December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

SG Spy Ring
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Times, September 4, 1996, p. 4. Singapore looks to superhighway By James Kynge in Kuala Lumpur Singapore took another step toward its vision of becoming an "intelligent island" yesterday, announcing an initiative to link the city-state's main on-line networks. Mr Goh Chee Wee, Singapore's minister of state for communications, said the "internetwork hub" would link service providers of the Internet, government on-line networks, commercial networks and some others. Singapore's move follows an ambitious scheme announced by neighbour Malaysia last month to launch an "information superhighway" designed to attract the world's leading information technology companies to Kuala Lumpur. The perceived advantage in Singapore's initiative is that users will be able to access all networks using a single leased line, rather than the separate lines currently necessary. The hub will use a single set of national standards, meaning inter-operability between networks becomes easier. Mr Goh said the hub should be up and running by the end of the year. A mechanism to identify users electronically would be incorporated into the hub network next year, paving the way for secure operations such as payments, banking and confidential correspondence. The move is part of the Information Technology 2000 masterplan, a scheme which aims to accomplish the sometimes conflicting aims of exploiting the information superhighway to its full potential while continuing to insulate Singaporeans from undesired influences. From September 15, the city-state will implement its first big attempt to police cyberspace. From then all Internet providers must channel more than 120,000 subscribers on the island through "proxy servers" before they reach the net. These servers will check every Internet site a subscriber requests and block access to a about a dozen banned sites known to display pornography. The government has warned against material deemed politically subversive or inciting religious disharmony. [End]

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >so in a very real sense, anonymity in >the phone system was considered a "problem" by some that has been >"solved" or "modified" by some recent advancements. (yes, most people >agree caller ID is an advancement). Yes, and that is why some companies (e.g., Private Lines) offer anonymous out-bound calling services. > >I think cpunks should hold the view that communication is a matter >of mutual consent between sender and receiver. if a receiver says, >"I don't want any anonymous messages", then should be able to block them. >this is essentially what is happening with the remailers *right*now*, >if you ask any remailer operator. people ask not to receive anonymous >mail, and are put on the blocking lists. imho only the extremists are arguing, >and have always argued, that they should have some ability to put >an anonymous message in front of someone else against their will. > >this basic rule becomes more murky when you look at public forums, >because you can't really say whether given individuals reading them want to >hear something anonymous or not. by designing the forum beforehand >to force the situation, you solve this problem. > I find most unwanted communications objectionable, anonymous or not. How about billboards. Should the fact that I choose to be outside or on a roadway make my eye a target for ads? (If so, then why not consider having an e-mail account in a similar vein?) The fact that I can immediately, or later, identify the responsible party doesn't keep me from initially seeing the ad and taking my time. If I object, what are my alternatives? The last thing I want is monetary compensation. I want my time back. Failing this, I want the abusers time (sorta' like in Zardoz). >I do believe that in the future there will be all types of forums: those in >which identity is required, those in which it is optional, and those in >which it is always cloaked. this is eminently reasonable imho. >those who argue against one of the >above's existence (such as saying it involves a ghettoization >of anonymity, that there should always be an ability to be anonymous >in any communication setting) are extremists imho. "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man." --George Bernard Shaw PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: flimflamery on anonymity
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >(last line is sarcasm for the sarcasm impaired) >a cpunk position I have seen repeated often. it goes along a very >simplistic line of reasoning that I have seen TCM evoke repeatedly. >it rather annoys me. it goes like this: > >cyberspace is merely discussion between people. anonymity should >be allowed anywhere there are discussions (its a free speech issue). >therefore it should be possible everywhere in cyberspace. > >this idea lacks a lot of subtlety in thought and to my mind is >tremendously simplistic. [snip] > >cpunks will also argue that anonymity can suffice for any >business transaction. that may be so, but what about a business >that simply says, "we choose to require identity among our >customers, and you can go elsewhere if you disagree". These attitudes create business opportunities for others who would seek to serve those who prefer anonymity. [snip] > >cyberspace as a whole is *not* going to lead to a totlal motion >away from physical identity. in some ways physical identity will >be more strictly enforced in cyberspace, in "some regions". >there will be other regions of cyberspace in which "anything goes". > As long as attractive, anonymous, alternatives sufficient for those (of a 'cyherpunk' mind) seeking to communicate, transact commerce, etc. exist it won't matter to whether others choose to enforce stricter identity adherence. [snip] >of course in the cpunk mailing list, who cares if there are >anonymous/pseudonymous participants? [snip]... but far more is at stake >in the "real world" and the risks posed by anonymity will be >adequately diluted because of this. and it won't be by people >who are all "f***ing statists"-- it will be by reasonable people >such as those who head EFF, who are interested in a civilized >society. > As always the market and the street will decide. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: desubscribe
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> desubscribe I`m sorry I can`t allow that Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az4= =riHc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by Jon Lebkowsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:02 PM 9/3/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >At 03:17 PM 9/3/96 -0700, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >>>> Not necessarily. The character of the anonymous speech is decisive. If you >>>> use anonymity to cloak harassment, for instance, the anonymity (which >>>> removes accountability) is a problem. The accountability issue is real and >>>> should be addressed, not evaded. > >At 07:44 AM 9/3/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >>>No: The harassment is the problem, not the anonymity that makes it >>>possible. > >At 06:52 AM 9/4/96 -0500, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >>The harassment is one problem, the lack of accountability another. > >So: > >Lucky Green and Dark Unicorn are not accountable. This is a problem? > >Because it is a problem "We" need to do something about it, Looks like you didn't quite finish yer msg...what is it that "We" need to do about it? -- Jon Lebkowsky http://www.well.com/~jonl jonl(a)hotwired.com

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Intelligence Community Briefing
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My security clearence has long since expired. Anyone on the list plan to attend and report back :-) ------------------------------------ AFCEA The U.S. Intelligence Community: Who Does What, With What, For What? October 8, 9, 10, 1996 #### This course is Classified SECRET. ### Sponsored by The Community Management Staff. Location: AFCEA International Headquarters, Fairfax, Virginia The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to undergo substantial changes. This top-down course provides an up-to-date understanding of the structure and functions of the Intelligence Community and its components, the changing threats and challenges with which they must deal, as well as resources and processes used. The course addresses intelligence programs structure and provides insight into relations between intelligence producers and policy consumers, as well as useful information about the interaction between U.S. Intelligence and industry. WHO SHOULD ATTEND This course is suitable for industry managers, designers and producers of security and intelligence systems and products, including software and special purpose products. The up-to-date coverage of the changing intelligence community is equally suitable for intelligence officers and operatives proficient in their own services or specialties who have or expect to have responsibilities involving other agencies and services, overview functions or supervision of interfaces between various agency efforts. Past attendance has been divided about equally between persons from the government and from industry. COURSE OUTLINE: Intelligence, Practice and Issues Background of U.S. Intelligence Definitions of Intelligence Intelligence Process Relationships between Intelligence and Policy Systems Intelligence Issues Components and Coordination of the Intelligence Community Organization and Components of the U.S. Intelligence Community The Role of the DCI DCI Special Staffs and Multi-Agency Activity Centers The Community Management Executive Director and Staff The National Intelligence Council Intelligence Oversight and Management within the Executive Branch Civilian Intelligence Organizations Military Intelligence Components Coordination of Counterintelligence Intelligence Budget Structure NFIP TIARA JMIP The Central Intelligence Agency Structure and Functions of the Changing CIA Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Dissemination CIA Support to Military Intelligence Operations Military Intelligence OASDC3I Organization and Functions Structure and Functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency Support for OSD, JCS, and Operational Commands Military Services: Organization, Roles and Missions Impact and Trends Resulting from Changing World Situation and Operational Experiences Overhead Reconnaissance and Surveillance National Reconnaissance Office Defense Airborne Reconnaissance The National Security Agency and Central Security Service Role in the Community Specific Functions Services of Common Concern Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Organization and Functions Law Enforcement Intelligence Functions Counter-Intelligence Relationships with CIA and Other Components of the Intelligence Community Counternarcotics Intelligence and the Drug Enforcement Administration The Problem The Counternarcotics Community DCI Counternarcotics Center Operational Counternarcotics Intelligence Activities Imagery The Central Imagery Office Relationships with Other Parts of the Intelligence Community Support to Operational Commands Intelligence Support for Arms Control and Disarmament Arms Control Intelligence Staff Non-Proliferation Center On-Site Inspections Nuclear Intelligence and Role of Department of Energy Intelligence Community and the Congress Functions of the Oversight Committees Legislation Affecting the Intelligence Community Trends Intelligence and Industry Relationship Between Intelligence Components and the Private Sector Opportunities to Market Services and Products Control Mechanisms Business Strategies Intelligence Developments in Private Industry Internal Intelligence System Risk Analysis Course Coordinator COL John D. Sitterson, USA (Ret.), is now a consultant to AFCEA and industry. His military career included assignments in intelligence and international security affairs, as well as combat and commands with extensive C3I involvement. He headed the Department of National and International Security Studies at the Army War College. Colonel Sitterson served on a White House Task Force, in operations coordinating elements under NSA, on a Presidential-Congressional Commission, and as a military member of two blue ribbon study groups at the Council on Foreign Relations. As a civilian he served 20 years in defense-related government and industry positions, including 11 years with HRB-Singer (now HRB Systems). Lecturers: Mr. Peter C. Oleson has had extensive experience in intelligence related positions in the U.S. government and industry, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been adjunct professor of Resource Management at the Defense Intelligence College. He now heads his own consulting firm. Other lecturers will be authoritative representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency; Community Management Staff; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I); Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Intelligence Services of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office; the Central Imagery Office; Department of State (INR); Department of Energy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; Arms Control Intelligence Staff; Non-Proliferation Center and the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Register by submitting the following information to: AFCEA 4400 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax, Virginia 22033-3899 Phone: (703) 631-6135 FAX (703) 631 4693 email = aafceapdc(a)aol.com until 1 October and then pdc(a)afcea.org Course Name or Number: Intelligence Course/ 203N Date Course Convenes: 8 October 1996 STUDENT: Rank/Honorific: Service: First Name: MI: Last Name: Title/Position: Company/Organization: Division: Mail Stop/ Suite/ Office Symbol: Street Address: City: State: ZIP: Country Telephone: (area code) Fax: (area code) Please indicate method of payment intended: Mastercard/Visa/AMEX/Diners Club/ DD1556/Voucher All registrations will be acknowledged. The acknowledgement letter will contain information on location of the course, housing and transportation details. Fees: Government Personnel $700 Industry $950 ### A Classified Visit Request must be submitted by mail or fax before the student is permitted to attend the course. This request should be received at AFCEA at least the week before the class convenes. ------------------------- PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Reputations
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Regulation - which is based on force and fear - undermines the moral base of business dealings. It becomes cheaper to bribe a building inspector than to meet his standards of construction. A fly-by-night securities operator can quickly meet all the S.E.C. requirements, gain the inference of respectability, and proceed to fleece the public. In an unregulated economy, the operator would have had to spend a number of years in reputable dealings before he could earn a position of trust sufficient to induce a number of investors to place funds with him. Protection of the consumer by regulation is thus illusory." -- Alan Greenspan TCM, seems like a reputable source to support your views. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:47 AM 9/4/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 3:02 AM 9/4/96, James A. Donald wrote: >>At 10:33 PM 9/3/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>>>The Leahy crypto bill introduced early this year made (paraphrasing) "the >>>>use of encryption to thwart a law-enforcement investigation illegal." I >>>>immediately pointed out that while this wouldn't make _encrypted_ remailers >>>>illegal, per se, effectively it would because the moment an investigation >>>>(even a phony or trumped-up one) is started and is "thwarted" by the >>>>encryption used, the remailer operator became guilty of a crime. >... >>I believe that judges have a policy of interpreting deliberately >>ambiguous statutes in whatever way makes the most sense. The only >>sensible interpretation of Leahy's bill is that it criminalizes >>strong remailers, that it is intended to punish ANYONE, not just >>the criminals themselves, who obstructs investigations. > >As the recent discussion of knives, switchblades, and throwing stars >showed, such ambiguous laws are often used to keep the coloreds down. Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all remailers, not just the ones that have been "stung." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Browne and foreign tyrants
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "George D. Phillies" <phillies(a)WPI.EDU> >Subject: Re: Browne & foreign tyrants >There is a section of the Geneva Protocols forbidding actions in occupied >territories directed against officers of political parties. Under that >section, the actions in Somalia against, e.g., the treasurer of General >Aidid's political party, were war crimes. No one seems to get very upset. > >> If there is such a treaty, the US has a long history of ignoring it. >> >> 0) Attempts to kill Hitler. >I don't think we ever tried this. And this was a real shame. Over 30 million people died in WWII, directly or indirectly. We knew that Hitler was going to be a problem well before 1936. Think how many could have been saved... If anything, WWII is excellent proof that AP is a good idea. Stauffenberg was the German who bombed Hitler's meeting in 1944 but failed to kill him. Stauffenberg knew as early as 1942 that Hitler needed to be killed, and a recent "60 Minutes" episode related how hundreds of people knew about this plot. The reason he failed was that while he was preparing the two bombs in a bathroom, he was interrupted. (The bomb's delay mechamism was acid dissolving a metal.) Rather than being caught, he left one of the briefcases in the bathroom and went to the meeting with only one bomb. Furthermore, he left the bomb at the meeting, but it was pushed behind the heavy table after he left, which shielded Hitler from much of the force of the explosion. If AP (or at least, some anonymous reward mechanism for Stauffenberg's family) had been available, he would have done "the honorable thing," and walked up to Hitler with the bomb and instantly detonated it right there, resulting in both Hitler's and Stauffenberg's certain death. At least hundreds of thousands or perhaps over a million people would have SURVIVED. As it happened, Stauffenberg's reticence caused not only his death after torture, but also the deaths of well over a hundred coup-plotters, but also the thousands that were yet to die in the last 6+ months of WWII. Question: Would you kill yourself to save a million lives? Even if you wouldn't, would you change your mind if your heirs would be anonymously paid an extra $10 million dollars or so? I'd say that's a pretty substantial motivation, wouldn't you? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: rc2 export limits..
by Surya Koneru 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RC2 uses a effective key size, so is it ok to use a key of 128 bits size with a 40 bits effective key size for export. Thanx --Surya >---------- >From: Simon Spero[SMTP:ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu] >Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 8:33 PM >To: Surya Koneru >Cc: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' >Subject: Re: rc2 export limits.. > >It's the usual - if you want commercial jurisdiction, > 40 bits unescrowed > 64 bits (16 escrowed) > >Above that, you'll have to go through state on a per customer basis >(which I don't think is that easy to get if software is being shipped >outside the US, and is definitely going to be expensive.) > >Simon > > >--- >Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina >you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. >And after all | Email address remains unchanged >You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet......... >

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