December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In my last message I wrote: --- .... statements I read. (The TIS statement points out that: "Separate licensing arrangements are necessary for organizations desiring Data Recovery Center ownership.", so there is the chance that if I want Grandma to be my spare key holder she might have to pay bucks to TIS and pass their scrutiny...if so, not a very nice option, and one which could turn even CKR into BB-Enabled software with a change in DRC policies...see point below.) .... --- Well, I've been looking at the DRC licensing steps, and it makes it clear that becoming a DRC is an expensive proposition: "A DRC technology license is priced at $30,000 for the first DRC, and $10,000 for each additional DRC to the same customer. A mandatory secure DRC computer system is available for $20,000 for each DRC location, plus an annual maintenance fee of $10,000 for the first DRC and $5,000 for each additional DRC. In addition, a royalty is charged against DRC service fees at the rate of 10% of the revenue stream." Not so expensive for a bank or other such business, but not something Mom and Pop will be getting into anytime soon! Also, it's clear to me that a DRC located in the United States is subject to court orders and subpoenas to release keys (there is no "protection against self-incrimination" in such cases, as the DRC is not in danger of being incriminated....there _may_ be attorney-client privilege, depending on whether the DRC is one's lawyer....lots of legal issues to explore). And it's not clear from the documents if TIS (or the government) will license/approve DRCs located in offshore locations, such as Anguilla or Switzerland. (I don't mean for CKE use, and with CKE strength, I mean DRCs for U.S. users of CKR.) (Depends on what channel the DRCs use to communicate with U.S. operations, doesn't it? If the Anguilla-based DRC must use CKE itself, then the stronger CKR is only as strong as the weaker CKE used in the offshore operation! Cache-22.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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url
by m5＠dev.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At <URL:http://www.osf.org/~loverso/javascript/track-me.html> find some interesting "surveillance" applications of Javascript. ______c_____________________________________________________________________ Mike M Nally * Tiv^H^H^H IBM * Austin TX * I want more, I want more, m5(a)tivoli.com * m101(a)io.com * I want more, I want more ... <URL:http://www.io.com/~m101> *_______________________________

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Search engines: query on queries
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have seen occasional references to various reports on what kinds of queries are submitted to Altavista and other search engines. Can anyone point me to an authoritative report? A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To supplement TIS's Web site information on CKE, here's a mailing from Steve Walker earlier this month: TRUSTED INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. February 2, 1996 There has been amazing progress on TIS's Commercial Key Escrow (CKE) initiative since my last status report. In November, we submitted a Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) request to the U.S. Department of State for our Gauntlet Internet Firewall Product with CKE-based IP Encryption, which constitutes our Global Virtual Private Network (GVPN) system (see figure 1). Our Gauntlet system has had a Virtual Private Network (VPN) capability using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm to encrypt firewall-to-firewall communications for the past year. But because of U.S. export controls, we have not been able to sell this option outside of the U.S. and Canada. By adding CKE technology to our firewalls, the Gauntlet system with DES and CKE now meets the U.S. government requirements for export to most parts of the world. In the course of several meetings with U.S. government representatives. we were told that it will take a while longer for all the details of the CJ process to be worked out, but that the U.S. government was willing to consider a temporary (up to 4-year) export license until the CJ process is in place. In early December, we submitted such a request and on January 19, 1996, it was approved (see figure 2). While this temporary export license has limitations (there must be a Data Recovey Center in the U.S. as well as in the foreign country because reciprocal agreements do not yet exist between the U.S. and foreign governments), it represents the first export approval of a DES-based key escrow encryption system, a small step but a giant leap toward full exportability of good cryptography when equipped with user-controlled key recovery. We are now discussing Global Virtual Private Networks, based on our Gauntlet-CKE system, with several multinational companies. In December, I attended a special meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris to discuss the international ramifications of the U.S. key escrow initiative. The consensus of the meeting was that user-controlled key escrow provides the only workable solution to the long-standing dilemma between the private sector's need for encryption protection and governments' needs to be able to decrypt the communications of criminals, terrorists, and other adversaries. Other meetings will follow, but it appears that most major governments endorse the U.S. government's user-controlled key escrow initiative as the only practical way through the cryptography maze. In mid-January, Microsoft announced its long-awaited Cryptographic Application Programming Interface (CAPI). This development promises to finally provide a well-defined separation between applications calling on cryptography and the actual performance of the cryptography. Now users will be able to request cryptographic functions in hundreds of applications and select precisely which cryptography to use at the time of program execution rather than program purchase. Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs) can now evolve independent of applications, and users can choose whatever cryptography is available wherever they are in the world. TIS is working closely with CSP vendors to ensure that CSPs with good cryptography are available in domestic and exportable versions as soon as possible based on the U.S. government's key escrow initiative. In a presentation at the recent RSA Conference, I tried to put all this in perspective by conducting a "thought experiment" (see attachment 3). + Suppose the U.S. government had never thought of placing export controls on cryptography... We would now have widespread use of encryption, both domestically and worldwide; we would be in a state of "Utopia," with widespread availability of cryptography with unlimited key lengths. But, once in this state, we will face situations where we need a file that had been encrypted by an associate who is unavailable (illness, traffic jam, or change of jobs). We will then realize that we must have some systematic way to recover our encrypted information when the keys are unavailable. When we add a user-controlled key recovery capability to our Utopia, we find ourselves in an "Ultimate Utopia," with unlimited key length cryptography, widely available through mass market applications, and user-controlled key recovery. + But, unfortunately, the U.S. government *did* think of cryptographic export controls. And over the past several years, we have been frustrated by repeated unsuccessful attempts to resolve this dilemma... In 1992, the U.S. government allowed the export of 40-bit keys, a solution so weak no one wanted it. In 1993, the U.S. government announced Clipper, an attempt to give users good cryptography while preserving the U.S. government's prerogatives. But almost everyone hated U.S. Government-controlled key escrow, including most foreign governments. In 1994, industry rebelled with the proposed Cantwell legislative initiative to remove cryptography from U.S. State Department control. And, behind the scenes, the U.S. government orchestrated a massive counterattack. The result: a study that acknowledged the widespread availability of foreign cryptography yet proposed no change in U.S. government policies on cryptographic exports. + Then in 1995, the U.S. government announced its key escrow initiative: allow the export of up to 64-bit cryptography (a remarkable concession) when accompanied by an acceptable form of user-controlled key escrow (critical component to this policy being that "an acceptable escrow system" must have sufficient integrity to give the government confidence that, with a warrant, the keys will be available.)... Some in the computer industry labeled this just another form of Clipper and vowed to continue the fight against U.S. government regulation of encryption in any form -- presumably forever. On the other hand, once the new escrowed encryption policy was announced, U.S. government agencies -- the FBI, NSA, White House, DoD, DoJ, NIST, and NSC -- closed ranks behind it and have shown little interest in discussing any other approaches. In addition, neither political party has shown any interest in taking up the argument in the Congress, probably because it is a complex issue and there is no obvious "winning" position. But, depending upon how the definition of user-controlled key escrow is resolved, the new escrow policy could just be the long-sought compromise between government and industry that gets us through this morass. + If we can ensure that organizations can control the security of backup access to their encrypted information through well-designed commercial key recovery systems -- yet also ensure that governments have access when justified via normal legal procedures -- we may have truly found the "Ultimate Utopia" solution to a dilemma that has existed all of our professional lives and threatens to continue through the next generation... Thus, in my thought experiment I have come to the conclusion that we (industry and government) are all heading towards the same objective, but on a different path from what some of us originally wanted. Yet, to my way of thinking, that path has to accomodate us all if we are ever to arrive at any mutually agreeable destination. When one group of participants raises insurmountable barriers for another group, it simply blocks everyone from progressing down any path, and the net result is that U.S. industry is not able to export any good crypto-based security. We at TIS are dedicated to finding a solution acceptable to all sides. We ask your help in this struggle. If you want exportable cryptography routinely available in your lifetime and believe that user-controlled key recovery is an important, if not vital, capability, please contact us at <cke(a)tis.com>. If you want to integrate exportable CKE into your product line, we are ready to help. If you want to buy internationally deployable good cryptography with your favorite applications, tell your application vendor you want escrow-enabled applications. We all have an opportunity to make a major difference here. The opportunity is ours to take or forgo. Help us make this happen. Visit our www site, at http://www.tis.com/, and learn more about this vital initiative. Sincerely, Stephen T. Walker Attachments: 1. Global Virtual Private networks with CKE/Gauntlet transaction security diagram. 2. CJ Application for "Escrow-enabled Gauntlet Firewall Model 3.2 with Gauntlet Data Recovery Center." 3. Diagram of cryptography evolution from 1992 to 1995, with Yesterday, Today, "Utopia" and "Ultimate Utopia." -----

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NSA agent arrested
by s1018954＠aix2.uottawa.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just heard a very short blurb on CBC radio about a KGB mole within the NSA from the 60's (?) getting arrested by the FBI. Pretty much no details were given. Any info? (Apologies if someone else has posted this today, I'm following the list from the hks archives, which I assume have a minor delay.)

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Re: Digital Signature Legislation (fwd)
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 20:54 AM 2/20/96 -0500, C. Bradford Biddle <biddle(a)pwa.acusd.edu> wrote: >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION: SOME REASONS FOR CONCERN > >[Copyright 1996 by Brad Biddle; permission granted for non-commercial >electronic redistribution] > >... >LIABILITY > >The Utah Act makes two policy choices concerning liability allocation >Under the Utah Act, consumers are held to a negligence standard in >guarding their private encryption key. Thus, if a criminal obtains a >consumer's private key and commits fraud, the consumer is financially >responsible for that fraud unless the consumer can prove that the consumer >used reasonable care in guarding the private key. ... One important point here is what is "reasonable care"? In a very real sense, all consumer computer operating systems are not secure. I have posted a theoretical virus born attack on PGP's secret key to the cypherpunks mailing list (archives at http://www.hks.net/cpunks/) Nathinal Borenstein of First Virtual has posted to the same list, a description of a partially implemented attack on credit card numbers which has received heavy response. If there is enough reward, these attacks will occur. The question I have is, does "reasonable care" include keeping your machine "virus free"? >There is a second troubling policy choice relating to liability. The Utah >Act limits the potential liability of one actor in the infrastructure -- >the certification authority -- to a fixed amount (termed a "suitable >guarantee" and determined by a complex formula or by administrative rule). The historic precedent is the liability limit on nuclear power plants. For both these problems, a relatively low liability limit would force people to use other techniques (e.g. old style signed contracts) for large transactions. While we are working the bugs out of a new technology, with new standards of "reasonable care", everyone might win if the risks are limited. >PRIVACY I believe the area of privacy is where the real problems lie. I will let other, more qualified, people suggest alternatives to the Utah law proposal. > >Brad Biddle, Legal Intern <biddle(a)acusd.edu> >Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Ctr for Public Interest Law >http://pwa.acusd.edu/~prc > >[The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the >Privacy Rights Clearinghouse or the Center for Public Interest Law.] Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: IPG Hoax Re: IPG Hoax?
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I must admit that after the first day I've been wondering if this whole > IPG thing isn't some kind of deep troll or early April Fool's joke. Well, not only is "Ralph" detweiling more intensely than anyone since the original, hitting as many hot buttons as possible, but he does an impressive job of trying to sound erudite by quoting various literary figures while misspellling their names (and misspeling other words far be-yond his obvious typ1ng defishncies.) And, of course, if he _isn't_ a hoax, he's probably representative of the rest of his company's quality process. Either way, he's quite impressive! Dos-toy-evsky

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Re: url
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:52 PM 2/22/96 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Mike McNally writes: >> At <URL:http://www.osf.org/~loverso/javascript/track-me.html> find >> some interesting "surveillance" applications of Javascript. > >Okay. We have some netscape people here on this list. > >When is the patch to let you disable JavaScript inside Netscape going >to go out? Its more than time. Why Perry, it's called Netscape 1.1N. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Digital Signature Legislation
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find it interesting to note that Dr. Biddle's concerns on the economic aspects of the legislation are almost the reverse of those on the cypherpunks list. For instance, he is concerned about too much liability by the consumer (and I would agree that the "strict liability" rather than "negligence" model is a problem). The concern on the list has been that there is too much liability for the CA, given the potential of unlimited liability for all transactions such as Dr. Biddle appears to be favoring. -Allen

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Re: Public Access Obsolete. Capitalism offers free email
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"fletch(a)ain.bls.com" "Mike Fletcher" 22-FEB-1996 03:53:16.20 > Who says the code has to run on their machine. Just forward >all incoming mail off to another box, and send all the outgoing mail out >from the free account. Depending of course on whether it's some sort >of shell account or if you POP/SMTP to their box. I'd guess it's some sort of dialin (possibly via tymnet or some such). In that case, you'd simply have your remailer on your system at home, calling the system up at some (probably randomly determined) time and downloading the incoming mail and uploading whatever outgoing mail that (given latency) you wanted to go out at that point. (Any on-encrypted email, such as their ads, you'd be able to filter out very easily). You could even potentially run it off of a portable computer. For unattended running, the hardware RNG would be best, of course. -Allen

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