December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

REMINDER: SAFE Forum Cybercast - Monday July 1, 12 noon - 6 pm EDT
by Bob Palacios 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SECURITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH ENCRYPTION FORUM MONDAY JULY 1, 1996 STANFORD, CA 9:00 am - 3:00 pm PDT / 12:00 noon - 6:00 pm EDT / 1600 - 2000 GMT On July 1, 1996 in the heart of California's Silicon Valley, members of Congress and prominent computer industry leaders and privacy advocates will meet to discuss the need to reform U.S. encryption policy. The SAFE Forum will bring together members of Congress, privacy advocates, cryptographers, and industry leaders for a discussion on the need to reform U.S. encryption policy. If you can't attend the SAFE Forum in person, you can still participate by attending the cybercast of the event. The cybercast will include still photos of the conference, a RealAudio broadcast of the forum, and a telnet chat room for netizens to discuss the event and cryptography issues. Just visit the SAFE Forum web site on Monday for the necessary links: http://www.crypto.com/safe/ (You will need to be a copy of RealAudio installed on your computer. Visit http://www.realaudio.com/ for a FREE copy of Real Audio). The SAFE Forum Cybercast is brought to you with the help and support of: MediaCast (http://www.mediacast.com/) and AudioNet (http://www.audionet.com/) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Event Information * Location: Kresge Auditorium at Stanford University, Stanford, California * Date: July 1, 1996, 9:00 am - 3:00 pm Program: 9:00 - 9:15 Welcome Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-Ca), co-host Rep. Tom Campbell (R-Ca), co-host Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) (by satellite) Jerry Berman, Center for Democracy and Technology 9:15 - 10:15 The Need for Locks and Keys on the GII: An Encryption Overview Marc Andreessen, Netscape Communications Lori Fena, Electronic Frontier Foundation Eric Schmidt, Sun Microsystems Craig Mundie, Microsoft Corporation 10:15 - 10:30 Technology Demo: The Need for Locks & Keys -- Packet Sniffing on the Internet (Cylink Corporation) 10:30 - 10:45 Break 10:45 - 11:45 How U.S. Encryption Policy Fails to Meet User Needs Herbert Lin, National Research Council Jim Omura, Cylink Corporation Tim Oren, CompuServe Incorporated Phil Zimmermann, PGP, Inc. Todd Lappin, Wired Magazine -- Introducing "Stories of Real-Life Encryption Users" 11:45 - 1:00 Lunch 1:00 - 1:45 The Cryptographers' Report: "Forty Bits Is Not Enough" Matt Blaze, AT&T Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems Eric Thompson, Access Data Tom Parenty, Sybase Technology Demo: The Genie is Out of the Bottle -- A World Wide Web Tour of Good Cryptography Available Outside of the United States 1:45 - 2:45 Addressing Law Enforcement Concerns in a Constitutional Framework Ken Bass, Venabel, Baetjer, Howard and Civiletti Cindy Cohn, McGlashan & Sarrail Michael Froomkin, University of Miami Law School John Gilmore, Electronic Frontier Foundation Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform Nadine Strossen, American Civil Liberties Union Daniel Weitzner, Center for Democracy and Technology 2:45 - 3:00 Conclusion Members of Congress expected to participate include: * Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) * Rep. Tom Campbell (R-CA) * Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) * Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) * Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) (by satellite) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sponsors Of The SAFE Forum: America Online American Civil Liberties Union Americans for Tax Reform AT&T Audionet Business Software Alliance Center for Democracy and Technology Center for National Security Studies Commercial Internet eXchange CompuServe Incorporated Computer and Communications Industry Association Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Cylink Corporation Digital Secured Networks Technology EDS Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Messaging Association Electronic Privacy Information Center Information Technology Association of America IEEE - USA ManyMedia MediaCast Media Institute Microsoft Corporation National Association of Manufacturers Netcom Online Communication Services Netscape Communications Corporation Novell, Inc. Oracle Corporation Pacific Telesis Group Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Prodigy, Inc. Progress and Freedom Foundation Rent-a-Computer Securities Industry Association Software Publishers Association Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sybase, Inc. Voters Telecommunications Watch Wired Magazine --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORRECTION An earlier Policy Post listed Matt Blaze with Lucent Technologies. That information was incorrect; he is with AT&T Research. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

MD5 breaks, etc.
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1) On the question of MD4, it has been demonstrated that one can generate multiple documents with the same hash -- an example was given in a paper a while back of two contracts, identical but for the dollar sum agreed two, with identical MD4 hashes. That demonstrates that MD4 is useless. 2) Hans Dobbertin on May 2nd released a short paper that circulated widely on the net describing collisions in the MD5 compression function. Several people have asked me for references on this. I cannot give you anything -- all I have is postscript of the document, which had not been published in any journal when I last checked. However, the result is widely known. MD5 is *not* something that should be trusted going forward, and I hope the next version of PGP uses SHA-1. Perry

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 1 Jul 96 6:47:34 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++__.-++- 10:04:50 100.00% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #######*+*## 1:13 100.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ####*#+--##* 14:24 99.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com *********+** 4:18 99.98% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +**** 23:43 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++++++++-+++ 51:58 99.97% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com +#######+*## 1:24 99.95% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *-+#++++###+ 9:25 99.94% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ++*******+** 5:49 99.94% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++++ 39:16 99.94% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com ** ****#+#-# 12:31 99.92% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com __.-_.-.--- 18:42:17 99.88% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +++ -..+++-+ 5:28:11 99.24% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----------- 4:20:06 99.22% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi __ _-..... 44:52:17 99.20% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --.-------- 5:15:59 97.93% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.___.-._ 22:24:17 97.35% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ******-+++** 38:56 96.99% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca * 19:19 96.68% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++ 56:06 95.20% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com #**-#*** 16:52 60.55% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Hardware RNG
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:23 AM 6/30/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > While radioactive decay is unpredictable (so are a lot of things, by the > way), there are all kinds of biases that reduce the apparent entropy. > Detector "dead time" is a classic one (basically, the detector can't detect > counts during a post-pulse recovery time...probably not a problem at low > count rates, but an example of how subtle things can sneak in). If he has more than eight bits of timing resolution, such biases will have no affect. He is using his non uniformly distributed random number to select a uniformly distributed pseudo random number. Provided that the does not attempt to get more entropy out than he puts in, the result should be a uniformly distributed truly random number. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

FTS2000 Security Info and RFP
by Mark O. Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The URL's for FTS2000 RFP, Security Policy data, and assorted sundries are: http://post.fts2k.gsa.gov/ (the official government stuff) http://204.70.134.242/policy/ (This appears to be an MCI server and I don't know if they know that this stuff is online) Enjoy. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Just as the strength of the Internet is |Mark Aldrich | |chaos, so the strength of our liberty |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |depends upon the chaos and cacophony of |maldrich(a)grci.com | |the unfettered speech the First Amendment|MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |protects - District Judge Stewart Dalzell| | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: crypto and bagpipes [NOISE]
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:01 PM 6/29/96 -0700, Michael Myers wrote: >>Perry E. Metzger wrote: >>| vinnie moscaritolo writes: >>| > >>>Mr Brooks, the piper, > (...) >>| > >>>claims he wasn't playing a musical >>| > >>>instrument, but practising with a weapon! >>| > >>> >>| > >>>The imagination boggles if his claim is successful! >>| >>| No one who has heard sustained bagpipe playing can deny the fact that >>| bagpipes are indeed an instrument of war, with no legitimate place in >>| peaceful everyday society. >>| >>| Perry > >Of course...when bagpipes are outlawed... Do you mean the FULL-AUTO "Assault Bagpipes," the ones that produce more than one "toot" per blow? Or the more "responsible" (but still dangerous!) semi-auto bagpipes, where you have to blow each time you want a toot. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

3 2

MacPGP 2.6.3 released
by Zbigniew Fiedorowicz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have put FatMacPGP2.6.3 v 1.6 on my web page http://www.math.ohio-state.edu/~fiedorow/PGP for distribution in the US and Canada in accordance with ITAR. The distribution is encrypted and you have to read the file README.txt for instructions on how to decrypt it. Here is a description of the main features of FatMacPGP2.6.3 v 1.6 from the README in the distribution: Enclosed is version 1.6 of FatMacPGP 2.6.3. This is a Macintosh port of the international version PGP 2.6.3ia released 04.03.96. The underlying PGP cryptographic code is the same as in the international release, except that it uses the RSAREF1.0 RSA library instead of Philip Zimmermann's MPILIB, in order to conform with US Patents on RSA. Also the legal_kludge switch, which allows interoperability with infringing pre-2.6 versions of PGP, is disabled. FatMacPGP 2.6.3 will run in native mode on a Power Macintosh, and will also run on 68K Macintoshes having a 68020 CPU or better. It will NOT run on Macintoshes with only a 68000 CPU such as Pluses, SE's, Classics or PB100's. It contains all the enhancements and bug fixes of PGP 2.6.3ia such as 1) It allows recipients of a public key message to be read in from a file containing the list of recipients, one per line. (Unlike previous versions of MacPGP it will not crash if the number of recipients exceeds 5 or 7.) 2) When extracting multiple keys into an ascii file, the each key is put separately into its own block, neatly labelled with the key id and user ids. 3) Better support for 8 bit character sets, ie. characters you get by holding down the option key. 4) Userids can be automatically signed with your secret key when creating keys ('pgp -kg') or adding new userids ('pgp -ke'). This is controlled by the AutoSign flag in the Options menu. 5) The misfeature of the initial 2.6.3i release, which didn't allow softwrapped text to be treated as text has been removed. 6) When clearsigning messages, FatMacPGP 2.6.3 will add a "Charset:" headerto the signature block, explaining which character set was used for creating the signature. This will help the recipient of the message to select correct character conversion when verifying the signature. If he/she is using version 2.6.3i, PGP will automatically choose the correct character set, thereby eliminating a lot of "Bad signature" problems. In addition to the above FatMacPGP 2.6.3 has many enhancements and bug fixes relative to previous versions of MacPGP. 1) Unlike MIT MacPGP 2.6.2 contains native Power PC code. Consequently it runs typically about 1.5 to 2 times faster than the MIT version on PPC machines, and even faster for large keyrings or large keys. It also runs typically 10-20% faster on 68K machines. 2) It has a greatly enhanced AppleEvent suite. For instance, unlike the MIT version, it is not necessary to write data to temporary files before passing it to MacPGP for en/de/cryption or signing. FatMacPGP 2.6.3 accepts AppleEvent TEXT parameters up to 32K in size in memory and returns the processed data as a parameter to the reply AppleEvent. (See the accompanying documentation for further details.) 3) It has options for automatic hardwrapping and detabbing of text, which should make electronic transmission of clearsigned messages more reliable and increase interoperability with many DOS and Unix text processing programs. 4) It has an option for stealthifying PGP encrypted files, removing any trace of their provenance. The resulting files can't be distinguished from white noise and can be completely concealed by "stegoing" into graphics and audio files. (There is of course also an option for destealthifying.) 5) It has an option for using SHA1 as the hashing algorithm for PGP signatures, instead of MD5. (Dobbertin has recently made some dramatic progress towards cryptanalyzing MD5. If he is successful, this might call into question the reliability of PGP signatures under certain circumstances.) This is an experimental feature which is not compatible with earlier versions of PGP. (It is not compatible with the proposed standards of PGP 3.0 either. But 3.0 is supposed to be deliberately incompatible with all 2.x versions to avoid the RSA patent issue.) FatMacPGP 2.6.3 is distributed under the same license terms from MIT and RSADSI as the 2.6.2 release, since its functional core is virtually identical. Please read the license agreements prior to using the program. Distribution of this program may be subject to US government export controls. This release is not endorsed by Philip Zimmermann, MIT or anyone else. However full source code for FatMacPGP 2.6.3 is being released together with the executable (although in a separate archive). It is not difficult to verify that the cryptographic core is unchanged from the 2.6.2 version. Also the author is mentioned in Zimmermann's documentation as the primary developer of previous MacPGP versions. A few support files, such as sample AppleScripts and other extensions, to facilitate interaction with the Eudora mailer program and the BBEdit text editor are included. While they are fully functional and hopefully useful, they are primarily intended to serve as illustrations to other developers on how to integrate PGP with other Macintosh programs. Detailed documentation can be found in the document "MacPGP263_AppleEvents" in the Macintosh Documentation folder. Read the included document "Verifying PGP" for instructions on how to verify this copy of MacPGP. Beginners should first take a look at the document "Getting Started with MacPGP". A detailed reference manual to MacPGP entitled "MacPGP263_Manual" is enclosed in the Macintosh Documentation folder and the indispensible "PGP User's Guide" by Philip Zimmermann is in the Documentation folder. Sources for FatMacPGP 2.6.3 will be available shortly. Z. Fiedorowicz -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: mac Comment: MacPGP 2.6.3 iQCVAwUBMdbLNr1LYmqiC9QjAQEl/wP+JXpDvgQ9VgTmXsvjjfFp+zd4v8ZeIMmt 45WcfqqPvSUPVEXv225MyYHMO1zKDkcKej1swBpFZDz5GV1eZJvriqYuNqc4Z0g0 0w9syQ2i6U5AoF6MR8bPs9Apq2Og9dRbFbaNXZ9Ba6bCtPHXyfZS1qQpi06Mkpty Xh39nE3dv4s= =/3Xe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

Message pools _are_ in use today!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:37 PM 6/29/96, Hal wrote: >From: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) >> A nice, albeit quite expensive, way of pretection from traffic analysis >> is to create a mailing list (or a newsgroup) and forward all messages to >> all users of that mailing list or newsgroup. Of course, since messages >> are encrypted, only the recipients will be able to decrypt them. > >This was discussed here several years ago, under the name "anonymous >message pools". Myron Cuperman, the operator of the extropia remailer >implemented one, although I don't know if it is still running (I >haven't gotten any mail from it for years). It was basically just a >mailing list specifically for this purpose, that you would use as your >anonymous return address. Of course a problem is that there may not be >enough people signed up to provide much privacy protection. The newsgroup "alt.anonymous.messages" has existed for a year or two, and serves to be working reasonably well as a message pool. Check it out. One will find numerous messages of the sort copied below. Having browsed some of the less common newsgroups (and trolled, in my my earlier days), I surmise that messages to nyms like "TheBear" are related to "support and recovery" sorts of topics. (I mention this because this is a compelling example of where anonymity is often sought; that people are using remailers and message pools to communicate is interesting. When Louis Freeh claims that remailers are only being used by hackers and Russian mafia arms exporters, this is a counterexample.) Here's just one such message, of several I saw this morning in "alt.anonymous.messages". (Note that anonymous message pool sorts of messages also appear directly from time to time in groups like "alt.abuse.recovery" and that ilk.) --begin copied message-- From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Newsgroups: alt.anonymous.messages Subject: TheBear Date: 15 Jun 1996 14:26:12 +0200 Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited Lines: 14 Sender: replay(a)basement.replay.com Message-ID: <4pua54$gt6(a)basement.replay.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: basement.replay.com X-XS4ALL-Date: Sat, 15 Jun 1996 14:26:17 MET DST XComm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting XComm: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)REPLAY.COM> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface hIwDrINEDTBBpVEBA/4sKOcgI33fdk6Pz5V27OIX0KiVfb4YDwgNLDpf6Wy0uvix 4oQ9p+vmtsZ32dPBoG4aF7bvh5ejqwZSpvuKOpgt1M8SKbA+Nma+EclMzQ3us3Ey OX5aFKo3TwB1Ck8tZPhpF8b/fI8gqz5v2FJhnon6NdktjFBVo3SBXya8AdlgUaYA AABsOTd6WOMH8PWnKHuP7PMCflH2p+halmCDsn9ytmoG6uzrINHH/B8c7aW6c7xw 9nXbB+99xLldhAqyg1M/oKi4pjfJ8cuSonDxMPTP8rr49XTCFaiOuQ7JUe3MEaop NIppnoBMrBvGRkKOgrYy =lYbJ -----END PGP MESSAGE----- --end copied message-- --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Re: Net and Terrorism
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Addressed to: CyberEyes <cyberia(a)cam.org> Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> CyberEyes <cyberia(a)cam.org> pontificated at 07/05/96 12:29pm -0400 = On Thu, 4 Jul 1996, attila wrote: = = > "denied zones" (we were never there) is no longer in vogue. however, we = > will probably see that again in parts of the world as many cultures do = > not have the basic respect for life we do. = = What is your last comment supposed to mean exactly? Just because = some Islamic militants decide to kill a few people in a terrorist attack = does not mean that the entire believer population of Islam does not have = respect for life. Just who is "we"? Americans? Europeans? All = industrialized nations? Every country except those Third World ones? Uh... = I don't see your point very clearly here... The only culture I can think = of that might now have respect for life are cannibals, and they DO have = respect for life in a way, they don't kill each other (I don't think), and = they do it because it's their lifestyle, but they don't perform = cannibalistic acts out of malice. Correct me here if I'm wrong. = let me phrase it another way: there are circumstances where the lives of 'n' innocent people are of less consequence than the enemy --in other words, try to keep collateral damage to a minimum, but get the target before he executes more harm (this applies to hostage situations, as well) in general, this does not mean wipe out an entire 100 story building to find a single sniper, but sometimes a commander is faced with the choice: send a team in with a 10% chance of accomplishing the mission (i.e. the team is killed or the target escapes) or waste the village. until you have experience the death of men in combat, you will never understand this principle. I certainly did not, and even as a graduate of Harvard and an active member of the LDS Church, I found it only takes once to _clearly_ understand that it is 'to kill or be killed.' don't sit in your ivory tower and pontificate until you walk the mile in my shoes. I also had the responsibility for as many as 1600 additional 'black shirts' in a fire zone --think about it. oh, sure, I (or anyone else) will never convince you --but maybe you will think about it. war is hell, son; and war zones are somewhere beyond. if you go, just pray that you come back understanding that and not with scrambled eggs for brains. -attila -- "Don't hunt wild game, hunt lawyers! They provide better sport, suffer from severe overpopulation; and, they taste just like chicken!!

1 0

Re: I confess [Was: Who was that Masked Cypherpunk?]
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:25 PM 7/5/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Since no one has mentioned exactly what happened at the LP Convention, I >will relate it from memory and JR can correct me. > >They were going to vote on adopting a platform plank that upheld the right >of everybody to use any crypto they wanted and export it an everything and >also opposing the proposal for a requirement that people use a key escrow >system set up by the government. I'm now watching the LP convention on C-SPAN, and taping it for a friend (who may have a book contract to do a book related to something along these lines). The one LP event I ever attended was the California LP annual convention, some years ago, and found it crushingly boring. This looks a bit more exciting. I suspect the LP will continue to get 3-4% of the vote, maybe a tad more this year due to widespread dissatisfaction with Dinton and Clole and with the obvious charisma of Harry Browne. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0