December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: An idle thought on CBC and block lengths
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well I do believe that your spam would be illegal if that was the case. And secondly there are no laws here in australia that you can use to prosecute me from the US for an email bomb, not that this is one, and if it is than so is your spam. >> It is illegal to use a invalid return email address. If this continues, I >> will >> be forced to prosecute the return email address - which they are >> making to look like you. >Is it? I beleive that if you look closely, you will discover hat all the >laws which would have made lying illegal on the 'Net have now been >repealed by more Federal judges than I can count on 1 hand... ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

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NIST conference
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Following is an announcement about a NIST conference on leveraging the distributed nature of the Internet to accomplish tasks that might be otherwise not feasible. The abstract notes that this type of activity has 'important economic, social, and political consequences'. This may already be old news, I was off the list for the past few days. Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 15:18:08 -0400 From: Liz Lennon <elizabeth.lennon(a)NIST.GOV> Subject: Cyber Conference Announcement To: csl-bulletin(a)NIST.GOV >Return-Path: <moline(a)sst.ncsl.nist.gov> >Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 15:00:46 -0400 (EDT) >From: Judi Moline <moline(a)sst.ncsl.nist.gov> >Subject: Cyber Conference Announcement >To: elizabeth.lennon(a)NIST.GOV >Cc: moline(a)sst.ncsl.nist.gov > > >Event: Conference on Leveraging Cyberspace > >Date: October 8-9, 1996 > >Purpose: People with shared interests are using the Internet to >solve problems, accomplish tasks, and create resources that would be well >beyond the reach of any one person or organization. The ability to leverage >the efforts of large numbers of networked users has important economic, >social, and political consequences. This conference is designed to explore >this phenomenon from both a technical and social science perspective. >Additionally, the closing session of the conference will cap off several >weeks of virtual discussions on the conference's web site. > >Location: Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) > Palo Alto, Calif. > >Keynote by: John Seely Brown, Vice President and Chief Scientist, > Xerox > >Program: Web: http://nii.nist.gov/cyber/cyber_conf.html > >Registration: $200 > >Sponsors: White House National Economic Council > Commerce's National Institute of Standards and > Technology > Xerox Palo Alto Research Center > >Technical contact: Judi Moline, NIST > (301) 975-4601 > email: jmoline(a)nist.gov > >Information: Web: http://nii.nist.gov/cyber/cyber_conf.html > >To register: Print registration form from web site and return with > payment to: > Office of the Comptroller > NIST > A807 Administration Building > Gaithersburg, Md. 20899-0001 USA > > Or fax to: > Lori Phillips, NIST > fax: (301) 948-2067 > > Or: > Lori.Phillips(a)nist.gov > > >

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NISSC
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The National Information Systems Security Conference in Baltimore on October 22-25 is bountifully described at: http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/program Section No. 10, Solutions, will interest those who want a peek at what the Puzzle Palace gang is up to. The other nine sessions cover everything the info-sec gov-biz wants to do to make the infoworld safe from everyone except them.

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote: > If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed, > I agree. I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more > ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters > shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against > them by governments, given their modus operandi. I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand the nature of it. I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not guaranteed at all. As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable. Here is the post I wrote earlier: ------- earlier post ------- jim bell recently wrote: > Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be > deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it, > and soliciting donations against them. I don't agree here. It would all be a matter of timing, unless the number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces would be able to destroy them. You have to realize that if the money is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of being paid are not too good. Just play the game "Command and Conquer" for a while and you'll see. Money is fuel. Don't run off of it! For that reason, I think that any AP server, *at the introduction of the concept* would have to be a covert operation. Servers could come out in public light when their number be large enough to warrant a strike on anybody trying to eliminate them. Same for the publication of the name of the individuals operating the server. To me, this seems obvious. Comments? To go on along that line, I had the idea that a specific piece of software, a bit like Private Idaho, that would chain remailers but that would be specifically designed to handle predictions, would have be designed. (Pardon my ignorance of the net here) The server need not to be a unique address. Actually, the prediction and any accompanying documents could be splitted a la Secure Split, and sent to N differents servers, M (<N) of which would be required to re-assemble the original prediction. This assures that if one gets closed, the other can rebuild the message. If thoses servers were set up on *large* machines servicing tens of thousands of messages a day, preferably located at a busy remailer location, any exchange of information between them to rebuild the prediction at a central location would not be easy to track by any govt. Comments? ----- end of earlier post ----- Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists and engineers, LabView programming PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: CWD--Wiretap In the Night
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adding to the CWD wiretap alarm by Brock and Declan: The Washington Post, September 26, 1996, p. A30. Wiretaps and Money Bills [Editorial] Legislators who have pet projects but not enough support to get them passed have a way of turning desperate during the closing days of the congressional session. Their thoughts turn ineluctably to unrelated appropriations bills. Only last week, Rep. Frank Wolf used the transportation funding bill as a vehicle for usurping the courts' role in a specific domestic relations dispute. Now senators working on the Commerce, State and Justice appropriations bill have slipped in provisions relating to wiretaps that have been before the Congress for 18 months but have not been adopted. The law should not be changed by means of these stealthy riders. One of the substantive changes in the criminal laws ordered by the money committee, for example, would make it easier to obtain court orders authorizing "roving" wiretaps. This would permit putting taps on any phone a suspect might use -- including unspecified public phones -- without requiring, as the law now does, that the government show that the suspect is attempting to thwart a home or office tap by repeatedly changing phones. This may or may not be reasonable, but Congress considered and rejected it earlier this year. It shouldn't be shoved through on an appropriations bill. The committee bill also increased the number of crimes for which a wiretap can be issued, adding a list of new, relatively imprecise offenses related to terrorism such as "providing material support to terrorists" and "terrorist acts transcending national borders." Taps already are allowed for just about every major crime in which a terrorist might engage, including bombing, arson, murder, kidnapping, extortion, espionage, sabotage, treason, hostage-taking and the destruction of trains ships, aircraft and aircraft facilities. What, then, is the reason for adding these new elastic terms, which could include far less serious offenses that someone thinks might be linked to terrorism? The committees that dealt with the subject in April did not see fit to do so. Why now has the Appropriations Committee intervened? The competing values of security and privacy rights require a much better sorting out. It's best done by people who have had the benefit of relevant testimony and experience. The appropriations committees are the wrong setting to deal with such questions, which should not be presented in a take-it-or-leave-it package with the government's continued operation at stake. [End]

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Re: Cuba, Iraq, AP...
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:08 AM 9/26/96 -0500, Phil Fraering wrote: > Shortly after the Gulf War elements in the Iraqi military tried to > overthrow Hussein; they apparently tried to co-ordinate with the U.S., who > tried to co-ordinate with Saudi Arabia, who warned Saddam that there was > going to be a coup attempt; gotta stop that Ol' power vaccuum... > > The fact that the people who performed the Bay of Pigs were enticed into > it by promised but withdrawn U.S. military support is a matter of public > record; would Castro still be in power had the United States not > (intentionally? I don't know) destroyed the core resistance against him > in that fashion? Two rulers, one of whom is a communist, have more in common than two communists, one of whom is a ruler. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: AP
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Derek Bell <dbell(a)maths.tcd.ie> writes: > In message <si4RuD1w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com>, "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" writes: > >Yes, I do. > > I'm not sure what you mean here. Is it: > 1. You hold people respobsible for what they did, not what their government > did. (Assuming said people didn't take part in what the government did.) > > 2. You agree that the IRA could justify killing any British citizen, even if > said citizen supported the IRA or agreed with its aims. > > 3. Something else. (Please specify.) (Redirected to the list.) Any British citizen, irrespective of s/he thinks about the IRA, has benefited economically from the 800 years of pillaging and genocide in Ireland. I see no problem if they pay with their lives for these crimes. Likewise I see no problem if U.S. civilians pay with their lives for their government's crimes in Iraq, even if they happen to disapprove of these crimes. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Is "Black Unicorn" a lawyer, or just a nym used by a lawyer?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said, in a discussion on another topic While BU is a lawyer, and I am not, I maintain [........] Is it correct to say that "Black Unicorn is a lawyer", or only that the nym "Black Unicorn" is used by a person who's a lawyer under another name? "Black Unicorn" at least doesn't appear to be a _practicing lawyer_, though maybe [name used for legal work by person who also uses nym "Black Unicorn"] is a practicing lawyer. Tim's signature file no longer asserts that he's a Licensed Ontologist, but this seems to be the kind of question you'd ask a L.O. if you knew one. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Public domain SHA-1 in C
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've written an implementation of SHA-1 in C. Public domain, so you can hack it to your hearts content and/or use it however you want. You can download it from http://www.edmweb.com/steve/sha1.c It's not hard to use. Allocate a SHA1_CTX, initialize it with SHA1Init() run over the data with SHA1Update() and finally extract the result using SHA1Final(). Or just compile the program as-is and use it to hash files. It's reasonably fast (the 80 core SHA operations look good) but I'm certain that there's room for improvement. Tested under FreeBSD 2.1.0-RELEASE on an i486SX. The three test vectors from FIPS PUB 180-1 hash correctly. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMksSsNtVWdufMXJpAQFV3AgApaK+upwWtBJZUwq5Pr4cpvjWQcxFHxv6 XEoZmwgwzR94lpjdEK5GPXt7U9HTp+xiwiaeQ7Hjg+iuR/qtofwZlZhQ5EmyBl2M 8rnFSRgwR4NH1y2PwAxQKSo2SaHU8JZ3X3D6Yk1WXAqk90vN8dzQAIa8B409IuhM tBPixrS6d0KsySSOHQkWO7Mqij43wZOnrgikJF3IDCvSf0us8gGC9wZjdIax3Rgr soswtQvT6QpZDZ/+39UiA2RSMFuER/S3NbZZSJdfIGK1XzUeU2MUC4NmURlc/ntz 3B1pd+jovxuHW1D/TQ2jHSIdg1Yol/zeu1OeuuhL37QOQAVkupgVUA== =B73M -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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a comment on AP vs. more peaceful resistance...
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You know, it occured to me earlier that all of this AP stuff flooding the list is overlooking one thing about cryptography: in a way, its use and dissemination represents to some people a means of nonviolent protest. Comments, anyone? Phil Fraering The above is the opinion of neither my internet pgf(a)acadian.net service provider nor my employer. 318/261-9649

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