December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: ACM/IEEE Letter on Cryp
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:25 PM 4/6/96 -0500, Dave Banisar wrote: >The export language comes from the origional Cantwell bill and orders the >Commerce Sec. Could somebody re-post that Cantwell bill? >to allow export of mass market software and allows somewhat more >limited export of non-mass market software dependng on what is available to >banks in that country. Which country? The country to be exported to? This bill is starting to sound distinctly manipulative! Remember, once it's out of the country, it can be sent _anywhere_ so it is pointless to include any destination distinctions, including "terrorist countries." And what happens if the only software available to banks in that country (by their law) requires some sort of key-escrow function, even if that country allows non-escrowed encryption to citizens? Do we get to export or not? It's already beginning to smell. The original claim, as I recall, was that export would be allowed if something was already available with at least as high a level of protection. No distinction as to _where_ that software was available. That would be a fairly broad allowance. Now, we are seeing that the evil hand of government is being inserted into the equation: Suddenly, what their government ALLOWS BANKS is the distinguishing factor. GRRRRRR! This is _exactly_ why I want to see this bill BEFORE it is officially introduced, and why everyone else here should as well. >Its not ideal Maybe it should be. There is already serious doubt as to whether this bill could even hope to pass before the end of the current session. That's not surprising; it will be introduced very late. If it can't pass, I see absolutely no reason to include misfeatures in a bill that will have many months to be re-written before the next session. Nothing is set in stone; it can all be changed _if_ it's not part of some sort of secret deal. The way I see it, if there is not a strong probability that it will be voted in, there is no reason to introduce a flawed bill. Even more so, there is no reason to support a hurried bill if the apparent reason for the hurry is to ensure that the bill contains "features" that will be hard to remove in the future. If Burns can't do it right soon enough to pass, he needs simply take an extra month or two and publicize the _corrected_ bill on (surprise!) the Internet, and worry about introducing it in the next session of Congress. (He'll get the election-year political benefit just as effectively. Pardon me for being cynical.) I can't see that anybody is going to hold a little delay against him. >(I think the limits on non-mass market >should be the same as mass market- almost none except for a limited number of >"terrorist" countries (we'd get killed if we argue that those should be >eliminated) but overall much better than leahy's and somewhat better than >goodlatte's bill. Pardon my language, but WHAT THE HELL IS "MASS MARKET SOFTWARE"? _Everybody_ wants their software to sell as many copies as possible; what is the difference between something which sells 10,000 copies and something that sells 10 million? Is this bill a sop to Egghead software? Is the legal difference going to be cost? Say, anything less than $1000? That would at least make a distinction that has a certain level of precedent behind it, since export licenses have had minimal-dollar-value exceptions built in for a long time. What about freeware/shareware? And you didn't answer my question about whether key length alone was a distinguishing feature, or software function. This is not looking good. Too many conditions? Too many exceptions? Too many caveats? Why can't those sleazy politicians give us what we want? Ooops, I just answered my own question. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Remove my name from this distribution list
by rakers＠flash.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Remove my name from this distribution list, thanx.

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Re: HANDS UP!
by Chevelle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey guys if there's anything I can do to help Kevin out anything at all please let me know! chevelle out....At 07:14 AM 4/5/96 +0200, THE HIJACK-CREW wrote: >HI THERE! THIS IS etoy! > >"the digital hijack" is NOW running ! > >the internet-underground has decided: it is definitely time to blast SOUND >and ACTION into the net !!! > >our software-agents have invaded the main searchservers... > >++++for more information check out : http://www.hijack.org/++++++++++ > >or get kidnapped live --> go to infoseek (netsearch-button on your browser) >and search for: > >UNDERGROUND - CENSORSHIP - DISCO - XTC - CLINTON - PORSCHE - CRACK - >KRAFTWERK - ELVIS - TERROR - PENTHOUSE - SEGA - MONDRIAN - SEXPISTOLS - >FIREARMS - TARANTINO - DJ - STONES - NETWORKS - BASE - CRIME - WAR - >BUSINESS - WOMEN - NET - SOCIETY - ART - CASTRO - PARADISE - ATHLETICS - >PULP - CYBER - YELLO - PETSHOPBOYS - REM - HUSTLER - BITCH - GUEVARA - >SEVESO - MELODYMAKER - PORNO - GABBER - ROLLERBLADES - REBEL - OASIS - >COMMUNICATIONS - PLAYBOY - BELGIUM - ORB - AND MANY MORE... > >these keywords will all appear on the TOP 10 - LIST. take the link to >hijack.org to get the hijack-experience like millions of bored >internet-users... > >download the hijackers-sound, get the best pictures and help us free our >friend KEVIN D. MITNICK, THE SUPERHACKER (charged for electronic-terrorism, >maximum sentence: 460 years prison) ! > >we would be very happy to welcome you on our site. spread this new >internet-lifestyle to your friends and to internet-freaks + surfers ! > >this is a underground art-project not a bastard-business mail. our grab >robot "etoy.IVANA" got your email-address by cruising the net. > >for the hijack-crew etoy >MARTIN KUBLI > >email mailme(a)etoy.com >fax ++41 1 363 35 57 >_______________________________________________________________________ >http://www.hijack.org/ >for highres-pictures: ftp.etoy.com /press > > >etoy: >leaving reality behind...abusing technology...flashing the net > >

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 PM 4/6/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >This model, is, I contend, the model with which courts are familiar. They >know that Alice can retrieve the funds, so they simply order her to. If she >does not comply, contempt of court. Q.E.D. > >What of a different model? What if, say, her funds are in a "time lock >deposit," with the bank unwilling or even unable (cryptographic protocols >involving multiple key holders) to retrieve the funds until, say, 2010? >Even if she is being tortured to death and pleading with the >Gemeinschaftbank of Zurich to please, pretty please, release her funds, >they cannot. > >It may take some convincing, and some education of the court (a la the >education that is slowly happening, as in the CDA case), but eventually it >will be realized that "contempt of court" is not applicable. I look at it this way: It is inappropriate to look just at the desire of the court and its sanctions, it is necessary to study what kind of "crimes" are normally dealt with in such a fashion, and why they need to be crimes in the first place. Over time, technology is dramatically increasing our protections: From locks to alarms to monitoring systems to remote cameras, with bank accounts that are secure from ordinary criminals, we are becoming less and less dependant on government for our security. Since the ostensible purpose of courts is nominally to protect us, if those protections begin to be replaced by technology the logical conclusion is that courts will become less numerous and less powerful. The problem is, that isn't happening, and the reason is that organizations tend to act in ways to protect their own power and influence. In fact, the average citizen is subject to far more theft of his assets BY THE GOVERNMENT than by common criminals, so at some point we have to realize that the government is now a net problem, rather than being a net solution. I think that most crimes that subpoenas would normally be used for are probably not crimes at all, and are probably "malum prohibitum," not "malum in se" crimes. And in the future, they would likely be used to harass political enemies, as harassment was done in the 1950's and 60's. This means, for anybody of a libertarian bent, that it would actually be better if the government could be rendered incapable of enforcing them. Naturally, governments and courts will resist, but that will be irrelevant. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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NYT: Chaotic Encryption: a Solution in Search of a Problem
by Dan Haskovec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times online site reports on a researcher at Oak Ridge National Labs who "devised and patented a new mathematical system for encrypting and authenticating digital data, based on the scientific concept of chaos." The article mention that people in industry were less than enthused about adopting it. Even the inventor says that it "isn't robust enough for military applications." It seems to use a chaotic system at both ends with a symmetric key. It almost sounds like the NYT covered it because chaos is "cool", not because this development is significant. Any insights? The story is online at http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0407chaos.html

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Re: the cost of untracability?
by hoz＠univel.telescan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>One possible way to get around this is to have ecash issuers pay interest >on ecash. However it requires ecash to be timestamped and therefore >compromises its untraceability. (Think of the timestamp as a serial >number.) It wouldn't exactly have to be timestamped. By convention, all interest bearing currency could be denominated as of some fixed date. For instance, its future value as of Jan 1, 2200 A.D. The issuer could then pay interest without knowing the date the currency was issued. (Of course, some accounting rules are probably going to need changing, hehe) Neither the payee nor the issuer needs to know the actual issue date when settlement time comes. When you buy a t-bill, it is worth some amount on some date. You don't know when the previous owner bought it or how much (s)he paid. The denominated date could even vary if it were "blinded". As long as the present value of the ecoin is the same, the issuing institution should not care how it is expressed. A variable interest rate scheme could even prevent an announced fixed rate from conveying clues about the issue date. Rick F. Hoselton (who doesn't claim to present opinions for others)

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Re: e$ seigniorage (and is this the cost of untracability?)
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wei Dai writes: >One possible way to get around this is to have ecash issuers pay interest >on ecash. However it requires ecash to be timestamped and therefore >compromises its untraceability. (Think of the timestamp as a serial >number.) Interest-bearing accounts cannot legally be anonymous--the IRS requires records of interest payments for tax purposes. Even if the e$ issuer is collecting interest on my ecash, I don't care as long as they don't charge me any fees,. As far as I am concerned, if the issuer can make anonymous e$ worth his while to issue, the loss in potential interest income is more than outweighed by the advantages of being able to use such a system. Jonathan Wienke

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:00 PM 4/6/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: > To me this entire thread has threatened to suggest to people that they > need only thumb their noses at the authorities, be it by cryptographic > protocol or otherwise, and sit back in their easy chair and smile to > themselves. [...] > > I understand that direct confrontation with government is appealing to > the authority hater. (I happen to be one). Overt resistance, however, > of the character suggested by Mr. Bell and others, is going to cause > problems in two ways. Firstly, its going to cause the individual > resister a good deal of headaches. Secondly, its going to make bad law > eventually. On this you are simply wrong: As Jim Bell pointed out, the current level of repression would have been unthinkable thirty years ago, and it has occurred with very little actual violence. 99% pure bluff. The authorities are generally reluctant to risk their reputation capital by direct confrontation. Government projects an image of being all powerful, but in fact they are in the same position as the lion tamer bullying his lions or the Mahout commanding the elephant to drag logs. Somebody complained that the image I put in by CDA protest was not obscene, mererly indecent (due perhaps due to the lousy dithering which obscured certain crucial features of the image) -- so I amended it to one which is definitely obscene. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: [NOISE] Unicorn of Color
by erc＠dal1820.computek.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No, it's "womyn", you Fascist male oppressor pretending to be in sympathy with the cause ;) ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: [NOISE] Unicorn of Color Sent To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Author: pjm(a)spe.com Reply To: pjm(a)spe.com Date: 4/7/96 1:36:53 AM The spelling is "wymmyn", you neanderthal oppressor.

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LSD|CFP
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All constructive comments, corrections & suggestions are greatly appreciated... <http://www.well.com/user/ddt/crypto/crypto.html> dave ___________________________________________________________________ Cryptography is the entertainment branch of the computing industry.

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