December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: TIS, SKE, & CyberCash Inc.
by STANTON＠ACM.ORG 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > I think we're somewhere in between, with some frightening laws on the > horizon (look at the War on Drugs, civil forfeiture, tax laws, > currency reporting requirements, health care proposals, etc.), but No Joke. From what I hear, the feds are about to close on of the loopholes in currency reporting by extending the reporting requirments to wire transfers

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anybody know if this ``BlackNet'' thingie is for real? I found this offered for sale someplace on the Net. <g> BLACKNET INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, 19 SEP 94 ***RECENT SATELLITE DEPLOYMENTS*** 18. MENTOR/JEROBOAM SIGINT launched 27 AUG 94, 04:58 EDT, Canaveral. Multi-spectral "K-9" mission, target includes cellular traffic, U.S. Northeast. Joint NRO/CIO/FinCEN mission. Achieved orbit, all systems nominal. 19. JUMPSEAT SIGINT ferret launched 3 MAY 94, 07:31 PDT, Vandenberg. NRO mission. Titan IV. Balkans/Bosnia is target. Mission nominal. ***CTIC/Ricebird Crypto Modules*** E-Systems now shipping Commanders' Tactical Terminal/Hybrid-Receive Only" (CTT/H-R) modules to authorized agencies. Tactical Information Broadcasting Service (TIBS) and Tactical Data Information Exchange System Broadcast (TADIXS-B) modules now included CAPSTONE-compliant cryptography submodules. Authorized LE use only. ***FISSIONABLES MARKET*** Hamburg, FRG: Arrests of 12 SEP 94 point to increasing prices on Class-IV fissionables. NEST personnel arrived from Nevada, 13 SEP 94, and all evidence transferred. ....

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Forwarded: tagging info
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from Extropians: First off, before I discuss schemes for tagging data, let me say that I'm completely opposed to copyrights, patents, and all forms of intellectual property law. They're unhip and anti-extropian. I realize that a majority of Extropians will come out in favor of copyright law, given that they're knowledge workers, but they're misguided: there are plenty of ways to turn information into cash without making the free exchange of information illegal. Use your originality rather than a big stick. (For more, see my article "Free the Bits", article #94-9-488) <falls off of soapbox> That said, let me describe the ways I've worked out to be Big Brother. I've done some work on methods of tagging data in such a way that the tags can't be removed without destroying the information. This is what we really want if we're trying to trace where our data goes. I'm interested in cryptographically strong methods of tagging data, so putting tags in the noise bits of an image, or in the whitespace of text, is not good enough. Such tags can be easily ripped out. The old mapmaker's trick -- inserting a small nonexistent street into each map -- is more like what I'm getting at. The idea is to do a small amount of damage at a chosen site, in such a way that if the thieves try to cover up the damage without detecting the target site, they will have to destroy the information they set out to steal. Mainly I've thought about the case of tagging a piece of ASCII text, with a different set of tags for each copy of the text, enabling me to enforce a contract with a buyer of the information not to redistribute it. I'm going to choose to make small content changes, like exchanging a word for its synonym, as my means of inserting tags into the text which can't be smoothed away. The meat of what I'm interested in is when, say, 10 thieves get together and compare their (distinctly tagged) copies of a newswire article. Can they succeed in removing the tags and distributing a clean copy? They do a "diff" of their copies and discover that the 100'th word is sometimes "but" and sometimes "however", and similarly for 20 other words throughout the document. The thieves now have to decide which word to include in their output document (say, by flipping a coin), in order to scramble any information the tagger hoped to insert. So who wins? Tagger or thieves? The short answer is, my kind of tagging is effective in most cases, but not against a large group of sophisticated thieves (more than about 20 or so of them). This is because the number of tag bits required, according to my calculations, is exponential in the number of thieves. To see some stuff I wrote last year as part of a discussion on the sci.crypt newsgroup, and code for a simulator I wrote to test out an interesting case, retrieve article #94-9-497... -- Marc Ringuette (mnr(a)cs.cmu.edu) Freely forward/archive this. End of forwarded message Brian D Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "A country that wants to be unarmed and free, wants what never has been and never will be." --- Thomas Jefferson

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ACLU release and letter on FBI wiretap bill
by ACLU Information 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE ACLU Opposes FBI Wiretap Access Bill; Legislation Would Create Dangerous Precedent For IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 26, 1994 Contact: Barry Steinhardt BarryS @ aclu.org or Kathy Parrent, 212-944-9800, ext. 424 The American Civil Liberties Union today called on the House Judiciary Committee to reject the FBI Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922, which would require private electronics manufacturers to insure that the FBI can wiretap using developing telecommunications technologies. In a letter sent to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, the ACLU stated that the bill "... creates a dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the power, subject to warrant to intercept private communications, but that it can require private parties to create special access. It is as if the government had required all builders to construct new housing with an internal surveillance camera for government use." "Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an extraordinary requirement is necessary..." the letter said. A copy of the full letter with the ACLU's detailed objections follows. ___________________________________________________________________________ September 22, 1994 Honorable Jack Brooks Congressman, State of Texas 2449 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515-4309 Dear Congressman Brooks: We are writing to you to express the ACLU's opposition to the FBI-Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922. While we were not actively involved in Subcommittee deliberations, we have reviewed the legislation and we have several major concerns. The principal problem remains that any digital telephone bill which mandates that communications providers make technological changes for the sole purpose of making their systems wiretap-ready creates a dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the power, subject to warrant, to intercept private communications, but that it can require private parties to create special access. It is as if the government had required all builders to construct new housing with an internal surveillance camera for government use. Even if such use were triggered only by a judicial warrant, such a requirement would be strongly resisted by the American people. H.R. 4922 establishes a similar requirement, and is without precedent. Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an extraordinary requirement is necessary. In 1993, there were fewer than 1,000 wiretaps authorized and many of them failed to yield any substantive evidence while intercepting many innocent conversations. It is far from clear that digital telephones will substantially obstruct legitimate law enforcement efforts. Without further public discussion and debate, the public will not have a sufficient opportunity to weigh the loss of privacy against the FBI's claims. There has been no opportunity to learn the full extent of the types of investigations that the FBI claims were precluded because of a restriction on their public dissemination. Yet, based on these secret assertions, 91 such incidents were cited by the FBI. On those slim assertions, the public's loss of privacy in digital communications is all but assured and taxpayers will be asked to pay an extraordinary price. H.R. 4922 authorizes $500 million over the next four years to reimburse telecommunications carriers for the costs that would be imposed by the bill. Even if you accept these cost estimates -- the industry puts the real cost in the billions -- we will spending $125 million or $125,000 per wiretap, for the fewer than 1,000 taps that will be conducted each year. As you know, the ACLU has the greatest respect for Congressman Edwards and Senator Leahy. Both have been tireless champions for civil liberties. The Edwards/Leahy proposal is an improvement over earlier versions offered by the FBI and we applaud their efforts to add new privacy protections. The proposed expansion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to cordless phones and the requirement that a court order be obtained for transactional data from electronic communication providers both are steps forward and merit separate consideration by the Congress. But they cannot and should not be traded for the unprecedented intrusion represented by H.R. 4922. In several respects, H.R. 4922 is still too broad in its application. For example, earlier versions of the bill would have applied directly to on-line communication and information services such as internet providers, America On Line, Compuserve, Prodigy etc. H.R. 4922 would apply directly only to "telecommunications carriers" such as the Regional Bell Operating Companies. But this provision does not narrow the scope of the bill as much as it might seem. First, with the new presumption that the government is entitled to require private manufacturers to insure its ability to wiretap, law enforcement will undoubtedly be back in future years insisting that this limitation thwarts its efforts and will seek to broaden the coverage to other information providers. Once the basic principle of H.R. 4922 is accepted, what arguments remain to resist its expansion. The limited application of H.R. 4922 is surely temporary; what matters is the basic requirement, not its immediate application. More importantly, law enforcement will still have the opportunity to intercept on-line communications over the internet or commercial on-line networks, by tapping into the facilities of the telecommunications companies. As critics of the earlier versions had noted the coverage of the on-line providers was largely redundant. All these communications still pass over telephone lines. Law enforcement does not need access at every point in a telecommunication in order to intercept it. Access at any one point is sufficient and that would be readily available since ultimately on-line communications must travel over the public switched telephone network which the bill requires be wiretap ready. Moreover, given the commingled nature of digital communication lines, it is inevitable that more private information from third parties will be intercepted than would be the case with analog phones, and the minimization requirements in the bill will not prevent this. In the end, this proposal will make our telecommunications structure more, not less vulnerable. In its original form the FBI Digital Telephony proposal would have given the power to the Attorney General to impose standards on communication providers which would guarantee that their systems were wiretap-ready. Essentially, this would have created a centralized wiretapping system that threatened the privacy of the entire nation and was dependent for its security on a few select people. This raised the real concern that if electronic communications service providers must design their systems to allow and ensure FBI access, then the resulting mandatory "back doors" may become known to and be exploited by "criminals." The new proposal contains the same risks. It would have the technical standards developed by the industry, through trade associations or standard-setting bodies, in consultation with the Attorney General. But it contains a "safe harbor" provision, which protects a carrier from sanction if it is in compliance with standards created by this approach. The safe harbor provision virtually guarantees that the standards developed through the industry-based process will be adopted by all. Whether the standards are directly imposed by government or created by concerted industry action, in consultation with the government, makes little difference. The result is the same. A centralized wiretapping capacity with all of its vulnerabilities will still be created. Finally, we have grave concerns about the encryption provisions. The Edwards/Leahy version has been described as "neutral" on encryption. The bill provides that telecommunications providers do not need to decrypt data, unless they hold the key. In the short term, this is an improvement over the earlier versions of the bill which would have created obligations to decrypt, but there are at least two longer term problems. First, is the new presumption that industry has the affirmative responsibility to create special technical capacity for the government to snoop. Can there be any real doubt that the FBI will be back in the years to come asserting that its ability to intercept communications has been thwarted by easily available encryption and that an industry obligation, analogous to the new obligation to provide wiretap capacity, must be created. Secondly, in some cases the telecommunications providers may well hold the key -- particularly as they expand the services they provide to their customers. H.R. 4922 proposes a radical and expensive change in our telecommunications structure. The threats it poses, now and prospectively, are real, but the need for it far less than evident or proven. We urge that your Committee not rush into consideration of this far reaching measure with so little time left in the session. We thank you for your consideration of our views and we would be happy to sit down with you to discuss these issues. Sincerely, Ira Glasser Laura Murphy Lee --endit-- The ACLU urges interested persons to contact the following members of Congress immediately: Rep. Jack Brooks Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (202) 225-6565 (voice) (202) 224-7494 (voice) (202) 225-1584 (fax) (202) 224-5474 (fax) ============================================================= ACLU Free Reading Room | A publications and information resource of the gopher://aclu.org:6601 | American Civil Liberties Union National Office mailto:infoaclu@aclu.org | "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" . -- ACLU Free Reading Room | American Civil Liberties Union gopher://aclu.org:6601 | 132 W. 43rd Street, NY, NY 10036 mailto:infoaclu@aclu.org| "Eternal vigilance is the ftp://aclu.org | price of liberty"

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Re: National Research Council
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You shouldn't immediately dismiss the establishment as being unsympathetic; >many of us are working toward common goals, but in different ways. In my >case, since '84, through mass commercial distribution of strong crypto. > >While you can obviously trust no one to represent your interests with 100% >accuracy, I've been here for a while and will most definitely be trying to >represent CP viewpoints through my perception of those expressed in this >forum. > >Ray This is certainly true. For instance, I've spoken with one ex-Air Force Intelligence Officer who feels that Clipper is a bad idea because it gives the enemy a single target to attack. Grab clipper and you've got the key to everything. He may care about "rights" but he talks about security.

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Kennedy in Florida? Blacknet reprise?
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Does anybody know if this ``BlackNet'' thingie is for real? >I found this offered for sale someplace on the Net. <g> > > >BLACKNET INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, 19 SEP 94 > >***RECENT SATELLITE DEPLOYMENTS*** > >18. MENTOR/JEROBOAM SIGINT launched 27 AUG 94, 04:58 EDT, Canaveral. >Multi-spectral "K-9" mission, target includes cellular traffic, U.S. >Northeast. Joint NRO/CIO/FinCEN mission. Achieved orbit, all >systems nominal. > I'm not sure if I could understand why FinCEN would need a satellite, but perhaps I just don't know their whole mission. Especially since everyone is going to be reporting every little favor exchanged soon. Plus, can you use a satellite to grab cellular phone traffic? Isn't the point of cellular to make the transmitters broadcast at a low enough power so you can put another transmitter reasonably closeby broadcasting at the same frequency. If the satellite could disambiguate the traffic from two different cells at the same frequency, couldn't a cellular phone substation? But I really don't know anything about this. I'm just being skeptical. Besides, do they still use the name Canaveral? I thought everything was named after Ted Kennedy now. :-) (Generation X humor.) -Peter

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CASH: Lone Star Cards
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The State of Texas rolled out a new cash card today (at a demo, the real rollout is Oct. 1), intended to replace food stamps over within two years. This card is to be used like bank ATM card, so none of the parties are private, and thus this isn't digital cash in the strong crypto/cypherpunks sense. A user swipes the card at a grocery store and then enters a PIN, which causes a transfer of funds from the Department of Human Services (or something like that) to the store. The Comptroller states that this system will lower costs through reduced paperwork and reduced fraud. Who knows, perhaps the checkout scanner logs can be sold for a profit to various companies too! ;) Anyway, just thought I'd mention it - this fits in with various predictions by Tim that an outright ban on cash will begin with steps like this. -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu 2.3: 5AD633; D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 2.6: 088C8F21; 97 73 9E 8B 98 3E DD B5 E8 97 64 7E 20 95 60 D9 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - K. Cooper

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_Do_ read a little Chomsky!
by TOMJEFFERSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You don't have to agree with where he wants to go to enjoy his analyses of where we are and where we are going. He can be devastating. The cheap way to sample Chomsky is to monitor misc.activism.progressive (or is it alt.-.-?) {

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Forwarded: tagging info
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brian D Williams <talon57(a)well.sf.ca.us> writes: > of intellectual property law. They're unhip and anti-extropian. > I realize that a majority of Extropians will come out in favor of Is there an Extropians FAQ, or someone who'd care to give me an explanation of what the Extropians are all about? I've heard about "you" for too long now, and don't know who "you" are. TIA! --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | BOYCOTT SEA QUEST DSV... ask me why. | == == -= | PGP 2.[3a|6] Key Available | ==== ====== +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Ping
by Just some guy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pinging Cypherpunks

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