December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: e$: The Demographic "Transaction" (was Re: Schelling Points...)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:36 AM 7/30/96, Arun Mehta wrote: >Socialism as an economic philosophy is fairly discredited, and is >on its way out without my expressions of outrage needed to help >it along. Yet, the capitalist economy seems to be no better at >dealing with extreme poverty. Really? Extreme poverty seems to be its own reward. So, I think market economies are dealing with the incompetent and/or the lazy very well. (This may sound harsh to many of you, but think about a world of seven billion souls, many of them living at the margins of survival. Not much more could be expected, no matter the economic system. In particular, command economies have not been more effective. Think about it this way: in 100 years, who cares if a billion or so folks lived only an average of 38.37 years instead of 41.91 years?) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Bush administration DT/Clipper strategy
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This redacted and declassified high level memo outlining the linkage of the Digital Wiretap bill and the Clipper initiative in the Bush administration was recently obtained by EPIC (http://www.epic.org) as the result of an FOIA request. I tried to keep the original spacing and relative lengths of blacked-out areas. Jim Gillogly 7 Wedmath S.R. 1996, 05:02 ___________________________________________________________________ UNCLASSIFIED stamped over TOP SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON January 17, 1991 [sic] MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DICK CHENEY Secretary of Defense THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. BARR Attorney General THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. GATES Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Legislative Strategy for Digital Telephony (S) On December 30, 1991, I sent to the President a memorandum seeking his approval for a legislative strategy for digital telephony. The substance of that memorandum is attached. On January 15, 1992, he approved the following course of action: - Justice should go ahead now to seek a legislative fix to the digital telephony problem, and all parties should prepare to follow through on the encryption problem in about a year. Success with digital telephony will lock in one major objective; we will have a beachhead we can exploit for the encryption fix; and the encryption access options can be developed more thoroughly in the meantime. (TS) <signed> Brent Scowcroft Attachment <stamped> Declassified/Released on <handwritten> 6/28/96 under provisions of E.O. 12958 by J. Saunders, National Security Council UNCLASSIFIED stamped over UNCLASSIFIED stamped over TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Declassifiy on: OADR ___________________________________________________________________ [Attachment: XXXX replaces blacked-out portions] UNCLASSIFIED stamped over TOP SECRET <stamped>THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN <handwritten> 1-15-92 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON <stamped> December 29, 1991 31 DEC 30 P3:00 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT <initials> SUBJECT: Legislative strategy for Digital Telephony Purpose <handwritten> EO To approve a legislative remedy to looming problems for law 12958 enforcement XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 1.5 (C) Background XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXXXXXXXXXXXX Analog technology allows interception of a single communication <written> through a tap on the target's line XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Same XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Digital technology simultaneously intermingles thousands of pieces of information on the line XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXe XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The best solution to this problem is to obtain legislation which ensures the cooperation of the telephone commXXXXXXXX providing access to target communications XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX All Same agencies agree with this legislative approach and that we should do it fairly soon. Preliminary soundings on the Hill suggest there is a reasonable chance of success even though these kinds of issues raise "civil liberties" issues with the attendant political fireworks. A timely legislative vehicle is the FCC Authorization Bill which has passed the House and awaits action in the Senate. We expect the Senate to take it up in January. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX <written> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX <stamp> Partially Declassified/Released 6/28/96 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX under provisions of <illegible> by J. Saunders, National Security Council UNCLASSIFIED stamped over UNCLASSIFIED stamped over cc: Vice President TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Chief of Staff Declassifiy on: OADR ___________________________________________________________________ UNCLASSIFIED stamped over 2 <written> TOP SECRET Delibera... Materi... <written> Deliberative Material XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The Justice view is that we should carefully press ahead and try to obtain a solution now. Justice contends that the costs of waiting (loss of access and the cost to recoup) are growing rapidly, and an attempt to fix it now is worth the political risks. RECOMMENDATION XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX Therefore, I recommend you give Justice the go-ahead to seek a fix to the digital telephony problem and direct all the parties to prepare to follow through on encryption in about a year. <checked> I prefer first to / meet with senior Approve __V___ Disapprove ______ advisors to discuss ______ <initials, underlined> GB UNCLASSIFIED stamped over UNCLASSIFIED stamped over TOP SECRET TOP SECRET ___________________________________________________________________ Transcribed by: ---- Jim Gillogly 7 Wedmath S.R. 1996, 05:02

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Let's Say "No!" to Single, World Versions of Software
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is imperative that Netscape, Microsoft, Qualcomm, and the other players be pressured/urged/cajoled to commit to introducing strong, unescrowed crypto for the *domestic* versions, even if not for export versions. I believe several signs are pointing to jockeying in the U.S. to get the major players in software to introduce "one version" programs with key escrow built in. While the avowed intent will be to stop _export_ of unescrowed strong crypto, such a "one version" (interoperable) strategy would mean that key escrow is the de facto situation within the United States. Several months back, during the flap over Netscape founder Jim Clarke's statements about the needs for key escrow, one result was that Netscape acknowledged that even if it had to have *two* versions, a domestic version and an export version, it would not put key escrow or other GAK versions into U.S . releases. It bears repeating, though we all know this: There are no restrictions whatsoever on crypto use in the United States. (The restrictions on airwave use of codes are more complicated to analyze, and don't effect speech, writing, normal communications, etc.) Not compromising on what is available to U.S. users is critical. (Of course, we all know that what is widely available to U.S. users will quickly become available in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. But this is no reason, formally, to compromise on basic freedoms within the U.S.) So, I urge you, be prepared to attack any of the major software vendors who offer any "one version" solutions which limit the strength of crypto available to the U.S. customers in the name of offering a single, world, exportable version. Without this ITAR hook, the government is currently powerless to control crypto domestically. (Many believe such restrictions would be dismissed on First Amendment grounds, as restrictions on the form of speech. Of course, many also believe the ITARs will eventually be found to be unconstitutional, at least the parts dealilng with software, technical articles, speech, etc.) One of the lines of my ever-expanding .sig has been "Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software!" I added this during the Lotus Notes flap, where Lotus honcho Ray Ozzie was proposing his "40 + 24" solution, where Lotus would give 24 bits of the 64-bit key to the government. When I coined the logo "Big Brother Inside," the Cypherpunks meeting after Clipper was announced in '93, it was this kind of cozy relationship between industry and government I was mainly commenting on. The NSA and FBI know that recruiting Netscape, Microsoft, Novell, Lotus, and others to implement GAK in their stupendously popular software products is the single best way to control the spread of strong crypto. I say we make it clear that this will not fly for U.S. versions! What kind of GAK gets built into products intended to be exported to Albania and Iran is of little relevance here in the U.S., where no laws give the government permission to dictate what is in a program, or how long a key is, or whether master keys have been duly deposited with the secret police. Let's remind people of this. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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HD Encryption
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there such thing as HD encryption?

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Re: Bush administration DT/Clipper strategy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many thanks to Jim G. for posting this. Several things caught my eye, but I'll only comment on one: " XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The Justice view is that we should carefully press ahead and try to obtain a solution now. Justice contends that the costs of waiting (loss of access and the cost to recoup) are growing rapidly, and an attempt to fix it now is worth the political risks." Considering that this was written in early 1992, I think we (and others) have done quite well to help stall this scheme for the past several years; the black eyes gotten by the fumbled Clipper I and Clipper II schemes have delayed and possibly derailed any hope for controlling both digital telephony and encrytion. (The document mentions going after digital telephony first, then tacking the encryption problem. Whatever one thinks of the needs or issues, this should make it clear that controlling crypto was a plan, not just the "public consumption" story of Clipper as a purely voluntary phone system for government contractors and the like.) The "race to the fork in the road," aka the point of no return, is underway. I think it is actually already too late to control crypto...too many packages already released, too many degrees of freedom in communication, too much "anarchy" in the Net. If we can keep NSA and the other TLA intelligence agencies in a state of confusion and missteps for another two years, I think the war will largely be over. (Not in digital money and banking, for other and more complicated reasons, but in the area of unbreakable communications.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Source Codes in C or Pascal
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone knows where to find source codes of sample encryption programs? I just wanted to know how they work... Thanks in advance!

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Re: HD Encryption
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:03 PM 7/28/96 +0800, Jerome Tan <jti(a)i-manila.com.ph> wrote: >Is there such thing as HD encryption? If you mean keeping the partition on your hard disk encrypted, with blocks decrypted when you want to read them and encrypted when you write, similar to the way Stacker and Doublespace decompress and compress files when reading and writing, sure. Obviously this sort of thing is operating-system dependent.... Most DOS commercial products that do this are not very good - they'll offer some sort of "fast proprietary encryption" which is either weaker than DES or FAR weaker than DES - though some use DES and a few have triple-DES as an option. There are several freeware products as well, with names like secdev and secdrv, that have good crypto. I don't know the Macintosh market. Some of the DOS/Windows products work under Windows 95 or NT, some don't. For networked environments, like Unix, there are better research-based systems like Matt Blaze's CFS Crypto File System, but since it's written in the US and Matt's with a large US company with many lawyers, he's not allowed to export it to you. There are also some commercial products. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Source Codes in C or Pascal
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:42 PM 7/28/96 +0800, you wrote: >Does anyone knows where to find source codes of sample encryption >programs? I just wanted to know how they work... Thanks in advance! The best archives are outside the US and not subject to its export laws. Some popular locations are ftp.funet.fi (in Finland), ftp.ox.ac.uk (at Oxford University in England), and ftp.dsi.unimi.it (in Italy.) You can also use AltaVista to look for Ron Rivest's home page, and look at his reference lists. The Cypherpunks home page is on www.csua.berkeley.edu . If you're somewhere that US technical books are readily available, Bruce Schneier's book "Applied Cryptography" is very good. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # Dispel Authority!

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TLAs on cypherpnks (was R
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> Is this the first confirmed report of TLA cypherpunk-monitoring? Might be the first reported, but many people probably thought it was... I did... P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... RAM = Rarely Adequate Memory ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Netscape Security Lies
by source＠iaccess.za 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have just tested Netscape's security page and it seems they are either lying or have a major bug. All you have to do to confirm this is to go to their page http://home.netscape.com/newsref/ref/netscape-security.html#test and click on the link under the heading Testing the Secure Server link "Here is a secure server you can visit. Do an iptrace and analyse of the interaction between the server and their browser version 3.05bgold and 3.05b, of which both reports that they are not even running a secure version of the server there. We decided to test further and found that the RSA secure server is only SSL 2 and SSL 3 which is what Netscape seems to be touting to the resting of the world saying they have it NOW. Later, if not much later seems far more realistic. I do not like being lied to, mislead or steam rolled by, how about you?

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