December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Can somebody unsubscribe cyberpromo from CP?
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:23 AM 10/7/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >I think somebody subscribed that Cyberpromo organization to the Cypherpunks >list. It needs to be unsubscribed... I did a "who" and didn't see them. Maybe someone already took care of it... BTW, the messages I was receiving from "abusebot(a)savetrees.com" were sent to me, not the list. I wrote the address in their email and was told that apparently someone was forging notes to their "abuse" address from mine -- the information about reporting abuses, etc, comes back in response. I was told the messages would be blocked, but I'm not sure if it happened as I'm now filtering them. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: You can be forced to turn over your encryption keys?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 AM 10/7/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 10:33 AM -0400 10/7/96, Geoffrey C. Grabow wrote: >>I thought we had a 5th amendment. Isn't turning over your key that may (or >>may not) expose encriminating evidence an extension of self-encrimination? >>Haven't there been dozens of famous witnesses (Patty Hurst, Oliver North, >>etc) that "take the 5th" dozens of times on the stand. Why couldn't I >>"take the 5th" when asked for my encryption keys? When asked for your key, >>can't you say: "I'm sorry your honor, but I respectfully refuse to answer >>that question on the grounds that it may incriminate me.". >Though IANAL, I know of many, many discussions of this question. So far as >I know, it remains one of The Great Unresolved Questions. I think that there was an idea that appeared in the last few months around here, which took advantage of the fact that a one-time pad makes all decrypts equally likely. If the cops sieze an apparently-encrypted file and they insist on the key, just ask them to give you the file back (although presumably you already had it) and present them with the OTP, revealing the fact (surprise!!!) that the thing decrypts to (for just one example) the first "N" bytes of the King James Bible, or the Cybernomicon, or "War and Peace" or the stock exchange results for August 1, 1989, etc... This suggests that there is a reason to have a program which uses OTP techniques but generates files which "look like" valid PGP output. The judge can't force you to reveal what you don't know, but more importantly if you give him a "key" that might be the correct one, and assuming it is impossible to prove that it wasn't the correct key, then it would be somewhat pointless and certainly unjustified for him to continue to insist on providing yet another key. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: encrypting pppd?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 06 Oct 1996 04:18:04 -0500, VaX#n8 wrote: >Thinking about it a bit more, if you only encrypt, say, telnet >then you've got a pretty predictable plaintext stream. If you >encrypt the entire link level properly then it might be much harder >to isolate the nonvariant bits of the protocols since the port and >that kind of header info is not available to the attacker at that >level. What about predictabilities in the PPP datastream? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Libel & Pseudonymous Reputation - permissions fixed!
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry about that. The file is available now. http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/CyberLaw_Course/cyberlaw.038 -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Program Director </HTML>

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Re: You can be forced to turn over your encryption keys?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:33 AM 10/7/96 -0400, Geoffrey C. Grabow wrote: >I thought we had a 5th amendment. Isn't turning over your key that may (or >may not) expose encriminating evidence an extension of self-encrimination? As Tim notes, this has been discussed several times. You might take a look at: Greg S. Sergienko, Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys, 2 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996), <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v2i1/sergienko.html>. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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Seeking help on WordPerfect 6.1 cracks
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Among the possessions of a murder victim (not suspect), the local police have found a floppy disk with some provocative-sounding files on it. Rather than getting them into the habit of cracking other people's personal files, I'd prefer to give them the password myself, but there seems to be no freely available cracker for WordPerfect 6.x, and I'm not sure this one-time use is worth $100 to me. Can anyone lend a hand? Just four small files. I can give you more than enough details off the list to assure you that this is totally on the level. Feel free to discuss the implications of providing such help. Failing that, does anyone have a technical, political, or personal preference for or against AccessData or CRAK, who sell the two commercial crackers I've found? - -rich [not on cypherpunks at the moment] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMllpfZNcNyVVy0jxAQHtcgH8D3oW21nsaNrIHxHMqhxE/Ho9/78L1elF DYHV3jeM4VSqTP6cKhMn5ZahB4b8KP9t7EG70NAtwn/usaKiWpw92Q== =uq4u -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by jeffm＠icu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Best-of-Crypto (was:this list is a joke)
by I~nigo Gonzalez 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > > "I~nigo Gonzalez" <nexus(a)adv.es> writes: > >> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >>> When I joined this mailing list, it had plenty of technical discussions >>> posted by people knowledgeable in cryptography. They have all since left. >> >> Where did they go?????? I want to read something _good_ not spam. >> What about coderpunks ???? > > There's some interesting discussion on coderpunks, but it's pretty > low-volume. There used to be interesting threads on cypherpunks - > I'm not awarae of any place where they continue. > Maybe we can build here (at adv.es) a Best-Of-Crypto mailing list... with the _same_ spirit we have now Best-Of-Security... I mean technical, relevant postings... Any comments ??? -- Iñigo González - ADV Internet Technical Advisor <nexus(a)adv.es> "Never say anything online that you wouldn't want to see on the front page of The New York Times." - alt.2600.moderated Posting

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Re: Voice Stress Analysis of Debates?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 06 Oct 1996 15:28:40 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>BTW, did anyone notice that some of the evening news anchors are imaged via >>a camera/DSP to render as more youthful (e.g., removing facial wrinkles)? >Really? Where'd you hear this? I suppose it's not beyond the realm of >possibility, but that would be rather sophisticated programming, >particularly in real-time. One of the big anchors admitted it. However it was only possible in the studio. Might have even been a contrast-lowering gadget. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:22 PM 10/7/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >>and an argument about the constitution: >> >>"The constitution says I must be given a choice between disclosing and >>contempt." >> >>I don't remember seeing any examples of the latter come across the list. As >>I remember things, the context of my statement above was a discussion of >>why third-party key escrow is not the same as self-escrow. > >the point is that many cpunks feel that warrants and wiretaps and >subpoenas are things to defy. it's a hypocritical double standard >in which they cloth themselves in the wrapping of the constitution >or law whenever it is useful to their arguments, and then advocate criminality, >such as via defying legal warrants etc, whenever the case suits them. Grandly ignoring the 5th amendment, I see?!? I don't see any contradiction: We can look to the Constitution, simultaneously, for rights for ourselves AND for restrictions on government. > >[wiretaps] > >>It's rarely quoted here because it is unremarkable; just as the list is not >>a place for basic crypto education, it is not a place for basic legal >>education. > >ooops, you fell for Unicorn's muddying misstatement of my question. OBVIOUSLY >there is lots of case law on wiretaps. what I was trying to point out >was that I find little discussion of cases here trying to discredit >wiretap law for various reasons, such as that the wiretapped >person is not informed. the distinction of the person *not*being*informed* >of the wiretap is very important as otehrs here agree, and I would >expect everyone would be familiar with a simple case that gives a >decision on it (in much the way many constitutional cases are >regularly quoted) or that people would advocate wiretap law would >be challenged on the basis of the lack of such a precedent case. Now _THAT'S_ a very valid point. Unicorn totally ignored that issue. I pointed out my expectation that the only reason wiretaps are secret is their technical ability to do them while staying secret. I've occasionally pointed out that if tomorrow, scientists discover some sort of teleport system that allows cops to sneak through walls, at the same time being invisible, cops and judges will suddenly announce that the requirement that people searched need to be informed of that search is, uh, no longer applicable. This is a problem. No, not the precise hypothetical I imagined above; I don't think it's going to be possible as stated for a long time and probably never. The problem, however, is that "the authorities" have respect for the rights of the citizens more in the breach than in the observance, and if they find what they consider to be a good reason to ignore them, they will with little hesitation. >>(The answer to most of the "how do I find out about 'X'?" questions > >you have a lot of good advice, but I ask none of the things you are >attributing to me. I simply would like to carry on a discussion with >a civilized lawyer who specializes in the subject, rather than have >a people tell me why I cannot even do this, and must become a law >specialized before I can even use the word "wiretap" with any >meaningfulness. It's particularly pointless that some of these lawyers keep saying things like, "You don't understand how the law works!" when it is quite obvious that in most cases, the people who are complaining DO know enough about how the law works to identify when it is being abused. This is not surprising: For example, I can't ice-skate worth beans, but I easily tell the difference between a bad and a good ice-skater. I can't make music, but I can tell the difference between bad and good music. I don't know much about architecture, but if I see a building collapse I can see that somebody made a mistake. I don't act, but I can tell the different between a good and bad actor. It is a frequent conceit among "experts" that the only people who should be able to criticize them are people who know as much as they do on a particular subject. Black Unicorn is particularly bad in this regard. >the chief point of my post was to question why the EFF etc. are not >at all interested in challenging the wiretap "status quo" in spite >of what many people here believe/advocate-- that wiretapping was >never legitimate in the first place. this is curious because EFF >etc. *are* willing to back up the cryptography cases out there, >ala Bernstein etc. Probably mostly because they expect that the government is going to be completely unwilling to admit that it's wrong. In fact, of course, that's exactly why the government is very much afraid of the advent of good encryption: Ubiquitous crypto telephones make the government's use of wiretapping irrelevant, totally without regard to what any cop or judge or prosecutor says. Fundamentally, it's a technical fix to a legal mistake. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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