December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Cure" for Crypto Anarchy?
by Edgar Swank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

INTERNET SUPPRESSION IN BURMA In an attack on the country's political dissidents, the military regime in Burma has outlawed the unauthorized possession of a computer with networking capability, and prison terms of 7 to 15 years in prison may be imposed on those who evade the law or who are found guilty of using a computer to send or receive information on such topics as state security, the economy and national culture. (Financial Times 5 Oct 96) ************************************************************ Edupage ... is what you've just finished reading. To subscribe to Edupage: send mail to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu with the message: subscribe edupage Charles Philipon (if your name is Charles Philipon; otherwise, substitute your own name). ... -- edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US (Edgar Swank) The Land of Garg BBS -- +1 408 378-5108

1 0

AW: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-esc
by Eric Verheul 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bert-Jaap Koops <E.J.Koops(a)kub.nl> writes on cpunks: >> We present an alternative that can give law-enforcement agencies >> access to session keys, without users having to deposit private >> keys. Unilateral fraud in this scheme is easily detectible. > >OK, so I can see how the `binding data' technique acheives a more >robust form of keys escrow of session keys, without handing over >private keys. (Your wording also implied to me that the problem would >not exist if private keys were handed over, but I think this is not >the case, if a warrant is required to get the private keys, the stated >presumtion is that no speculative decryptions will be tried). Also >the proposal (and other proposals which escrow session keys) doesn't >really provide any guarantees of protection from LE abuse, as such, >because they can decrypt all of the escrowed session keys with their >own private key No. In the scheme Law Enforcement (that is your LE, right?) agencies are never handed over the private keys of Trusted Retrieval Parties (TRPs), only the session keys. So for each sessionkey LEs will have to go to a TRP. Moreover, the choice of TRPs should be large, so the idea is that you can always pick one you trust. Or set up your own, for that matter... > [stuff deleted] >However, simpler approaches I think fulfill the requirements given the >(stated) voluntary nature of GAK. > >For instance, if you are using a hybrid RSA/symmetric key system with >the session key encrypted with RSA, you can encrypt the session key to >a second recipient also (PGP allows this much, Carl Ellison suggested >this for PGP, Bill Stewart recently also suggested the same). If the >recipient wishes to check that the sender is really escrowing the same >session key, this can be acheived by revealing to the primary >recipient the random padding of the second recipient's RSA encrypted >copy of the session key. The primary recipient can then repeat the >encryption, and check. (I proposed this on sci.crypt last year some >time, with an anti-GAK caveat :-). In our scheme any third party, which is probably never a TRP, can check equality of the sessionkeys send to the primary recipient (the TRP) and the second recipient (the real adressee), i.e. *without* needing secret information! In your suggestion checking can only be done with secret information (you need the secret key of the primary recipient). Also, "random padding" information of the second recipient is very secret as well, just compare the results Don Coppersmith presented on Eurocrypt97: if you know the enough padding you know it all. So for instance sending along the padding info along will make any key-escrow superflous (-; >As GAK is (stated to be) voluntary, surely the only person who has any >business knowing whether the message is honestly GAKked is the >recipient. After all you can double encrypt or not use GAK at your >option, so this seems to lose nothing for the GAKkers. > >The description of the paper also says nothing about trust worthiness >of the TTPs, from the public's perspective. As far as we are concerned, anybody - willing to follow regulating - can set up his own TRP. > (Not that I, >or anyone else would want to use GAK still, but it would be a gesture >of good will on the part of the GAKkers, and would show intentions not >to misuse the system. I suggest that they would never agree to such a >system because their stated aims are untrue: they *do* want to outlaw >non-escrowed encryption for domestic US traffic, and they *do* want to >decrypt without warrants, and without public audit. Export control >and temporarily `voluntary' GAK is a means, not an end.) Who is they, governments as a whole? If you simplify discussions in this way, I might as well say: "you guys only want to help criminals". I understand your fears, but don't exaggerate. Eric Verheul

2 1

Re: pgp, edi, s/mime
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>S/MIME has come a _long_ way. An earlier version (now called S/MIME 1.0, >although I'm not sure this is going to make it into any marketing >materials) had a couple of cryptographic problems compared with PGP. >Those problems have been fixed in version 2.0, which is expected shortly >(as an internet draft). > >S/MIME 2.0 _defaults_ to 168-bit triple-DES, unless you're stupid enough >to use the export version. RSA key sizes up to 2048 bits are supported, >as are a number of alternate symmetric algorithms. In addition, digital >signatures are based on 160-biy SHA1, rather than 128-bit MD5, which is >half broken anyway. > >In the meantime, Deming software is shipping a slick Windows >implementation of S/MIME, which integrates nicely with Eudora. Netscape >is expected to ship cross-platform S/MIME capability in version 4.0 of >Navigator (their original publicity materials were only off by a factor >of two ;-), and that will make a huge dent in the market. > >In sum, S/MIME leaves PGP in the dust, both techically and as a market >force. There's still a lot of sentiment that PGP is one of "ours" and >S/MIME is one of theirs, but at this point it's the latter that has the >most promise of bringing encrypted e-mail to the masses. > >If only X.509 weren't so darned ugly :-) > >Raph How will users be made confident that the S/MIME crypto isn't somehow compromised in these products? Vendor trust (I think not, with all the government pressures)? PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter-cultural technology development our specialty. Vote Libertarian. Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

3 2

------>FREE DEMO<---------
by dsmith＠prairienet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Greetings! > >This email is intended for persons that are interested in >electronic marketing and online business. Your email addresses was >selected because you were listed in the net abuse newsgroup as >someone who probably had their message deleted. If you are interested >in learning how you can market online in a way that the cyber-cops >can't stop you, read on. If you don't fall into this category please >excuse the intrusion and ignore this message. > >Within my targeted group electronic marketers and online businesses, I am >especially looking for individuals that are interested in marketing using >email. If you are in that group, you may be interested in a software >package I distribute called Email Works. If you'd like more information and >a FREE DEMO simply call our offices at: 609-933-0644 or 212-953-5234 > >Don't reply to the email address from which this came for more information. > >If you want to be placed on my remove list, reply to the address you >received this email from with the word remove in the subject line. > > >Thank you, >Lisa > > > > - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMl0YcyoZzwIn1bdtAQHniwGA2CJwO+2gzcDChrWWVgXPChpQEVoAfhpd l8Apav87Pv6aH6Hm8ZE+Vv46hifO+Giw =e8Sy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

RE: Swan song...
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excellent. Thank you - you do a great service to ...er, many. I hope to join you. ---------- From: Perry E. Metzger[SMTP:perry@piermont.com] Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 1996 8:01 PM To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Swan song... Well, folks, after four or five years here, I'm finally leaving. I've picked this moment for two reasons. First, the signal to noise ratio here is now too low to be measured without expensive lab equipment -- as bad as Usenet, or even worse.

1 0

Re: Missionaries (was: "Mormon Asshole?" re: GAK)
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Try signing your messages in the clear next time, since this sort of > message is a little awkward to read. Be patient man, if you start your PC on a factoring attack of his RSA modulus now you will be able to read the message in a few hundred billion years. Some people just can`t wait for anything can they ;-) Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

1 0

No Subject
by listprep＠rand.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0

RE: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:54 PM 10/9/96 -0700, blanc wrote: >From: Black Unicorn [in reply to Vlad the Conqueror] > >I understand that it's difficult for you to grasp how firmly entrenched >the concept of wiretapping is in law enforcement, courts and the >legislature, and that your novel new approach has been tried before. >.................................................................. > >This should help him understand it. I won't say who this quote is from, but he was a very respected French author: > "Both the English and the Americans have kept the law of precedents; that is to say, they still derive their opinions in legal matters and the judgements they should pronounce from the opinions and legal judgements of their fathers. [...] Unicorn's response was inadvertently hilarious. He says that wiretapping is "firmly entrenched" in law-enforcement, but the truth is that it was "firmly entrenched" long before it was even legal! Ironically he said it, despite the fact that wiretapping is comparatively rare. Perjury, "drop guns," faking and planting evidence, accepting bribes, strongarming suspects, and similar techniques are probably far more commonly used than wiretapping ever was, but I don't see Unicorn describing those as "firmly entrenched" even though that would be an accurate characterization. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

Why not PGP?
by rollo＠artvark.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a basic puzzlement about this whole war over strong crypto and key escrow. I admit to being relatively crypto unsavvy, but with a strong (but not avid) interest in the subject. Schneier sits on my bookshelf, and I have cracked it a few times, but the prospect of studying it seriously makes me feel slightly gut-sick. I use PGP to communicate (presumably) strong-cryptoed messages to my stepson Ray Hirschfeld in Amsterdam, and vice versa. He uses an internationational version of PGP, and I use the domestic version that I got from MIT. They seem to be compatible. I don't intend to submit my present or future private PGP keys for key escrow (Is that what's called GAK?). To protect myself against forgetting my private key (which has happened once already) I'll no doubt some day put it on a floppy and put the floppy in my bank safe deposit box. Two questions: 1. Does anyone think that legislation might be passed which would criminalize my communications with Ray? 2. Suppose someone writes a program Z that has no expicit crypto code in it, but has hooks for installing one or another version of PGP. Given a copy of Z, someone in this country could install PGP he got from MIT, whereas someone in Europe could install the international version. Would export of Z violate ITAR restrictions? Rollo Silver / Amygdala | e-mail: rollo(a)artvark.com 216M N. Pueblo Rd, #107 | Website: http://www.artvark.com/artvark/ Taos, NM 87571 USA | Voice: 505-751-9601; FAX: 505-751-7507

3 2

Re: AW: Binding cryptography - a fraud!
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:05 AM 10/10/96 +-100, Eric Verheul wrote: >>I am at the same time dismayed and disgusted at the tendency of some >people >>to want to "detect fraud" on the part of ordinary citizens, as this paper >>appears to want to do, but says _nothing_ about preventing fraud >>_by_government. How is the average citizen to know if keys are being >given >>out to government agents for valid reasons? > >First of all, that (and the legitimacy of "wiretaps" in general) is >something that should >be regulated in national law (including procedures, checks and balances, >penalities). Procedures which aren't followed. Checks and balances which don't. Penalties which aren't enforced, etc. That sort of thing? Why not spend your time working on a system to enforce the law...AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT! > Maybe >you have the opinion that that is impossible to achieve, [or at least that >making wiretapping >as such by government impossible is the only satisfactory way of doing it >(-; ]. Currently that's the best way, and it may turn out to be the only way. >Our concept >assumes that it is possible and acceptable, although legislation (and >especially appliance of >it) in some countries might be improved.. But it won't be, and you know that. And if anything, the system you've described seems to be intended to allow governemnts to become even more restrictive. Currently, one of the problems facing government is that even if they want to illegalize non-escrowed encryption, they can't easily do it because escrowed encryption would be faked, or super-encrypted or... Give them a tool to figure out who'se using "espionage-enabled" encryption, and you've practically invited them to illegalize all other forms. Is that really a step forward? Or a few giant steps backwards? I think it's the latter. Why strengthen their hand? Why help them tyrannize us? > >Second, the concept is flexible in the choice of Trusted Retrieval Parties; >we have the opinion >that if you don't trust the existing TRPs then, hey, setup your own TRP. We >believe that should be possible (and forsee serveral "privacy-protecting" >organisations doing so). However, as you don't >want to have criminals setting up TRPs, some legislation on this point >should be made... What about a "TRP" operated by an organization which says, in effect, that they don't believe that wiretapping is constitutional, so until it's proven to their satisfaction they're going to refuse all requests for keys? They're not "criminals", right? But if legislation forces them to do what they consider the wrong thing, just how "wrong" does it need to get before they can refuse? In addition, I object to the concept of wiretapping without informing those tapped. Part of these "escrowed-encryption"/GAK proposals is usually a statement that keys will be released to the government without informing those targeted. If this system is truly "voluntary" why can't I insist on being informed? >Finally, as said in the announcement: >"In [VKT], we explain how we envision the framework in which the binding >concept could present a security tool in the information society." Thumbscrews could also be considered "a security tool." Right?!? >>I am further enraged by the last portion of the paragraph above where he >>says, "fraud can be properly discouraged _and_punished_" Why "punished"? >>Why call it "fraud"? Why should sending the "wrong" bits become a crime? >>The US government, for example, has repeatedly claimed that key-escrow >>systems should be "voluntary." Presumably, except for authoritarian and >>totalitarian countries, no other country should force their own citizens >or >>others to use any sort of key-escrow/GAK system. > >Wait a minute. It is a *voluntary* system, but it has some rules that >apply. The whole >idea here is: if you don't like it, use your own system. "Fraude" refers to >using the >system without sticking to its rules, maybe fraude has a wrong connotation. Well, you'd better be careful about your terms. But the term "voluntary" is really far more troublesome at this point than "fraud." "Voluntary" implies no coercion, but when the US government enforces laws against encryption exports UNLESS a company agrees to develop GAK'd systems, how "voluntary" is that, really? I'd say that the system isn't intended to be "voluntary" at all, but it's intended to look that way, sorta, in a somewhat darkened room if you squint real hard. It's the "1984" version of "voluntary", right? >>Maybe I'm biased: I'm a libertarian who believes that sending the wrong >>bits shouldn't be considered a crime. The problem we have is with the >Depends, it might be childrens pornography. The information society is >*not* about bits, but about information. Under the circumstances, I can't support ANY such prohibitions. All of the "usual suspects" are being dragged out just to be able to support GAK. The real goal is tyranny, not the elimination of "drug smuggling, terrorism, organized crime, child pornography, etc." >>politicians, NOT primarily the criminals. Giving the government the >ability >>to punish people merely for sending the wrong bits (absent some other, >REAL >>crime) is an enormous step backward. And if they're guilty of a real >crime, >>why bother about the bits? >In a democratic country one needs evidence to convict someone. Wishful thinking, I see. You also need a crime, right? Well, make the use of non-GAK'ed encryption a crime, and there you have a crime! Make it easy to detect use of non-GAK'd encryption (as you are doing) and you've send us all down a short road to an authoritarian or even a totalitarian government. >>Even if I believed in GAK, which I don't, I don't think governments or >>anyone else should be able to determine whether the "correct" code is >>included with the data until and unless the government has a valid >warrant, >Code is checked (on protocol compliance) by third parties all the time. >They >should not get any wiser from it, that is the point No, the government's ability to verify GAK'd software without the decrypt key allows them to focus their harassment/enforcement on those who choose to be different and not fit in. Ask your parents or grandparents about yellow stars and pink triangles, if you have any doubts that governments want their primary targets to be easily identifiable. I believe that the government should absolutely NOT have the ability to know who is using "GAK-ok" software. If they get what they believe is the key and it doesn't work, they'll know soon enough. They're no worse off than they were before, are they? The only think your invention is going to do is to help the government ban good encryption. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0