December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

test message
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is sent to cypherpunks-outgoing-ksiuw. Will it make it to the cypherpunks list?

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Re: One time pads and randomness?
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>[Blurb on OTPs ...] I realize this has a limited amount of >messages before it is used up. But would this be secure? >Any suggestions, complaints, big gapping holes I missed? TMK, this is as close to a perfectly secure system as can be achieved. *AS LONG AS* the disks/discs are never compromised and never reused. As an interesting sidenote, if you read Tom Clancy's "Sum of All Fears" this is the type of system the CIA wants to implement even though the NSA doesn't want to back them because they think their (compromised) sytem is secure. Don't we all wish... _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ "I thought your patience was infinte?" 'Since space and time are curved, the infinite sooner or later bends back upon itself and ends up where it began and so have I.'

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Re: Dr Vulis's crypto experiment (Re: IMDMP: SOURCE CODE RELEASE ANNOUNCEMENT)
by Casey Iverson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri is a low life piece of Russan shit who is trying to distroy this list because he has serious mental problems or he is a tool of the NSA. What part of his vicious personal and anomyous attacks against members of the list 'are not being read correctly'? What part of his calling everyone on this list that won't put up with his deliberate abuse, "fagots", 'are not being read correctly'? If you don't get it, you are a *really dumb fuck* or a KTOM tool. At 09:42 PM 1/16/97 GMT, you wrote: > >It's occured to me recently that Dimitri's posts are not being read >correctly, it is not the content which is the point, nor the >superficial lack of crypto relevance. > >Dimitri is an intelligent guy, and has a high level of crypto >expertise (he has a PhD on a cryptography topic). It is my belief >that his posts can only be understood in a "meta" sense -- he is >engaged in a highly complex cryptographic experiment. People who read >and respond to his individual posts are the unwitting subjects in his >experiments. His posts and the responses to them are actually the >data-set for a thorough cryptanalysis of mailing list threats. His >current topic under investigation is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks >on mailing lists. > >Denial of service on mailing lists is a complex business, and requires >expert human input to be done properly. > >Dimitri has systematically explored these types of posting behaviour: > >1. Posting only crypto relevant material. >2. Interspersing crypto relevant posts with hand personalised flame bait. >3. Interspersing crypto relevant posts with bot generated flame bait. >4. Interspersing crypto relevant posts with news stories. >5. Posting only non crypto relevant material. > >The alert reader will recall these phases of posting style (currently >we are in sub experiment 5, the other phases have occured over a >protracted period of intensive experimentation, and some newer readers >may have missed earlier phases). > >There were other experiments which may or may not have been part of >Dimitri's series of DoS experiments: > >6. Subscribing the list to itself (testing list resilience to recursion) > >7. Forging posts to carefully selected newsgroups with >"cypherpunks(a)toad.com" as the sender (this indirectly adds user >"cypherpunks(a)toad.com" to many direct marketing lists as direct >marketers make use of email addresses scanned from newsgroups). > >8. The "UNSCRIVE" and other spelling variations of "unsubscribe" epidemic, >and ensuing instructions and discussion > >9. Subscribing the list to other lists > >10. Bot generated flame bait posted anonymously (with ascii art) > >>From the post I am following up to the reader will observe an oblique >reference to the transition from phase 4 of the experiments to the >current phase, phase 5 (the reader will also note references to experimental >results c and d described below): > >Dimitri Vulis <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: >> One memorable "censorship" incident occurred when the lying cocksucker >> John Gilmore (spit) forcibly unsubscribed me from this list because he >> didn't like the contents of my submissions - or did you forget already? >> Look up Declan's disgraceful writeup on Netly News archives. >> >> At that time most valuable contributors to this list (such as myself) >> resolved not to contribute crypto-relevant content to a censored forum. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > >More widely read cypherpunks will know that Dimitri has performed >similar experiments in other fora -- his systematic experiments in >numerous USENET newsgroups resulted in the his receiving the >prestigious KOTM ("Kook Of The Month") award. > >His main experimental results to date with the cypherpunks mailing >list series of experiments have been: > >a) many cypherpunks publically announcing kill filing him > >b) numerous cypherpunks suggesting censoring him (a particularly >interesting result considering the libertarian leanings of many on >this list) > >c) the outstanding experimental result of being forcibly unsubscribed >from the list, and of being barred from resubscribing by John Gilmore. >(creator of alt.* USENET newsgroup hierarchy, and well know freespeech >advocate) > >d) another interesting, incidental experimental result was provided by >Declan McCullagh in his Netly News piece in prematurely, and entirely >unwittingly, publishing some of Dimitri's expermiental data-set. > >e) the main experimental result: the list shortly moving to a >moderated form, seemingly at the request of Sandy Sandfort, with >agreement from John Gilmore. > >These experimental results are quite significant, when taken in the >context of the anti-censorship, libertarian, pro-freespeech >environment of the cypherpunks mailing list. Dimitri should be >congratulated on his outstanding work. > >I await with interest the last phases of Dimitri's experiment, when >the cypherpunks list becomes a moderated forum. My suggestions for >interesting experiments during the moderated phase are: > >1. Testing the limits of Dale Thorn's anti-censorship sentiments (for >those who don't read Dale, he is subscribed to "cypherpunks-unedited" >in preparation for the moderation). > >2. Testing Sandy Sandforts rejection criteria. > >3. Testing Sandy Sandforts rejection rate for long crypto relevant >posts interspersed with irrelevant flame bait. > >4. Testing Sandy Sandforts rejection rate for posts with flame bait .sigs > >I hope Dimitri's selfless efforts in furthering understanding of DoS >attacks on mailing lists is properly acknowledged when he publishes >his findings on completion of his experiments. I also hope that >Dimitri will document his recommendations for mailing list >configuration and management in light of his experiments. > >Adam >-- >print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> >)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc` > >

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 20 Jan 97 6:47:59 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net +#+-*******# 4:38 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +++++-+++++ 1:34:36 99.95% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++++-++++++ 36:32 99.94% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *+ ********* 3:01 99.94% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net * +*++++*+** 35:08 99.88% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com * ++##*###*# 1:14 99.86% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----------- 2:02:21 99.86% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -++--+.--+- 3:01:52 99.74% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++ + ++ +++ 1:35:05 99.41% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++-++*+*+ 39:30 99.35% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ----------- 5:06:43 98.93% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +* .-####+# 2:24:43 98.64% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*+******* 15:38 98.25% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net + + -+-- 1:51:15 92.61% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++ -+ .-- 1:48:09 67.78% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .-++-+. 4:35:20 50.49% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Dedikend Cut's and such (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > Did a little research, Dedekind Cut's and such use Integers to define a > > SPECIFIC Real to a arbitrary BUT FIXED resolution. They do not define the > > set of Reals. > > They do. The set of all numbers representable by a DC is precisely > the set of reals. Then you are saying that using Dedekind Cut's it is possible to define the ENTIRE set of Reals? I am assuming that entire includes all those Reals which aren't representable by any algorithm and of which we can't even speak (even though we are). Another pretty nifty trick. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: [Math Noise] (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Infinity does not have a predecessor, so it makes no sense to > count back from it a finite number of steps. If infinity does not have predecessors (ie is immune to normal arithmetic operations) then it is not possible for a sequence to approach it by adding a finite amount to succesive terms in order to approach it. This means that a sequence can not meaningfuly be asymptotic with infinity (meaning I have to be able to draw a asymptote, at least in theory, in order to demonstrate the limit). > If one constructs the Ordinals, which are isomorphism classes of > well-ordered sets, and the Cardinals, which are equivalence > classes of equipotent sets, one will automatically end up with > all sorts of transfinite numbers. If infinity is not a number, how is it possible to have a definite number (ie transfinite) which is larger than it? My contention is that number theory as you present it is playing fast and loose with the concept of infinity not being a number or visa versa. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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RE: infinity & set membership
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The argument I supplied earlier for the rational nature of 0.1234... >still holds. >Math Man Aleph-Naught bottles of beer on the wall. Aleph-Naught bottles of beer. If some finite subset should happen to fall, There'll be Aleph-Naught bottles of beer on the wall. For those really long road trips, or when you choose to read all the cypherpunks traffic. James Q 1. Describe the history of the papacy from its origins to the present day, commenting specifically but not exclusively on its effects on the development of 14th century South America. Describe in detail. Be brief concise and specific. Give examples.

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Re: [Math Noise] (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > And I contend that ANY number which is Real can be expressed by the decimal > > expansion above. Which clearly qualifies as a formal system. > > To be a formal system of the type required, you would also have to > specify deterministic rules that could generate the "Ai" values. The > key distinction is between "expressed by" and "generated by". But we do have a formal system for generating those terms. Dedekind Cuts used to enumerate the value of an arbitrary length compared to the unit length.

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UNS_top
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

01-16-97. Reuters: "Unstoppable Internet will defy controls" Governments which seek to restrain the freedom of speech and tax the vast electronic commerce spawned by the Internet will almost certainly be wasting their time, experts say, and that any attempt to control traffic over the Internet will be futile. Governments in China, Burma and Singapore have already tried to discipline this on-line activity with minimal success. Dr Bob Glass of Sun Microsystems Inc said any attempt by governments to curtail any of this would be a waste of time. Not even the most powerful computers will be able to effectively patrol the world's telephone lines. Individual computer experts will always be one step ahead. "Big brother is out there trying to monitor this, but I don't think they're competent enough," he said. "Government is not really aware of the magnitude of money exchange on the web, but there's really not much they can do about it." Professor Patrick Purcell from London's Imperial College describes the Internet as a highly subversive phenomenom for international telecommunications, for a nation's state security and for international commerce. ----- UNS_top

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Re: infinity & set membership (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What could be the problem here? One problem might be that an integer > (not including infinity) divided by "infinity" should be 0. This ratio has one of 3 outcomes in my system depending on the rate of approach to infinity of the defining functions, oo/oo = 0 if the denominator grows faster than the numerator oo/oo = oo if the numerator grows faster than the denominator oo/oo = 1 if the two functions grow at equal rates Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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