December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Op-Ed piece
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We all complain how the media are actively ignoring the crypto issues during the campaign. Here's a chance for us to quickly do something with some impact beyond our group. I'm looking insert an (1000-2000 word) op-ed piece or letter to the editor in my local Sunday paper presenting a non-technical, Libertarian/cypherpunk, view of the present crypto situation, our objections to the government's proposals, etc. Does anyone have a suggestion on where to find such an animal? I'd rather not spend the next day or two writing one. Perhaps we could coordinate a plan to have the same piece inserted next Sunday in various newspapers. -- Steve

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binding cryptography
by um＠c2.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

liberal (Japan) to non-liberal (France). We believe that "binding cryptography" is flexible enough to achieve this: a liberal crypto policy might use no Trusted Retrieval Parties at all, while a very non-liberal country might want one (government controlled) TRP, a compliance check on all network traffic and a ban on other crypto. I doubt that even French internet providers would want their routers to perform six modolo exponetiations and four modolo divisions whenever someone opens a secure socket... We offered a solution for the *first* task not for the *second*; the point is that criminals(!) do not gain any real advantage from using the system in that way as they - among other things - still face the key-management problem. The above dicussions are only relevant in countries where the use of crypto outside the structure would be prohibited. Of course, criminals do get real advantage from this system. They can use strong encryption for their messages and super-encrypt them using "binding" cryptography. So their illegal messages look perfectly inconnous as long as their government trusts in the "binding" property of this scheme. Only when the GAK key holder tries to decrypt a message, they notice that they cannot read it. Can you imagine that anyone would ever create a program that tries to look like a conforming implementation, but generates invalid "binding" data -- when it is so much easier to simply use PGP, and (if necessary) disguise that fact using the government-approved encryption software? I don't, so in my opinion the verification process is abolutely useless. One might say, binding cryptography, like several other cryptographic protocols, is a nice 'solution', but one with no corresponding 'problem' in the real world. :) It doesn't help in legitimate law enforcement, but it causes trouble to network operators and it deprives law-abiding citizens of their privacy. And criminals don't face "the key-management problem". In any GAK scheme, the official keys can be used to certify other un-escrowed encryption keys. Binding cryptography makes it just a little easier, because there is no need to create any "illegal" key pairs. Everyone can encrypt messages using the government-certified ElGamal keys, and then repeat that process, this time including the data required for goverment access. that use of other systems will always be possible. Also, the above discussions already showed that if such a system is voluntary, then there are lots of way to go around it. Criminals will always find ways around these systems -- even if they are mandatory. Just those who actually "have nothing to fear", will not go in the risk to use illegal encryption. So governments can wiretap law-abiding citizens, but not criminals. What useful is a system like that? -- one ring to rule them all, one ring to find them one ring to bring them all and in the darkness bind them in the land of mordor where the shadows lie.

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RE: RE: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:48 AM 10/13/96 +0000, everheul(a)mail.rijnhaave.nl wrote: >To explain the backround of "binding cryptography" once more; with >respect to (interoperable, worldwide) security in the information >society socities/governments have to achieve two tasks: 1. >stimulating the establishment of a security structure that protects >their citizens, but which does not aid criminals. I think this is a phony distinction. Practically every product sold today could arguably "aid criminals." It isn't possible to prevent this. And that's the problem with your thinking above: If government argued that it had the authority to regulate any product that, arguably, "aided criminals," then it would automatically be able to regulate anything. > 2. Coping with the >use of encryption by criminals outside of this framework. > >An inherent problem with these tasks is that different >socities/governments have different views on the matter. Given that item we just read about Burma illegalizing the non-authorized use of fax machines and modems, that is a vast understatement! > So to achieve >the first task you'll need a concept behind the security structure >that is flexible enough to incorporate *any* crypto policy, i.e. from >liberal (Japan) to non-liberal (France). Just a second! WHy should technology bow to government policy? Until now, the microcomputer industry has pretty much developed and sold products without much or any (?) regard for what governmental policy would desire. In fact, it isn't even clear that governments have had much opinion about the direction that the microcomputer markets should go. Why should we start adjusting business policies and product capabilities in a way which is hostile to customers, just because the government wants this? > We believe that "binding >cryptography" is flexible enough to achieve this: a liberal crypto >policy might use no Trusted Retrieval Parties at all, while a very >non-liberal country might want one (government controlled) TRP, a >compliance check on all network traffic and a ban on other crypto. Why not ___NOT___ help these guys out? Do they somehow deserve to be assisted in the subjugation of their people? Does the name "Zyklon B" ring a bell? >With binding cryptography the issue on a crypto policy becomes >non-technical and politically debatable: which features does a country >want and what implementation? I would much prefer a situation where freedom is provided and/or guaranteed by technology, and it is NOT debateable! See, one problem is that contrary you your implication above, where you said that crypto policy becomes "politically debateable" (which implies that the ordinary people of a country have some input) the _reality_ is that any such decision will be made by a tiny number of bureaucrats, if they can get away with it. The US Clipper proposal was a classic example of this: There was absolutely no public discussion or debate on it before it was announced, and it was obviously intended to be a fait accompli. Further, nearly all non-governmental people who are aware of the crypto issue disagree with the government's policies in this matter. Clearly, you cannot imply that crypto will REALLY be "politically debateable"! >> For this kind of application, binding cryptography is spot on. >Jim bell[SMTP:jimbell@pacifier.com] wrote: >> I think the biggest problem with allowing "anyone" to check the >> correctness of a key is that what is a technical possibility today, >> will become a legally-mandated requirement tomorrow. What if >> Internet backbone companies and/or ISP's were told that they had to >> implement software check these keys, and if they discovered an >> "incorrect" escrowed key, they were legally obligated to either >> refuse to forward that message, and/or forward a copy of that >> message to someone like Spooks(a)NSA.gov or Thugs(a)DOJ.gov. > >The information society is international by nature; we want to >securely communicate with Singapore. If Singapore, a democratic >country!, has such a crypto policy that they want the above control, >then so be it. Don't blame "binding cryptography" for making that >possible, but start a dialogue with your politicians on what features >of the proposal are acceptable in your country. No, I think I _will_ blame your infernal invention for trying to make limited communication possible! There's no doubt that the leadership of places like Singapore might want to restrict communication, but on the other hand they also want to be connected to the rest of the world for "non-political" speech. In effect, they are forced to make a choice. Most countries, except for a very highly authoritarian few, will probably opt for connectivity and this will lead to increased freedom for the people in their countries. _YOU_ are trying to give those governments connectivity while maintaining tyranny. Are you proud of what you're doing? > >Some countries seem to have the philosophy that "law-abiding" citizens >should have nothing to "hide" from their government, so should not use >encryption at all. I think that that is not acceptable. The concept >behind the third-party checking is that no "law-abiding" citizen >should have any problem that abuse - and only that - of a *voluntary* >system can be "seen" by many parties. I think the terms "voluntary" and "abuse" are contradictory in your statement. If the system is "voluntary," then it is presumably "voluntary" to use a non-conforming system, right? And unless the government's goal is to harass or imprison or fine the user for not using that "voluntary" system, there is no purpose in knowing whether a person's use of encryption meets that "voluntary" standard. >If and *how* checking is >done, is a matter of each society. The same concept holds for many >things in life and is well accepted. I see: "How each society decides to use our thumbscrews is totally voluntary and up to each country!" Pardon me while I puke. > For instance that is why cars >have registration plates: if a car drives through after an accident on >a *public* road, then by-standers (third parties) can observe that. I >for one don't the information society to be the wild west, where >anything goes. I'm much closer to "the wild west" than you are, and I like it just fine. I prefer it much better than the tyranny of stratified societies that have enslaved people for over a thousand years. >Of course, people are rightfully worried that such a checkable system >might be abused by a totalitarian regime to control their citizens. >However, as long as such a system is voluntary I see no problem. Maybe you need to remember that the way governments use it, the definition of the word "voluntary" tends to pick up a rather Orwellian meaning. Also, you need to remember that the difference between a "voluntary" and a mandatory system may be as little as a single law passed in the middle of the night by a legislature. A law which you are intending to make possible! > Signs >in the USA indicate (cf. the NRC study & remarks of the president) >that use of other systems will always be possible. You seem to have ignored by conjecture, where I pointed out that Internet backbones and ISP might, hypothetically, be required to check keys and report "violations" to the government on a moment-to-moment basis. Further, they might be prohibited from forwarding messages that do not conform. This gets us back to the definition of the world "voluntary," again. Even if such an eventuality should occur, the government could cynically say that use of non-conforming forms of encryption were still "voluntary," because it's true you could use them. But they wouldn't be very useful if they didn't propagate on the Internet, now would they? >Also, the above >discussions already showed that if such a system is voluntary, then >there are lots of way to go around it. Not if the cooperation of everyone else is coerced! And moreover, not if they are coerced into not dealing with anybody who doesn't go along. You must really hate freedom, huh? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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None
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The NOTS materials were just posted again to a.r.s. via > huge.cajones.com Thanks for telling me where to find the NOTs; I always wanted to read about how to rid myself of body thetans. Now I have been enlightened by Hubbard's words and you are guilty of contributory copyright infringement. (The SPA told me so :)

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Re: Fuck Cyberpromo
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:07 AM 10/13/96 CST, roy(a)scytale.com wrote: [snip] >Anyone on the list know of a good, heavy-handed collection agency that >would like to take this when it tops, say, $500? Why not just filter the shit? It's not like they're switching addresses or anything. All mail from that address just goes straight to my trash unread... Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: is there no end to AP & Creative Wiretap Arguments?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:47 AM 10/12/96 +0000, attila wrote: > after months of patient explanations to Jim Bell and > sympathizers, going over the same points in 31 flavours, > the same arguments of what I would call "respectable" anarchy > (well stated by Tim May) rather than the "world at war" anarchy of > Jim Bell -- where are we?!? > > I read Jim's first "manifesto" at least 18 months ago; and, the > "refined manifsto" less than a month ago. I have yet to see an > application of civilization which brings AP society up to even the > level of Tombstone AZ just prior to the OK Corral. Be careful about the Wild West analogies. Current theory is that contrary to what Hollywood cooked up for our movie-viewing pleasure, it was a rather peaceful place most of the time. If anything, the reason that certain incidents (OK Corral) were so memorable is that they were, likewise, rare. > > Jim's theories all hinge on betting pools which supposedly can > be run like the lottery where the poor can share a ticket > (egalitarian, of course), anonyminity (which as an argument is > appropriate, but what for in a selfish immoral act?), and a > justice is served attitude, even if there are mistakes. I would be far more worried about "mistakes" if I hadn't already thought through it, and concluded that abuse and misuse and errors would be strongly deterred by the very structure of the AP system. It will most easily attack who coerce the most people, for example politicians, bureaucrats, and some government employees in general, precisely because the cost will be shared among hundreds or thousands. It will also fairly easily get rid of "common criminals," since most people have been a victim of crime at some point in their lives and would be willing to pay to prevent this in the future. However, using AP to attack undeserving people will be difficult precisely because it would be rather expensive, since the cost will presumably not be shared. True, it isn't any kind of centralized coercive control, but it is a excellent form of control, somewhat analogous to the "invisible hand" concept of free markets. The problem is, it's difficult for some people to comprehend the kind of distributed-control that free markets represent. > the whole concept of AP does not even support the concept of > "justice is expeditiously served!" it is a resort to the manners > of dogs and monkeys sitting at the same table --a spiteful, > arrogant player can move the betting pools to assassinate anyone. There is a powerful limitation as to how much one individual can manipulate the system, as I've previously described... And besides, the problem you describe already exists: Gang-related murders are an example. AP would eliminate the gangs, at least to the extent that they are a threat to others. > In other words, are we planning to use James Caan as the lead > runner in "Roller Ball" --except this time we're playing with a > "live" society for which we hold in common the utmost contempt? > > are we trying to return to the bread and circus mentality of > Rome on its deathbed and slide to subjecation by Attila the Hun > who was actually stopped from sacking Rome after the Pope so > impressed him with his regal robes.... deciding tribute from an > established dictatorship was more reliable? --and less costly?!? > > has anyone seen a single social moral fiber in Jim's often > passionate arguments for AP, I'm afraid yours is a vastly distorted question. Let's go back to the beginning, shall we? I've claimed that AP will: 1. Eliminate war and militaries. 2. Eliminate government and taxes. 3. Eliminate dictatorships and political tyranny. 4. Drastically reduce crime and the costs of crime. Add all this up, and presume that I think it's a good thing (I do) and how can you claim that this is not "a single social moral fiber"? Sure, you could claim that AP won't do these things, or not all of them, or not very well. I happen to believe it will. Even if you're partly right, at most you have a challenge to my judgment, not my morality or sincerity. > or even in the "results" in a society > which will never breed another leader: religious, secular, or even > political? What, exactly, is wrong with a society without leaders? Do we NEED leaders? I understand that people have probably gotten so used to the concept of having leaders around that its hard to imagine the alternative, but you're going to have to do better than this to support the existence of leaders. > does AP permit anything except slaves and drones which can > just as easily be replaced by robots? maybe noone will miss news > reports (as 'canned' as they are), This may sound odd, but what is there wasn't any news to report? Maybe that's exaggerating things a bit, there will always be weather and the occasional accident and other events. But watch the news for a while, and notice what a large fraction of it is government-related, politics-related, war-related, coercion-related, etc. > or movies which entertain or provoke? It's unclear why you think AP will prevent this? > or ice cream sundaes at the soda fountain? likewise... > ...and the disappearance of grocers, and doctors, and dentists > bringing forth a new age of subsistence farming and hunting for > the lucky few who might live to a readjusted live expectancy point > of 30 yrs, burning books and computer printouts for cooking and > warmth. Is this line of argumentation a throwback to the "we've got to have a dictator! How else will society operate?" > > why have books or knowledge when there is noone willing to > accept the responsibility of educating your children, the instructor > waiting for the parent of Dumb Suzy to avenge her failing grade? If it's a private, non-coerced school, why should this happen? > sacrificing 55,000 men and frying the brains of another > 1.5 million solely to fatten the industrial war machine? using > John Foster Dulles' "domino theory" to justify the carnage... BTW, in an AP society Vietnam couldn't ever happen, for at least a dozen reasons. > to bad I was still of an era which said 'you will serve if called' > and so stupid to take almost six years to get out. Would you > serve a country today which is rotten to the core? No, I won't. But I will be happy to help eliminate that rot. > "Assassination Politics" is nothing more than a childish game > which 'legalizes' killing anyone you wish. are AP's proponents so > naive they believe the bookies will not have any public person > assassinated by rigging the pools for their own profit? remember, > law enforcement ceased with the return of 'law of the jungle' > anarchy. "Laws" will no longer be enforced, it's true. However, legitimate interests will be defended and intiation of force will be punished. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Blinded Identities [was Re: exporting signatures only/CAPI]
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:28 PM 10/13/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote: >It is unpublished, but he kindly allowed to me describe it in a paper I >wrote that discussed whether a bank would ever want to take the risk of >allowing bank accounts where it did not know the identity of the customer. Why should that be a problem? It's the customer's money, isn't it? It's not like the bank is making a loan. It's the customer who should be worried...about the bank's identity. Remember "plausible denial." Shouldn't we believe that if a bank cannot know its customer, likewise it isn't responsible for who that customer is? A bank's legitimate interests should not include acting as enforcer for the government, so any system that prevents this from happening is helpful. And I don't think that a bank can ever be embarrassed (assuming bank accounts are anonymous) by it being revealed that some particular bad guy kept his money there, any more than other cash-based (anonymous) businesses are embarrassed if it is revealed that some bad guy used their services. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [STEGO] Enigma
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[ocksucker] May is a phoney and a fraud.

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Re: -No Subject-
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why not just make flute or netscape your shell instead of program manager? (Shell= line in system.ini) Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: cypherpunks cc: From: kpieckie @ Harding.edu (Compton) @ smtp Date: 10/11/96 11:12:03 PM Subject: -No Subject- Due to the high volume of mail from this list, I rarely get to read every message that comes through here. Thus, I ask a reply be sent to kpieckie(a)harding.edu directly rather than through the list. Please forgive the interruption if this message is slightly off-topic. The library here at Harding University is attempting to set up some internet computers that run Netscape only and do not allow access to anything else on the computers. We use a scripting program called Flute that hides the Program Manager (WFW 3.11) and reloads Netscape when it is nuked with Alt-F4. Another program removes the ability to use any of the netscape pulldown menus less help. The problem is the keyboard. If a user hit's Alt-F4 after Progman has loaded but before the Flute script executes, Flute is terminated and the user has access to the computer. Are there any programs that will disable Alt-F4 and Control-Esc in Windows? Where can they be attained? Freeware is preferable, shareware is fine, trial period is required for commercial products. Thanks. Kevin kpieckie(a)harding.edu

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Re: BAY AREA CYPHERPUNKS SATURDAY 10/12 TRESSIDER HALL STANFORD
by Tom Lojewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How do I get off this list? >X-Sender: erchiu(a)diablo.cisco.com >Date: Fri, 11 Oct 1996 11:54:43 -0700 >To: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> >From: Eric Chiu <erchiu(a)cisco.com> >Subject: Re: BAY AREA CYPHERPUNKS SATURDAY 10/12 TRESSIDER HALL STANFORD >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >At 01:06 AM 10/11/96 -0700, you wrote: >>There will be a San Francisco Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday 10/12 >>at Stanford University. The meeting location will be the tables outside >>Tressider Hall, where we've met for several previous meetings. >>The canonical time is noon for lunch and milling around, and 1pm >>for organized program. > >Bill - > >What time is the meeting? >Eric Chiu >IS-Finance and Adminstration >Tel: 408-527-1665 >Pager: 415-424-7282 > > > --------------------------------------------------------- Tom Lojewski - ProNet Consulting - lojewski(a)earthlink.net

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