December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Solveig Singleton on "Brave New Partners in Net censorship"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 16:26:03 -0500 From: Solveig Singleton <solveig(a)cato.org> To: declan(a)well.com Op-ed: Brave New Partners In Internet Censorship by Solveig Singleton (solveig(a)cato.org) Solveig Singleton is the director of information studies at the Cato Institute. A few short months ago, the Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment protects the Internet just as it protects booksellers, newspapers and books when it found the Communications Decency Act (CDA) unconstitutional. That critical ruling signaled censorious governments in countries like Argentina, China, Germany and Zambia that the United States would not provide a precedent for blocking undesirable Internet content. Yet now the computer industry flirts with technologies of "self-censorship" at a December Internet summit under the guiding hand of the Clinton administration. The summit, called Focus on Children, poses subtle new dangers to free speech on the Internet. The First Amendment keeps the government out of the business of controlling media content. Private citizens are free to follow their consciences in choosing their own reading material and guiding their children to seek out or avoid certain information. There's no First Amendment objection when a newspaper editor refuses to print an article or when parents take books away from their children, or use a "censorware" program like SurfWatch in their own homes. The private sector is allowed to edit, to exclude and to silence speech). The public sector is not. But the summit's organizers call for "partnership" between industry and government in keeping "inappropriate" material from children. President Clinton is expected to attend. The summit emerged from a July meeting of President Clinton, Vice President Gore and some of the groups involved in the lawsuit against the Communications Decency Act. As it blurs the line between public and private, the Focus on Children summit becomes government action disguised as parental action. Filtering software like SurfWatch and the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) -- a computer language standard that allows labels to be attached to Internet content -- are fine as long as they stay in the private sector, driven by customer demand and free choice. There's no need for a summit to make that happen. With nothing better to do, politicians and sensationalists are likely to use the occasion to shine a media spotlight on the dangers of the Internet. Government pressure will make it all the more likely that the computer industry will be unable to resist calls for mandatory PICS or universal filters built into the fabric of the Internet itself. Disturbingly, the summit's program suggests that free speech rights do not necessarily rank high in the sponsors' priorities. Its sponsors include, for example, the conservative group Enough is Enough; the summit's Web site links to their pro-CDA arguments but not to anti-CDA sites. While some opponents of the CDA are involved, defenders of free speech such as the American Civil Liberties Union are conspicuously absent. Documents promoting the summit describe the CDA as "well intentioned" and note that "supporters and opponents of the CDA agree that children should not have access to inappropriate material on the Internet or in any other medium. The real question is, how best to do it." The right question is whether government has any proper place at the table discussing any of these issues -- and especially in determining what is "inappropriate." The answer is a resounding no. Furthermore, government involvement is not necessary. The vendors of filtering programs have reason enough to ensure that parents are aware of their products. Government involvement promotes political, centralized solutions to what should be private problems. The V-chip is a prime example. Before lawmakers chose to mandate V-chips, entrepreneurs and private groups competed to help parents monitor their children's viewing habits, offering dozens of different blocking technologies as well as ratings and reviews of programs from diverse perspectives. Now the monopoly V-chip threatens to shoulder those offerings out of the picture. Freedom of speech on the Internet offers hope to millions of people around the world who live under political regimes that stifle their access to information. But the Internet's freedom depends on its technology. Politicians should be ashamed to set a precedent in this country by pressuring the industry to engineer this freedom out. We do not need a V-chip for the Internet any more than we need a rating system for libraries or bookstores. ### Solveig Singleton (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Director of Information Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

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PGP bought by McAfee
by steve 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"Network Associates, Inc. >(Nasdaq: NETA, commencing Dec. 2), formerly McAfee Associates >(Nasdaq: MCAF), announced today that it has a signed a definitive >agreement to acquire privately-held Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (PGP)." Varous Questions, comments rants, etc.: Does anyone know how this will affect PGP's: security, commitment to no-GAK, Founder (P. Zimmerman), the continuation of the PGP product line? I heard that McAfee's PCCrypto product will still be sold by NETA as a retail product, (are they considering incorperating the 2 together and just using PGP's team for R&D?) steve -- A picture tells a thousand words. Stego

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PGP Inc Sold for $35M - News Flash
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Network Associates Acquires Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 04:46 p.m Dec 01, 1997 Eastern Standard Time SANTA CLARA, Calif., Dec. 1 /PRNewswire/ -- Network Associates, Inc. (Nasdaq: NETA, commencing Dec. 2), formerly McAfee Associates (Nasdaq: MCAF), announced today that it has a signed a definitive agreement to acquire privately-held Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (PGP). The PGP acquisition extends Network Associates' network security and management software products with the leading applied cryptographic security solutions for protecting corporate assets and enabling secure electronic communication. According to an Ernst and Young study, top threats to network security include virus attack, sabotage from inside the firewall and sabotage from outside the firewall. The combination of PGP and Network Associates unites leaders in addressing these corporate security threats. Network Associates' McAfee anti-virus security software is used by over 25 million users and more than 80% of the Fortune 500. With more than four million users in 50 countries, PGP is the worldwide de facto standard for Internet email and file encryption. "The synergy across our product lines is phenomenal," said Bill Larson, chairman and CEO of Network Associates. "We will now be able to provide an integrated software solution for securing both corporate networks and enterprise data." "There is a pressing need for comprehensive, integrated security solutions," said Phil Dunkelberger, general manager of Network Associates' Total Network Security Division, (formerly president and CEO of PGP.) "The combination of resources and talent of the respective companies will provide customers with a premier enterprise-scale security solution." Network Associates leads the way in providing large corporate customers with integrated network security and management suites. Network Associates' Total Virus Defense Suite incorporates client, server and gateway protection against computer viruses, and is a leading offering in its class. The PGP encryption and management products, including the PGP Business Security Suite, will be the cornerstone for a complementary suite offered by Network Associates called the Total Network Security Suite. By combining Network Associates' intrusion and virus detection products with Business Security Suite's desktop encryption software, and key server and policy management tools, the Total Network Security Suite will address, in a single solution, the needs of network administrators and corporate security officers. PGP has long been a pioneer in the security industry, contributing significantly to many of the principles that have driven the industry. Network Associates will continue to support the guiding principles that have made PGP a successful technology. These principles include a commitment to strong encryption and open standards. Network Associates will build on the progress made with the Internet Engineering Task Force, including RFC2015 and the Open PGP working group, to develop standards for security designed to unify industry practice. The acquisition, which is expected to close on or about December 15, 1997, is subject to PGP stockholder approval and other customary closing conditions. Members of PGP's board of directors and management, and certain other major PGP stockholders have agreed separately with Network Associates to vote their PGP shares in favor of the acquisition. The aggregate consideration payable in the acquisition is approximately $36 million (payable at closing in cash and the assumption of certain liabilities) and warrants to acquire a specified number of shares of Network Associates common stock. The acquisition will be accounted for under the purchase method of accounting. In accordance with generally accepted accounting principle, Network Associates expects to incur a significant charge to earnings for the Dec. 31, 1997 quarter related to the purchase of in-process research and development. With headquarters in Santa Clara, Calif., Network Associates, Inc., formerly McAfee Associates, is a leading supplier of enterprise network security and management solutions. Network Associates' product offering includes four individual software suites, Total Virus Defense, Total Network Security, Total Network Visibility and Total ServiceDesk, which can be centrally managed from within the Network Associates' NetTools unified management environment. For more information, Network Associates can be reached at 408-988-3832 or on the Web at http://www.networkassociates.com. This news release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Because such statements apply to future events, they are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause the actual results to differ materially, including without limitation, integration risks related to the proposed transaction and the risk that the proposed transaction will not be consummated. Important factors which could cause actual results to differ materially are described in Network Associates' reports on Form 10-K and 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. SOURCE Network Associates, Inc. Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548 -- <@><@> --

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Robert A. Costner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that the purpose of a remailer is to strip the headers, including the FROM header, not to put in fake headers. Until someone can explain it to me, I'd consider the idea of adding a FROM header to anonymous mail to be asinine. Best I can tell, the only reasonable good purpose for this is to create a persistent nym identity without a reply to capability. Well, remailer software cannot support everything I suppose. (Even if Cracker may apparently support this) I would think the best way to put in a persistent nym capability would be to database the PGP key id's along with the persistent identity. Then the remailer could produce lines like From: "Monty Cantsin" <anon(a)anon.efga.org> Persistent identities would be created by sending a signed PGP message that includes both the PGP public key and the persistent identity. Since the identity server would not database email addresses, only PGP key id's, and only work for signed messages, there should be no problem with people worrying about the remailer being compromised. This also keeps someone from stealing another's reputation capital. -- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746 Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh@efga.org http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key

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Big Brother Is Watching ATMs
by Jonathan Wienke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I just heard that a bank card company has just released a program for using photos of the iris in people's eyes as a biometric ID to replace people's PIN codes for ATM / credit cards. What I found really interesting is how they plan to implement it. As people use the ATM, they are photographed. (Every ATM has a security camera.) Over time, as people use the ATM, the security camera images are composited to produce a high-quality image of their irises, which is coded and placed in their account information. Once this is accomplished, when a card is inserted into the ATM and the security camera gets an iris image that matches the account sufficiently closely, the user can conduct transactions without entering the PIN code. People affected by this will merely receive a letter that under certain circumstances, entering the PIN is no longer necessary, but this is not a security problem. This scenario may not be a security problem, but it certainly poses a privacy problem. Given the frequency that the average Joe Sixpack uses the ATM, it is only a matter of time before the government mandates a nationwide eyeprint ID database to catch ATM and credit card theives, money launderers, tax cheats, and other undesirables. Perhaps the eyeprint could even replace or supplement the SSN as the unique taxpayer ID key for tax and other purposes. Of course, given the fact that ATMs have had cameras from the start, this theoretical eyeprint database could already be under construction. How's that for paranoia? >:-( Of course, there are a few ways to beat this, such as mirror sunglasses, (which would only be useful while alternative credentials to eyeprint ID are still available) and contact lenses, (which would have to be carefully oriented so that the same side of the lens was always up, or the fact that you are wearing contacts and are therefore a Suspicious Person would become obvious to the system) and of course intraocular implants of various types. Of course if the implant's power-on LED gives your eyes a constant Satanic red glow, you may be flagged as a Suspicious Person anyway. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBNIJMc8JF0kXqpw3MEQJEiACdH+0zupstOe2EK3nO+xkF6nY4SOsAnAuO d/cf2DBRj3tiSUHgBaQHOgq9 =LxX3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jonathan Wienke PGP Key Fingerprints: 7484 2FB7 7588 ACD1 3A8F 778A 7407 2928 3312 6597 8258 9A9E D9FA 4878 C245 D245 EAA7 0DCC "If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lightly upon you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams "Stupidity is the one arena of of human achievement where most people fulfill their potential." -- Jonathan Wienke Never sign a contract that contains the phrase "first-born child." RSA export-o-matic: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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PGP User's Guide 2.6.2
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can I find a copy?

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Re: Digital Signatures
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Monty Cantsin writes: > You can't see it up here, but this is a signed message using a > protocol which is modestly titled "Cantsin Protocol No. 1". > Suggestions for improvement are most welcome. A very interesting idea! Please consider the following suggestions if you like, or feel free to ignore them. One problem with signatures which have no indication at the top is that two passes over the data are necessary: the first to scan and find the start-of-signature indicator, and another to go back and calculate the hash. Signatures such as S/MIME and PGP have enough information at the top of the signed message to allow one pass processing. > The first line is "16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin Protocol > No. 1]". The hexadecimal number was chosen randomly and is the > indicator that this is a Cantsin Protocol No. 1 signature. The number > was chosen randomly and it is somewhat unlikely that anybody else will > accidently choose it. You might want to think about what happens if the document itself contains (maliciously, or perhaps because it is talking about your signatures) the string in question (as yours does and this one does as well). This could throw off an automated signature checker. > The second line in the signature is an SHA1 hash of the public key. > The hash is computed on the concatenation of the hexadecimal ASCII > forms of p, g, and y respectively. There should be no leading zeros. > (Remember to leave off the newline!) Presumably you could use the key hash to look up the key to use for verifying the message. This has a mild denial of service attack. Someone else could create a key with different boundaries between p, g, and y but which would create the same string as this concatenation, and therefore the same hash. If you left the "p: ", "g: ", and "y: " in place it would prevent this. PGP's key fingerprints have had the same problem. > The fourth line contains an offset and a length to specify the area of > the text which is signed. The offset is relative to the signature > itself. That is, the first character of the Cantsin Protocol No. 1 > code is at position 0. As signatures are usually appended, the offset > will usually be the additive inverse of the length. It is intriguing that this can be used to sign a subset of the text. Presumably there could be multiple signature blocks each of which signed different subsets, possibly with different keys. One problem is that it is not obvious to the human reader what part of the text is signed. A nice effect with PGP and S/MIME signatures is that even readers who don't have the tools can have some slight confidence in signatures, because other readers will often report it when signatures don't verify. With a signature that only covers a portion of the text, people might assume that if there are no reports of failure, more of the text is signed than is the case. This is not a technical problem but is a social phenomenon which may not interact well with this signature format. You need to specify a canonical line ending format. Based on the count values in your document, it appears that you are counting line terminators as being one character long. Your count value of 1CB9 corresponds to decimal 7353, there are exactly 7353 characters from the first character of your message body to the beginning of your signature magic number, if line ends are one character. The specific characters for line endings need to be specified as well for the hash to be calculated consistently. Your hash appears to be calculated with LF as the line ending (although the hash program is broken, see below). Probably CR/LF would be preferable for the line endings as that is a widely used internet standard as well as being common on windows. > You also need to be able to compute SHA1 hashes. I've been using > something called "sha1file" which, I believe, originated at Adam > Back's web site. That program has a bug. The routine SHA1_update in the file sha1.c is missing a line: while ( ctx->mlen == 64 ) { convert_to_bigendian( (word32*)ctx->M, 64 ); SHA1_transform( ctx ); use = min( 64, data_len ); memcpy( ctx->M, data, use ); ctx->mlen = use; data_len -= use; *** data += use; *** MISSING *** } Correcting this will make your hashes be correct. > El Gamal is simple enough that the signature on this message can be > checked using standard Unix tools such as dc version 1.1. Let's say M > is the SHA1 hash of the message. It is checked by verifying the truth > of this equation: (y^a * a^b) mod p = g^M mod p. El Gamal is a rather lengthy signature, although the verification equation is relatively simple. DSS has a shorter signature. If you report not r,s, but rather r,w where w is the inverse of s mod q, then the verification is: r = g^(M*w) * y^(r*w) mod p mod q. It's not really much more complicated. There are some subtleties to choosing El Gamal keys, but with the 2048 bit values you have chosen you are pretty safe. You want to make sure that the generator g doesn't generate a small subgroup; to do this you need to look at the factors of p-1. Your p-1 has several small prime factors: 0x2^3, 0x3, 0x6b, 0x16f, 0x1f79b, 0x3533a1eb3. Beyond that is a 1978 bit composite which I can't factor. Chances are very high that a random g will generate a group of size which is a multiple of a large prime factor of this large composite value, so it is strong, although not quite 2048 bits strong. Also, you can't really justify using 2048 bit keys when your hash is only 160 bits. The hash becomes the weak link for keys beyond about 1024 bits, and unless you use a stronger hash your key strength is misleading. This is why DSS is only specified up to 1024 bits. -- A hasher to be named later --

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California
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1997 11:45:58 -0500 Reply-To: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> Sender: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> From: Ben Wright <Ben_Wright(a)COMPUSERVE.COM> Subject: California Comments: To: digsig-post <digsig(a)lists.state.tx.us> To: DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU The California Secretary of State has published the final draft of his digital signature regulations at <http://ss.ca.gov/digsig/digsig.htm>. The final draft contemplates both dual-key signatures and signature dynamics like PenOp. --Ben Wright <http://infohaus.com/access/by-seller/Benjamin_Wright. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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by 20145708＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Fwd: Japs and the UN
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >Return-Path: <Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net> >Received: from falcon.adelaide.on.net by cti02.citenet.net (4.1/SMI-4.1) > id AA11267; Sun, 30 Nov 97 17:19:02 EST >Resent-Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 08:45:53 +1030 >Resent-From: Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net >Resent-Message-Id: <9711302219.AA11267(a)cti02.citenet.net> >Received: from default (ppp253.adelaide.on.net.au) > by adelaide.on.net (PMDF V5.1-10 #25974) > with SMTP id <01IQNJH3VW8Q00CE9B(a)adelaide.on.net> > (original mail from ssa(a)adelaide.on.net) for jf_avon(a)citenet.net; Mon, > 1 Dec 1997 08:46:02 +0930 >Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 08:45:53 +1030 >From: ALERT <Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net> >Subject: Japs and the UN >To: ssaa-alerts(a)adelaide.on.net >Resent-Reply-To: Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net >Reply-To: Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net >Message-Id: <3481E599.D57(a)adelaide.on.net> >Organization: Sporting Shooters Association of Australia >Mime-Version: 1.0 >X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win95; I) >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Comments: Sporting Shooters Association ALERTS mailing list >X-UIDL: 6ab40261c41b93db3a6bd1fed4a9e264 > "Japan paid salaries to officials on loan to U.N." .c Kyodo News Service TOKYO, Nov. 30 (Kyodo) - The Japanese government has paid salaries to its officials on loan to the United Nations for the past 27 years in violation of the U.N. Charter, a national daily reported Sunday. Officials from Japanese ministries and agencies on loan to the world body receive salaries from the U.N. as well as salaries from the Japanese government, the Mainichi Shimbun said in a report from Geneva. The government has paid billions of yen for more than 1,000 officials from Japan's ministries and agencies after a law, stipulating government officials dispatched to international institutions be paid 70 to 100% of the salaries paid in Japan, took effect in 1971, the Mainichi said. The U.N. Charter and U.N. staff regulations ban receiving payment from any government to maintain its independence. An official at the National Personnel Authority was quoted as saying half the Japanese officials on U.N. assignments are paid 100 % of their home salary amount. Tsukasa Kawada, director of the Foreign Ministry's U.N. Administration Division, was quoted as telling the Mainichi the payments are aimed at guaranteeing the status of officials on loan by continuing their pension and insurance fees' benefit and are not rewards for their duties in the U.N. AP-NY-11-29-97 2338EST ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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