December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Aust crypto regulations
by M.Gream＠uts.EDU.AU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, fuck that for thinking I was living under a less restrictive regime -- and I can say goodbye to an international market for my software. ---- begin include ---- From: M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream) Newsgroups: aus.computers.ibm-pc,alt.security.pgp Subject: Re: PGP for Oz users Date: 6 Sep 1994 06:44:14 GMT Matthew Gream (M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au) wrote: > That sounds bogus to me, at least from the information you've given me > there. I've had the pleasure of being routed from our `Australian Trade [..] > I'm fairly confident in saying that there are no export restrictions on > software (specific clause stating that mass market, public domain and > "unsupported after installation" software is not covered by the > Industrial List). There do exist restrictions on hardware. All of these > restrictions are a direct result of our adherence with COCOM > regulations. I'm afraid I have to post a clarification to a clarification. I've just been in contact with the relevant people at the Defence Signals Directorate. It seems that regardless of advice obtained from other departments and documentation that points to the contrary, there are restrictive controls on software. In my conversation, the following was articulated (she was refering to the same document as previously mentioned [1]): 1. The "General Software Note" on Page 1-6 of [1] does not override the regulations in "Category 5: Telecommunications and `Information Security'", specifically s.5.A.2 and s.5.D.2. This means that they assert control over all forms of software _including_ public domain. I tried to pin-point what the "General Software Note" is for then, but didn't receive an acceptable answer. 2. DES can only be exported for specific banking and associated applications, even then only to 8 governments and certain banking groups. They accept RSA for export where it's used in Key Distribution applications. In essence, there is a list of specific uses for certain algorithms. 3. Message digests are in general OK, so long as they can't be modified to perfom cryptographic functions (ie. encryption/decryption). 4. Export is regulated on a per end user basis. In order words, they assert control over _each_ item of software sold. 5. The fact that COCOM is in a "forum" period does not affect the current regulations. 6. I specifically asked about "public domain" distribution of software via the Internet. She said that this was "highly inadvisable" and "if our government found out about it, they could take action" and asserted that it would be worse for an individual than if the violation was carried out by a company. She said that she wouldn't like someone to become a "test case", and made mention of problems in the USA. She was extremely helpfull though, but the real problem I had, and I spent most of my time on this, was that these requirements aren't solidified anywhere, and hence subjective. I'm not really surprised though, that's the whole point of it all. I wasn't concerned about "weak crypto", only DES, IDEA, RSA, MD* and locally produced algorithms. In short: Anything cryptographic, they want to know about, and they want to know about it on a per end-user basis. They advise against distribution on the "Internet" and any distribution without prior approval otherwise there could be "problems". Matthew. [1] "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications", Aust Dept of Defence, Sept 1992. -- Matthew Gream <M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au> -- Consent Technologies, (02) 821-2043 Disclaimer: From? \notin speaking_for(Organization?) [cfqx103] ---- end include ---- -- Matthew Gream <M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au> -- Consent Technologies, (02) 821-2043 Disclaimer: From? \notin speaking_for(Organization?) [cfqx103]

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Re: AIDs testing and privacy
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:28 PM 9/7/94 TZ, Mike Markley wrote: >What about being denied a job because you have been treated for some >disease? There are more than 1,000,000,000 employers on earth (not counting yourself). Get a job from someone else. Try contract employment. >How about being denied a loan because your medical history has >a profile that indicates that your life expectancy is shorter than the >duration of the loan? It seems that the potential for abuse is so great >that we should not allow such cross referencing. Borrow from someone else. Save the money. Buy something cheaper. Use your wife's/kid's/friend's credit. There are plenty of options. DCF

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Re: AIDs testing and privacy
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:19 PM 9/7/94 -0700, Jamie Lawrence wrote: >Another example- A Lyndon LaRouche type could get elected. >(I personally don't have enough faith in the Folk At Large >not to hand someone like that power) "Starting tomorrow, >all Hawiian Citizen Units will begin moving to the mainland. >Some of the smaller islands have been cleared, and HIV+ >units are being relocated as this address is being broadcast..." Obviously, privacy is more important in a totalitarian society but those sorts of social arrangements have become less likely since markets would largely prevent their development. Capital flight and punishingly high interest rates would squash any developed country that tried the totalitarian route these days. They couldn't afford it. DCF

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Re: AIDs testing and privacy
by alano＠teleport.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Obviously, privacy is more important in a totalitarian society but those >sorts of social arrangements have become less likely since markets would >largely prevent their development. Capital flight and punishingly high >interest rates would squash any developed country that tried the >totalitarian route these days. They couldn't afford it. The nature of control freaks is that they ignore the actual costs of their actions. Is the government actually concerned with the true costs of installing monitoring devices into every phone switch in the country? Do they really think of the financial costs associated every little decision designed to control our lives? The true concern is *POWER*. How they can get it, how they can keep it, and how they can extend their grasp into more and more of your/mine/everyone's lives. What must be determined is how to identify control freaks and what to do with/to them when you find them. /========================================================================\ |"I would call him a Beastialic Sadomasochistic | alano(a)teleport.com | |Necrophile but that would be beating a dead | Disclaimer: | |horse." -- Teriyaki (What's up Tiger Lily?) | As if anyone cares! | \========================================================================/

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Re: AIDs testing and privacy
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by Mike Markley: What about being denied a job because you have been treated for some disease? How about being denied a loan because your medical history has a profile that indicates that your life expectancy is shorter than the duration of the loan? It seems that the potential for abuse is so great that we should not allow such cross referencing. ................................................................. ..... Hey, Mike, just remember in the real world no one is required to be kind. If some hospital or company makes a decision to deny service for whatever reason they justify to themselves, it's their call as long as they are not owned by the State. They would likely make the same decisions upon receiving any information which represented a potential loss of revenue, whether that information came from special history files or from a client's personal admission. Even though having information about oneself passed around among agencies is odious to contemplate, what a private company decides to do as a consequence of their information is not really 'abuse'. (How they get that information in the first place, however, could be.) Blanc

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Re: NYT Fears Cypherpunks
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg byJohn E. Kreznar: More useful than the rulers-ruled division is the division into those who gratuitously accept the benefits of government (usually without even realizing that this is why government gets so big), and those who scrupulously avoid gratuitous involvement with government. The latter are an infinitesimal fraction who are being overwhelmed by the former. ................................................................. .......... The latter must find a way to live their way in spite of the rest of them. It's the individual against the mindless State, you know. (or the Mindless Condition) Blanc

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Introduction: Telephone traffic analysis
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I stumbled upon this great explanation of telephone traffic analysis and thought I'd share it with the list: Remember also, as far as security goes, that individuals always have the ability to add their own encryption to a system. But I would argue that encryption is also of minimal protection against a knowledgable telephone company or government with message traffic flow tracking capability. This is a capability that every phone company has since they use it to generate your bill every month. Consider the following: Some undesirable activity (to the govt or phoneco) is happening. The govt/phoneco (govco) is able to identify one or more persons involved. (now known as targets.) Targets: *1* *2* *3* They track and compare the frequency of calling patterns made by the targets. Now they know the "calling circle" of the targets. They expand the tracking pattern and start looking for cross overs. Targets: *1* *2* *3* / | \ / | \ | Level 1: A B C D E A F When they start to find a commonality (by Phone # or account holder(s)) they can begin to build the list of those persons most often called within the identified target group. In the above 'A' is common to targets *1* and *2*, thereby implying that the "group" is composed of *1*, *2*, and 'A'. Those most often called are the "key communicators", regardless of any formal or informal organization or public presence. By iterating this process recursively the entire organization and any supporting sympathizers can eventually be located. Both by members of the target group and by others outside the group who may not have any knowledge of other members of the group or even of themselves being in a group. Further, since all phone numbers are tied in the planning databases to physical locations and to billing addresses, enough data can be gathered to completely locate and identify (for further evidence research and cross referencing) members and supporters. Notice that this works even in those cases where no formal organization exists. Notice that this works regardless of whether the communications in question are encrypted or not. Applying this means that a movement, or any organized or coordinated activity could be disrupted by proper targeting of those who are the true key communicators. Actions as simple and subtle as cutting off phone service, placing bad credit reports, starting a tax audit, getting the person a better paying job in a different area, etc., etc. could all be just as effective as outright arrest and harassment. If they don't work, then things would escalate. So consider this as well and don't rely just on encryption to keep yourself secure. -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP public key by finger

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Karl Hess Club-L.A. area
by j.hastings6＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, and let me remind you, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." -- Karl Hess Libertarian, anti- and pro-Party, joint meeting: VAN NUYS (the Valley) CALIFORNIA U-S-A- ------------------------------------------------ The following text was written by SEK3: --- T H E K A R L H E S S C L U B --- invites you to our fourth meeting on Monday, September 19, 1994 Joseph Miranda asks us, COUP D'ETAT, U.S.A.? Soon? And...So What? Seven Days in May. Now, The Enemy Within. Is a military takeover of these United States still a possibility? Can it happen here? And...who would care? Would a dictatorship be worse than democratic oppression? Would State trains...or buses...run on time? Could more be privatized? Come and find out. Feel free to join in the...interrogation! MC for 4: Mike Everling TIMES: 7pm dinner. 8 pm Libertarian Party presentation. 8:15 announcements 8:30 pm Joseph Miranda speaks! PLACE: Van Nuys Dugout, 14032 Oxnard Street 1 block from Hazeltine, in the Valley, at last. (p.15, E6, Old Thomas Brothers, says Mike). Or call Dugout at (818) 780-9458. DINNER: $12 each, includes soup or salad, garlic bread, coffee or iced tea, and a potato (baked or fried) (except with first entree choice) and one of four entrees: Spaghetti with meatballs, Fried Chicken, Fried Filet of Sole, or Acapulco Special (ground beef, cheese, onions & ortega pepper). Dessert extra. Full bar at hand. No charge for presentations only, of course. BUSES: The 420 is the most frequent, all-night bus in the Valley, running all the way downtown. NEXT MONTH: Oktoberfest -- and Elections! Kent - j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com Ham radio AX25: WA6ZFY @ WB6YMH.#SOCA.CA.USA.NA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLm6XFzQYUX1dU7vxAQGutQQAvoNqZ214bQM3r+ECEF4TaoRJusOB9eLk UiC4PWVyaSuL4Yd4gp45pzRGGxW5sp9oNMXtEkQottGoBdNRGkwXYEyKUfVB9MvZ Tymc9yaGAvDr24vP4XIRXEf33tITS0KkYDf/qO7Ozv/fT2j2zS+7SOgDH4jp5brc y2VLs5uFX3Y= =xueN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Al Gore's home page
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After reading the official announcement in "What's new with NSCA Mosaic" I just checked out Vice President Al Gore's home page at http://www.financenet.gov/vpgore.html Interersting that except for the "This is the Vice President's Mosaic Home Page" header, it is all empty. This from the man who wants to bring us the Information superhighway. Why can't politicians stay away from stuff they don't understand? Because that would mean that they have to stay away from everything. Just another anarchist, -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP public key by finger

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Fwd: FBI RAIDS SMALL MICHIGAN RPG COMPANY
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Interesting tidbit, forwarded to me by a friend. ------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: tucholka(a)aol.com (Tucholka) Newsgroups: rec.games.frp.announce Subject: FBI RAIDS SMALL MICHIGAN RPG COMPANY Date: 7 Sep 1994 13:09:02 -0400 Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364) OK, there have been some wild rumors about the FBI raid on Tri Tac Games just after GENCON. Lets set them straight. FBI RAIDS SMALL GAME COMPANY PRESS RELEASE At 10am Tuesday morning, August 23rd, a special tactical team from the FBI gained swift and overwhelming entry into the corporate offices of Tri Tac Games in Pontiac Michigan to the great surprise of the entire staff who were still sipping coffee. Richard Tucholka, owner and president of Tri Tac, was duly informed of his rights as the squad of federal agents neatly and politely searched the offices of Tri Tac claiming to be looking for 'phony FBI Identification Badges' and 'Illicit government operation manuals.' It is to be noted that Tri Tac Games publishes an award-winning Role-Playing Game called Bureau 13, detailing the adventures of a secret division of the FBI which uses magic and Harrier Jump Jets to defend America from supernatural criminals and monsters. After painstakingly searching everything from the yet-to-be released CD ROM computer game version of Bureau 13, through the paperback copies of the Cult -hit novels from Ace Books in New York, absolutely nothing incriminating or illegal was discovered-- an incident close to the precedent setting invasion of Steve Jackson Games a few years ago by the US secret service which resulted in a major lawsuit rightfully won by the innocent game company. In preparation for another government visit, Mr. Tucholka has informed his lawyer, alerted the media, and set an extra pot of coffee to brew for the agents if they return. **************** Yes, it happened. No kidding. Apparently some fool at GENCON thought a $1 double sized Plastic ID badge on flaming orange and pink paper was a threat to national security. These badges were given to players of Bureau 13 as promotional material. **************** The agents were professional and Tri Tac cooperated with them. Computers were not touched (It is a federal law that a writers 'Works in Progress' may not be taken.) They removed plastic Bureau 13/FBI ID badges from a display shelf and versions of a Department of Justice ID badge produced by Databank Press. On Thursday the 25th Richard Tucholka was informed that the Federal Prosecutor would not be pressing charges for the badges because there was no malice or intent in their production. There would be a file established at the FBI with these badge examples for future reference. He was instructed to send in all production copies and masters as well as destroy the ID Badge Computer Graphics file in question. Richard Tucholka shook his head and said "Only an idiot could think these badges were real. Wonderful to see my tax dollars at work." And that's the story. 8)

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