the cost of getting Dimitri out here. Still haven't heard from Dimitri, though. (I guess it's hard to type one-handed.) :-) In the likely circumstance that we get more money pledged than is required to fete Dimitri, I'll return the excess to donors on a pro rata basis. For now, though, I need more pledges. Thanks. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Why not PGP?
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: rollo(a)artvark.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Oct 10 18:39:42 1996 Rollo Silver wrote: <snip> > I use PGP to communicate (presumably) strong-cryptoed messages to my > stepson Ray Hirschfeld in Amsterdam, and vice versa. He uses an > internationational version of PGP, and I use the domestic version that I > got from MIT. They seem to be compatible. They are. > I don't intend to submit my present or future private PGP keys for key > escrow (Is that what's called GAK?). Good. (Yes.) > To protect myself against forgetting > my private key (which has happened once already) I'll no doubt some day > put > it on a floppy and put the floppy in my bank safe deposit box. This protects against forgetting your passprhase only if you have that on the disk in plaintext. It protects you against harddrive crashes, though, which is a good thing.(tm) > Two questions: > > 1. Does anyone think that legislation might be passed which would > criminalize my communications with Ray? Yes. [It's possible. But not before the election for obvious reasons.] > 2. Suppose someone writes a program Z that has no expicit crypto code in > it, but has hooks for installing one or another version of PGP. Given a > copy of Z, someone in this country could install PGP he got from MIT, > whereas someone in Europe could install the international version. > Would export of Z violate ITAR restrictions? Yes. JMR One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other way around. -- me Defeat the Duopoly! Vote Harry & Jo http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:jmr@shopmiami.com> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMl17M21lp8bpvW01AQHFlAP9Fyw3hs4K+wsXND9EPwPew7P9kdVGV4is 2pTHvni81dDA2ZIRuGe/JqHbtY4RkJ+/EH85pyf+nvlpfsmaszR6xCDfMHBx2T/s yXYlExJoG/cysykX/PuYHnkywie1UApGlaQzj+t4N1yMJk/BsPxrYWb5huACd3cG QeQywVDBYVA= =rLgj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Why not PGP?
by Geoff Klein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: froomkin(a)law.miami.edu, rollo(a)artvark.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 11 15:08:50 1996 On 10 Oct Michael Froomkin wrote: >> 2. Suppose someone writes a program Z that has no expicit crypto code >> in it, but has hooks for installing one or another version of PGP. Given >> a copy of Z, someone in this country could install PGP he got from MIT, >> whereas someone in Europe could install the international version. >> Would export of Z violate ITAR restrictions? > > Yes, but these are currently being challenged in 3 separate court > actions. Can you post a reference to more info about these actions please. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager http://www.commtouch.com, Tel: 972-9-963445 (ext 130), Fax: 972-9-961053 For my PGP public key send mail with subject: Get Key - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMl441ELv5OMYFK1FAQF8tQQAipKnURVdvOMRiOdKNPXjDO13ZL7qyXqy s3Bk6THTWxMLGhmuHc566NdZAMjQJIRFPKjf/0OJdiu9XZYPAGZjo42ry435hG0S 4WqfN19MIhVN0oLpCSTz/cUFQFBGh916icPjnp43/2fx+rqCfcF87MCicBUjukFd X34M9N91cLs= =PNAM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Creative Wiretap Arguments [Was :Re: Put up or shut up]
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The introduction of the digital mobile network was deleayed several months here in australia (this was several years back). The delay was based on the need to be able to intercept digital communications. Untill a backdoor was built into the system, the Federal Police would and did not let the cel net go online. > >Which raises the issue, "Is the ISP required to install 'wiretap-friendly' > >capability?" Apparently not, if the cellular phone industry is any > >precedent: For awhile, cops couldn't easily tap cell phones because no such > >capability had been designed into the cell-site software. Such an omission > >was not considered a violation of law. ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

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[NEWS] Crypto- and AP-relevant wire clippings
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Washington Post: Wednesday, October 9, 1996 AT&T Adds On-Line Card Protection By David S. Hilzenrath When it comes to using credit cards on-line, many Internet businesses say their biggest fear is fear itself. Citing consumer concerns about the security of credit-card numbers as an impediment to on-line commerce, two industry powerhouses have introduced guarantees in an effort to overcome what they call unwarranted anxieties. AT&T Corp. Tuesday said it would indemnify holders of its own credit card against fraud when they use AT&T security software to shop at World Wide Web sites that AT&T maintains for its business clients. That means AT&T would assume responsibility for the customer's usual $50 deductible. America Online Inc. said last month that it would assume responsibility for the deductible when subscribers shop at on-line retailers that have been certified as meeting its own customer-service standards. That would include about 50 of the more than 250 merchants on-line with AOL, which only recently began the evaluation process, said Michael Minigan, vice president of marketing for AOL's interactive-marketing unit. ``We think that this is a way to jump-start the industry for both businesses and consumers,'' said Kathleen Earley, vice president of AT&T's EasyCommerce Services for businesses. Through the power of the AT&T name and the security guarantee, ``we can help customers overcome any concerns that they may have,'' Earley said. AT&T introduced a different guarantee in March, promising that holders of its Universal Card who also use AT&T as their on-ramp to the Internet would not be held liable if their credit cards were compromised anywhere in cyberspace. AT&T said it didn't think the guarantee would cost it much money because the risk of a security breach is so small. Many analysts and retailers agree that the burgeoning business of electronic commerce is battling a perception problem. Concerns about hackers stealing credit-card numbers on-line have spawned a new industry of companies dedicated to making on-line transactions secure through the use of encryption. ``There's still a reluctance to use credit cards on-line,'' said David Simons, managing director of Digital Video Investments, which studies the Internet for institutional investors. ``It's irrational because there's probably a greater chance of theft or fraud by giving your credit card out to an individual on an 800 number or ... the old-fashioned way, over the counter.'' ``This is strictly a perception issue,'' said Jeff Bezos, founder and chief executive of Amazon.Com, an Internet-based bookstore that handles thousands of sales a day. ``It's so much easier to go through a trash can or dumpster and get credit-card numbers than it is to break the encryption schemes that are used on the Internet.'' Still, Bezos said there is evidence that perceptions are changing. When Amazon.Com opened for business 15 months ago, about half of its customers opted to provide their credit-card numbers over the phone instead of over the Internet. Now, 85 percent complete the transactions on-line, Bezos said. AP Online: Tuesday, October 8, 1996 Bankers Shrug Off Cybertalk BY E. SCOTT RECKARD HONOLULU-- Go high-tech or wither, speakers as auspicious as Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan told the 1,100-strong American Bankers Association convention. ''If you don't, you're basically toast, and punishment is swift,'' agreed convention speaker Don Tapscott, author of ''The Digital Economy.'' You might think conventioneers from the largest organization of U.S. banks would all be rushing to be first in online banking, computerized marketing to customers, and other services and automated processes. You would be wrong, especially at smaller banks, where many seem content to take a more relaxed approach. Louis Prichard, president of Farmers National Bank of Danville, Ky., is computer literate. He rose at 5 a.m. Hawaii time Monday to e-mail colleagues and check the bank's latest financial picture via his laptop. Farmers has a World Wide Web site with information about services and rates. But home and online banking are still being studied by the four-branch, $190 million assets bank, and Prichard says that while Tapscott glossed over computer security concerns, his customers worry about them. He wants other banks to solve the start-up problems before he wades in. ''We're like water skiers: We'll let someone else cut through the waves,'' he says. ''We'll ride along, not far behind.'' Far fewer than half the bank officials in a huge ballroom at the Hilton Hawaiian Village here held their hands up when Tapscott asked if they had tried the Internet. Some, like Harold R. Pehlke, never use computers and are downright hostile to the idea. Pehlke, 57, chief executive of Republic Bank of Chicago, sat through one of many small-group sessions on new technology, then announced to the consultant making the presentation: ''You have convinced me to retire in three years.'' ''I wasn't sure I was going to do it, but after listening to you I am.'' Even featured speakers older ones, anyway shared similar views. William Seidman, head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. under presidents Reagan and Ford, said he had listened to Tapscott's presentation, ''and my immediate reaction was, 'Thank God I'm old.''' On reflection, though, Seidman said he realized that most bank depositors were probably in no particular rush for high-tech banking. ''Don't panic,'' he told the bankers. ''It'll take plenty of time before your average customer gets there.'' That sounded good to Gib S. Nichols, a director of the Flathead Bank of Bigfork, Mont. ''Our customers will let us know when it's time,'' he said. Seidman, who ran the Resolution Trust Corp. when it began selling off the wreckage of the 1980s savings and loan debacle, said the now flourishing bank industry had better watch for risks as well as find new high-tech ways to market services. Many banks ''are reaching for loans today,'' he said. ''When the going gets tough, the tough get out of the way and let someone else do the dying,'' he said. ''We used to say as regulators, 'When the tide goes out you'll see who's swimming without a bathing suit.' Those of you who feel the tide better look down.'' News Release (NationsBank):Tuesday, October 8, 1996 NationsBank Official Partner of NCL's Internet Fraud Watch NationsBank (NYSE: NB) is joining the National Consumers League's battle to ensure the safety and security of online commerce. Through a $100,000 grant, NationsBank is becoming the exclusive bank sponsor of NCL's Internet Fraud Watch. Internet Fraud Watch, launched in February by the League and operated from its National Fraud Information Center, is a first-of-its-kind program for monitoring, reporting and preventing fraud on the Internet. NCL shares Internet Fraud Watch data with local, state, and federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general, as well as international law enforcement groups. "Internet Fraud Watch is a resource that consumers can use to get educated on the Internet," said NCL President Linda F. Golodner. "Since our launch in February, our Web site alone has received more than 300,000 visits from consumers and averaged 25,000 hits a week. We have helped consumers as well as law enforcement officials keep cyberfraud in check." The NationsBank grant will significantly expand the Internet Fraud Watch consumer education and protection programs, according to Golodner. With plans to offer Web-banking in mid-1997 and more than 120,000 customers already using its PC banking product, NationsBank ranks online security as a top priority, according to NationsBank President Ken Lewis. "NationsBank is happy to help NCL broaden its fraud education and prevention efforts," said Lewis. "The Internet's growing popularity and potential for commerce make it a vitally important avenue for American business. It's equally important that consumers know the Internet is a safe and secure place to do business." The Federal Trade Commission rigorously monitors the Internet. The FTC recently cracked down on a pyramid scheme it believed had bilked consumers of more than $6 million. It also took action against several firms that marketed business opportunities by using deceptive claims and false earnings reports. "Consumers who suspect a scam on the Internet have critical information that can be used by law enforcement agencies to track down and stop potential frauds before more consumers are victimized," said Jodie Bernstein, director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. "The Internet Fraud Watch program gives consumers an easy and cost-free way of providing this information, and it has been a major help to the FTC in identifying particular scams in their infancy." National Consumers League advisors field calls about alleged incidents of online fraud, direct callers to local resources and report the information to state and federal enforcement authorities. Enforcement agencies use the data to help shut down cybercrimes and boiler rooms. Work-at-home schemes are among the top-five scams currently operating online. (NCL Top Five Internet Scams will be available on Wednesday, Oct. 9.) Consumers can reach NCL's Internet Fraud Watch by phone through the National Fraud Information Center at (800) 867-7060, or visit the home page at http://www.fraud.org . They may also send e-mail messages to nfic(a)internetmci.com. Financial Times: Wednesday, October 9, 1996 Smartcard Trials Extended The race to replace notes and coins with electronic cash hots up this month as the Mondex consortium extends trials of its smartcards. The group, which includes British Telecom, Midland Bank and NatWest Bank, is issuing students at York and Exeter universities with the cards, which contain a microchip that can be loaded with electronic money from automatic teller machines and home telephones. The cards are "swiped" through retailers' tills to deduct payment for purchases. Users do not have to sign an authorisation slip as they do with direct debit and credit cards. Electronic money saves banks and retailers the considerable costs of handling physical cash. But so far consumers testing Mondex smartcards in the UK have not received a share of this saving. Mondex is well ahead of its main rival in the UK, VisaCash, whose backers include Barclays and Lloyds Bank. It could be a year before VisaCash starts its own trials; Mondex could be offering its cards to the public by then. Jonathan Guthrie AP Worldstream: Tuesday, October 8, 1996 Banker Sentenced to Death for Fraud HANOI, Vietnam-- A Vietnamese private bank executive has been sentenced to death after a court in southern Vietnam found him guilty of financial fraud and stealing funds from accounts, state-run media reported Tuesday. Nguyen Van Son, deputy general director of Gia Dinh Joint Stock Commercial Bank, will face a firing squad for his crimes, said the Communist Party newspaper Nhan Dan, or The People. Ho Chi Minh City's People's Court convicted Son of fraud linked to the private bank he and his wife, Thai Kim Lieng, established in 1992. The court said Son stole about $4.5 million from the bank's accounts. Unable to collect the necessary capital to qualify for a bank license, Son and his wife forged several documents claiming they had about $800,000 worth of funds from 17 shareholders, court records said. When the State Bank of Vietnam granted the couple a banking license in 1992, they began siphoning off money from newly opened savings and other accounts. At the time, the bank had more than $6.5 million worth of accounts, the newspaper said. The bank also had collected substantial gold reserves. Son continued to forge credit documents over several years to increase the bank's financial standing, the report said. A police investigation in 1994 led to the arrests of Son, his wife and five other bank associates. Lieng and bank director Nguyen Le Tue also stood trial with Son. Both were sentenced to life in prison. Four other bank executives were sent to prison for terms ranging from 3 to 20 years. Although a number of banking scandals have been reported in Vietnam since Hanoi began shifting toward a market economy. This latest case is the largest of its kind and marks the first time a bank executive has been sentenced to death for his crimes. Nhan Dan described Son's crimes as ''organized acts that cause extremely serious consequences and pose dangers to society.'' In addition to the death and prison sentences, the court ruled that the culprits must repay money taken from the bank. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: pgp, edi, s/mime
by Geoff Klein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: andrew_loewenstern(a)il.us.swissbank.com, raph(a)cs.berkeley.edu, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 11 15:08:58 1996 > Raph Levien writes: > > In sum, S/MIME leaves PGP in the dust, both techically and as > > a market force. Disagree: 1. Technical superiority of S/MIME over PGP is arguable. 2. It will be some time (if ever) before you will be able to communicate securely using S/MIME across US borders. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager http://www.commtouch.com, Tel: 972-9-963445 (ext 130), Fax: 972-9-961053 For my PGP public key send mail with subject: Get Key - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMl443ULv5OMYFK1FAQEWmQQAljOoIDcxoaOdOHWW9EurIsMsGt85Wmkn 65slX58eONq3LdkLY+NEEIG/bpIZIzcy0wQO7aWX2qQdJRYBSBSmHzDxb4A07cJM AN3c5q3pRZzB27iKJHlsPtoauvRE+O0LAwTRz+0zhNfAwsDcvttfYXTE8AycwtoY DCuPGrR1s6g= =/otj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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