December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: GUT and P=NP
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James A. Donald writes: > I was referring to the proposed quantum computers. > > > Since such machines do not operate algorithmically > > > > This statement is exactly wrong. Such machines *define* a class of > > algorithms. > I recommend that you read the following paper. > E. Bernstein and U. Vazirani, {\it Quantum Complexity > Theory}, Proc. 25th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computation, pp. 11--20 > (1993). James, without reading the paper, can you tell me why the following argument is incorrect? 1) By definition, if something can be computed by a turing machine, then it is an algorithm (Lewis and Papadimitriou) 2) a quantum computer can be simulated by a TM with exponential slowdown. (claimed by you on the Extropians list, but also claimed by Feynmann I believe, not about qm computers, but qm systems in general) then by (1) and (2), it follows that 3) quantum computers are algorithmic (if not, it would contradict 2) and possibly 1) It doesn't matter how slow the turing machine runs the simulation because we allow an arbitrary time along with the infinite tape to complete the computation. -Ray

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RE: Come On
by cyber1＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Connie Sadler <sadler_c(a)hosp.stanford.edu> writes: <I find lines like the above very offensive/non-professional. I >won't let it stop me from continuing on, but what's the >point? I really don't get it. CypherPUNKs is an offshoot of the cyberpunk paradigm, which can be stated as "high tech/lowlife". There are no claims of professionalism as far as I know. If cypherpunks share a common attribute, it is probably their enjoyment of the _practice_ of encryption and related disciplines. I did not notice anyone insult you personally. Surely if you find the language offensive, the solution is to filter your mail, or else unsubscribe. -- Alex Brock

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Re: Voice/Fax Checks
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:33 PM 7/21/94 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >All existing substitutes are either insecure (credit cards) or involve >excessive labor and transaction costs. > >Electronic transactions will take off like a rocket once they >*undercut* existing methods. > >As yet, our mail encryption interface is still bad. Convenient >crypto cash must come after convenient crypto mail. Chaum's going to do a full-blown internet demo real soon now, but the topic of this thread (faxed account, ABA#, etc) is being done right now, right out of the box. There are the various "net.malls" on the net out with secure mosaic credit card transactions. A guy just said he made his first sale (encrypted receipts and all) and we pooh-poohed him 'cause he didn't tell us anything we didn't already know. (We gotta be nicer to these guys, maybe???) To mutate what I said in the previous post in this thread, 85% of the people will settle for 75% privacy. If there's something to buy, and they can do an honest transaction and get the stuff they buy without being ripped off, then they probably don't care who's looking over their shoulder. Privacy will probably never be a selling point. Privacy will probably be an outflow of the need for e$, not vice versa. At this point I may have a quasi-religeous faith that the key to the adoption of e$ is that e$ reduces transaction costs, but we don't have any data to back it up. As someone who's been thrashing this a little bit, I've gotten stuck on exactly how to "*undercut*" the transaction costs of existing methods. Got any ideas? Are those transaction costs as a percentage of total cost meaningful enough to embue digital cash with the rocket-like competitive advantage we hope for? I don't have answers to these questions. I challenge you to come up with that analysis without a working system to benchmark your assumptions against. Mr. Solman, who seems to have pre-announced an agent based system with e$ "ticks" like in telescript, has my devoted interest at this point, but until there's some actual data, we're only speculating. BTW, I agree with you that Crypto mail isn't convenient. I still don't use PGP because it's way too much trouble to screw around with, and I bet doughnuts to dollars (Perry can hold the stakes. He's a wagering man ;-)...) that the Mac PGP I have is easier to mess with than any version on any other machine. <MacBigotMode(off)> But, as I said above, you don't need secure email to move e$ around. Secure mosaic will do just fine. I used email in the section you quoted because it's the simplest protocol conceptually, and I'm sorry you got tripped up in it. Light dawns on Marblehead. (Massachusetts joke). Isn't the point of digital cash that you *can* send it through unsecure mail and buy things? Perry, I want my bag of doughnuts back. No need to have a "mine is better than yours" bet after all. I really should just go to sleep now... Good Night, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by Peter Murphy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have deleted most of the blather from "Nobody" on this subject. However, this line was _very_ interesting... > BTW, I don't like what has been going on the list where there are anonymous > attacks on people in the list. This, of course, comes after about 60-80 lines of insinuations that Perry Metzger is really L. Detweiler. Isn't the world a funny place? Peter.

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aNdOm0Zre suggests that Perry Metzger is really a tentacle for L:.D:., and that Perry isn't one of the alifornia Cypherpunks so who knows him. Well, I've known Perry since beforre the Cypherpunks group started, and he was at one of the first couple Cypherpunks meetings I'd been at after I moved out here,as well as being out here fairly often for Extropians gatherings and computer conferences. He's real. (I can't vouch for certain that he's not Detweiler, since I haven't met the Detweilers, but he's real.) At one of those meetings, it was noticed that most of the major tentacles were there, including Jamie Dinkelacker (one of the first to be accused of being a Tim May tentacle), and I even sw California Drivers Licenses from the 8 or so who were there. Personally, I think if he hadn't existed,we would at some point hasve had to invent him to discover some of the practical difficuties with anonymity techniques, but we would probably have invented a less verbose, less paranoid version who can be turned off when we do't need him :-) Bill

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Double DES calculations
by DAVESPARKS＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

norm(a)netcom.com (Norman Hardy) wrote: > >Anyone care to estimate what the cost of the RAM alone for the > >"MITM interface" machine would be? Let's see, for two 56 bit beys, you'd > >need storage for 2^57 blocks of 8 bytes each, or 2^60 bytes. At $40 per > >Mb, or so, that would come to ... let's see ... $4 * 10^51 for memory > >alone. And once the list of blocks started growing as the attack > >progressed, could the interface processor keep up with the other two, in > >real time? Massively parallel processors might speed both ends of the > >attack, but the "database comparison phase" would be the real bottleneck, > >IMHO. > ... > DAT tape, not RAM, I think. At $5 per GB I get $5*10^11 to hold the info. > MITM requires a sort of this which requires roughly log(10^20) passes with > a favorable constant. This will wear out a bunch of DAT drives but that is > relatively minor. This is about an order of magnitude bigger than a > project that I considered once to find the optimal solution to the Rubics > cube. "Only" $500 Billion, huh (for tapes and drives alone)? Let's see how the logistics work out on that. If each tape drive measured 2"X4"X6", and if they were mounted in racks, back-to-back, five feet high, with three feet wide aisleways between them, they would require 3.2 million square feet of floor space. (How big is the entire Pentagon, BTW?) Assuming each of the 300 million tape drives consumed 25 watts of power, the total power consumption would be 7500 megawatts! At $0.10 per kwh., it would cost $1 million/hour in power costs alone, assuming a 33% overhead for removing all they heat they generated. Assuming it took an average of five seconds to load a tape into a drive, loading 300 million tapes would take 16,680 man hours, or roughly 10 man-years assuming a normal 40 hr./week work schedule. A set of replacement tapes alone would cost $3 Billion. It has been estimated that breaking single-DES would take 1.35 hours on a hypothetical "super-DES-breaker" machine, searching half the total keyspace, with a 50% probability of finding the key in that time. You yield the same probability on double-DES would require searching 71% of the keyspace, which would take roughly two hours, using TWO such machines. During that two hours, each of the 300 million tapes would be filled with data, but no actual MITM comparisons would have occurred yet. Thus far, we've spent $2 million on electricity alone. Now let's assume that each block of data generated was at least pre-sorted onto one of the 150 million available drives during the initial phase, according to its MSBs, or whatever. Now it remains to check for matches for the data on each of the 150 million drives on the ENcryption side with the corresponding drive on the DEcryption side. Let's further assume 150 million processors each assigned to handle a pair of drives, one on each side. Assume that a complete pass through the tape would require the same two hours as it took to write the data there in the first place, with buffered I/O so that at least half of the drives are running at full speed, and ignoring any rewind time between passes. Assuming a fast enough processor, the number of passes required would vary according to the ratio of the total data on each tape, divided by the total RAM, with the available RAM available for searching equalling four times the search block size to allow double buffering on both sides. With that in mind, the number of passes required would equal to ( 4 * 4 Gb / RAM ). If 64 Mb of RAM is available per processor, then a total of 256 passes would be required, for a total search time of 512 hours. The sum total of all the RAM on all 150 million processors would be 2 * 10^16 bytes. At $40/Mb, the RAM alone would cost $800 Billion, bringing the total cost of this machine to $1.3 TRILLION! The time required to crack a double-DES key is over 200 times that of a single-DES key, at a cost in excess of half a BILLION dollars per 112 bit key. While that *MIGHT* be technologically feasible, it probably wouldn't be politically feasible. That is probably more than the sum total of all US defense spending in out 120 year history, and probably more than "Star Wars" was projected to cost. That'd be a bit hard to hide in a "black" budget. Of course, there are various ways of trading dollars for time in designing such a system. Speed is virtually proportional to cost. Nevertheless ... if you've got the time to do TRIPLE-DES, it's probably still wise, "Justin Case"... /--------------+------------------------------------\ | | Internet: davesparks(a)delphi.com | | Dave Sparks | Fidonet: Dave Sparks @ 1:207/212 | | | BBS: (909) 353-9821 - 14.4K | \--------------+------------------------------------/-/

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Please unsubscribe vtw-announce from com-priv list!
by kwe＠cerf.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>[updated July 18, 1994 shabbir] > >[HR 3937 COMES TO THE FLOOR WEDNESDAY JULY 20TH; YOUR ACTION NEEDED] >[PLEASE CHECK THE "WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW" SECTION!] >********************************************************************* > > DISTRIBUTE WIDELY > >********************************************************************* > >Table of contents: > Introduction & Alert > Status of the bill > What you can do right now > List of legislators supporting HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) > List of legislators wavering on HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) > List of legislators opposing HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) > What is the Cantwell bill? > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >INTRODUCTION > >Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on >legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. >If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: > > -public testimony, > -reply letters from the legislator, > -stated positions from their office, > >please contact vtw(a)panix.com so they can be added to this list. > >General questions: vtw(a)panix.com >Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)panix.com >Press Contact: stc(a)panix.com >Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/1/1/vtw >WWW URL: Be patient; we're working on it. :-) >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 7/18/94) > >The Cantwell bill HR3627, that allows for fewer restrictions on exports >of cryptography, was rolled into the General Export Administration Act >HR 3937. The House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the full strength >version out of committee after open, public hearings. The House >Intelligence Committee took the bill and gutted it after a day of >closed, secret hearings. The gutted version will come to the House >floor on Wednesday July 20th. > >A amendment that reinstates Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export >provisions WILL be offered. It is crucial that you ensure that your >representative knows that you support ONLY the amended version of this >bill. > >This may be the last thing you can do for the cryptographic export >legislation. Take the time to make a call! > >Schedule/Chronology of the bill >Jul 20, 94 HR3937 comes to House floor; a "good" amendement will be offered > [YOUR ACTION IS NEEDED TO PASS THIS] >Jul 11, 94 House Rules Committee marks HR3937 "open"; allowing amendments >Jun 30, 94 [*** vote postponed, perhaps till the week of 7/11/94] > House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments > on the bill when it reaches the House floor >Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence >May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence >May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 > attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act >Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and >Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW > >Estimated time to do this good deed: Six minutes > >Your legislator needs to know that you want them to support HR3937 >but only with an amendment including Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography >export provisions. > >If you wish to fax a letter instead of calling, that's fine too. > >If you don't know who your representative is, call: > > -The League of Women Voters in your area, or > -Any representative from your state. They will tell you which > is yours. > >You can obtain a complete copy of all representatives by: > -checking the VTW gopher site: > > URL:gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/1/1/vtw > (check under Congress) > > -or by dropping a note to vtw(a)panix.com > >[Our directory is a bit out of date. Please check all fax numbers before >sending. People volunteering to obtain a new directory for us are >welcome to help out.] > >Feel free to use the following sample communique: > > The Honorable ____________ > address > Washington DC, 20515 > > Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, > > On Wed. July 20th, HR 3937 (General Export Administration Act) > comes to the floor. Please support HR3937 but only with an > amendment including Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export > provisions. These provisions are crucial to the development of > privacy-enhancing technology as the competitiveness of the > American cryptographic industry. > > Sincerely, > > _________________________________ > > >A shorter telephone sample communique might be: > > Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, > > Please support HR3937 but only with an amendment including > Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export provisions. > > Thank you. > >------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION > >The following legislators have formally registered support for >cryptography export legislation. Call them with your cheers. > >All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 > > Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax > ==== == ======================== ============== ============== > 1 WA Cantwell, Maria (D) 1-202-225-6311 1-202-225-2286 > 1520 LHOB > HR 3627's sponsor; thank her for her work! > > 16 IL Manzullo, Donald (R) 1-202-225-5676 1-202-225-5284 > 506 Cannon > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 11/22/93 > > 3 UT Orton, William H. (D) 1-202-225-7751 1-202-226-1223 > 1122 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 3 OR Wyden, Ronald (D) 1-202-225-4811 1-202-225-8941 > 1111 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 > 2307 RHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 19 OH Fingerhut, Eric D. (D) 1-202-225-5731 1-202-225-9114 > 431 Cannon > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 4 MA Frank, Barney (D) 1-202-225-5931 1-202-225-0182 > 2404 RHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 2 UT Shepherd, Karen (D) 1-202-225-3011 1-202-226-0354 > 414 Cannon > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 3 WA Unsoeld, Jolene (D) 1-202-225-3536 1-202-225-9095 > 1527 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 19 FL Johnston II, Harry (D) 1-202-225-3001 1-202-225-8791 > 204 Cannon > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 9 WA Kreidler, Mike (D) 1-202-225-8901 1-202-226-2361 > 1535 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 4 WA Inslee, Jay (D) 1-202-225-5816 1-202-226-1137 > 1431 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 7 WA McDermott, James A. (D) 1-202-225-3106 1-202-225-9212 > 1707 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 8 IN McCloskey, Frank (D) 1-202-225-4636 1-202-225-4688 > 306 Cannon > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 14 CA Eshoo, Anna G. (D) 1-202-225-8104 1-202-225-8890 > 1505 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 > > 10 NC Ballenger, Thomas C. (R) 1-202-225-2576 1-202-225-0316 > 2238 RHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 > > 2 WA Swift, Al (D) 1-202-225-2605 1-202-225-2608 > 1502 LHOB > Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >LIST OF LEGISLATORS WAVERING ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION >[Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling > or writing a legislator.] > > 26 NY Hinchey, Maurice D. (D) 1-202-225-6335 1-202-226-0774 > 1313 LHOB > Recently told a constituent that he is taking the Cantwell bill > under consideration, but has "national security concerns" about > allowing encryption to be exported outside the United States. > > 1 IA Leach, James (R) 1-202-225-6576 1-202-226-1278 > 2186 RHOB > Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. > > 13 NY Molinari, Susan (D) 1-202-225-3371 1-202-226-1272 > 123 Cannon > Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. > (has taken inordinately long) > > 8 NY Nadler, Jerrold (D) 1-202-225-5635 1-202-225-6923 > 424 Cannon > Met with lobbying constituent in April '94; no position taken yet > > 25 CA McKeon, Howard P. (R) 1-202-225-1956 1-202-226-0683 > 307 Cannon > Responded to a constituent with a "non-position", May '94 > Had a favorable meeting with a constituent and a VTW volunteer > in May '94. > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >LIST OF LEGISLATORS OPPOSING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION >[Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling > or writing a legislator.] > > Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax > ==== == ======================== ============== ============== > 5 AL Cramer Jr, Robert E. (D) 1-202-225-4801 1-202-225-4392 > 1318 LHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 8 CA Pelosi, Nancy (D) 1-202-225-4965 1-202-225-8259 > 240 Cannon > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 32 CA Dixon, Julian C. (D) 1-202-225-7084 1-202-225-4091 > 2400 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 40 CA Lewis, Jerry (R) 1-202-225-5861 1-202-225-6498 > 2312 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 46 CA Dornan, Robert K. (R) 1-202-225-2965 no reliable fax > 2402 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 2 CO Skaggs, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2161 1-202-225-9127 > 1124 LHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 10 FL Young, C. W. (R) 1-202-225-5961 1-202-225-9764 > 2407 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 4 KS Glickman, Daniel (D) 1-202-225-6216 1-202-225-5398 > 2371 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 1 NE Bereuter, Douglas (R) 1-202-225-4806 1-202-226-1148 > 2348 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 9 NJ Torricelli, Robert (D) 1-202-224-5061 1-202-225-0843 > 2159 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 3 NM Richardson, William (D) 1-202-225-6190 no reliable fax > 2349 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 1 NV Bilbray, James H. (D) 1-202-225-5965 1-202-225-8808 > 2431 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 17 PA Gekas, George W. (R) 1-202-225-4315 1-202-225-8440 > 2410 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 2 RI Reed, John F. (D) 1-202-225-2735 1-202-225-9580 > 1510 LHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 14 TX Laughlin, Gregory H. (D) 1-202-225-2831 1-202-225-1108 > 236 Cannon > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 16 TX Coleman, Ronald D. (D) 1-202-225-4831 None > 440 Cannon > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 19 TX Combest, Larry (R) 1-202-225-4005 1-202-225-9615 > 1511 LHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 1 UT Hansen, James V. (R) 1-202-225-0453 1-202-225-5857 > 2466 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > > 6 WA Dicks, Norman D. (D) 1-202-225-5916 1-202-226-1176 > 2467 RHOB > > FAILED Cryptography exports: > Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the > House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >What is the Cantwell bill? > >The Cantwell bill would permit companies to export products with >encryption technology in them. US companies are currently >not permitted to export products (hardware or software) with this >technology in them. > > >What is encryption technology? > >Encryption technology, or cryptography, is the art of scrambling >a conversation so that only the people communicating can decode >it. Other people (such as eavesdroppers) cannot learn about >the conversation. > > >Where is cryptography being used? > >Cryptography is used to encrypt electronic mail to protect its confidentiality >in transit. It's used by bank automatic teller machines to protect >sensitive data (such as your account number, your Personal Identification >Number, and your bank balance). It can be implemented into software >(such as electronic mail programs and word processors) as well as hardware >(such as telephones and "walkie-talkies") to ensure your privacy. > > >Why is there a restriction on exporting products with technology >in them? > >For many years the United States poured vast sums of money into >cryptography. The US government thought that if they did not let this >technology be exported, foreign individuals would not be able to obtain >it and use it against us (by keeping US intelligence agencies from >eavesdropping on their communications) > >Today, many companies selling cryptographic technology are producing >their products for the global market. A recent Software Publishers' >Association Report (available from the VTW gopher) identified over 200 >non-US companies producing cryptographic technology in the global >marketplace. You can buy the same, high-quality cryptographic >technology from many international firms despite the US export >regulations. Although the marketplace has changed, the regulations >have not. > > >Why should the regulations be changed? > >US companies compete in a global marketplace. Because of the export >regulations, they often compete alongside products with superior >cryptographic capabilities built into them. > >The result is that US companies build their products with >an inferior encryption technology. The result of this is that >you, as an American consumer, have great difficulty obtaining >products with strong encryption in them. > >Because US products cannot compete against products with better >privacy features, and because the laws are outdated, the regulations >should be changed. The Cantwell bill fixes these regulations to more >accurately resemble the current situation of the world marketplace. > > >How can I help encourage more privacy-enhanced products and >pass the Cantwell bill? > >Call or write your representative and ask them to support or cosponsor >Rep. Cantwell's export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General >Export Administration Act, HR 3937. You can base your letter on the >sample communication below. > > >SAMPLE LETTER OR PHONE CALL > >The Honorable ____________ >address >Washington DC, 20515 > >Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, > >As a citizen concerned for my privacy, as well as a supporter of >American business, I urge you to cosponsor the Rep. Cantwell's >cryptographic export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General >Export Administration Act, HR 3937. > >The bill would allow US companies to produce and export products with >cryptographic privacy-enhancing technology in them. These products >are already available from firms throughout the world. US companies >lose nearly $100 million per year in exports to them. > >By encouraging this industry, ordinary citizens like you and me would >be able to purchase products with better privacy features. > >Please support or co-sponsor HR 3937. > >Sincerely, > >___________________________________ > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Gore's "new and improved" key escrow proposal
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is it just me, or has the administration just delivered the knock-out puch? It seems that by abandoning the Clipper proposal for a software based system they managed to convince key industry groups (and soon the public?) to end their opposition to the fascist key escrow proposal. Cypherpunks, we are in deep trouble. -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP public key by finger Clinton is in the process of making internal passports aka "Universal Health Care Card" mandatory: "REV 13:16 And he causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their foreheads: REV 13:17 And that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name."

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Re: Come On
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray writes: > > I'm not going to fall into the trap, so I won't bother responding. Spider Robinson was right! God _is_ an iron. Too late, Ray. >> Off by a millimeter at the arrow's point; off by a mile at the target. > > You shouldn't think out loud. But your reflections on your own >behavior are quite on the mark. "I know you are, but what am I?" _Very_ impressive. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Gore's new and improved key escrow proposal
by thad＠pdi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Gore's new and improved key escrow proposal >> Is it just me, or has the administration just delivered the knock-out puch? >> >> It seems that by abandoning the Clipper proposal for a software based >> system they managed to convince key industry groups (and soon the public?) >> to end their opposition to the fascist key escrow proposal. Cypherpunks, we >> are in deep trouble. >> I feel the same way. I posted an article from the Mercury News to here about three weeks ago, reporting on a conference between the White House and several private cryptography companies, where they were trying to work out some kind of private sector EES. So, this has been in the works for some time. I can dig up the article for anybody that would like to see it. I'd buy stock in TIS, if it were a public company, I'd guess that they will have the inside track on this. thad Thad Beier Pacific Data Images 408)745-6755 thad(a)pdi.com

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