December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by John Brothers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:03 PM 7/25/96 -0400, you wrote: >On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, jim bell wrote: >> My guess? They all agree to kill whoever made that suicidal rule. >> Otherwise, all but two would end up dead. >But the people at the start of the line know that if they don't >hang together, they will end up dead, and if that they act purely >selfishly only the last two will benefit. Because they want to stay >alive, a better solution for the first person to propose equal shares, >which would be opposed by the last two players, but supported by the rest. >He could also split the money only amongst the first half of >the gang, since he only needs half the votes. doh! I just spent 20 minutes writing all the logic to that down! And to absolutely maximize his chances of staying alive, he will divide the money amongst robbers #2 - #10, and give up his own share. At least, that is the proposal I would make were I under those circumstances. John --- John Brothers Do you have a right not to be offended?

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Welcome to tmdgmet
by majordomo＠ayla.avnet.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the best way to approach this problem is to first try to solve it assuming there are only two robbers rather than 20. Then once you have that figured out, try it for three, then four, and so on. Keep in mind that 50% support is enough for a proposed distribution to pass, you don't need a strict majority. Hal

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- CLARIFICATION
by Erle Greer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:13 PM 7/25/96 -0500, you wrote: >Igor Chudov wrote: >> >> Here's a puzzle for our game theorists. >> >> Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's >> how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy >> suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If >> 50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted. >> >> Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 >> to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply. >> >> The question is, what will be the outcome? How will they split the >> money, how many robbers will be dead, and so on? >> > >I forgot to say what the GOALS are. The goals of every individual >cypherpunk are (in from highest to lowest priority): > >1. Stay alive >2. Get as much money as possible >3. Keep as many cypherpunks alive as possible, all other things being equal. > > - Igor. > Well, two wrong so far, here it is: Nobody knew that robber#17 was Steven Segal under-cover. #1 proposed an even split, so Segal broke his neck. The other 18, being CypherPunks, were smart enough to make tracks. One dead, Segal 20 million, and no lines rehearsed. vagab0nd(a)sd.cybernex.net http://ww2.sd.cybernex.net/~vagab0nd/index.html Visit web page for public key.

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- CLARIFICATION
by Erle Greer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:13 PM 7/25/96 -0500, you wrote: >Igor Chudov wrote: >> >> Here's a puzzle for our game theorists. >> >> Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's >> how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy >> suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If >> 50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted. >> >> Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 >> to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply. >> >> The question is, what will be the outcome? How will they split the >> money, how many robbers will be dead, and so on? >> > >I forgot to say what the GOALS are. The goals of every individual >cypherpunk are (in from highest to lowest priority): > >1. Stay alive >2. Get as much money as possible >3. Keep as many cypherpunks alive as possible, all other things being equal. > > - Igor. > OK, robber #1 secretly discusses with each other robber that if he votes for #1, that they will split it. All robbers thinking this, vote for #1. #1 then leaves town with 20 million. vagab0nd(a)sd.cybernex.net http://ww2.sd.cybernex.net/~vagab0nd/index.html Visit web page for public key.

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RE: Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory--Part II
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:51 PM 7/25/96, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >The stats on the average internet user are usually something like 85% male, >US$50K average income, 30-35 years old, Univeristy education. I doubt the age figure, and would want to see confirmation before using it. Certainly most people I deal with on the Net seem to be younger than 30-35, though this may be a reasonable _average_ (if not _median_). But the rest of the stats fit. >It may come as no suprise then that Internet users as a group could have life >experiences significantly different than a majority of the population. >Similarily, their views may also be in the minority. On the other hand, they do >hold a majority of the technological power. > >Revenge of the Nerds is one phrase that I have heard. An old movie name, of course. And "Triumph of the Nerds" was the name of the recent PBS/Mark Stevens program. (I hate the term "nerd," as I hate the names "dweeb," "geek," "jerk," etc. Believe me, anyone who thinks being called a "nerd" is complimentary, or anyone who labels himself as a "geek," is probably one who would call himself a "nigger," or a "queer.") >tcmay(a)got.net wrote: >>Even meant humorously (">;-)"), many of us would dispute the notion that >a >voluntarily-taken job is a "McJob." Frankly, working at a fast-food place >>is usually not a lifetime career, but is instead a [stepping stone] > >And what or who guarantees that this later, better job exists. Much of what I >read today suggests that McJobs may become the norm for many. "Guarantees"? You ask "what or who guarantees" a better job? I am speechless. There are no guarantees, friend. Not in this reality. Jobs are not something created by the stroke of a Presidential pen--jobs are what we call the exchange of labor or brainpower for money or other considerations. If Alice wants a new roof, and Bob offers to roof her house for a price she think is reasonable, this is a "job" for Bob. And so on. >Can you image working at a low paying job for your entire life. I personally >can't. I work hard and am doing well for myself. Like most of those here, >crypto >would be a benefit for me. On the other hand, unlike most of the population, I >could join Mensa if I applied. My point: I'm not average and I suspect that >neither are you or most of those here. How do you make the cypherpunks agenda >(on the days that there is one ;-) of widespread concern to the average >citizen? I don't, actually. As to "working at a low paying job...", it's a matter for them to work out, perhaps by getting new skills, perhaps by working two jobs, perhaps by opening a business. The statistics on where wealth was created in the 1985-95 period show it overwhelmingly came from new entrepreneurial efforts. >I'm having a hell of a time getting my e-mail read because I'm too busy >shooting >at the food scavengers. They killed my dog! > ???? Not a persuasive argument. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 PM 7/25/96 -0500, ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov) wrote: >In my initial post that caused all the turmoil I said (literally) this: >``Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank.'' > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >I was careful choosing words. That was my reaction as well. I'd assume that if twenty cypherpunks rob a bank, either it's one of Eric's party games (:-), or else they probably conspired over the net to rob a bank by computer. 1) The bank probably knows which bank got robbed. 2) The public probably won't hear about it. 3) The cypherpunks might or might not. 4) The number and identity of the cypherpunks is unknown, both to each other and to the bank. 5) If all twenty bank-robbing cypherpunks do conspire to get together in a room to split up the loot, it's probably a chat-room or mud-room; it's not likely to be physical space. 6) It's very hard to kill people whose identities you don't know across a net that obscures their physical location as well. 7) I suppose you could kill-file them, which does cut them out of the voting process, and therefore probably out of the money, but is certainly less drastic than shooting them. 8) Besides, how do you tell who's first on the list when they're all nyms anyway? 9) Who's got the money, anyway? Was there some sort of secret-sharing protocol to make sure that the one cypherpunk holding the loot doesn't just telnet to Argentina.com with it? 10) Money? What money? 11) How do they conduct the voting? Merely arguing over the voting protocols could occupy megabytes of list bandwidth. 12) They could just decide to use the money to pay the winner of a lottery to predict when somebody shoots Jim Bell. 13) But that wouldn't really take much, so there's still a lot left over. 14) N>10 of the twenty are really all Tentacles, so they can all vote to shoot any non-Tentacle and then vote to split the cash between themselves. 15) They could even killfile one or two Tentacles just to make it look like a fair process. 16) I _knew_ we shouldn't have killfiled Lieutenant Niedermeyer! 17) Seventeen is the mystical number. 18) If the public _does_ hear about it, the bank's stock will drop like a rock, and they can use the money to buy out the bank. 19) It's mine, mine, all mine! 20) Bang! # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Ross Anderson's Eternity Service
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In response to Hal's questions... I think the Eternity Service, as I understand the idea (altho I haven't read the paper yet), is valuable to society. In some countries, the government may try to suppress views and information unpopular to them and the ES could help make the information available. Sort of like Radio Free Internet. This one use - helping people who may be living under repressive governments get access to more information - would make the service valuable. There is certainly a large risk to intellectual property holders, if people used such a service to distribute copies of software, music, videos, or whatever, to avoid paying royalties and etc. -- pj re the DES hack, has anyone asked Damien when the researchers go on vacation? ;^)

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Re: CD Prices and Inflation
by mike＠fionn.lbl.gov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jul 26, 5:06am, Timothy C. May wrote: > Something not being talked about in any of the messages I've seen is the > role of _inflation_. Those claiming CD prices are "too high" should > consider inflation. Good argument, but I think you're still paying more. Some have made the argument that the cost of manufacture of a CD is less (I wouldn't know). Most people pay considerably more taxes for that new platter, too. Sales tax is 6% or more now, was 2-3% then for most people, other taxes have gone way up too. You probably had to earn $28 to bring home that $16 cd.

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:03 PM 7/25/96 -0400, Simon Spero wrote: >On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, jim bell wrote: >> My guess? They all agree to kill whoever made that suicidal rule. >> Otherwise, all but two would end up dead. > >But the people at the start of the line know that if they don't >hang together, they will end up dead, and if that they act purely >selfishly only the last two will benefit. Because they want to stay >alive, a better solution for the first person to propose equal shares, >which would be opposed by the last two players, but supported by the rest. >He could also split the money only amongst the first half of >the gang, since he only needs half the votes. Yes, my answer was quick, flip, and partly wrong. It turns out the answer is probably indeterminate, because the amount people want to live is indeterminate. Consider: If two were left, #2 would get everything by the rules. (he would propose, "I get everything!" The vote would be 1-1, or 50%, which would win.) If three were left, #2 knows that if #3 is eliminated, he would win as above. #1 knows this as well, and is motivated to make a deal with #3 to prevent this. #3 is also motivated to deal, because if he can't get an agreement he's not only out of the money, he's dead. How they choose to split up the money is unknowable, I suspect, because of the "death" aspect. #3 could also deal with #2 if #1's terms were onerous. This problem would be simpler to analyze (and probably determinate) if anyone whose proposal was rejected was simply out of the game, rather than dead. There's another complicating aspect. Voting order is important. According to the rules, #3 must make a proposal, which needs to be voted on. Obviously, #3 will vote for it. But even if he's come to some agreement with #2, will #2 vote yes? If #2 votes no, 3's gone and #2 wins everything. So #3 couldn't trust #2 to vote yes. particularly if #2 voted last. If #1 voted last, and #2 defected, #1 might vote for it, _IF_ it was more desireable than "zero" for him. Could #3 make a proposal like this: "I propose that the money be split up among all who vote for this proposal." #1 would have to vote for it, else he'd get nothing. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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