December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [NOISE] Geek Apartments and Etherpunks
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:55 AM 8/14/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat <wombat(a)mcfeely.bsfs.org> wrote: >Most manufacturers offer SNMP-manageable hubs, but these don't offer >MAC-layer security. That usually costs a lot extra. The MAC-layer feature >is not widely used. AT&T was about the first vendor with that feature. Aside from solving a _lot_ of potential security problems, it was very convenient for finding out what device really _was_ connected to what hub port - the hub recorded the most recent MAC address received on each port, and you could compare that to ARP tables and untangle lots of problems. Not as fancy as a Sniffer, but let you do things that a Sniffer on ThinWire couldn't. (Of course, since it wasn't NSA-rated, the fact that it actually did solve security problems didn't give us extra slack on government jobs that needed it. ) A multi-port bridge gives you similar security capability, but generally costs more because it needs buffering and much more intelligence; the AT&T SmartHub was a lot simpler and (in its day) cheaper. It was about twice the cost of a regular hub, half the excess from cool features and half because it was from AT&T :-) It was less reliable than the regular hub, because it needed a fan to handle the extra heat from the processor board, and was also more awkward to mount. And the SNMP implementation was rather buggy, though it did have a convenient PC SNMP manager that knew how to use SNMP-over-MAC and the special features of the hub. Cool device. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Reassign Authority!

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Re: Stealth Buildings Was Re: "X-Ray Gun" for imperceptible searches
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:01 AM 8/16/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: >I repeat. Generations of sweating engineers have discovered and confirmed >that there is not an easy, "Silver Bullet" cure of the canonical problem >of shielding electromagnetic energy from reaching someone who knows how >to interpret it. > >Bill, you are welcome to look at a layer of tin foil and give a sigh of >relief that you've shielded your gun or your crypto diskette or your >private body parts feom someone who knows what they're doing. Go ahead, >chant a mantra too, if it makes you feel better.+- I've stayed out of this "tin foil" debate, but some basic physics is being missed, or misused. The invocation of TEMPEST and leakage of RF does not say much of anything about _imaging_. If a gun, for example, were _radiating_ RF energy of some particular sort, then it might indeed be true that tin foil/gold lame shielding would not stop _all_ of the emitted radiation, and that sensitive enough detectors might detect the characteristic signal 60 or 90 dB down. Maybe. But a gun is not a radiator, it is at most a _reflector_ of RF energy. Thus, the TEMPEST invocation is misleading. The signal would perhaps be down by 100-130 dB or more, as the "leakage" must first get around the shielding, be reflected, and then get back around the shielding. And what this does to "imaging" almost needs no explanation. What leaks around the periphery or through holes in a shielded container will provide essentially zero spatial information about the configuration of sources and reflectors inside the shielded container. (I spent much of 1972-73 working inside a Faraday cage on ultra-low-noise superconducting Josephson junctions. Believe me, what signals leaked in, or leaked out (by symmetry analysis) could not have been used to deduce the configuration of sources and reflectors inside the room.) I should say I'm skeptical that millimeter detectors will be widely deployed anytime soon. For detecting concealed weapons, "metal detectors" in specific locations are both cheaper and have fewer constitutional and "false positive" problems. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Scientology *really* tries to crack PGP...AGAIN?!?
by modemac＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology,alt.security.pgp From: grady(a)netcom.com (Grady Ward) Subject: Criminal cult begins PGP crack attempt Message-ID: <gradyDw7Cnt.I6A(a)netcom.com> The Special Master has informed me that Madame Kobrin has asked her to retain a PC expert to attempt to "crack" a series of pgp-encrypted multi-megabyte files that were seized along with more than a compressed gigabyte of other material from my safety deposit box. Ironically, they phoned to ask for assistance in supplying them with a prototype "crack" program that they could use in iterating and permuting possibilities. I did supply them a good core pgpcrack source that can search several tens of thousands of possible key phrases a seconds; I also suggested that they should at least be using a P6-200 workstation or better to make the search more efficient. The undercurrent is that this fresh hysterical attempt to "get" something on me coupled with the daily settlement pleas reflects the hopelessness of the litigation position of the criminal cult. It looks like the criminal cult has cast the die to ensure that the RTC vs Ward case is fought out to the bitter end. Which I modestly predict will be a devastating, humiliating defeat for them from a pauper pro per. I have given them a final settlement offer that they can leave or take. Actually they have a window of opportunity now to drop the suit since my counterclaims have been dismissed (although Jusge Whyte invited me to re-file a new counterclaim motion on more legally sufficiant basis). I think Keith and I have found a successful counter-strategy to the cult's system of litigation harassment. Meanwhile, I could use some help from veteran a.r.s'ers. I need any copy you have of the Cease and Desist letter that you may have received last year from Eliot Abelson quondam criminal cult attorney and Eugene Martin Ingram spokespiece. Physical mail: Grady Ward 3449 Martha Ct. Arcata, CA 95521-4884 JP's BMPs or fax-images to: grady(a)northcoast.com Thanks. Grady Ward Ps. I really do need all of your help and good wishes after all. Thanks for all of you keeping the net a safe place to insult kook kults. -- Reverend Modemac (modemac(a)netcom.com) First Online Church of "Bob" "There is no black and white." PGP Key Fingerprint: 47 90 41 70 B4 5B 06 90 7B 38 4E 11 8A ED 80 DF URL: http://www.tiac.net/users/modemac/ (FINGER modemac(a)netcom.com for a FREE SubGenius Pamphlet!)

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Garage door openers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:34 PM 8/15/96, Douglas R. Floyd wrote: >That is known for cars. I double checked, and found some car alarms able >to do this. However, I have not found any house garage door openers able >to pull this off. Most still use the old blurt code method. > Sure, most garage door opener codes are easy to break....but how many thieves who do this know to enter the _second_ correct sequence within 45 seconds, the one that stops the poison gas from filling the garage? Steganographic entry codes have their uses. --Tim May (P.S. There were six (6) names copied on this post, besides CP. Can't we edit the cc: lines? I try to, so why don't you all?) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Anguilla...etc.
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess the point I was trying to make all along is this; Is a data haven going to be a security through obscurity operation? This is what the Swiss have with secret bank accounts, etc. Or will it be an operation where the operator of the system lets whatever on, and hopes he won't get prosecuted. In Island in the Net, the haven were physical. The authorities got to them eventually. Vince's system is restricted by physical laws. There will always be a finite array of information he can present without putting the whole operation on the line. Is he still a data haven then? I believe so. But through creative diplomacy he could balance the powers that bind him. How well he or anyone else does this is the key to the range of information presented. ---------- > From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Anguilla...etc. > Date: Tuesday, August 13, 1996 9:07 PM > > At 2:21 AM 8/14/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: > > While Tim may be right that nobility is lost when backing down to the > >authorities, the fact is that this game has little to do with noble > >purposes. Check that, obvious noble purposes. While most on this list > >would agree that free flow of information is noble we have all seen that > >this is otherwise with people in power. As I stated in my last post, the > >Swiss have maintained thier "haven" for many years by playing both sides. > >In accomodating everyone they avoid harassment. > > This way the Swiss maintain a good system and live to fight another day. > > Let me be clear that I am not talking about "noble motives." In the sense > of somone sacrificing himself for the good of the herd, blah blah. > > Rather, there is an "archetype," if you will, of what a "remailer" is, what > a "data haven" is, what a "tax shelter" is, etc. While we cannot reasonably > expect a remailer to exactly match the archetype, we can point out obvious > deficiencies. > > For "data havens," we have very few examples, compared to operational > remailers. We have the fictional form in Bruce Sterling's "Islands in the > Net," some of whose plot twists have some parallels to the current Anguilla > situation. Another is the form described in Ross Anderson's "Eternity > Service." > > What might we expect of a true data haven? I've tried to describe several > of the attributes in my earlier posts, mainly by asking questions about > specific examples (bomb-building instructions, "Kill the monarchy" screeds, > etc.). > > Interestingly, with several of these examples, Vince has said that he is > not interested in having this kind of material on his site. His invitation > for Multi-Level Marketers to avoid U.S. and other laws by locating on his > service has now been withdrawn, from his latest comments. (To the person > who sent me mail explaining that MLM schemes are not illegal in the U.S., > indeed, some are legal and some are not. I said as much. And for those > which are legal in the U.S. or France or wherever, they would hardly have > any need to use Vince's service, would they? I surmised from his invitation > that he was encouraging MLM/pyramid scheme operators to avoid their > parochial fraud laws and use the services in Anguilla.) > > I plan to do more looking at just who is left, who is using Offshore > Information and what kinds of services they are offering. Not to harass > Vince, of course, but to better look at the envelope of what is considered > OK and what is not. > > If i find that all the "juicy" stuff is gone and all that is left is > booking sailing cruises around the Carribbean, I'll hardly call it a "data > haven." Which is not to say it's not still a useful and profitable business > for Vince, just that it has no Cypherpunk relevance. > > --Tim May > > Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > >

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Re: Imprisoned Capital
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell wrote: >There is no straightforward link between amount of capital invested and >productivity or wages. If there were, some steel plants in the Soviet Union >would have had the best paid and most productive workers on earth. It's not a coincidence that you mention the Soviet Union. As I said in a previous post, Austrian economists like Murray Rothbard, Hans Hermann Hoppe, etc. don't consider government expenditures to be *investments* of capital; they consider all government expenditures to be *consumption*. >Additionally, countries which prevent capital outflows don't receive capital >inflows and thus become poorer. >DCF This is a good point when you talk about governments that will prevent *all* capital from flowing out. But a government could prevent the outflow of capital of it's own citizens, and still allow capital of foreigners to leave the country. As long as foreign capital isn't imprisoned, foreign capital could be attracted. Bart Croughs

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BlackNet as a Distributed, Untraceable, Robust Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:05 AM 8/16/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: >The only ideal I can think of would be the fictional "Port Watson". What >is you had a system that spanned countries, using the internet as a linking >device. It would be the same service. But when you specified the kind of >data you wanted to post, the system would route it to the appropriate >server in a country where it wasn't illegal. > I have to speak up here and say that there is an actual working exemplar of a distributed, untraceable data haven. While it lacks a robust _payment_ mechanism, that is also untraceable, so does the "Visit Port Watson" example (which has never actually existed). The simple structure I built in 1993 for "BlackNet" actually works. It has been discussed in many places, and will be the subject of a couple of sections in Peter Ludlow's new book, "High Noon on the Electronic Frontier" (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/mitp/recent-books/comp/ludph.html) Features of relevance to any discussion of data havens: * messages are posted to message pools, including any of the 18,000+ Usenet groups copied automatically in sites around the world. * the initial messages are in plaintext, of course, as how else could readers determine which are of interest to them? "Anyone have details of the medical condition of Chirac?" might be an example. * a public key is posted along with the plaintext, thus allowing a reader to respond _privately_ by encrypting his message to the public key and posting it (through a chain of remailers and eventually to a mail-to-News gateway, for example). * this establishes two-way communication, in a "black pipe" that is visible to all, but opaque to all but the parties. * if some jurisdictions attempts to cut off a particular newsgroup, e.g., "alt.anonymous.messages," then the traffic can be shifted to other newsgroups, e.g., "talk.politics.singapore." * posting can be as untraceable as a chain of remailers linked to a mail-to-News gateway can be. * thus, two agents can establish a communications channel between themselves without knowing the identity or location or jurisdiction of each other. (There are some subtle issues of man-in-the-middle attacks, as with these sorts of protocols for establishing communication between parties who have not met; webs of trust, again. For the several cases of communications using BlackNet I was personally involved with, mostly in '93, this did not ever become a problem any of us were aware of.) * as I mentioned, BlackNet lacks a robust, untraceable payment system. Alice and Bob may be able to connect up with each other, by exchanging reciprocally encrypted messages in a public place, but transferring money is problematic. (I don't know just how well the Mark Twain/Digicash stuff really works at this time....someone motivated to actually transfer money would be a better judge, along with the several cryptographers on this list who've looked at it more recently and in more depth than I have.) The important thing to note is that BlackNet, and similar systems, do not depend on any particular jurisdiction or site to host the communications. The anarchic, distributed Usenet is used. (And there is no reason why mailing lists, a la Miron Cuperman's message pool list of a few years back, or the Web itself could not be used. Using a Web site does potentially open the owner of the URL site to charges of conspiracy, though the fact that the messages are encrypted (after the early plaintext.) There are certainly things yet to be done, but it's important that the example of BlackNet be mentioned. Solve the payment problem (for real, not the semi-GAKked version of Digicash that Chaum now appears to be promoting) and there's no need for "physical" data havens in Anguilla, Burma, St. Barts, Lichtenstein, or wherever. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Jurisdictionless Distributed Data Havens
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:52 AM 8/15/96 -0500, "Douglas R. Floyd" <dfloyd(a)io.com> wrote: >As of now, I am looking for someone who can help me implement a redundant >controller system, so when the DH is contacted, even if the first one if >smashed, the "RAID" stays operable. One approach is "Just Don't Do It" - let the user (or user interface program) handle the RAID work. You can get fancy and use Shamir Secret Sharing, or non-fancy and use N+1 sparing RAID, or medium fancy and use {<even-bits>,<odd-bits>,<evens xor odds>}, depending on how private and how reliable you want to be. Having just the even bits of decently-encrypted cyphertext makes cracking tough.... Some issues to think about - - Access patterns - who do you want to be able to retrieve the data? --- only the owner? --- people who the owner shares a secret with? --- Everybody? --- Everybody who knows where the pieces are? --- One retrieval? Many retrievals? - How do you want the data delivered? Anon remailer? HTTP? POP3? - Threats - who don't you want to be able to read the data? --- who don't you want to be able to delete the data? --- who don't you want to find out who retrieved the data? - Payment - who pays? Writers? Readers? Cops with warrants? Account holders or one-shot users? Digicash only? How much? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

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Physical Havens
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's take a look at the successful havens of history. 1. Hashishim( Old man of the mountains)-The Aga Khan survived thousands of years of harassment by the surrounding powers by placing a few well choosen daggers. 2. The monastic system- These whole setup was an excellent model. The monks were burrowed away in those places for centuries. The church built them like fortresses to withstand the heathens, both mentally and physically. The original "data warehouse". 3. The pirate havens- Places like the carribbean(originally), then Madagasgar(last). Pirate havens did business for everyone. 4. The silk routes- The trading centers of the old silk road sprang up overnight then vanished. Original anonymous trade. All of these physical havens eventually fell to the persistance of the major powers of the day. Or were co-opted by others who absorbed the critical black market features of these systems. ??????????????????????????????????????? Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com "Eppur si moeve" -Galileo ???????????????????????????????????????

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Re: remailers/kiddie porn
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"The Internet is like heaven for the pedophile," said Toby Tyler, >a United States police officer who lectures at the FBI Academy on child abuse. ... >However computer experts agree the existence of just one re-mailing system in a country with more lax laws is enough for the global distribution of child >pornography on the Internet. >Tyler said the most widely used re-mailing system currently operates from Finland, through which about 99 percent of all child pornography with untraceable >address codes passes. Classic governmental statistics abuse. Given that probably far over 99% of all untraceable remailer return addresses are on Penet, it's no surprise that 99% of all material with untraceable destination addresses goes through there... The largest userid number I've seen on Penet was about 500,000, and I doubt there are 5000 addresses on nymservers or reply-block users. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

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