December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Husband/Wife jailed f
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Published in Washington, D.C. July 9, 1996 > Insult to Clinton leads to 2 arrests > > ------------------------------------------------------ > By Ruth Larson > THE WASHINGTON TIMES > ------------------------------------------------------ In> I think you should try a more credible paper. Say, Scientology's In> Freedom Magazine, rather than the Moonies'. You are of course free to In> believe whatever you wish. In> -rich Lets see... I heard that on: * CNN * Local News * And on a Shortwave radio broadcast. They might not bat 1000, but even 500 is good. P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... RAM = Rarely Adequate Memory ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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NAV_ios
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

8-26-96, NYP: "A Netscape Bid For the Souls of New Machines." Markoff. Netscape plans on Monday to announce that it has created a software company that will enter an alliance with I.B.M., Oracle and four Japanese consumer electronics giants. The venture, called the Navio Corporation, intends to develop refined software for browsing the Internet and a new OS that Netscape hopes will become a standard means for controlling Internet access and basic operations for a broad range of consumer devices. The four Japanese companies in the alliance -- Sony, Nintendo, Sega and NEC -- are dominant in producing a variety of home entertainment devices, and the expected announcement, analysts said, suggested that the Internet, which until now has largely been a business and educational marketplace, would soon vastly broaden its scope. ----- http://jya.com/navios.txt (8 kb) NAV_ios

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No Subject
by Mike Howell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anybody know what I can get for generating the credit card numbers?

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. Last update: Mon 26 Aug 96 6:48:16 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ***-* 17:17 99.96% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +-++-+--++++ 2:27:19 99.95% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca *******.**** 1:14:34 99.94% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com ************ 15:42 99.93% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +-+- 2:27:26 99.62% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ...---..-- 21:06:37 99.58% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *++* ** 5:07 99.10% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com -- 1:34:56 99.02% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -------- -- 3:52:36 98.47% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu + +++++++-+ 52:43 96.86% winsock winsock(a)c2.org ..------ -- 12:52:32 95.16% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *******# *** 4:39 92.86% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net * - -*#*#* 37:17 83.96% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---- - 5:40:19 73.28% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Apology
by sclatter＠netscape.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

During my efforts to rectify a problem with our news server, I inadvertently remailed a number of messages to this list. I apologise for the disturbance this has caused, and will do my best to prevent a repeat of the error. Thank you, Sarah

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Re: Public vs Private (Was: Re: Violation or Protection?)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a very thoughtful essay. We need more of them. Though "I agree" messages are frowned upon, the fact is that most Cypherpunks messages understandably are messages critiquing or disagreeing with some part of another message...this is not too surprising. But sometimes it's useful to say "I agree." At 1:31 PM 8/26/96, Lou Poppler wrote: ... >As with anything, there are gray areas and boundary cases in real life >where this is not as clear-cut as in the private/public examples TCM >has provided us in the past. Let's look at a couple of fuzzy examples. ... >Another fuzzy gray area would be the common areas in shopping malls -- >the large corridors outside the stores, with fountains and park benches >and payphones and trees and public performance areas. These spaces ... >for trendy young people to want to gather. Various skirmishes are >occasionally fought over such questions as soliciting petition signatures >or giving out free printed information in these spaces. This is essentially a "squatter's rights" kind of "blurring," as I see it. (And I don't agree with the argument for the blurring.) The argument goes something like this: "I've been coming to this Mall for many years, and this is where the people I want to see my protest come. Therefore, I have earned a kind of squatter's right to enter your property and make my protest." The larger game-theoretic point is the one Lou notes later, that the players on all sides use the law to jockey for advantage--the merchant gets skateboarding and loitering banned on public streets, customers of private shopping malls get the courts to let them set up their protests on the property of others. (Needless to say, I don't sympathize with either example.) ... >This is true in perhaps more ways than those so far discussed. >The cause of liberty is broad: it embraces Mr. May's freedom to run his >hypothetical business by his own rules, dictating what his employees may >and may not do using his computers and firing them if he doesn't like >the color of their tie; it also embraces the freedom of surly youths >and old codgers to hang out somewhere, up to no particular good and >espousing unpopular or pig-headedly-wrong opinions, frightening horses >and small children. And just as one lobbying group is pushing for restrictions in public places of "loiterers" and "bums" (my town, Santa Cruz, passed a law which criminalized _sitting_ on public streets, even out of the flow of traffic), other lobbying groups are pushing for interfering with rights of employers to set dress codes, as but one example. A constant confusion of what "rights" really are. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Denning interview in Wired
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

don't recall anyone mentioning this-- Steven Levy did a lengthy piece on Dorothy Denning for the recent Wired. any reactions? I was personally struck at how Dorothy seems to lack strong convictions that hold up in the face of others. she wrote a paper urging that hackers be studied and worked with by the security community and then backed away from the position quickly after talking to "authorities". I was amazed that Dorothy, after a long time, has failed to confront some very basic issues in her advocation of Clipper: 1. constitutional issues. it would be ok for me if she described why she thinks that privacy is not constitutionally protected, but she fails to mention constitutionality issues in virtually any of her writings. frankly this strikes me as the utmost weasely evasion. is she aware of any court precedent on freedom of speech, freedom to speak in private etc? she never quotes any case law etc. 2. she fails to address the issue of "returns vs. cost" or "cost/benefit" ratio. her argument amounts to an extremely simplistic line, "law authorities have been stymied by crypto. therefore it should be restricted". but this reminds me of speed limit advocates saying, "55 saves lives". well, how many? 35 saves lives over 55. the key issue is that of *compromise*: what is the optimum compromise? we can catch more criminals by adding security cameras everywhere, but what are the costs? such back-and-white thinking has little place in any complex policy issue, yet unfortunately tends to dominate them. it's very bizarre to see an academic like Denning just seem to be vacuously oblivious to such simple concepts such as "tradeoffs". nothing I've read suggests she has ever addressed the issue of *compromise* in regard to catching criminals vs. protecting rights. but amazingly, people like Kallstrom seem to think the same way. paraphrased, "if even one criminal gets away because we didn't have enough funding in the FBI, we need more funding in the FBI" etc. 3. she fails to address the "big brother" issue. why is wiretapping never going to be used by "big brother"? it's inconceivable to me how she can honestly evade this issue as well. she has never addressed the issue of abuse by law authorities from what I can tell. 4. Denning seems to be to be remarkably swayed by "authority figures". she has changed her opinion before based merely on conversations with "authority figures" in the FBI and NSA. it seems maybe she has a bit of "spook envy" or something like that. many of her arguments for me essentially amount to, "people that claim to know what they are doing say we need [x], therefore we need [x]" well, I am not trying to start a new round of Denning-bashing (although that's always fun, hee, hee) but the recent article does give a little new food for thought about Denning's psychology etc. frankly I think that Denning has lost the intellectual battle because she absolutely fails to address some of the above key points. (particularly the total failure to address the constitution is getting more egregious). I suggest that anyone who wants to debunk her line of thinking (which apparently is getting to be awfully easy) just focus on any of the above areas. she apparently has no reponse to these points in anything I have read of hers.

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Re: NSA's Venona Intercepts
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:49 AM 8/26/96 -0600, Rick Smith wrote: >One question that I haven't found answered in my perusals of the site is a >definitive statement of the cryptographic technology used by the Soviets. I haven't revisited the site to check, but I distinctly remember a statement to the effect that the system was a one time pad system. However, due to a mistake somewhere in the chain, some of the one time pads were used twice. The resulting two time pad system gave NSA the wedge they needed to recover what they have. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Cave ab homine unius lebri | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | [Beware the man of one | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | book] - Anonymous Latin | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Spamming
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:38 PM 8/25/96 -0500, you wrote: >Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: > >What do cypherpunks think about the following practice or law (I realize >that it may be impossible to implement): each email message should carry >a little digicash check for, say, 20 cents. Mail reading programs should >reject (send back unread) all messages not carrying these digital >checks, unless the senders are in the "friends list". The MUAs should >ask users whether they want to "cash" the digital check or not. I'm all in favor of it. The POP3 client I write to cash those little digital droplets and tell the spammers that I *love* to get their ads, read each one for 45 seconds/page, scroll thru them lovingly, and reply to the specified address for much more information, has the potential to pay for my master's degree. Call it the SpamMonster(tm). ("Spam is for money, that's good enough for me") Therefore, in order to actually make their system work, they'd need to send out their own special mail readers. And I'd disassemble one and SpamMonster(tm) would continue to eat their spam, ad infinitum (pun not intended, but it works really, really well, n'est pa?) I do not believe it is possible to have a secure executable that exists on an uncontrolled user's machine. "Tamperproof" encryption chips still require communications in and out from the user's program. A determined attacker could continue to use the pieces of their code that talk to the encryption chip. Never underestimate the allure of "free money" when you're planning to give it away. >If they do cash the check, the digital bank notifies the senders, so >that they can adjust their behavior and would not send letters to such >individuals. > >The checks should expire very soon to prevent people cashing them later >when they are desperate for money. There can also be public notice >systems that store addresses of individuals who abuse the system (for >example, those who post questions to newsgroups and collect the digital >checks), so that people would not reply to such users in the future. Hmm. Reading ONE message from them puts me on a "Spammer's blacklist"? Without the e-cash incentive, sign me up! >Is there a potential for abuse in this system? Depends on your point of view :-) I certainly think it has potential! John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: Spamming (Good or Bad?)
by James C. Sewell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:47 AM 8/24/96 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote: > >No I have to dissagree. Who I send mail to or whom I receive mail from is >no-ones business. I for one have no intention of "signing up" or >"regestering" with any mail server. I most certainally want to be the one to >decide what mail I receive or do not receive, not someone elses idea of what >I should receive. Upon reflection I can say you are right, UNLESS we can put this "signup" thing on the end-user's machine so he can set it in his own privacy and no one else can pilfer it. The ultimate solution is AI mail clients, but that's too far off to wait for, I feel. Jim Sewell - jims(a)tansoft.com Tantalus Incorporated - Key West, FL

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