December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Crypto Bounties: Another Thought that crossed my mind.
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes gave a two-part presentation at DEFCON IV, which he has subsequently polished up, that addresses: 1. ways to implement a Universal Priacy System that enables simple and anonymous data hiding using the existing Net facilites, and 2. a system of intellectual property distribution and funding which is based more closely on models used in Hollywood (e.g., completion bonds). Eric, what's the status of your proposal? -- Steve >Here we go again: > > There are is a lot of software that we would all like to see >developed and deployed right? > > There are a lot of people out there who write code, sometimes >even freely redistributable code, but they have to eat, and get their >net access right? > > Well, I was thinking, what if a "Crypto Software Bounty Server" >were set up, so that someone could propose a tool that they would like >to see, along with an initial bounty. Others could contribute toward that >bounty (anonymously if they wish) until either the tool was delivered. > > The original issuer sets standards for the software (i.e. "easy to >use interface to mixmaster remailers for Macintosh", then must define >easy to use; Software considered delivered when in [alpha beta late-beta >&etc.]). The first to present software meeting these qualifications gets >the bounty, with the caviate that the software must be either gnu-copylefted, >or some similar "free use" copyright, after all, "The Net" paid for it... > > Some of the problems (and potential solutions) I can think of in this: > > 1) Refusing to honor the contract--Maybe when a project is proposed, > some other people (for a small percentage of the total) sign on > as judges. When they feel that it reached the stated goal, then > it is done. -Or- Money put up is non-refundable, and the bounty > stays in the "bank" until claimed. > > 2) If the money stays in the bank until claimed, people might not > put up that much (or enough) to make a specific project worthwile-- > > This could be solved by allowing the "bounty" to lapse in one > of 3 ways: > > A) <x> length of time after the initial proposal (bad because > i) someone could already be working on it; ii) bad because > other people might add to the bounty, so a potential programmer > might not start until the "pot" has grown to a certain level. > > B) <x> length of time after the last addition to the bounty, > bad for both i & ii above. > > These can both be gotten around (and other problems) by allowing > programmers to "register" with the service that they are working > on a project (either anonymous registery, so that people will > still contribute to the project, or list those registered so > that people know [if who] someone is working on it) > > 3) Funding: The server (in both the machine and the organizational sense) > could be funded by: > > A) Interest on the money accumulated. > > B) A percentage of the bounty (say 10%) > > C) Both A & B. > >Has anything like this been proposed before? I know that the FSF (IIRC) accepts >contributions, but I am thinking of something more targeted, more "market >driven" if you will. > >This could be expanded to non-crypto software as well, just think, if half >the X Window users ponied up $5 a peice for a "good, easy to use non-motif >word processor", how long do you think it would take for someone to start >coding a MS Word killer? > >Comments? > > >Petro, Christopher C. >petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> >snow(a)smoke.suba.com

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Strong Encryption for International Versions of Netscape
by Scott Weisman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: November 17, 1996 ANNOUNCING STRONG ENCRYPTION FOR INTERNATIONAL VERSIONS OF NETSCAPE JERUSALEM, Israel -- SecureScape Technologies announces the alpha release of its first product, SecureScape. This revolutionary program offers international users of Netscape Navigator the same strong encryption as that enjoyed by users in North America. All software encryption products developed in the United States are subject to export restrictions. Such exported software is subject to an arbitrary 40-bit key length, compared to the 128-bit (or greater) key length commonly found in domestic software. This weakened software is in certain ways inferior to no encryption at all, since it gives users a false sense of security. The Executive Order by President Clinton on November 15, which modifies U.S. Government policy on export restrictions, still requires requests for export permits to be considered on a case by case basis. Furthermore, it is very likely that strong encryption products will be granted export permits conditional on key-escrow or other compromise arrangements, because the Executive Order states, "the export of encryption software . . . must be controlled . . . such software shall not be considered or treated as 'technology'." Implying that encryption software is still considered a form of munitions. The irony, of course, is that strong encryption has been widely and easily available outside of the U.S. for years. SecureScape was developed using the freely available SSLeay library, developed by Eric Young of Australia. SecureScape Technologies was founded by Scott Weisman, a software developer residing in Jerusalem, to develop and market Internet security products. The company is seeking investors interested in a strategic partnership. The SecureScape home page is located at <http://www.SecureScape.com/secscape/>. SecureScape currently works with Netscape versions 1.1 or later on the Windows 95 and Windows NT platforms. CONTACT: Scott Weisman P.O.B. 31194 Jerusalem 91311 ISRAEL sweisman(a)SecureScape.com © 1996 Scott Weisman - All Rights Reserved. Netscape and Netscape Navigator are trademarks of Netscape Communications Corporation. Microsoft, Windows, and Windows NT are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. SecureScape uses software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)mincom.oz.au)

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Unsubscriving Briefly
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm unsubscriving from the list for a few days (weeks?) until the noise level drops down a bit. I'll check it periodically on the Web and I'm pretty sure that if something happens that shakes the world of cryptography to its very foundations, someone will probably send me some email about it. Please continue to party while I am away. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Please take me off the list
by Tom Van de Wiele 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sir Please take me off the list. Thanks Tom Van de Wiele -- tomvdw(a)glo.be

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Re: [NOISE] aga isn't on cypherpunks... (and I'm glad)
by Sven 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> I have a suggestion... How 'bout if everybody on this list dropped >> a procmail configuration that mailed aga(a)dhp.com and postmaster(a)dhp.com >> a copy of every message that originated from aga(a)dhp.com? Do you think >> he would start to "get it" then? Why are these people so uptight? Sven MOSER016.JPG |__ |--> SVEN: a.k.a. Chris Blanc Internet consulting/Web design [ http://www.loop.com/~sven/ ] Some only sample the dark wine of life's blood...

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Re: MSIE 128 Bit
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM (dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com) wrote: : Steve Shelby <sshelby(a)feist.com> writes: : > : > Microsoft has a 128 bit version of their Explorer available. : > : > You have to jump through a few hoops, but they have it. : How about maiking available on a European mirror site with no questions asked? ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/incoming/0-microsoft/ has one 128 bit version. -- Alex de Joode http://www.replay.com/people/adejoode I have a linux emulator for Win95: it's called "loadlin" ... *g*

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RE: The Utility of Privacy
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Hal Finney You suggest that the main motivation which someone might have for protecting privacy is that they are engaged in some illicit activities: page 45: "Why should I really care if someone sees this? I have nothing to hide." ..................................................... This statement from David Brin impressed me with the consistency of a certain way of thinking that some people have: "I think that having a minimum standard of living is good, therefore everyone should be coerced to contribute to the general welfare." On the other hand, "I myself have nothing to hide, therefore no one should be concerned (read: permitted) to do so." The issue for them in regard of what everyone should/should not do, is whether anything is logical as far as they themselves can see - and the logic revolves around what they themselves think is right; the extent of their own vision is considered sufficient to determine the parameters of everyone else's life & actions, and therefore sufficient cause to have their measures imposed over all. But this letter of Hal's brought up an important point: that even if a person has nothing to hide, it is not the openness or closedness of information which is of concern, but the *responses of others* to that information. When an individual wants to live a free & open life, they expose themselves to dangers. In order to be free to roam, they must have a way to protect themselve from all manner of destructive influences - the weather, predatory animals, vicious strangers, etc. There must be a way to protect what is one's own in order to preserve it. If it was easier for everyone to defend themselves against attacks on their person or reputation, maybe there would not be as much concern about privacy. Perhaps if a person could "get away" from others, could continue to have a normal life without too much disruption, once some exciting bit of info was out in public, if they could maintain command over the effects upon their life despite living in a fishbowl, then no one would worry quite as much (although the principle of personal control over one's property remains the same). But in the meantime, we have but few ways to protect ourselves under the centralized arrangement for protection (police, defense agencies). Anyone in a government position is aware of how their public expressions can result in public outcries against them; the secret agencies protect their information files because of what "the enemy" would *do* if they found out about these - even if the agency itself does not consider its activities immoral. If Information is like munition, privacy is like defense - it is a form of self defense. .. Blanc

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:39 PM 11/17/1996, Simon Spero wrote: >On Fri, 15 Nov 1996, Rich Graves wrote: >>Peter Hendrickson wrote: >>> There are times when one wishes to speak anonymously, yet speak >>> as a member of a group. >> You either need to trust a shared server to know and then blind your >> identity, or trust the people with whom you share a secret key not to >> give that key to non-group members. > Why not use blinding for obtaining the certificate? > Create a number up public/private key pairs, blind them, then do the > cut-and-choose thing with the security officer. He signs the blinded key, > then returns it. Unblind the remaining pubic key, and you've got a public > key with the appropriate signature on it. Okay, this would work. But, it requires that all (or at least many) of the Members of Parliament cooperate. If not, then the security officer will be able to make very good guesses about who is speaking. Parliamentarians may not cooperate for a variety of reasons. They may not wish to be attacked by terrorists for the words of others. They may believe that cowardice is not to be encouraged. They may not believe in anonymity. It might be too hard for them. What I would like to see is a method which relies only on published public keys and no other cooperation from the people who are (more or less) being used as shields. This may be impossible. (A number of people have posted references to other ways of doing this. I have yet to track down the references they gave so I don't know if any of them fit the bill.) Peter

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Re: Computer CPU chips with built-in crypto?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> > I'm not sure if I can answer this but, at last week's SF cypherpunks > meeting, an Intel engineer asked whether there might be any interest > in a computer chip with some sort of encryption mechanism built > into the chip. As I understand it, this chip would process an > encrypted instruction stream. I.e., it could not execute a program > unless the "key" for that program was first loaded into the chip. > > An interesting idea: does anyone have more information? This sounds like something which might be used in a set-top-box or "information appliance" application where pay-per-use programs would be loaded from a CDROM or network connection. People have been dreaming about pay per use software for many years. It is a similar idea to the "mini application" concept which would replace the monolithic super-apps, the Microsoft Words and the giant do-everything web-browsers/newsreaders/mail-clients, with small, single function utilities. This is part of the idea behind Apple's OpenDoc and Microsoft's OLE. In the same way, instead of buying a big program for hundreds of dollars, you'd just download and use the functionality you needed for a small fee. Yet in practice it is not clear whether either of these trends will have any market success. Monolithic applications seem to be doing very well, with more integration being the trend, not less. And the whole idea of introducing metering to a market which is used to paying just once for access is one which is bound to meet resistance. Look at AOL which is going to single-charge unlimited access to the net. So in both cases the trend looks to be going in the opposite direction. Another possible application for the built in encryption is software piracy protection. You'd unlock software for your CPU but it would not run on anybody else's without a different key code. Here again there is not much benefit to the end user, unless software prices come down dramatically when this device is used. But otherwise the computer manufacturers are selling computers which have features which will limit the powers of the buyers, and having to sell them more expensively to boot because of the special chip. In these days of razor thin profit margins in the PC business it is hard to see how this will sell. Hal

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[NOISE] Want to know about this "aga" character? Read the Grubor FAQ!
by Alan Bostick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case you aren't clued in enough to know, "aga(a)dhp.com" is none other than John Grubor, well-known Usenet Kook Of The Month winner for November, 1995. He *cannot* be reasoned with. Don't even try. He makes Dimitri Vulis appear sane, calm, and rational. Read the Grubor FAQ, http://kendaco.telebyte.com/dharland/Grubor.FAQ.html for more details. Alan "pseudonum of the LYING FORGER PETER VOROBIEFF!!!!1!" Bostick -- Alan Bostick | You know those chemicals women have in them, | when they've got PMS? Well, men have those very mailto:abostick@netcom.com | same chemicals in them *all the time*. news:alt.grelb | Margaret Atwood, THE ROBBER BRIDE http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick

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