December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: List for crypto minus political rubbish
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 03, 1996 14:38:59, 'Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)cyberpass.net>' wrote: >Just about everything on cryptography has already been said far too many times. >Just read Applied Cryptography and be done with it. What remains to discuss is >politics, psychology and marketing. How do you get people to use the >cryptography that already exists and how will the authorities react when people >do use it. An exemplary air-clearing for a smoke-filled agenda; and two challenging questions which may pose a High Noon amongst munitions-slingers. Bravo, Matts, for cryptic concision.

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problem
by Fallen Angel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I unsubscribed from your mailing list so why am I still receiving email from it. I No longer wish to receive any more mail, so please stop it. Fallen Angel fallenangel(a)multipro.com

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Re: FAA to require transponders on all aircraft passengers
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This does seem to be real. CNet has a few more details: http://www.cnet.com/Content/News/Files/0,16,2031,00.html At 08:28 PM 8/2/96 -0700, you wrote: >According to KCBS, a local radio station, the FAA has closed a long >anticipated deal with a manufacturer of transponder devices. The goal of >the system to be deployed nationwide is to match aircraft passengers to >their luggage and thereby identify unaccompanied luggage on board an >aircraft. > >Transponders will be affixed to all items of luggage and all passengers. If >the system discovers a transponder on the luggage in the cargo hold without >the corresponding transponder on the passenger on board, an alarm will >sound. I am not making this up. > >As many of you know, I have long predicted subcutaneous transponders to >become widely deployed in the near future. First for child identification >and monitoring of criminals, then, as the children grow up, as universal >ID, driver license, proof of eligibility for employment, PIN substitute, >etc. > >Today, we moved a step closer to this future. > >[Note that the transponders will have to be affixed to the passenger. An >example would be a hospital style bracelet that stops working when removed. >Why embedding the transponder in a hand carried item, such as a card, will >not work is left as an exercise to the reader. Even an affixed device does >not provide perfect security. You'd really have to embed the transponder in >the body at an early age to make removal nearly impossible.] > > > >-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. > Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. > Vote Harry Browne for President. > > > >

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Re: FAA to require transponders on all aircraft passengers
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:56 8/3/96, David Lesher wrote: [Quoting Lucky] >> According to KCBS, a local radio station, the FAA has closed a long >> anticipated deal with a manufacturer of transponder devices. The goal of >> the system to be deployed nationwide is to match aircraft passengers to >> their luggage and thereby identify unaccompanied luggage on board an >> aircraft. > >I thinks they have mixed their marbles.... Nope. This from Micron's website: Editorial Contact: Julie Nash, Micron Technology, (208) 368-4400 Web Site URL http://www.micron.com Fax-on-demand: 800-239-0337 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE MICRON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ANNOUNCES AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Boise, Idaho, August 2, 1996 - Micron Communications, Inc., today announced a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRDA) with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop a model Positive Passenger Baggage Matching (PPBM) system. The objective of this PPBM system is to automatically recognize when baggage has been placed on an aircraft without an associated passenger. Micron Communications intends to utilize remote intelligent communications (RIC) technology developed for its MicroStamp family of products to design a security system which will enhance current systems and provide efficient tracking of passengers and baggage. "Micron Communications is proud to be associated with products that are designed to help increase the safety of airline travel, while providing operational benefits to the industry and increasing the convenience to the traveler," said John R. Tuttle, Chairman and President of Micron Communications, Inc. "Our experience in microelectronics and systems design should enable us to develop systems that use tomorrow's technology in finding solutions to these important problems." "Once again, an Idaho company is breaking new ground," Senator Larry Craig said. "As chairman of the Congressional-White House Task Force on Terrorism, its exciting to see this kind of high-tech advancement in security being developed here at home by Micron Communications, Inc. The Positive Passenger Baggage Matching system is exactly the kind of common-sense answer we are looking for to improve airline safety and give us all greater comfort when we fly in the future, " Craig continued. Current MicroStamp-based products include the MicroStamp credit card-sized device and the MicroStamp Engine in a 20-pin, small-outline integrated circuit (SOIC) plastic package. Micron Communications believes that the MicroStamp integrated circuit is the first wireless communications technology to integrate a single-chip CMOS solution, which includes a direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) microwave-frequency radio operating at 2.45GHz, a microcontroller, and low-power static random access memory (SRAM). It also contains a synchronous serial port allowing additional memory expansion. RIC units are different from RFID tags because they have a central processing unit (CPU), memory and microwave on board. This combination allows RIC units to perform more applications than low-performance RFID tags that use older technology at lower frequencies. MicroStamp RIC units are more powerful and more flexible than RFID units. They are also smaller and cost less than other RIC units of comparable performance. Systems integrators, original equipment manufacturers or end users interested in the MicroStamp family of products should contact Micron Communications Customer Service department, 1-888-MSTAMP1, (888-678-2671). Micron Communications, Inc., is a subsidiary of Micron Technology, Inc., whose common stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE) under the symbol MU. MicroStamp and MicroStamp Engine are trademarks of Micron Communications, Inc. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: Tolerance (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 3 Aug 1996 06:44:54 -0700 (PDT) > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)eff.org> > Subject: Re: Tolerance (fwd) > > > > It isn't my interpretation. Perhaps you should have paid better attention in > > class. These issues have never been tested in a court of law in the US in > > regards to computer networks and their special nature. > > [...] > > > That is a two edged sword. Where did you get your law degree? My lawyers > > both got theirs at UT Austin Law School. Both are federal lawyers and both > > have argued before the Supreme and are currently allowed to argue before the > > Supremes. > > > I've deleted most of Jim's meanderings above, mostly because I'm > fascinated by the credentialism in the graf above. What credentials mine or the lawyers? > He implies, without directly saying so, that "his lawyers" have weighed > in on this dispute and agree with him. Hmmm, I looked back over this and I fail to see where this interpretation can be taken. Perhaps you as well read more than is on the page. If you would like to address specific issues then perhaps there would be some basis for dialog. > Of course this is hardly likely; > he advances no coherent legal theory. (Except the "public forum" > argument, which might apply to Usenet, but not cypherpunks.) I have advanced several coherent theories. My primary one being that if the 9th and 10th are included in Constitutional interpretation many of the issues, such as crypto and gun ownership, become trivial issues to resolve. As to if it applies to cpunks and other similar 'private' resources, we will just see how the court cases fall down the road. > This is attempted proof by credentalism. I call him on it. Not any more than the original comments I was responding to. Anyway, what is yoru credentials to 'call' me on it? While it may be true that you don't agree with my views that hardly carries the weight to dismiss those views out of hand. You sir, are not the legal benchmark in this country. I am simply trying to change something I see as unjust. > Okay, Jim, what _do_ your lawyers say on this? Have you asked them? I, > too, have an attorney, a civil liberties specialist and a graduate from > Princeton law. So what? Yes, I have asked them, both. They both agree that the issues that I raise have NOT been tested in a court of law in this country (or any other) and that it is possible that the inclusion of the 9th and 10th in a civil liberties case could prove quite unsettling. They have also warned me that quite a bit of current legal precedence is in fact against my views. I accept this, just as the folks who fought for womens suffrage or the end to slavery fought against societies which enacted laws and policies that while accepted by the vast majority as the status quo were never the less wrong. If my views were the commen standard we wouldn't be having this discussion in the first place.

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Re: List for crypto minus political rubbish
by sparks＠bah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<rant> Personally, I enjoy some of the rantings, although I would like a forum for new users to get some help and guidance.. perhaps they can scan my ISP to see if I have accessed some bomb making info ... </rant> >Status: U >Date: Sat, 3 Aug 1996 13:34:10 GMT >To: Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)cyberpass.net> >Subject: Re: List for crypto minus political rubbish >From: jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >X-PipeUser: jya >X-PipeHub: pipeline.com >X-PipeGCOS: (John Young) >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk > >On Aug 03, 1996 14:38:59, 'Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)cyberpass.net>' wrote: > >>Just about everything on cryptography has already been said far too many >times. >>Just read Applied Cryptography and be done with it. What remains to >discuss is >>politics, psychology and marketing. How do you get people to use the >>cryptography that already exists and how will the authorities react when >people >>do use it. > > >An exemplary air-clearing for a smoke-filled agenda; and two challenging >questions which may pose a High Noon amongst munitions-slingers. Bravo, >Matts, for cryptic concision. > > > >

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Re: AP story: Police look for Olympic bombing Internet link.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:26 PM 8/3/96, Jonathan Corbet wrote: >My local paper (a Knight-Ridder rag) printed this story -- unquestioned -- >as well. Needless to say, I think a statement like this needs to be >responded to. Letters to the editor, folks! Wouldn't it be nice to have a >press that did a little more than print what the "authorities" have to say? ... >Meanwhile, I have a question: as far as I know, no bombing has actually >been tied to the Internet in any way. Does anybody know otherwise? Even >though it's not really relevant to the principles of the debate here, it >seems worth pointing out. But, as I keep saying, this is not a very useful argument. Given that bomb-makers get their information somewhere (encyclopedia articles, books, Loompanics catalogs, etc.) and given that the Web is beginning to seriously compete with these traditional sources, I have no doubts that the Net will sooner rather than later be implicated in a bombing. If one makes the arguments the the Net should not be regulated because it has not been used to supply information for a crime, then what happens when the Net *is* implicated? That particular argument then crumbles. I prefer to argue it this way: "Sure, the Net could be used for information on bombs. So could encyclopedias, books, "Time" and "Newsweek," and CNN. So what? We don't throw out the First Amendment and our belief that people can read and write what they want just because a few bombers may gain knowledge. We don't shut down chemistry departments because bombers learn about chemistry. And so on." This is, I think, a more lasting and persuasive argument. --Tim May HOW TO MAKE A PIPE BOMB: "Buy a section of metal water pipe 1/2 by 6 inches long, threaded on both ends. Buy two metal caps to fit. These are standard items in hardware stores. Drill a 1/16th hole in the center of the pipe. This is easy with a good drill bit. Hanson is a good brand to use. Screw a metal cap tightly on one end. Fill the pipe to within 1/2 inch of the top with black powder. Do not pack the powder. Don't even tap the bottom of the pipe to make it settle. You want the powder loose. For maximum explosive effect, you need dry, fine powder sitting loose in a very rigid container." (more information at http://sdcc13.ucsd.edu/~m1lopez/pipe.html, or by using search engines)

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Anonymous Message Broadcast
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone implemented a simple anonymous chat system (an anonymous irc) using the technique described in Applied Cryptography 2nd edition? I'm speaking of the Anonymous Message Broadcast documented in section 6.3, it begins on page 137. Can the same system be implemented using base256 (unsigned char, 8bit ASCII) instead of the simple on/off binary method that is described in the explanation? How would it differ. Thanks. (define(RSA m e n)(list->string(u(r(s(string->list m))e n))))(define(u a)(if(> a 0)(cons(integer->char(modulo a 256))(u(quotient a 256)))'()))(define(s a)(if (null? a)0(+(char->integer(car a))(* 256(s(cdr a))))))(define(r a x n)(cond((= 0 x)1)((even? x)(modulo(expt(r a(/ x 2)n)2)n))(#t(modulo(* a(r a(1- x)n))n))))

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Re: FAA to require transponders on all aircraft passengers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:21 PM 8/3/96, David Lesher wrote: >They are going to hang one of these on EVERY bag? > >At what per-unit cost? > >It's all the airlines can do to get barcode labels on each piece >that geos by, much less even a credit-card-sized gadget. And how >many will they lose??? > >THEN think of the RFI problems..... It turns out that I'm one of the early investors in a start-up company developing a very similar product, albeit (we hope) with some technological advantages. Lucky Green, for one, has met the principals in this company and can confirm what I'm saying. (I began working with them, and investing, several years ago. It was partly the long-term implications of their ideas which triggered my proposal a few years back: the "position escrow system." Under position escrow, citizen-units would voluntarily escrow their positions for access by authorized law enforcement officers, dietary compliance agents, social workers, and other interested officials. The system is voluntary, as key escrow is voluntary, in that it only applies when people leave their houses and use the public streets; they are of course free not to leave their houses, and hence not to voluntarily escrow their movements.) I heard about the Micron-FAA deal on CNN, and went to the Micron Web site for details. It's a spread-spectrum system, so it may well work in a luggage environment (though perhaps not as well as the units planned by the company I'm an investor in). The "every bag" point is feasible, though I would assume conventional luggage tags would work adequately. "Per-unit" costs could be low enough....these units will be reused many times, after all. The RFI problems are actually the least of the concerns, given the "code space" technology which is possible. (That is, tens of thousands of transponders can share the same RF spectrum in a local environment by allocation of frequencies or, even better, by using code space allocation...there are some close parallels with cryptography, of course, as there are in communications technology and spread-spectrum technology in general.) Personally, I'm not convinced that the Micron-FAA deal with accomplish much, but the authorities are rushing to "do something," so struggling Micron may get some of the largesse. (Besides, "bag escrow" will allow other agencies--such as DEA--to sniff bags for traces of cocaine residue and then automatically issue arrest orders for the citizen-unit associated with the bag. The surveillance state needs technology like this.) --Tim May HOW TO MAKE A PIPE BOMB: "Buy a section of metal water pipe 1/2 by 6 inches long, threaded on both ends. Buy two metal caps to fit. These are standard items in hardware stores. Drill a 1/16th hole in the center of the pipe. This is easy with a good drill bit. Hanson is a good brand to use. Screw a metal cap tightly on one end. Fill the pipe to within 1/2 inch of the top with black powder. Do not pack the powder. Don't even tap the bottom of the pipe to make it settle. You want the powder loose. For maximum explosive effect, you need dry, fine powder sitting loose in a very rigid container." (more information at http://sdcc13.ucsd.edu/~m1lopez/pipe.html, or by using search engines)

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Re: Information gathering by news servers
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12.33 PM 8/2/96 -0400, Scott McGuire wrote: >How much information about what someone reads can be gathered >by a news server? Is there an anonymous way to read a public >news server, or would a server have to be set up intentionally >to allow anonymous reading? You could use the Anonymizer (http://www.anonymizer.com/) in combination with a Web Usenet archive: Dejanews, for example. (http://www.dejanews.com/) =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMgOHcBguzHDTdpL5AQE2QAQArHuoLVA0dOJ+LddI2TumYvD/vaFrWBmI LQ3pDNlDRHdyY7u1RouVKkJbYVTvxNZCKQyaWYMgcA38eZl52V65DFq+N11Jhwm4 egCBlOlezDjPOeTk/nK25Ojavdb8ABtqGXGRFf4GwfFBQPq2kApzi8MewYEYeCJG HaofCy5FDWU= =bG1v -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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