December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cypherpunks@hks.net service
by cactus＠bb.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The cypherpunks(a)hks.net service is now available. It will sign any message sent to cypherpunks(a)hks.net with its (currently 384 bit) key and forward the signed message to cypherpunks(a)toad.com. The key for the server is: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQA9Ay7eB60AAAEBgOGkDzo6mkSp3G4W3EXwMWK8SrTVSmosuN5Y7Z2FdBS5uJ3o 1O0XNAwqGc8CJ9W3bQAFEbQuQ3lwaGVycHVuayBzaWduaW5nIGFnZW50IDxjeXBo ZXJwdW5rc0Boa3MubmV0Pg== =ajZM - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- I welcome any suggestions on the format of the message and the prepended message. - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt5xMyoZzwIn1bdtAQEItQGAzXF0V/4buTcY9Ry0iGsiqjpq3o6jYRr7 E6QAlTsBd5Xy9k8v/ttlXcbEIHNLuhu8 =19Vo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: public accounts / PGP / passphrases
by collsc＠snowbird.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Thu Dec 1 20:25:31 1994 > Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 21:18:55 -0500 > Subject: public accounts / PGP / passphrases > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu > X-Server-Version: Cactus-Serv 1.1 > Reply-To: cypherpunks(a)bb.hks.net > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 1705 > Rather than assume that the "Reply-To:" field shown above is appropriate, I have Cc'ed your originating address as well. So, if you get two copies of this, you'll know why. > > Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using PGP with a > passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ? Am I wrong in thinking that my > secret key is useless to an intruder until she guesses my passphrase ? I > have no net access except via an account on a public machine, so I'm not > about to start storing my secret key elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase > to <null> if it's irrelevant anyway. I just reviewed the PGP docs a bit and > Phil says "Nobody can use your secret key file without this pass phrase.", > which seems to contradict what many people on the list have said. > Postulate an unscrupulous sysadmin (or anyone who manages to get the password for 'root' via fair means or foul). Let's call him Charlie (since we know that neither Alice nor Bob would do such a thing :). Charlie could easily install a process which logs each keystroke you enter, thus capturing your passphrase in said log. Alternately, he could substitute a rogue version of PGP for the real version. This rogue version would function exactly like the real version (to avoid suspicion on your part), but would surreptitiously copy your secret key and passphrase into a log file. Admittedly, this kind of attack is far-fetched. As long as you are aware of the possibility, you are free to assess the likelihood of such an attack and proceed accordingly. - -- Scott Collins "Now, thanks to the computer revolution, many Alcatel Network Systems geeks make ten times as much money as you do." Richardson, Texas Canter & Siegel, the Green Card Lawyers -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt8tgyoZzwIn1bdtAQFxDAF/Vu1A4jQ5R0hW2OODcMMPCjeCFZG0aRvB OJDeQZi5hBGAVjVk2QOeCZR//zWvp1lC =Rpnk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

1 0

Eric, please can you clarify
by Jonathon Fletcher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric, Can you clarify your intention for the list ? I'm a little puzzled by the alternatives that are flying about. You initially stated an intention to delay (eventually bounce) unsigned messages to cypherpunks list. A couple of posts back you talked about "This is an unsigned message" headers in messages. Are you intending to implement both of these, one of these, or one now and the other later ? What type of checking are you intending on signatures - just syntax or signature verification ? I apologize for asking for clarification, but I've lost the signal in amongst all this noise. -Jon -- Jonathon Fletcher, j.fletcher(a)stirling.ac.uk (X400: "/S=jf1/O=stirling/PRMD=uk.ac/C=gb/")

4 5

Re: FYI: Eudora and PGP
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > All of MacPGP 2.3v1.1, MacPGP2.6ui, and Viacrypt PGP 2.7 can >be driven via the use of AppleEvents, by the macpgp kit. This leads >one to believe that all three use the same suite of events. My >scripting environment is broken, so I can't actually test to see that >the entire suite is the same. > > The macpgp kit can be found at >duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip Now, if there was just something for us PC Eudora users...... Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)feenix.metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome, encouraged, and preferred. "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." John F. Kennedy

1 0

Update of Secure Edit a0.3.3->a0.3.4
by Thomas J. Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- UPDATE/PATCH OF *SECURE EDIT* for Mac FROM a0.3.3 to a0.3.4 (AND MAILING LIST NOTICE) There was a bug in Secure Edit a0.3.3 that would cause it to crash when setting a default startup pass phrase on 68k macintoshes, but not power macintoshes, which is what I was testing it on. I was not planning to release any upgrades before a major update and release in which I would overhaul most of the program, including changes advised by Colin Plumb and others. However, I thought this was important enough to release a patch. I have uploaded a patch to upgrade a0.3.3 to a0.3.4, as well as a a0.3.4 package, to ripem.msu.edu in the directory /pub/crypt/mac. These correct the bug. However, please save your work regularly as well as before using this feature, just to be safe. I am overhauling much of the program completely for the next release. The method for verifying the default password has also been changed from the previous "baroque" method. Now, it takes the MD5 hash of the key, encrypts this hash on the key, and uses the first 8 bytes of the resulting ciphertext to validate the default startup key. Please report any problems/suggestions/improvements you may have regarding Secure Edit. Also, if you wish to be on a list of email addresses that will receive information about Secure Edit updates or other Miyako Software releases, please send me an email to that effect. Anonymous IDs are, of course, fine. No code will ever be sent by email. Actual programs and source code must be FTP'd from ripem.msu.edu Miyako Software tjb(a)acpub.duke.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLt4R708YjrUhOUC5AQE0dQP7BvOWvOe6B1edvJ07RJ60UodPXoYAOmOX DQ6AueVoqrfcYqvstaHQrHl/9V6Ie9P9KbQLdxlHk7CbIsyKgdwOs5YOmUSYB01V YeIpp1YYkNa/ztpdcREtIGA4ghQMU/ijU7Ni6b/kLiITTSMr4HUosvBVEpMkh9Bw 93J/BzpvpO4= =m0R+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

public accounts / PGP / passphrases
by lmccarth＠ducie.cs.umass.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hal writes: > Just create a special key for your netcom account. Use no pass phrase; > using one would give a misleading sense of security IMO. Just pass your > mail through "pgp -saft" or equivalent and you've got it. It is easy to > do this from most editors. Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using PGP with a passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ? Am I wrong in thinking that my secret key is useless to an intruder until she guesses my passphrase ? I have no net access except via an account on a public machine, so I'm not about to start storing my secret key elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase to <null> if it's irrelevant anyway. I just reviewed the PGP docs a bit and Phil says "Nobody can use your secret key file without this pass phrase.", which seems to contradict what many people on the list have said. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "Don't say my head was empty, when I had things to hide...." --Men at Work - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLt6Cq2f7YYibNzjpAQF3KwP/ZgxKliBQe+BQ+Q0FfiN9ycxTRWRHlPWY qF4iqmxT70uWLm6hsSX6A88EKv1E+k4mfYhVAnT8XQCTp2wEYMVOHvlFJQiKHOCj 55Cot8bL7JCrJ+lUIDdCPOnNra61F2cc+S26EyB5jIKvudzkPLsWI49galG201M7 ILld5lrJhAw= =vc9N - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt6D+ioZzwIn1bdtAQGz5gF+Kokq6ZW/HpgRWowG2/+3QB913tJD2opJ +gKNrxqTK40qzj/8pdNNpreKYrf4rWIi =9YBk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

Re: making public keys public
by lmccarth＠ducie.cs.umass.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric writes: > someone (Alex Strasheim ?) writes: > Perhaps we would have > a default web, which would have everyone's key in it. > > This is a really bad idea. Some "public" keys should not be made > public, but rather revealed only to the correspondent. Forward > secrecy is the reason. If the public key has never been in the > possession of an opponent, and assuming the results of the public key > operation yield little or no information about the modulus, then when > the keys are changed and destroyed, no amount of factoring can find > the private key because the public key isn't around to factor. If you're not going to make the public key public, why use public key cryptography at all ? Save time and effort and use a symmetric cipher. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "Don't say my head was empty, when I had things to hide...." --Men at Work - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLt6Eq2f7YYibNzjpAQGIJQQAvKd0jyHXkaNfXp787EXQl/dXMYUXz8dB dF9NF9tiYp761ZwtkeKOoASZGYWvygO+8nseE/1pFz9Gns1XkUM0uyHvg4nvgIWj CJHtVsbV2rtRFZfIjDwD3wqsfRTRms5JvFcRpUsOSKol93hcabnIf3Vx9EAdIUSv hEtvQUBhzKY= =3yjE - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt6F9SoZzwIn1bdtAQFUvwGAhbycPCwIjZGjGeNMWkgnxQUJw6v2RpU3 Z2hvAV6sSiz3+wyLlkR+Nz9nTgRHqjWT =RaG/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

autodecrypting incoming mail
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've been fooling around with scripts which automatically decrypt incoming mail, and I'm curious about how others are approaching the problem. In particular, I'm interested in how Mime gets mixed in. A problem with using a script which acts as a PGP aware pager to display mail is that it would choke on certain types of Mime data, an attached binary, for example. The best solution to this problem would be a PGP aware Mime mailer, but that's too hard for me, so I've been playing around with scripts which will transform mail spool files with cyphertext in them into mail spool files which are all plaintext. First of all, I'm assuming that premail was used to encrypt the mail automatically. To try to get a handle for what's going on with the headers, I've been sending mail from elm, pine, and /bin/mail and seeing how they vary as encryption is added. When encryption is used, premail always uses Mime headers, with a Content-Type field that says "application/x-pgp; format = mime". When encryption isn't used, elm doesn't use Mime headers, but Pine does. There are a few other differences between the various mail programs as well. Elm, for example, has header fields which say how long the body is, while Pine doesn't. This makes me wonder if the transformation that premail uses on outgoing mail is a reversible process. Is it possible to transform a mail spool file so that it's exactly as it would have been if premail encryption hadn't been used? It's pretty obvious that we don't need it to be completely reversible: all that's needed is a header that will match the plaintext body. But what factors need to be considered when the new header is constructed? Specifically, which header fields would have to be modified? Signatures complicate things further, because they add information to the letter which has to be included in the plaintext somehow. If the same letter is sent twice with the same software, one signed and encrypted by premail and the other sent normally, it's not good enough to transform the first into a copy of the second. Somehow the user has to be told if the signature checked out. Is it possible to add a Mime section that would contain this information? Suppose, for example, we use Pine to send a letter. The letter contains normal text and an attached binary. This would mean that it would contain two sections in the body. Does it make sense to decrypt the letter, check the signature, and construct a new three section body, with the added section containing the results of the signature check? If we do that, how can we make the mailer display it? I'm sorry to ask so many basic questions, but I don't know much about Mime. I started using elm a long time ago, and I've stuck with it because it's comfortable. I don't have a lot of experience with Mime mailers. (If anyone could suggest a good cutting edge unix Mime mailer, I'd appreciate the pointer: I think just using the software would help a lot.) Thanks, == Alex Strasheim | finger astrashe(a)nyx.cs.du.edu alex(a)omaha.com | for my PGP 2.6.1. public key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLt6FUxEpP7+baaPtAQGbrAQAoWCj9ilFdE59fj+6beOYdv8MGQ3BtlMP ClfdJkQhbUheJx+vKtlvfw3/Cz8qiHpxy0QHqLbXzpTKrdN36xp1IbnAmFDGoFBz pjaBZdLMI/Izjein6aeardeKnwnhgVC1X6jgrQUhYfRsa0fHzx1Hl9PXucgckHHn gkQKsuIauR0= =82Jv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

NYT Potpurri and Econo-cash
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- John Markoff writes today on an interview with Michael Spindler, chairman of Apple. Here're some tidbits: "And flirting with heresy, Mr. Spindler says he sees no need for the so-called information superhighway. And 500 channels? Sixty are plenty. 'This is not going to be an all-electronic world where we all sit on a couch and are force-fed a constant stream of information,' said Mr. Sindler." "Mr. Spindler took pains to contrast himself with two of his industry's rivals -- and vaunted visionaries -- William H. Gates, chairman of Microsoft, and Andrew S. Grove, chairman of Intel. 'They believe that just because of technospeak it's going to happen, but it's not,' said Mr. Spindler." "And yet, Mr. Spindler, even as he decries the industry's preoccupation with the so-called vision thing, acknowledges that there are still ways of improving the life of the computer user. 'We still have to switch our computers on and off,' he said. 'We go to the restroom, and when we leave it flushes automatically.' " And, on Mr. Schindler's daring mis-speak, note others today parlaying technospeak and adverting profitably in The Times just like the Forbidden Fruit: "I.B.M. to Replace Pentium Chips in Some Machines" [Company News] "Takeover Talk Pushes Lotus Shares Up", by Glenn Rifkin. "A Challenge to Microsoft in Interactive TV", by Lawrence Fisher. "Prodigy Testing Link to World Wide Web", by Peter Lewis. "I.B.M. Makes Board Change". - ------------------ For those yearning to see the November 26 not-so-short article on e-cash in The Economist mentioned here twice and lavishly praised by one reputable cpunk: Send blank message with subject: ECO_do. [If remailer hks.net is a sucker punch I'm hit.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt6KLioZzwIn1bdtAQFv0wGAo5bKL0EOmdTpYtQ871U/ZU1b6rPiCidL JXWT+yggmo7oPFn+avTw+EtrTl8fCn0A =mb5r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: public accounts / PGP / passphrases
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:18 PM 12/01/94, lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu wrote: >Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using PGP with a >passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ? Am I wrong in thinking that my >secret key is useless to an intruder until she guesses my passphrase ? I >have no net access except via an account on a public machine, so I'm not >about to start storing my secret key elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase >to <null> if it's irrelevant anyway. I just reviewed the PGP docs a bit and >Phil says "Nobody can use your secret key file without this pass phrase.", >which seems to contradict what many people on the list have said. Theoretically, your sysadmin could quite easily get ahold of your passphrase, through a number of means, including logging all of your keystrokes. As a general rule of thumb, the sysadmin can do anything. I'm also don't have the crypto-math knowledge to know whether it's easier to crack your IDEA-encrypted passphrase then it would be to crack your private key only having some ciphertext and perhaps some corresponding plaintext in your possession. It certainly would be easier to crack your passphrase if you use a bad passphrase, like an english word. Generally, I think you don't want your private key falling into the wrong hands, passphrase encrypted or not. So if your sysadmin actually wanted to, your sysadmin could get at your key. Now, obviously this doesn't mean that your passphrase might as well be null. Nor does it mean there's no reason to use PGP at all if your only option is using it on a time-shared machine. I have a feeling that many people who don't know better think one of these two things after seeing all of the messages on this list that say "Don't use PGP on a time-shared machine! It's useless!" It's not useless, although you are losing some security by doing so. It's only a false sense of security if you don't understand exactly how much security you are losing. [and admittedly, I don't understand _exactly_ how much, myself. But then, I'm not using PGP on a timeshared system at the moment.]

1 0