December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May asks: : Any other ideas on how the government plans to enforce GAK, to make GAK the : overwhelmingly-preferred solution? The problem seems somewhat analogous to the software copy protection problem and maybe the enfocement will be similar: make "examples" of a few high profile offenders who are exchanging blatantly un-GAKed traffic with foreigners. This assumes they fine tune the law to make such behavior illegal without having to prove you yourself exported the stuff to them. Wonder what the Supremes will say to that. But that's not the end of the story. If there is lots of GAK encrypted traffic flowing about, then encrypted traffic in general is no longer noteworthy. So as long as your traffic looks like GAK, you won't be hassled until they try to read your traffic. So it's possible that products will appear that use pseudo-GAK protocols -- they look just like their GAKed cousins but the GAK fields contain plausiable garbage instead of keys. It could even turn out to be a vendor "quality control" thing -- oops, the GAK was supposed to work but... You couldn't do that with Clipper (except via Matt Blaze's brute forcing of the LEAF checksum) because the crypto wouldn't decrypt a packet with an invalid LEAF checksum. Since it was a sealed hardware module, implementers had no choice but to play by those rules. There's no such enforcable limitation on commercial software implementations. Rick.

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new mailing list: solving spam problem
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

a new list dedicated to trying to solve the problem of spam just popped up, and may be of interest to some here-- ------- Forwarded Message Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 16:01:08 -0400 (EDT) From: Chris Rapier <rapier(a)psc.edu> To: ietf(a)IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US Subject: Anti-Spam BOF Mail List I've decided to take some initiative and set up a real mailing list for the discussion on spamming. I would like to see us take some sort of action at the next IETF and maybe get some rough ideas about what is and/or isn't possible in dealing with this problem. If you would like to join the mailing list send mail to majordomo(a)psc.edu with subscribe spam-list [prefered address] in the body. If you have any problems subscribing let me know. Also, this mailing list superceeds the one I set up and announced around an hour ago. Anyone who has alrteady sent requests to that mailing list will be added to this new one. Chris Rapier Senior Sysadmin/Cabin Boy 2nd Class Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center MI 230B ------- End of Forwarded Message

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White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 14:56:21 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late I just got back from the White House, where Gore's office held a roundtable plugging the administration's long-awaited and already widely-derided Return of Clipper proposal. Gore announced that jurisdiction over crypto exports would move to the Commerce Dept; that the export embargo on 56-bit DES would be lifted in part for two years only; that to be approved for export firms must submit a detailed proposal describing how they will move towards key escrow; that the new regulations would go into effect on January 1. The true problem with this plan is that 56-bit DES is woefully inadequate. But much of the media coverage I've read of the plan doesn't even mention that. Take Elizabeth Corcoran's article, which ran above the fold on the front page in today's Washington Post. (It's what almost certainly prompted Gore's office to move the announcement to today rather than hold it later this week.) The thrust of the article is that the administration's new proposal balances the needs of privacy, business, and law enforcement. But it doesn't. The Feds, foreign governments, and determined attackers can crack anything encrypted with 56-bit DES -- the strongest crypto that can be exported under the plan. This vital fact appears nowhere in the Post article. That's why Bruce Schneier, author of Applied Cryptography, recommends against using DES in favor of a more secure algorithm. According to Schneier: "A brute-force DES-cracking machine [designed by Michael Wiener] that can find a key in an average of 3.5 hours cost only $1 million in 1993." More recently, in January 1996 an ad hoc group of renowned cryptographers including Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Ronald Rivest and Schneier, released a report going even further. They said: "To provide adequate protection against the most serious threats - well-funded commercial enterprises or government intelligence agencies - keys used to protect data today should be at least 75 bits long. To protect information adequately for the next 20 years in the face of expected advances in computing power, keys in newly-deployed systems should be at least 90 bits long." What's even more disturbing is what the administration might do next. After the roundtable broke up, I chatted with Michael Vadis, one of the assistant deputy attorneys general who oversees national security issues. He said an international consensus is forming that terrorists can use crypto; therefore crypto must be controlled. The U.S. is certainly pushing this line at the OECD talks. "But it just takes one country to decide to export strong crypto," I said. "You're missing something," said Vadis. "What?" I asked. "Unless you're talking about import restrictions." "Exactly," he said. -Declan ******* Some background: Linkname: Brock Meeks on White House plan -- 6 Sep 96 Filename: http://www.muckraker.com/muckraker/96/36/index4a.html ******** http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1996-10/01/041L-100196-idx.html U.S. TO EASE ENCRYPTION RESTRICTIONS Privacy Advocates Wary of Proposal For Software Exports By Elizabeth Corcoran Washington Post Staff Writer Tuesday, October 1 1996; Page A01 The Washington Post The Clinton administration is cutting off an emotional four-year-old debate with the computer industry over the export of information-scrambling technology with a plan that it says will help U.S. companies boost sales overseas and still allow law enforcement agencies to unscramble messages, officials said yesterday. President Clinton has decided to sign an executive order that changes the rules restricting the overseas sale of the technology, the officials said. Although the full details of the plan had yet to be revealed, privacy advocates and some industry executives contended that it would be difficult to put into practice. Under current rules, companies can sell only relatively easy-to-crack scrambling technology. Under the plan, they would get permission to export somewhat more sophisticated versions of the software and hardware, which prevents eavesdroppers from looking at information. The issue has caused enormous friction between the government and computer industry and privacy groups, which contend that keeping any restrictions in place will harm the protection of personal information everywhere and slow the development of on-line commerce, which relies on keeping credit card numbers and other sensitive information secure. The administration counters that it has come a long way in meeting such objections. However, last night some companies and privacy advocates were still worried that the constraints will leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage abroad and will not ensure that individuals will be able to protect their communications. The government's plan preserves what has been its unnegotiable cornerstone since the debate began in the early day of the Clinton administration -- that law enforcement officials must have the means for peeking at encrypted information when they are properly equipped with court authorization. Earlier versions of the plan tightly limited what kinds of technology could be sold abroad. They also called for makers of encryption technology to deposit "keys" with approved third parties so that law enforcement authorities could decode material. The new plan doesn't specify who would have the keys. Last night, several companies, led by International Business Machines Corp., said they have a technical plan that they believe could comply with the new rules on keys. [...] Industry officials say they ultimately want to be able to use the most sophisticated encryption technology available. "It's really critical to doing business around the world," said an IBM source. "But governments exist. It's a balancing act . . . to satisfy the needs of the governments and make sure that markets and individuals trust the integrity of what's being sent over the networks." [...]

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Re: Export laws don't just affect crypto
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:32 PM 10/1/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >Lucky Green writes: >> > Umm, so are you violating ITAR if you *use* these GPS-guided missiles >> >> No you aren't. A little known provision in the ITAR excempts exports >> by missile. Seriously. > >Well, not quite -- it exempts exports by space launch, but I think >thats intended for things like satelite launchings and not for things >like missile attacks against other countries... If ITAR exempts exports by missile, does that mean that we merely have to make a model rocket, put a floppy containing PGP in the payload compartment, and shoot the thing over the wall into Mexico, or into Canada? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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[SPAM] Timmy May has no life
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I suppose one of the reasons why Americans are so stupid is that so many of them are of English origin. How does one donate to the IRA anyway? >Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 17:40:49 +0000 >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More "fuckhead" fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >Priority: normal >X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) >Message-Id: <844193577.12916.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > > >> berserk >> Timmy May has gone . Has he been eating speed? >> bananas > >What? speak English motherfucker. > >> >> What has Timmy been smoking? > >I assume you are referring to me here, my name is Paul Bradley and >you can go fuck a kokonut dude. > >> >> ]From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Sun Sep 29 19:03:40 1996 >> >> ]Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) >> >> ] via UUCP; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:14:06 EDT >> >> ] for dlv >> >> ]Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; >> >> ] id AA25790 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:03:40 -0400 >> >> ]Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ac16129; >> >> ] 29 Sep 96 15:59 BST >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net >> >> ] id aa09441; 29 Sep 96 15:54 BST >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP >> >> ] id AA843903697 ; Sat, 28 Sep 96 09:41:37 +0000 >> >> ]Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> ]From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk > >As you can see my sending is authenticated and the reply path is to >my host (fatmans.demon.co.uk) the message has passed through >post.demon.co.uk/disperse.demon.co.uk and on to psi.net, Tim May is >at got.net. > >> >> ]I am not Tim May, Check out the return path if you don`t believe me, >> >> ]if you still don`t here`s my PGP public key signed by the EFF, they >> >> ]don`t sign keys here and there without checking ID`s... > >>Fuckhead. > >Fraid not dude, this thread is getting distinctly boring, cut the >shit, if you have something to say say it, don`t keep spewing shit >without warning, but really it`s only to be expected from you. > > > > Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security > Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk > Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org > Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ > Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 > "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Can we kill single DES?
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since it looks like the US government will be allowing the export of 56 bit espionage-enabled software, it's time to kill single DES. As some of you will recall, a while back I wondered aloud about the feasibility of brute-forcing DES on general purpose machines, ala the RC4-40 crack last year. Unlike many cypherpunks, I actually write code (:-). I took Phil Karn's DES386 as a starting point, and modified it to run effiiciently on the Pentium. The code I've written will run 14 round DES (all that is required for a key test app) at 254,000 crypts/sec on a 90 MHz Pentium. Allow about 10% overhead for key scheduling (there are some tricks to speed this up), and we're still at about 250,000 keys/sec on a 100MHz Pentium (I'm using a nominal 100 MHz Pentium as my 'unit' of cpu power). On a Pentium, it runs entirely in the L1 cache. The code will also run on a 486, but at less than half the number of crypts/sec for the same clock speed. On this type of processor, it would still take 9133 years to exhaust a 56 bit key space. On the other hand, on 20,000 processors of this power it would take less than 6 months. If the target is encrypted in a chaining mode with an unknown 8 byte IV, the time more than doubles. Clearly, this goes far beyond the number of cpus available to the members of this list (though well within the power of most governments and many corporations) The best idea I've heard for recruiting this many cpu cycles is to create a screen saver which does DES-cracking while machines are idle. Another incentive is to offer a cash prize to the person(s) who find the key. Yes, I KNOW that a hardware based cracker is a LOT more efficient, but between the up-front cost and the difficulty of design and production, it's less likely to get done. (Still if someone wants to buy me a nice FPGA board, I'll see what I can do). If you're interested in volunteering machines to do a key search, please read to the end. Questions for general discussion: 1. Is this a good idea? What will happen if DES becomes perceived as insecure? 2. What is the probability of success required to make it worth doing? 3. What would be the consequences of failure? 4. What other platforms than NT/Win95/Pentium should be considered? I could write a Unix demon version, but unless it's tailored for the cpu, a lot of efficency is lost (The aggregate number of idle cycles available for testing is the crucial number). 5. What's a good target? Ideally, we need a plaintext/ciphertext pair, encrypted in Single DES ECB mode. Preferably from a commercially available program, in which a single key is used for a great deal of traffic over a long period. I would strongly prefer, however, that the target key be a *test* key - I don't want to compromise anyone's actual security. We need a target which is both convincing and realistic. 6. What other incentives can be used to recruit machines? ------------------------------ If you're interested in volunteering cycles: RESPOND ONLY TO ME (trei(a)process.com) NOT TO THE LIST. The last thing we need is a hundred 'I'll help' messages on the list. Assume that the program will be a Win95/NT screen saver or Unix deamon. Think about how many machines you could get it to run on (maybe you can talk other people into installing it as a screen saver or background task) I have not written the screen saver yet. I will not do so unless it looks like we'lll get enough machines, so nothing is likely to happen for a couple of months at least. I need to estimate how many cpu cycles will be available: Calculate: Number of Pentiums * Hours available/week * MHz + (Number of 486's * Hours available/week * MHz * 0.30) For, Alphas, MIPS, Motorola, PowerPC etc, running UN*X, MAC, etc, just report how many cpus, their speed, and OS - I'll need help to get versions for other platfoms. 64 bit processors like the Alpha can run this stuff *fast*. Send the aggregate numbers to me. I'll also need to know how many machines are directly on the Internet and could thus query a key-space server, and how many would need some other mechanism to get keyspace and report results. If you're volunteering machines which are outside of the US/Canada, please note the fact: ITAR may be an issue here. I'll summarize to the list. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Press Release
by Peter D. Junger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Press Release Plaintiff Seeks Summary Judgment in Cleveland Case Challenging Licensing of ``Exports'' of Cryptographic Information Government Argues That Law Professor Cannot Challenge Regulation Requiring Him to Get Permission Before Teaching and Publishing Because He Did Not Apply for That Permission Oral Argument in Junger v. Christopher Set for Wednesday, November 20 Cleveland, Ohio, Tuesday, October 1, 1996 For Immediate Release For More Information Contact: Raymond Vasvari (216) 522-1925 Gino Scarselli (216) 291-8601 Or see URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/jvc/ Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 1 -- Lawyers for Professor Peter D. Junger today filed a brief and a motion for summary judgment in Junger v. Christopher, the case challenging the licensing of the communication of ``cryptograhic software'' that is pending before Judge Donald C. Nugent in the Federal District Court here. Junger seeks an injunction against the enforcement of provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations that require him to get the permission of the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (the "ODTC") before he can communicate information about cryptographic software to foreign persons, ``whether in the United States or abroad.'' The penalty for failing to get such permission before disclosing the information can be as great as a fine of one million dollars and imprisonment for ten years. These provisions effectively prevent Junger from admitting foreign students to the course that he teaches about Computers and the Law at Case Western Reserve Law School in Cleveland, Ohio, and keep him from publishing his course materials and articles containing cryptographic software, or explaining what it does, how and where to get it, and how to use it. The challenged licensing scheme threatens the long-run viability of the United States software industry and, according to a blue-ribbon panel of the National Research Council, already costs that industry at least ``a few hundred million dollars per year ..., and all indications are that this figure will only grow in the future.'' The regulations have been extensively criticized by industry and bills to repeal or limit them are now pending in Congress. Junger's legal challenge is not based, however, on the economic damage that the ITAR's cryptographic licensing scheme imposes on the software industry and the nation's economy, but rather on the unconstitutional restraints that it imposes on anyone who wants to speak or write publically about any computer program that has, in the words of the ITAR, the ``capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems.'' Junger does not challenge the constitutionality of requiring one to get a license before exporting a physical cryptographic device: ``It isn't unconstitutional for the Office of Defense Trade Controls to damage the computer industry and our economy by requiring export licenses for cryptographic hardware, but information about cryptographic software is, as the National Research Council has pointed out, `pure knowledge that can be transported over national borders inside the heads of people or via letter.' Requiring the permission of the government before one can communicate knowledge is unconstitutional. Such a prior restraint is, in fact, the paradigmatic example of a violation of the First Amendment.'' THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT PLAINTIFF MUST APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO SPEAK BEFORE HE CAN CHALLENGE THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE APPLY FOR SUCH PERMISSION In motions and briefs submitted August 21st, the government has asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit, or in the alternative, to grant the government judgment prior to trial. The government makes the initial argument that Junger lacks standing to claim that the provisions of the ITAR requiring him to get a formal license or other permission from the ODTC before he publically communicates information about cryptographic software, including the contents of the software itself, are unconstitutional. And it also argues that that claim is neither ``ripe'' nor ``colorable'', because Junger has not applied to the ODTC for such permission. Junger takes the position that as a law teacher who venerates the First Amendment it would be as improper for him to request the federal censors for permission to speak and publish as it would be for him openly violate the law. As he puts it: ``My duty is to challenge these unconstitutional regulations, not to give in to them nor to violate them in an act of civil disobedience.'' His lawyers point out in their briefs that few propositions of constitutional law are better established than the rule that a plaintiff does not have to submit to an unconstitutional restraint on speech and on the press before challenging it in court. ``Those arguments by the government are rather strange,'' says Gino J. Scarselli, one of Junger's lawyers, ``they seem to be based on their argument that cryptographic software is actually hardware because it is functional.'' And then he adds, ``Of course, that argument is also rather strange.'' THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT SOME OF THE MATERIAL AT ISSUE IS EXEMPT UNDER THE ITAR The government also contends that some of the information at issue may be exempt from the ITAR's licensing requirements as technical data that is in the ``public domain'' because it is available to the public through ``fundamental research in science and engineering'' or through ``sales at newsstands and bookstores.'' ``That hardly is a defense,'' says Scarselli, ``since it is quite clear that the government will not concede that all of the information that Professor Junger wants to be able publish and discuss is in the public domain. And to make matters worse, the only way that Professor Junger can actually find out whether the government will treat particular information as being exempt from the formal licensing requirements is to apply to the ODTC for it calls a Commodity Jurisdiction Determination, which in reality is just another form of license.'' ``It is not as if I am engaged in fundamental research in science and engineering.'' Junger adds. ``What I want to publish and discuss has to do with the political and legal issues that are raised by computer technology, including, of course, cryptography. ``For just one example, since lawyers have a legal and ethical duty to protect the confidences of their clients, I am convinced that lawyers who use electronic mail or other computer technologies to communicate with their clients, or to store information supplied by their clients, are in some circumstances ethically, and perhaps even legally, required to use cryptography to maintain the confidentiality of that information. And yet I cannot publically explain to law students and lawyers--and lawyers cannot publically explain to their clients--how to obtain and use effective cryptographic software without first getting the government's permission to disclose that information. And, of course, if the cryptographic software really is effective, then there is little or no chance that the government will permit its disclosure.'' THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOFTWARE IS NOT PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS FUNCTIONAL There is no law in the United States that forbids or regulates the use of cryptography. Yet the government argues that the information in texts containing cryptographic software, including recipes for creating such software, can be used in a computer to preserve secrecy and confidentiality, and concludes that cryptographic software is ``conduct'' and ``functional'' and is thus not a text that is constitutionally protected as speech. Junger's lawyers, on the other hand, say that his claims do not relate to the conduct of running a cryptographic program on a computer--conduct that is not regulated by the ITAR, after all--and that he only challenges the restraints that the ITAR impose on the communication of information about how to carry on such legal conduct. ``Expressive conduct is exactly what is protected by the First Amendment,'' says Raymond Vasvari, another of Junger's lawyers. ``And if that expression were not functional, if it were not effective, there would be no need to protect it. The government's argument turns two hundred years of First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.'' ``The government's arguments about software being conduct and functional are striking examples of the sort of confusion that pervades the whole area of Computers and the Law,'' Junger says. ``Trying to clear up such confusion is my major goal in my course in Computers and the Law. In fact, when I started teaching that course in 1993, I wrote some cryptographic software to assist my students in grasping the distinction between software as a text that can be communicated, and that is protected by copyright law and the First Amendment, and software as a process that runs in a computer's central processor that can be protected by patents, but not by copyrights. If it weren't so frustrating, it would almost be funny that I cannot publish that software because of the prior restraints imposed by the defendants' interpretation of the ITAR, even though it is perfectly legal for me, or for any one else, including `foreign persons,' to actually run such software on a computer. The government's confusion is so extensive that an agent of the ODTC has actually told me that software, cryptographic software, is actually hardware.'' ``It is quite clear to me,'' Junger adds, ``that the State Department and the National Security Agency and other elements in the executive branch of the government are attempting to restrain the communication of information about cryptographic software not only abroad, but also within the United States, because they do not want us actually to be able to use cryptography to preserve the privacy of our thoughts and our communications. It is as if the government required one to get a license before explaining how to make or use an envelope, even though it did not forbid the use of envelopes themselves. After all, all that cryptographic software is is a way of making electronic envelopes.'' ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED Junger v. Christopher has been placed on a fast track by Judge Nugent. On September 5 he established a briefing schedule: the plaintiff's brief was due and was filed today and the government's response is due on Friday, October 18. Oral argument is scheduled for Wednesday, November 20. Judge Nugent's decision is expected before the first of the year. BACKGROUND ON THE LITIGATION Litigation is expensive. Professor Junger and his volunteer lawyers were only able to bring the suit because of a generous gift by an anonymous donor of $5,000 that was used to create the ITAR Legal Attack Fund. Additional donations by Professor Junger and others have increased that fund to more than seven thousand dollars. Scarselli and Vasvari are lawyers in private practice in Cleveland who have dedicated much of their professional lives to the protection of First Amendment freedoms. The third lawyer on the team is Kevin O'Neill, a law professor at Cleveland State University and the former legal director of the Ohio Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. --30-- -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH Internet: junger(a)pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger(a)samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu

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SYN_not
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-1-96: "Check Point to Provide Safeguard Against TCP SYN Flooding." The new module, now available free of charge on Check Point's Web site (http://www.checkpoint.com) provides protection against this denial of service attack, which has crippled several ISPs in recent weeks. "Certicom Introduces Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem Instruction To Its Security Classroom." It has launched new information about its Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem on the Information Security Classroom section of its web site (www.certicom.ca) "IBM to herd cave-in cats for rat encryption." IBM will be joined by Digital, TIS but few others. An executive at TIS declined to comment on whether it is involved in the IBM cave-in. The company is in a quiet period before making an IPO based on government bribery. "Battle brewing over gov.crypto bribery." Last week, the DARPA announced it has awarded Trusted Information Systems, Inc. a two-year, $1.5 million contract to develop what it calls security wrappers for a Java Prototype System as well as one for the Unix operating system. ----- http://jya.com/synnot.txt (15 kb for 4) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/synnot.txt SYN_not

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Re: Clipper III on the table
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:44 PM 10/1/96 -0400, Perry wrote: >We really have to work on cracking DES at least once -- it would >substantially reduce the wind in the Administration's sails. 56 bits + GAK does generally mean DES/GAK, though RC4/56/GAK is also possible. One "56-bit" protocol that might be allowable under the new rules is "something strong with all but 56 key bits revealed", e.g. RC4/128 with 72 bits salt revealed (like the RC4/128 with 88 bits salt revealed that Netscape uses, or 3-DES with 112 bits salt revealed), which would be substantially stronger against cracking than raw 56-bit DES. A big advantage is that it makes pre-computation of lists less useful, since two cyphertexts with the same 56-bit key might be different in the top N-56 bits of key, and the key schedules are less reusable. The 3DES version, for instance, also gains because some of the big DES hooks that let you scrounge a few bits don't work. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com America's Open Presidential Debate - Beyond Dole and Clinton! <A href="http://gate.net/~bdcollar/bbe/media.htm">Tuesday, Oct. 8th 8:00 PM EDT</a>

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ITAR satellite provision
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone on the list have the exact ITAR reg. text relating to the exemption for space-launched crypto? -- Steve

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