December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Sports Statistics to Be Regulated Under WIPO Treaty (fwd)
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was my response to the excellent Telecom Regulation posting by Mr. Love. [snip] >If the treaty is approved and implemented, sports leagues >will have far broader powers to dictate the terms and conditions >under which sport statistics are reported and disseminated. >Nolan Ryan's Earned Run Average (ERA), the number of tackles or >quarterback sacks by Lawrence Taylor, Cal Ripken's career batting >average, Bobby Hull's career assists, the number of steals by >your favorite NBA point guard, and similar information will be >"owned" by sports leagues. According to the proposed treaty (and >legislation introduced in the 104th Congress to implement the >treaty), the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB will have the right to prevent >anyone from publishing these and other statistics without express >permission from the sports league. This will include the right >to control access to the historical archives of sports >statistics, and even to dictate who can publish the box scores >from a game or print a pitcher's ERA on the back of a baseball >card. [snip] > >The treaty seeks, for the first time, to permit firms to >"own" facts they gather, and to restrict and control the >redissemination of those facts. The new property right would lie >outside (and on top) of the copyright laws, and create an >entirely new and untested form of regulation that would radically >change the public's current rights to use and disseminate facts >and statistics. American University Law Professor Peter Jaszi >recently said the treaty represents "the end of the public >domain." > I couldn't be more pleased that sports and greedy corporations which are fixtures of American life are pushing for these draconian measures. I hope they pass with the strongest possible language and penalties and will support same. A broad section of the populace now takes this information for granted. They will be outraged their elected representatives pass measures which noticably limit their access to 'public domain' information which are part of their daily lives. This will serve to expose many of our elected as the special interest puppets they are and align the common citizen with the cypherpunks. This, in turn, will undermine confidence in our 'unrepresentative' government and its authority. Best of all it could lead to populist boomerang legislation which emasculates current copyright law and via widespread and flagrant 'civil disobedience' regarding copyright on the Net. I'm rubbing my hands in anticipation. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Lamarr Labs | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 7075 West Gowan Road | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Internet and Wireless Development Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne, Libertarian, for President. http://www.harrybrowne96.org

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Computer hacker tries to hire rapist: Police
by reagle＠rpcp.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure many people will be pleased with the term "computer hacker" to describe someone with an AOL account getting stung...(those insidious hackers will stop at nothing...) BOSTON (Reuter) - A Vermont man who used a computer online service to try to hire someone to rape and sexually mutilate his wife unknowingly employed a policeman for the job, the Massashusetts Attorney General's office said Thursday. Harold Clarkson, 50, was charged with two counts of hiring someone to commit kidnapping and sexual assault. He faces a maximum of 10 years in prison, police said. Clarkson, identifying himself on the America Online service as ``Trudy21'', a 21-year-old woman from North Carolina, said he wanted to hire someone to kipnap his sister, beat her with a baseball bat, rape her with a champagne bottle and commit other acts, a spokesman for Attorney General Scott Harshbarger said. Massachusetts State Police Lt. Andrew Palombo, who works for the Attorney General's Office and routinely investigates on-line services, was also logged onto America Online while off-duty. Palombo contacted America Online and discovered 'Trudy21' was Clarkson and the victim was his wife, police said. Palombo then posed as a woman on the online service and contacted Clarkson, who described a variety of sexual torture practices that he would like to perform on a woman, said Robert Sikellis, the Massachusetts attorney general's chief of special investigations. Palombo arranged for a woman undercover police officer to meet Clarkson in Rutland, Vermont, where he showed up with handcuffs, rope, a blindfold and other devices and was arrested Wednesday, he said.

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ENT_ice
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-11-96. WaPo Page One: "Preventing Terrorism: Where to Draw the Line? With Militias, U.S. Adopts Preemptive Strategy" This strategy requires aggressive and potentially controversial tactics as investigators infiltrate groups and bring charges on the basis of allegedly criminal plans that are conceived but not carried out. Federal agencies are more willing to launch investigations when people talk about committing violent acts, and investigators are more prone to use ordinary citizens as informants. According to legal experts, the mere discussion of a crime, no matter how fanciful it may be, can constitute a criminal conspiracy. "The classic example is that you are guilty of a crime if you conspire with someone else to stick pins in a voodoo doll in the belief that your enemy will fall dead," said Albert Alschuler, a law professor at the University of Chicago. ----- http://jya.com/entice.txt (13 kb) ENT_ice

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Re: Hello from the Brotherhood
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: darkened-node(a)geocities.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 11 12:20:44 1996 > Hello to everyone from the Brotherhood of Darkness > Oh, joy, just what we need..... How about if you folks go off and do your thing, and leave us to ours? Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoapqMVrTvyYOzAZAQFDSQQAoiPhXhSOSJR7nKcCrkiVhue1tIiI2q7n GLZlR5jaWZGV3ONJikWINt09mZqyaAZjuK3hbPqVNJnICOY8LtPYn0Z39oisxacO Kq+WHSavMRHstWqUm/sbknQOW24TINqi1NQs0Rn8nMrOTCYYxcugtmiLrSpgTNJa dt9DMKtOKAk= =AUie -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: mianigand(a)outlook.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 11 12:31:25 1996 > > My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: > > > > Is there any particular reason that such can't be > accomplished via > > on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using > standard > > (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? > > It's possible to have a key-server listen on a port and accept > requests, then it would > fork a process, process the result, and return an answer set. > > But how many CPU cycles would it take for a machine to process a > request, ie going through > 1000 of keys? I am not exactly sure, it took a long while on my > pentium. > > In my opinion, if I were to run a key server as a service, with > clients connecting and requesting a key > it shouldn't take more than a minute to get a responce. > Agreed - a proper search algorithm should yield an answer in a few seconds, at most. > > The things that come to mind are a 'client' request for a > key, a > > 'client' submission of a key, an external host requesting a key > exchange, > > and the host itself requesting a key exchange with another system > (only > > new/changed keys being swapped). > > Had the exact same idea, but came up with an interesting concept. When > a person submits a key, a PGP process is spawned yeilding the > following information 1.) The name (peponmc(a)cris.com) 2.) The real > name (Michael Peponis) 3.) The key size 4.) Creation date of the key > 5.) Key finger print > > This information, along with the acutal key would be inserted into a > SQL Database table > > With a structure similar to this ... <deletia> ... The reason I brought the idea up here was in the hope that others on the CP list could help work out the fussy details of the protocol: what info would need to be included for what types of exchanges, what port(s) would be good to work with, etc. Platform/implementation would be subject to considerable variation - but the idea would survive (hopefully :-) > > It's not that hard, it's performance that's more of an issue. The > beauty of my approch would be that initially, there would be alot of > "Add" requests, resulting in many PGP processes running on the box, > but eventually, they would tapper off. Again, implementation on any particular platform using any particular OS would be up to the afficionados of said platforms/OS's. I'm more interested in the CP list coming up with the protocol/standards. Dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoasIsVrTvyYOzAZAQEkTAP+JQtMdr5x+Wz4s6SXchgA4ow3+P9WLpzs JpjXRbNeHspJ2btlAe4pSgRqSp9oygqJ6Nxpa6DFOC4uB6sl3NaOw8tzcVVJm8GN +QsGP3KBoeTtRh1xE5yUsFoWmGWSqtDLLhu7bU34TaryLBU/Hvj2mOQXqwXhQlvE FhE5VETJJ2o= =LG7t -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:51 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: ... >In practice I suspect that good stego is hard. You don't have to be >right every time when you look for it, just some of the time. When >you see packets that seem kind of funny to you, the judge issues you >a warrant and you search the suspect's house and computer very carefully. >If stego is in use, the software that generated it can be found. Then >you hand out a life sentence. ... I have heard of trojan horses as being destructive little programs that are disguised as some other application. This is most certainly true. A scenario for you. The police gets that court order and they raid my house. They confiscate my files. They look over every piece of software. Alas, they find nothing, although there do seem to be some nice games. Unknown to them, when I run that little doom type game and come to the first switch, I press Ctrl, Alt 6 and I get a nice little stego routine that allows me to copy any file into any other file. They didn't find it because the program and associated files run for about 6 Kilobytes, All of the prompts are found in the game, ("Hint: enter your card key at the food processor for extra health." print characters 7 - 27), and the game isn't obviously designed for the manipulation of files, with the exception of those that come with the game. This would be a DESTRUCTIVE little trojan horse, even though it didn't destroy one file.

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Re: criminalizing crypto use
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:18 AM 11/8/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 04:43 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: > >>* Intent. It's hard to imagine someone being imprisoned for using >>cryptography, except perhaps in wartime conditions. I may be wrong. Also, >>there are deep Constitutional issues we haven't been much discussing. > >One change I suspect we'll see sooner or later on the Federal side is an >amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines to include an upward adjustment for >the use of encryption to frustrate law enforcement efforts. This wouldn't >be a conviction for using crypto, but would result in harsher penalties for >people convicted of other crimes where they happened to use crypto in a way >connected with the crime. (Keeping child porn or records of a forbidden >business on an encrypted disk volume, using PGPfone to conspire across long >distances, etc.) > >As an example, less than a year ago, Congress directed the Sentencing >Commission (a sub-branch of the federal Judiciary) to amend the guidelines >to enhance the penalties by at least two levels for using a computer to >advertise or "ship" a visual depiction of child porn. Pub. L. 104-71, Sec. >2 (12/23/95). > ... I myself have heard of people getting tougher sentences for monitoring police bands during the commission of a crime. It seems that using a scanner while committing a crime is itself a crime, at least around here.

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:02 AM 11/8/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: ... >You know, I've always wondered, how did the genie get in the bottle in the >first place. Someone must have coaxed him in there. ... Yes, they told him that it was for his own protection and that if he didn't do it, no one else would either. They told him that it wasn't nice, but it was far better than what he would be enduring if he stayed outside. Upon being released, however, he had the insight of the confinement. You can fool a being once easy enough, everyone has to learn somwhow. Its much harder to fool that being a second time, they know better. Like someone said, the government has to act now before the people know better.

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FW: Validating a program
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> My question is as >> >follows: If PGP and DES are as secure as thought to be, then why is it >> >not ruled illegal software, just as they do with silencers, narcotics, >> >certain type weapons, etc..... > >[snippo] > >> Why does it follow that these must be crackable, or the government would >> have outlawed them? Despite recent moves to limit encryption, there are >> currently NO domestic (U.S.) restrictions on crypto. Nothing prohibits >> you from using a true One Time Pad, which is mathematically proven to be >> unbreakable, now and forever, even against infinite resources. If this >> is not prohibited (and it isn't), doesn't that refute your argument? > >Dale Thorn replies: >This is a misleading challenge. There's a helluva difference between the OTP >and a >Public Key system. If, for example, it can be proven that I can crank up PGP >to its >most cryptic level, and send the OTP overseas with "absolute security", so >that I >can now send messages with the OTP which was crunched with PGP's highest >security, >then that would mean something. > >My point here is that Ed was asserting that PGP, DES, etc., must be >crackable, otherwise the U.S. government would have ruled them illegal >(domestically). I pointed out that one can legally own and use a true OTP >with impunity in the U.S., despite its unquestioned unbreakability. >Therefore, his argument falls. If it made sense, the USG would have AT LEAST >outlawed OTP's (which they most assuredly cannot break). > >Just so there's no misunderstanding: > >1. The OTP is absolutely unbreakable. (if done correctly) >2. The OTP encryption cannot be decoded on the other end unless you can >deliver the > OTP to the person on the other end by a secure means. >3. PGP, which is not usually used at its highest level of security (for all >bits in > a message), *will* be used at its highest level of security to send the >OTP to the > person on the other end. >4. The OTP arrives on the other end, completely safe from snooping. > >Now you see the problem. #4 above can't be assured, and that is why Ed says >that PGP >is not shut off "right now", because it's probably not "really secure". > >I'm not sure what you're claiming here, or what point it is intended to >demonstrate. No matter the strength of PGP, delivering a OTP in this fashion >would render it no longer a OTP. Besides, this scenario makes no sense. In >any case, there is no restriction I know of in sending encrypted data (or >even One Time Pads) to whomever you choose, by whatever means. (Granted, if >you send encrypted traffic to khadafi(a)libya.gov, or dispatch couriers with >briefcases handcuffed to their wrists, you might invite suspicion...) > >Could you clarify the point you're making above? > >I'm amused to think that, in a nation armed with 20,000 or so nukes, the >paranoid of >paranoid nation-states as it were, some of the erstwhile intelligent citizens >think >that the U.S. military are just sitting around wringing their hands over the >"fact" >that the citizens have "unbreakable" crypto. > >Bear in mind the Scientific American articles on Public Key crypto back in >the 1970's. >The military knew the score back then, and if you think they just sat back >and allowed >all this to happen, well, sorry, I don't believe in Santa Claus or the Easter >Bunny. > >Well, while the feds are no doubt powerful, they ARE subject to the same laws >of mathematics as the rest of us. While it is _possible_ they know much more >about factoring than the rest of the world, I find it unlikely that they are >advanced enough to factor 2000-bit numbers. (I can't prove it, just as I >can't prove they don't know how to make their agents invisible.) > >And they didn't just sit back and allow this information out -- witness >Bernstein, et. al., and all the continuing ITAR/GAK fallout. Of course, I >expect that some will claim this is just for appearance's sake, so as not to >make it obvious that they can actually read all our thoughts directly, using >technology they got from the Greys from Zeta Reticulon... > >Tunny >====================================================================== > James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny > Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 > tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C >====================================================================== > >

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DOUBLE the Reward for Errors in _Digital Cash_
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week, I offered $10 for the first person to report any technical errors in the first edition of my book, _Digital Cash_. I got many good suggestions for additional topics to add to the book, but not one mention of any errors. So I'm doubling the reward. $20 for the first person to report a technical error to me. The details and restrictions follow this message. I would also like to encourage people to continue to send suggestions. If you thought some topics were covered too lightly, let me know. This isn't a technical error, but I reserve the right to reward you anyways. Also, I hope that any company with new or improved products will write. One of the biggest problems I've found in researching the book is finding the right person to contact in a company. So I encourage you to volunteer. --Peter Wayner (pcw(a)access.digex.net) 1) The offer may withdrawn at any time. Check my web page for any changes. 2) The offer could be increased at any time, but it probably won't be. So don't push your luck waiting for more money. 3) My decision on the "first" person to send me a technical error is final. I may choose to reward both people if it is clear that they found the error independently. The limitation is necessary to keep people from telling their friend, "You want $20? Just send this email message to this guy." 4) My decision on what constitutes a technical error is also final. Errors in grammar or word choice are not rewarded. But you're free to write about them. It's not that I don't want to hear about them. I just think that the concept of "grammatical error" is so ill-defined that I don't want to get in arguments in that domain.

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