December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Technology- vs. Human-based Surveillance
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:35 AM 7/8/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: >Who needs high-tech for a surveillance state? I remember several >years back a Soviet-history class that put a lot of emphasis on the >Czar's totalitarian regime, much of which was already in place when >the Bolshviks took power (and one of the reasons they held it). ... A human-based surveillance state is very expensive, even by the standards of modern America and its bloated government. The recent example of the DDR's "Staasi" provides an example. Hard to hide the extent of the surveillance when so many people are involved. Better, think the Thought Police, to use technology to do the intercepts and pre-screening of the take. Also, the right technology (right for them, not us) makes widespread tapping possible, where human-based systems are not. (As but one example, hard to get human spies into companies on short notice to monitor a target.) In short, technology-based surveillance is "scalable" in a way that human-based surveillance is not. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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TACDFIPSFKMI (fwd)
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 16:36:09 -0400 From: Elaine Frye <elaine.frye(a)nist.gov> Subject: Announcement re New TAC July 8, 1998 Note To: Key Escrow Distribution List From: Ed Roback Subject: Establishment of the Technical Advisory Committee to Develop a Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure (TACDFIPSFKMI) FYI, the following notice was published today in the Federal Register. --------- Published 7-8-96 in the Federal Register, Volume 61, Number 131 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Technical Advisory Committee to Develop a Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2, and the General Services Administration (GSA) rule on Federal Advisory Committee Management, 41 CFR Part 101-6, and after consultation with GSA, the Secretary of Commerce has determined that the establishment of the Technical Advisory Committee to Develop a Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed upon the Department by law. The Committee will advise the Secretary on the development of a draft Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure. The Committee will consist of no more than twenty-four members to be appointed by the Secretary to assure balanced representation among individuals with established expertise in cryptography and the implementation and use of cryptographic systems. The Committee will function solely as an advisory body, and in compliance with provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The charter will be filed under the Act, fifteen days from the date of publication of this notice. Interested parties are invited to submit comments regarding the establishment of this committee to Edward Roback, Computer Security, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, telephone: 301-975-3696. Dated: June 27, 1996 Mark Bohannon Chief Counsel for the the Technology Administration [FR Doc. 96-16896, Filed 7-5-96; 8:45 a.m.] ***************************************************** Elaine Frye Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology Bldg. 820, M.S. Room 426 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-0001 Voice: 301/975-2819 Fax: 301/948-1233 *****************************************************

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Re: Style gettting in the way of clear reporting
by Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

May complains loudly about Meek and other writers style. Meek hardily needs my defense, he's the best in the biz (speaking as another writer, I add, damn it!) But, your problem is simply one of style, not of substance. Like it or not, Meek does communicate well with the vast majority of his readers. His faux-Chandler isn't for everyone, but he makes his points loud and clear. Steven Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols sjvn(a)access.digex.net http://www.access.digex.net/~sjvn/vna.html QOTD: "You have a job. I work for a living" -- sjvn, freelance writer

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Re: The Net and Terrorism
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks for the fine comments (and the comments from your shrink-wrapped friend on Ritalin). A very few comments: At 8:16 AM 7/8/96, Arun Mehta wrote: >because you were taught hate, doesn't mean you won't outgrow it. My mother >was active in the freedom struggle against the British, and told me enough >horror stories that I grew up hating them. But once I met some perfectly >decent specimens, it evaporated. This is my experience, too, with using common sense in deciding which races, if any, to hate. >India is a large, diverse country with lots of injustice, poverty and other >problems. When we analyze what breeds terrorism, we find aspects such as: > >- Severe neglect by the government (i.e. problems keep getting worse): For >instance, the north east (which is east of Bangladesh, and has a long >history of militant opposition) had to agitate for a long time to even get a >railway line to connect them to the rest of the country. A case, of course, where the government set the policy on who to connect, based on votes and influence. In a market economy, regions get connected by rail when a market for goods to be shipped appears likely, when customers will pay for tickets, etc. (Until the last several decades, this is the way railroads and shipping in the U.S. expanded. J.J. Hill built the "Great Northern" rail line across the northern part of the U.S. without a dime of subsidy and without much interference by government.) >- Meddling by politicians: in Punjab, there was a Sikh regional party that >was quite strong. To erode its popular base, Indira Gandhi encouraged the >fundamentalists on its right. Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi's government helped >train the Tamil LTTE. Both paid for these blunders with their lives, at the >hands of the very groups they had once tried to foster. This "tactical move" of pitting one religious or ethnic group against another should be a lesson for the rest of us. Much better to take a hands-off attitude and essentially pretend that differences don't matter. (As opposed, say, to giving special privileges to Baptists, blacks, Catholics, etc.) In this regard, I think the U.S. got it "right" (though we are drifting toward a "minority rights" situation, which is sowing the seeds of Indian-style sectarian conflict, e.g., the riots in Los Angeles a few years ago). (Arun is now quoting someone else) >>The U.S. has a level of tolerance for diversity that I >>only recently came to >>appreciate. We hosted a foreign exchange student from Scotland (hardly >>culture shock to him), but he surprised me when he commented on how >>surprised he was that different groups of people were mixed together > >I've had a similar experience. I was part of the Indian delegation to a >couple of Amnesty International International Council meetings. In this >organisation, multiracialism and multiculturalism are heavily promoted. But >if you looked at delegations from Europe, even from countries with sizable >racial minorities, they were typically all-white. The US delegation, on the >other hand, had blacks, different kinds of Asians, Hispanics... and not by >design -- the US section leadership is highly "mixed", so they did not have >to think about multiracialism, it just happened. Of course, given the >"melting pot" ethos in the US, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, Americans are often branded as racist yahoos by the enlightened, racially-tolerant folks of Europe. They cluck at our "racial problems." However, America is a melting pot, as Arun notes. On a daily basis we interact with blacks, Asians, Mexicans, whites of all flavors, etc. Blacks, for example, are very well-represented in so many areas (not science and technology, for educational/cultural/image reasons--see Note if you want to hear why). For anyone who buys the UNESCO line about how American is a fundamentally racist society, a visit for a few weeks should clarify things. There is still a lot of racial separation, by choice and not by law, and economic disparities. But the fact is that the races mix on a daily basis, with little or no conflict. Music, sports, entertainment, business, etc. (Note: For various cultural and image reasons, science and technology are _not_ emphasized as careers for black children. Contrast the image of science in predominantly black environments with the image of science in, say, predominantly Jewish environments. The result is clear: blacks are severely underrepresented in these areas, and Jews are overrepresented in these same areas. Hey, I'm just citing a basic truth of our times, at least in this country. Similar statistics apply to Asians, with more than half of all U.C. Berkeley science and engineering undergrad students being Asian, and something less than 3% of them being black. The figures for who _graduates_ are even more skewed. There are various reasons for this. One of my pet peeves is how the terms "dweeb," "nerd," and "geek" are used to characterize science and engineering majors and professionals. Hardly terms that are likely to make a brother in the hood consider studying science!) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Pseudo-DC-net Project
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am working on a project to implement a variation of a DC-net to be run over the Internet. I am posting this summary to find out if it overlaps with projects others are working on; to see what members of the lists think of the general ideas for the network I have in mind; and to see if anyone is interested in helping me out. The variation of a DC-net I have in mind will vary in three important ways from a true DC-net: Difference (1) (Pseudo-random numbers) It will use pseudo-random numbers in place of true random numbers. Difference (2) (Star shaped network) The graph of the network will be star shaped instead of completely connected. Difference (3) (MACs) Messages broadcast on the pseudo-DC-net will have a MAC appended in a key shared by the channel participants. Difference (4) (Encryption) Messages sent to the channel will be encrypted in a key shared by the participants. Because of these difference from a true DC-net I will refer to the network I have in mind as a "pseudo-DC-net". Difference (1) is desirable since current techniques for generating true random numbers on PC's are slow, and distribution of the resulting true random numbers is enormously consumptive in terms of bandwidth. Difference (2) is made possible by the use of pseudo-random number generators, and is desirable since it reduces the total number of messages that need to transferred. Difference (3) is desirable to identify messages broadcast by unauthorized parties to the network, and, as a side benefit, to help clients filter out collisions--- when two parties try to broadcast at the same time. Difference (4) is desirable so that eavesdroppers cannot determine what messages are being broadcast to the network. Difference (1) implies a downgrading of the level of anonymity from unconditional to cryptographic, and difference (2) opens the possibility for protocol attacks. I would like to break this project up into three parts: a formal protocol specification, a client implementation or implementations, and a server implementation or implementations. I would like the formal protocol specification to be publicly available to allow anyone to write their own clients and servers, and to communicate their criticisms of the protocol. The protocol will not dictate what pseudo-random number generator is to be used, although there will be a note of a rule to ensure that pairs of users are using the same generator for the "coin flips" they share. Similarly, the protocol should be flexible enough to allow the use of any reasonable length MAC. A general outline of the protocols I have in mind are as follows: Protocol (1) (Channel registration protocol) Channels will be registered with the server. A channel will be specified by a time frame in which a pseudo-DC-net is to be run; the IP address and port to which clients are to connect to join the channel; the length of each message block to be transmitted to the channel; and a channel ID. Protocol (2) (Pseudo-DC-net real-time protocol) The protocol for running the channel will consist of a series of "rounds". Each round will consist of the following steps: Step (1) The transmission of a round synchronization number from the server to the clients, along with a string of bits specifying the set of users connected. Old clients should make sure that the synchronization number is consistent with the synchronization number of the previous round. Step (2) Receipt by the server from each client of a block of input for that round. (If the user does not wish to broadcast, this will be the XOR sum of the next blocks in the the pseudo-random number streams shared by the user with the other users (call this sum S). If the user wishes to broadcast, it will be the encryption of the following: the XOR of S with a message consisting of the concatenation of the channel id, round number, message length, message, message padding, and MAC of these five components.) Step (3) Transmission from the server to each client of the XOR sum of the blocks received. Protocol (3) (Optional Payment Protocol) I would like to add the option for the server to charge e-cash for the administration of the channel. I have also thought about an extension in which messages to the server would be signed so that the server could prevent an unauthorized user from hijacking a connection and disrupting a channel. If you would like to help me out with this project, if it overlaps with something you are already doing or have done, or you just think my ideas are no good (or good! :) ), please let me know. I am especially interested in attacks in which the server lies about the round number or set of connected users. If this project is works out well, I would like to later work on protocols for voting using a pseudo-DC-net. Leonard Janke (pgp key id 0xF4118611) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMeFVY0MBIFf0EYYRAQErKwf+OcQjqoODovlRJZtrXuqTGeiRHTobFDa+ DFWEmGl+yditRBt9nAlCgXGiRkCXhqroX30M+SEVw02trc1eBMCeJUSvxB9d0pN6 9x3vDN/XB4Kj6kAuAypulBCa0f74Uim4nJvZDw7boEW/hXY3Yuf7d3mgOsNY/LRT p62FL24wnz8aeBAVYnE6SJp59u9Yssrvb2lez1IuKIdN8Rqx590Fwn1VBZ2oqGk8 6UucJkvTht7XmKPuckND+Lhq7jv1vVZKZD3NRe4Uy21JstwKwwpuVXVX98YlNc+Y a15wW4WstZIzsKuPrYVsLsb+wXsETp1sgp5jDkKQABfit7XS8FVC9g== =KZsI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Announcement] - Crypto library for Java available
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Systemics Cryptix crypto library for Java is now available for download at http://www.systemics.com/software/ The library is FREE FOR COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL USE. Apart from much tidying up, there have been several signigicant additions to the library, including a Blowfish implementation, RSA encryption (including key generation routines), CFB and CBC block cipher mode modules, and a cryptographically secure random InputStream. Enjoy! CRYPTIX 1.1 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC EXTENSIONS FOR JAVA _________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION This library contains a suite of cryptographic classes for Java. Some of the classes have been implemented in native code for performance reasons, and have been tested on Windows 95, Windows NT, Solaris, Linux and IRIX. The package documentation is available on line. FEATURES All of the following have been implemented: * java.crypt.BlockCipher This class is a base class for all block ciphers. * java.crypt.Blowfish (based on code from A.M. Kuchling, Bryan Olson and Bruce Schneier) An implementation of Bruce Schneier's Blowfish block cipher. * java.crypt.CipherFeedback A class for implementing the cipher feedback mode of block cipher encryption. * java.crypt.CSRandomStream A cryptographically secure pseudo random input-stream. * java.crypt.DES (based on code from Eric Young) An implementation of the DES block cipher. * java.crypt.HashMD5 An class encapsulating MD5 hashes. * java.crypt.HashSHA An class encapsulating SHA hashes. * java.crypt.IDEA An implementation of the IDEA block cipher algorithm. Based on native libraries. * java.crypt.MD5 (based on code from RSA Data Security, Inc.) An implementation of the MD5 message digest algorithm. Based on native libraries. * java.crypt.MD5OutputStream An output stream the creates an MD5 hash of its input. * java.crypt.MessageDigest A base class for all messsage digest algorithms. * java.crypt.MessageDigestOutputStream A class for using message digest functions to hash an output stream. * java.crypt.MessageHash A base class for classes encapsulating hashes. * java.crypt.rsa.PublicKey An RSA public key. * java.crypt.rsa.RSAKeyGen A class for generating RSA public/secret key pairs. * java.crypt.rsa.SecretKey An RSA secret key. * java.crypt.SHA (based on code from NIST and Peter C. Gutmann) An implementation of NISTs SHA message digest algorithm. Based on native libraries. * java.crypt.SHAOutputStream An output stream the creates an SHA hash of its input. * java.crypt.StreamCipher A base class for stream ciphers. * java.math.BigInteger (based on code from Eric Young). This class implements arbitrary length integers and some associated mathematical functions. Based on native libraries. * java.math.MPI A class for converting BigIntegers to and from MPI format integers. * java.math.PRNG A class for generating a pseudo random sequence with a period of 2**160. * java.math.RandomStream An input stream that is random. * java.math.TestPrime A class for testing the primality of BigIntegers. COPYRIGHT This library includes (or is derived from) software developed by (and owned by) the following: * Peter C. Gutmann * A.M. Kuchling * NIST * Bryan Olson * RSA Data Security, Inc. * Bruce Schneier * Eric Young &lteay(a)mincom.oz.au> Other parts of the library are covered by the following licence: Copyright (c) 1995, 1996 Systemics Ltd (http://www.systemics.com/) All rights reserved. This library and applications are FREE FOR COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL USE as long as the following conditions are adhered to. Copyright remains with Systemics Ltd, and as such any Copyright notices in the code are not to be removed. If this code is used in a product, Systemics should be given attribution as the author of the parts used. This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software must display the following acknowledgement: This product includes software developed by Systemics Ltd (http://www.systemics.com/) THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY SYSTEMICS LTD ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be copied and put under another distribution licence [including the GNU Public Licence.] _________________________________________________________________

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Web redirector to defeat kiddie-filters?
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, sort of..... http://www.mordor.com/neslon/decide/ Ryan

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InfoWarCon V: DC
by winn＠Infowar.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* * * * * * * P L E A S E D I S T R I B U T E W I D E L Y * * * * * * * InfoWarCon 5, 1996 Electronic Civil Defense for the 21st. Century The Convergence of the Commercial and the Military Sectors: Vulnerabilities, Capabilities and Solutions September 5-6, 1996 Washington, DC Sponsored by: Winn Schwartau, Interpact, Inc./Infowar.Com National Computer Security Association/NCSA.Com Robert Steele, OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS, Inc./OSS.Net Sponsoring Organizations: Command Software Systems Digital Equipment Corporation Norman Data Defense IBM Phillips Publications Jane's Information Group Historically, civil defense has meant to protect citizenry against hostile military actions. Today, with the specter of Information Warfare representing new challenges to late-industrial and information age nation-states, the rules have radically changed. Societies are rapidly migrating to increased dependance upon four critical interrelated infrastructures and adequate methods of protection must be developed: - The Power grid is the basis of most of modern society. With it gone, not much else happens. If you think this is just a matter of building more generators, think again--what happens if the factories that *make* the generators are taken down, too? - The Communications infrastructure: land, sea, air and satellite. 95% of military communications go over the public networks, and 100% of all financial and industrial communications. Is it worth protecting? - The Global Financial structure depends upon the first two infrastructures, and is perhaps the most vulnerable to theft and denial of service attack. 99+% of all "wealth" is digital--what happens if it vaporizes? - Transportation systems rely upon the other three. The air traffic systems require both power and communications to manage the thousands of airplanes in the sky. What happens to the thousands of airplanes in the air if air traffic control across an entire country goes down? Without all of these infrastructures properly and reliably functioning, the private sector and the national security community cannot function. No heat, no air conditioning, no food distribution, no light, no radio or TV, no Internet. Are we prepared? Do we have a a crisis response for the day money as we know it vanishes? Electronic Civil Defense will soon become a critical component of any nation's well being while the needs of both the private sector and government converge. The convergence of military and civilian interests that Mr. Schwartau predicted two years ago is happening before our eyes. Defensive and commercial postures have so intertwined as to make them indistinguishable. This Fifth International Conference on Information Warfare is an unclassified, open source forum, and will examine the myriad questions of Electronic Civil Defense from the US, International and multi-cultural perspectives. Our seasoned experts will work with InfoWarCon5 delegates to outline a framework for the vulnerabilities, threats, risks and solutions for Electronic Civil Defense. From this conference participants will be able to draw critical insights which will improve their own legislative, regulatory, financial, and operational readiness and security. Last year's Washington InfoWarCon brought together over 600 people and was covered by CNN among other major media organizations. This year key world players in information warfare from the economic, military, and law enforcement communities of over 30 countries are expected to participate. Be prepared for highly interactive sessions with plenty of audience participation. Please bring your opinions and be ready to discuss them with us all! PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE September 4, 1996 16:00 - 20:00 Registration Begins 18:00 - 20:00 Sponsored Reception for attendees, speakers, sponsors and the press. Light food fare and liquid refreshments. Meet Mr.Schwartau, Mr. Steele, Dr. Kabay and many of our other world-class speakers. September 5, 1996 6:30 - 7:50 Registration 7:50 - 8:00 Welcoming Comments and Administration: Dr. Peter Tippett, NCSA Winn Schwartau, Interpact, Inc. 8:00 - 8:30 Keynote Presentation: "National Security in the Information Age" Senator William Cohen (R-Maine) * 8:30 - 9:00 "A Commander in Chief's View of Rear-Area, Home-Front Vulnerabilities and Support Options." General John J. Sheehan, U.S. Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command 9:00 - 9:30 "Global Finance: Protection in the Age of Electronic Conflict" Colin Cook, V.P. Information Security, Citibank * 9:30 - 10:00 "We Can't Do It Without the Private Sector" Ken Minihan, Director, NSA * 10:00-10:30 Break 10:30-11:45 National Policy Reviews of Electronic Civil Defense Programs Ms. Sally Katzen, Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, USA Dr. Anders Eriksson and Peter Wallstroem, National Defence Research Establishment, Dept. of Defence Analysis: Sweden Dr. Leroy Pearce, Canada, What is the current thinking in Electronic Civil Defense? How do plan on protecting our citizens against invisible unnamed assailants? What are the top policy makers planning for? International experts will present their views as well. 11:45 - 13:15 Sponsored Lunch 12:30 - 13:00 Luncheon Address 13:15 - 14: 30 Breakout Sessions A1 - A4 A1 A Military Briefing: The Electronic Projection of Power in a C4I World Moderated by General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) Barry Horton, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I * Captain Patrick Tyrrell, Assistant Director, Information Warfare Policy, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom A2 Protecting the Global Financial and Communications Infrastructures: Weaknesses at the Transport Layer Ron Eward, Martech, Inc. One scary session. Forget about HERF Guns and hackers. Mr. Eward will tell us how to wreak disaster with a few well placed pick- axes, from New York to Palermo to Taipei. An incredible research effort with global on the generally forgotten physical underpinnings of Cyberspace. Do not miss his tremendously important findings. Messrs. Eward and Schwartau upcoming book on this overlooked topic will shake the financial global community. A3 Media Manipulation, Perception Management and PsyOps Moderated by Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA Mark Bender, ABC News * Jim Roberts, SOLIC Neil Munro, Washington Technology How can a nation-state use the media to bend the will of an adversary, or leverage its own position prior to, in or after a conflict? Who is really using who? A4 National Defense University Session Moderator - Dr. Dan Kuehl, Professor, NDU Top students from the School of Information Warfare and Strategy, the Nation's top-level school for potential flag officers in the IW arena, will discuss their findings and concerns. 14:30 - 15:00 Break 15:00 - 16:15 Breakout Sessions B1-B4 B1 - Emergency/Disaster Planning for the Effects of Information Warfare: Moderator: Mark Aldrich, Chief Infosec Engineer, GRC International, Inc. Michael Logan, Federal Planning Associate, American Red Cross William W. Donovan, CISSP, FEMA Ken Barksdale, Association of Contingency Planners Assume the worst happens, and an infowar assault takes down major life sustaining portions of the infrastructure. What do we do about it? How do we minimize the damage and protect the victims and citizens? These esteemed experts will tell you what they think and then invite your comments. B2 Legal Liabilities and Responsibilities in Information Warfare Danielle Cailloux, Judge, Committee on Intelligence, Belgium Charles Dunlap, Judge Advocate, USAF Kenneth Bass III, Cyber-Attorney, Washington If a company is attacked and it loses significant assets, what are the recourses of the stakeholders? How do we measure and evaluate the losses and responsibility? On the military side, what constitutes an Act of War and what steps are necessary to formulate a response? B3 The Forensics of Information Wafare for Law Enforcement Moderated by Michael Anderson, New Technologies Investigation Division Howard Schmidt, Director, AF Office of Special Investigations Ken Rosenblat, Santa Clara County Prosecutor, Author "High-Technology Crime: Investigating Cases Involving Computers" How can you tell you are under attack? Once you determine you are, how do you make a case which will stand up in court? How do you collect evidence? How do you involve law enforcement without compromising your efforts? Experts share years of experience with you. B4 Naval Postgraduate School Session Moderator: Dr. Fred Levien, NPS Top field grade students from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California will present InfoWar papers and concepts. 16:15 - 16:45 Break 16:45 - 18:00 The Hacker/Underground and Social Engineering Moderated by: Nic Chantler, Australian Intelligence (Ret) Andy Mueller-Maguhn, CHAOS Computer Club, Germany Chris Goggans, co-founder, Legion of Doom, USA John Gilmore, Electronic Frontier Foundation If you've ever wanted to know how hackers think; what makes them tick and how they became the first Information Warriors, here are the people who can answer your questions. These sessions are among the most popular at every InfoWarCon. Gilmore will present his unique concepts for Defensive Information Warfare. 18::00 - 20:30 Sponsored Reception/"Live Hackers" Off-Line September 6, 1996 6:30 - 7:50 Continental Breakfast 7:50 - 8:00 Opening Remarks and Administration 8:00 - 8:30 "Domestic Law Enforcement and Electronic Civil Defense" Louis Freeh, Director, FBI * 8:30 - 9:00 "The Convergence of Military and Civilian Defense" General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) 9:00 - 9:30 "What is National Security?" Michael R. Nelson, Ph.D. Special Assistant for Information Technology White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 9:30 - 10:00 "Building a Society from the Net Up" Pedrag Pale, Chairman of the InfoTech Coordinating Committee, Ministry of Science, Technology and Informatics, Croatia 10:00-10:30 Break 10:30-11:45 The Russians are Coming Moderated by: Greg Treverton, Director of National Security Program, Rand Corporation From academia to the military to their business community, the Russians have been thinking long and had about Information Warfare. Here's what they have to say. Get front row seats and be ready to ask your questions. Dr. Victor I. Solntsev, Assoc. Prof. Moscow State Tech. Univ. "Information Warfare and Human-Operator Security" Dr. Dmitry Chereshkin Russian Academy of Sciences; Editorial Board, "Information Infrastructure and Policy." Dr. Georgy Smolian Russian Academy of Sciences and Scientific Council "Democratization of Russia and Information Security." 11:45 - 13:15 Sponsored Lunch 12:30 - 13:00 Luncheon Address 13:00 - 14: 15 Breakout Sessions C1-C4 C1 Corporate Civil Defense: Moderated by Don Sortor, Director Security Prgms, Corp. InfoSec., Motorola, Inc. A team of cross-industry experts from the primary infrastructures, will examine how industry and government can and should interact in the event of an Electronic Pearl Harbor. What is the role of the company and its management? What policies should be put into place to prepare for the malicious Acts of Man? How should the government work with the private sector to mitigate damages? These experts will set you on the right track. C2 Denial of Service in the Private Sector: The Nuclear Weapons of the Information Age: Magnetic Weapons from the Military to Electronic Pipe Bombs Carlo Copp, Defense Analyst, Australia Kelly Goen, Penetration and Security Engineer Get Seats Early! Magnetic weapons; directed energy weapons; HPM; HERF Guns; electromagnetic pulse cannons and EMP. Learn about the latest in high energy weapons systems and how they can be used to attack and destroy critical electronically based infrastructures. Then find out what the terrorist can do with home-brew electronic pipe bombs. C3 The Net Under Attack Dr. Dorothy Denning, Chair, Computer Science Dept., Georgetown Univ. Jim Christy, Permanent Subcommittee Investigations U.S. Senate (And USAF OSI) What makes an attack on the Internet and what do we do about it? Ms. Denning is an internationally recognized expert who will guide us and her panel of experts through the maze of possibilities. Incredibly valuable for security professionals. C4 USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies Moderated by Col. Richard Szafranski, USAF, Air War College National Military Strategy Col. Szafranski and his top students will discuss their views, opinions on Information Warfare. The USAF SAAS has produced some of the most revolutionary papers in IW, including the now globally recognized papers on taking down telecommunications and national power systems. 14:30 - 15:00 Break 15:00 - 16:15 Breakout Sessions D1-D4 D1 Anonymous Global Banking: Pitfalls and Solutions Moderated by Bruce Schneier Kelly Goen, Security Engineer Eric Hughes, Cypherpunks Phil Zimmermann * How does anonymous international banking work? Is it merely a front for Criminal Central? Or is there a true value? How do conventional banking institutions view it? What about cryptographic solutions? Are your funds "naked on the Net today? Come see for yourself! D2 The Ethics of Information Warfare Moderated by Winn Schwartau Col. Phil Johnson, Judge Avocate, USAF Dr. Dan Kuehl, NDU While CNN is looking over your shoulder, as a military commander, here is your choice: either use a precision smart bomb which will immediately kill 20 civilians for the world to see. Or, use a non-lethal IW weapon, no immediate TV deaths, but a predicted 200 civilian collateral fatalities within 30 days. What do you do? The Ethical conundra of Information Warfare will be examined from all perspectives. Or: you have been attacked anonymously--you suspect one party, without proof--another attack is coming. What now? Should we develop new intelligence capabilities to permit precision detection and response in cyberwar? D3 National Information Assurance: Cooperation is the Key to Safeguarding Communications, Power and Transportation Moderated by: Major Brad Bigelow, Office of the Manager, National Communications System Jeff Sheldon, General Counsel, Utilities Telecommunications Council Steve Fabes, Director of Electronic Delivery Services, BankAmerica Carl Ripa, VP National Security/Emergency Preparedness, Bellcore Experts from the major civilian infrastructures will discuss how past cooperation between industry and government has echoed economic realities. The bulk of the nations information infrastructure is not under the economic or regulatory control of the Federal government. So, how do we maintain a healthy balance between private initiative and legislative and regulatory actions? Today there is no "due diligence" standard which requires that communications and computing services be guaranteed in terms of security and data integrity. Our panel will provoke an active discussion of remedial cooperative measures. D4 "Understanding and Defending Against Industrial Espionage and Information Terrorism." Tom Fedorek, Managing Director, Kroll Associates New York* Matt DeVost TITLE COMING Charlies Swett, Acting Deputy Director for Low-Intenstity Conflict Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict A look at how modern espionage and information is conducted, why it's done and who's doing it. How much can it cost your company and how can you tell if you're targeted? Do not miss this fascinating session which is expected to feature the Kroll Managing Directors from Paris, London, and New York. 16:15 - 16:30 Break 16:30 - 17:00 Wrap Up: "What is War?" Moderated by Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) John Petersen, President, The Arlington Institute You - The Audience An exciting 'don't miss' interactive audience session. What a closing! (* Speakers with an * have been invited but have not confirmed as of June 28, 1996.) HOTEL INFORMATION: Crystal Gateway Marriott 1700 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22202 The Crystal Gateway Marriott is offereing a special conference rate of $129 single/$139 double occupancy. This rate is good until August 14, 1996. 703-920-3230 (Voice) 703-271-5212 (Fax) CANCELLATION POLICY After August 9th, any cancellation will incur a $100.00 processing fee. If the reservation is not cancelled and no one attends, the full registration price will be charged. Substitute attendees are welcome. InfoWarCon '96 Registration Form: Name: ___________________________________________________________ Title: ___________________________________________________________ Org: ___________________________________________________________ Address: ___________________________________________________________ Address: ___________________________________________________________ City: ___________________________________________________________ State: _______________________________ Zip: _____________________ Country: __________________________ Email: ________________________ Phone: __________________________ Fax: _________________________ FEES: Payment made BEFORE August 9, 1996: ( ) 595.00 NCSA Members/OSS '96 Attendees ( ) 645.00 All others Payment made AFTER August 9, 1996: ( ) 645.00 NCSA Members/OSS '96 Attendees ( ) 695.00 All others Make checks payable to NCSA, or Charge to: ( ) VISA ( ) MasterCard AMEX ( ) Number: ___________________________________________ Exp date: ___________________________ Signature: ___________________________________________ MAIL OR FAX OR EMAIL REGISTRATION TO: National Computer Security Association 10 South Courthouse Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 Phone 717-258-1816 or FAX 717-243-8642 EMAIL: conference(a)ncsa.com For more information about NCSA: WWW: http://www.ncsa.com CompuServe: GO NCSA EMail: info(a)ncsa.com Version: 1.10 Peace Winn Winn Schwartau - Interpact, Inc. Information Warfare and InfoSec V: 813.393.6600 / F: 813.393.6361 Winn(a)InfoWar.Com

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Synchronization Attack on Pseudo-DC-net's
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's an easy attack on a pseudo-DC-net that I thought up over lunch if the clients trust the server to be honest in telling both the round number and who is on. Let Stephanie be the person running the server, and let Alice and Bob be two users. Let f(n) be the pseudo random function they share. Assume that Stephanie knows their secret encryption key. It is then possible for her to compromise their anonymity as follows: First Alice joins the net, and Stephanie tells her that it is round 100 and Bob is on. Alice sends a messages. Stephanie sends back some random junk to Alice to convince her that there was a collision. Alice backs off for a few rounds. Stephanine now receives f(101), f(102), f(103), etc. and then tells Alice that Bob has left. Alice leaves now. Later Bob joins. Stephanine tells him that it is round 101 and Alice is here. Bob starts talking right away, sending three message: f(101) xor M1, f(102) xor M2, and f(103) xor M3. From this Stephanie is able to recover M1, M2, and M3 by xor'ing f(101), f(102), and f(103), which she has from before, back in. Bob has completely lost his anonymity! Thus, it looks like trusting the server for both who is on and the round number is a bad idea! It might be possible to remove the need for a round number if the number of seconds since channel creation is used instead, and the clients are time synchronized. In that case running the pseudo-DC-net on top of UDP might be preferable to running it on top of TCP. Can anyone think of an attack if the server is just trusted for a list of who is on? If there is one, I guess new clients could ask for signed messages of who is on: "It is 456 seconds since channel creation, and, I---Alice---am on. (signature)". That would complicate the protocol, of course, and cost Nancy---a new client---some time in verifying the signatures. Good attacks so far! Keep 'em coming. :) Leonard Janke (pgp key id 0xF4118611) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMeF6nUMBIFf0EYYRAQGITQf/U0Wjpsyb7XpG6uCVFCPNaAYVIJpLeEyk Mxl6X/TQPhJFRclbRJwFoWfwH46M2le/QKHu6nFFjioyYbXofaLWqDeOa61XY5/c 4law80/xxAg9IdzoQp4mAz6QOvToMCOlNE21MCL8YlPrrdhIL4MfAH9gpU8+Otui IH1S5VB7TGE6ttZEx18sKdBUxYeJeU4jrXb4Uj2HEN5inLrhJBic/fsZ0hZXjCAH 5kbZLI8sf+leLyoW03qILeVl8jjYuPy/z16MsY2SDzJ3hFv8nngT9+fzVItX7sO2 ngvqvyUW4SIWfK8XwRWUiMFW7i7gyMcKteSSEJBaEdOZNcGUvXY+5Q== =jmVk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: What remains to be done.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 96 at 14:12, Ray Arachelian wrote: [..] > I'm constantly switching between NT and 95 and have them installed on the > same drive. Would be cool to have some low level driver to encryption > from the Master Boot Record for example to get around unfriendly OS's- but > then NT won't respect the BIOS calls, 95 in 32 bit mode won't, Linux sure > as hell wont, etc.... that was the whole idea of having a BIOS in the > first place, but woe is us. BIOS was written for real mode... part of the problem. Another is the not-made-here syndrome, and in a sense Linux, OS/2, NT and 95 are different types of operating systems, so a shared BIOS is unfeasible. It would be nice to develop an encrypted filesystem that could be ported across operating systems for those of us with multiple OS's. BTW, Linux 2.0 is making a nice step in that direction by adding support for mounting a file (which contains a filesystem), specifically to allow encrypted file systems as well as things like testing out iso9660-fs before buring CD-ROMs, etc. In theory something similar can be done with Win95/NT and OS/2, but it hasn't been done the proper way (SecureDevice is really a hack in that sense). --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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