December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

how much entropy in common answers
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been playing arround with some code to implement CME's secret sharing using low entropy answers. (His write-up is in http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/rump96.html) In the write-up, Carl says " That means that it has very low entropy. For example, a person's first name has only about 8 bits of entropy. Car makes and models have only 2 to 4 bits of entropy -- especially if one is naming cars desirable to a teenager." Further on, he says "Therefore, if each answer has entropy E, the attacker must correctly guess T=(EK) bits of answers. If T exceeds 90 bits or so, then the user is reasonably secure from answer-guessing attacks." (where K is the number of questions) My question is, how do we measure the entropy of each answer so we can calculate when we've got 90 or so bits. I know when I was a teenager, the list of car lust objects was short, and everyone wanted a Mustang or Camaro, so the entropy of those two choices was much less than half a bit. A similar idea was mentioned in a critique of the plot of West Side Story. The question is, on a hot night in Spanish Harlem, what percentage of women are named "Maria"? Clearly there are cultural issues involved. The entropy in a question such as "what is your favorite brother's name?" is low in an Irish family like mine where names cluster arround choices such as are Patrick, John, Sean, and Dan. So how do we measure the entropy objectively? Thanks Pat Pat Farrell CyberCash, Inc. (703) 715-7834 pfarrell(a)cybercash.com #include standard.disclaimer

1 0

RE: Mass-market crypto phones
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:40 AM 11/22/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: >The LEA's are not intested in saving the public money. They are >interested in preserving and expanding their power. If it costs >$1,000,000 per wiretap, who cares? The government has men with guns that >can always go out and extort more cash from the population. > >--Lucky They could if they would; but they can't so they won't. Governments (like real people) always collect as much revenue as they possibly can at a given time. If they could figure out a way to get more they would. To argue otherwise is to imply that they are not maximizing their total monetary and psychic income and are forebearing to grab all they could. I don't think members of this list should pay The Great Enemy such a compliment. Remember the findings of the Public Choice school. DCF

1 0

A.Word.A.Day--syncope (fwd)
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, For those of you who don't get Word.A.Day, you might enjoy the unatributed quote at the bottom of the post. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 23 Nov 1996 01:52:20 -0500 From: Wordsmith <wsmith(a)wordsmith.org> To: linguaphile(a)wordsmith.org Subject: A.Word.A.Day--syncope syn.co.pe \'sin-k*-(.)pe-, 'sin-\ n [LL, fr Gk synkope-, lit., cutting short, fr. synkoptein to cut]short, fr. syn- + koptein to cut - more at CAPON 1: a partial or complete temporary suspension of respiration and circulation due to cerebral ischemia : FAINT 2: the loss of one or more sounds or letters in the interior of a word (as in fo'c'sle for forecastle) ........................................................................... The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ To subscribe or unsubscribe, please send a message to wsmith(a)wordsmith.org with "Subject:" line as "subscribe <Your Real Name>" or "unsubscribe". Email anu(a)wordsmith.org if you have any questions, comments or suggestions. Archives, FAQ, words and more at the WWW site: http://www.wordsmith.org/awad/

1 0

Re: wealth and property rights
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 21 Nov 96 at 18:35, Dave Hayes wrote: > However, I would question the implication that "socialists" are > responsible for the higher tax rates you currently experience. > > For example, I could make a strong case that you really have some > clever "capitalists" who have learned how to express their > "capitalism" quite effectively across the space of all people in a > "country". OK. I am not on Cypherpunks anymore but this leftover of the mail queue landed in my mailbox. So, please, reply directly. I just couldn't let this one pass by me without jumping on it. :) Your second paragraph is attacking a straw man. You even included the word 'capitalist' in double quotes ("). The common point between socialists and theses so-called "capitalists" is that they both use that fact that some coercion is enacted on a given population to get rich an/or powerful. The socialists seek, as a value, power over producers and your "capitalists" seek to get rich and/or powerfull. But both blank out the cause of the obtention of their goals: legally exerted coercion (via govt rules and powers). To use terms coined by a well known writer, one is a Witch Doctor, the other is an Attila (morally sanctionned by the Witch Doctor). They natures are not opposite, they are simply both sides of the same coin. I sometimes wish peoples would use words for what they really mean... jfa Please reply or Cc. directly to me. Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

2 1

Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote: >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable. No? Please prove your assertion. Your claim is similar to IPG's - nobody has done it yet. Your claim is stronger - hardly anybody has worked on IPG's algorithm, nor are they likely to. diGriz

8 8

Announce PGP263UI (long message)
by Steve Crompton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To All PGP Users: I am happy to announce the availability of PGP 2.63ui, the successor to PGP 2.6ui and 2.62ui, an unofficial international release of the famous public key encryption program, based originally on version 2.3a. This version is being made available for a number of reasons: * It is the only version fully compatible with *all* versions of PGP from 2.0 to 2.7 * It incorporates a number of bug fixes and features not available in the MIT release (see below) or in Stale Schumaker's 2.6.x.i releases based on the MIT release. * This version, like 2.3a and 2.6xui before it, is published under the terms of the GPL. Consequently: - You are not bound by the RSADSI licence since this version does not use RSAREF (which forbids commercial use and unauthorised use of the cryptograpgic routines), as you are with MIT PGP - You are not bound by the MIT licence (which requires the program to produce output that cannot be read by earlier versions), as you are with both MIT PGP and Staale Schumacher's PGP 2.6.xi. - you can therefore do what you like with the code of the program provided any derivative work is also GPL'd. - The only relevant patent for users outside the USA is Ascom-Tech's patent on IDEA. For non-commercial use it's free, anywhere. For commercial use you need a license, but Ascom-Tech offers a single- user license for a modest fee. See http://www.ascom.ch/systec Users inside the USA may not legally use 2.63ui, because the RSA patent is in effect there. USA residents are advised to obtain one of the MIT versions which have a license for non-commercial use of RSA. However, I note in passing that by using the armor_version parameter in CONFIG.TXT, that armored output from PGP 2.63ui can be made difficult or impossible to distinguish from other versions. Note that I personally have not done very much of the actual coding on this version. However if bugs are reported or constructive suggestions for improvements made I will pass them on to the individual(s) who have done the bulk of the work to make this release possible. I am assured that continuing support will be provided. This is a partial list of the changes and fixes since 2.62ui. A complete list is in file 263UICHG.ASC, which is inside both ZIP distribution files. Added CONFIG.TXT Parameters: LabelEncrypt = on # Label Encrypted Armored files with Recipient(s) This will add readable text in front of an encrypted and armored file listing the public keys used to encrypt it. The format of the text is similar to what appears on the console during (-l) decryption. PrePendSigV=on # Prepend Signature Verification msg to output text When verifying the signature on a text (not binary) file, and a detached signature (-b) is not requested, PGP 2.63ui will prepend a message with the results of the signature verification (good or bad) similar to what appears on the console. Expanded Compatibility with Early PGP Versions. version_byte=3 is usually set to Emulate PGP 2.6 after 9/1/94 Version_byte must be set to 2 before encrypting/signing messages to be decrypted/verified by PGP 2.2 or 2.3a. Also, unique to PGP 2.63ui, is the ability to set version_byte to 2 in extracted keys (-kx[a]). This allows PGP 2.63ui to extract keys which may have been created and/or signed by MIT PGP or by a ui version with version_byte set to 3 and create an extracted key which may be added (-ka) by PGP 2.3a. Note that the reverse is not true. If version_byte=3, keys created with version_byte=2 are -not- changed when extracted. Expanded Error Checking Most disk writes are now checked for errors or running out of disk space. Key Generation and other Keyring maintenance operations check for write access to public and (where required) secret keyrings before lengthy processing starts. Previous versions were not checking if the keyrings were set to read-only, which led to invalid results. PGP 2.63ui allows you to change UserID's of keys not your own (corresponding secret key not present). You can sign the new ID with your own secret key but (obviously) not with the other person's secret key. PGP 2.63ui is distributed in two ZIP files pg263ui.zip [executables & documentation] pg263uis.zip [source code & documentation] They are currently available at: ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/mirrors/utopia.hacktic.nl/pgp/pc/dos/ ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/pgp/pc/dos/ Each zip file contains a MANIFEST signed by me which gives the MD5 digests of all other files within the ZIP. You can use the MD5SUM.EXE program included in pg263ui.zip to verify the MANIFEST (after using PGP to strip the signature). Here is the MANIFEST for pg263ui.zip 840317378232e54d03424e7e49a9bd4a *263UICHG.ASC 7408f5f49f74e0209f7a712a10c95e8e *CONFIG.TXT 83c8d06f39a0984066464e9a70e62550 *ES.HLP 64fa593bc5f188cf5a3cda03f3ed0ea5 *FR.HLP 480f583a2ac6776a4de7df6e7382545e *KEYS.ASC 5ba7143bad4739a4b749e492b5eee1ce *LANGUAGE.TXT ecec59110e8a3bfd7fb195ec5964d5ce *MD5SUM.EXE ca537810f4fdf5f359ec6583eeb176bb *PGP.EXE 3e2afe9edfc197554e9de9e3d433cdd0 *PGP.HLP e1ef684d67c7e23143bca9163ce04966 *README.1ST 473d455178341f5f6e5f53394fd5a1d9 *README.2ND a7491b03c6e87d57e34ec03ace211509 *README23.DOC 01a94cd84d68ea1cb905ce29caf0961e *DOC\BLURB23.TXT ad4652e2dcfd4a0ecf91a2c01a7defd5 *DOC\COPYING fbdd95ba04c9d2be5c4b8e2769482c32 *DOC\KEYSERV.DOC 8ab813656498102101d55b9ecfddde98 *DOC\NEWFOR22.DOC cf12a2daac04470b6ad2b311cc514431 *DOC\NEWFOR23.DOC 5413061db46b1379a5489296c214ee38 *DOC\PGFORMAT.DOC 2a6c84401fc0c3b9febd77dd965c7b4f *DOC\PGP.1 33eeab5a938d0d33b8ca8ecf97038d73 *DOC\PGPDOC1.TXT ff0d028f72c4632c2b87c099dce92180 *DOC\PGPDOC2.TXT ca6253109c92944d44a9a1767f0b58ff *DOC\POLITIC.DOC b648ac7c1c3aa7b0c92f80dc18dc9bcc *DOC\README.VMS e4cfe2f3c28aab747f2396ae5e0a8ba8 *DOC\SETUP.DOC Here is the MANIFEST for pg263uis.zip 840317378232e54d03424e7e49a9bd4a *263UICHG.ASC 7408f5f49f74e0209f7a712a10c95e8e *CONFIG.TXT 83c8d06f39a0984066464e9a70e62550 *ES.HLP 64fa593bc5f188cf5a3cda03f3ed0ea5 *FR.HLP 480f583a2ac6776a4de7df6e7382545e *KEYS.ASC 5ba7143bad4739a4b749e492b5eee1ce *LANGUAGE.TXT 3e2afe9edfc197554e9de9e3d433cdd0 *PGP.HLP a7491b03c6e87d57e34ec03ace211509 *README23.DOC e1ef684d67c7e23143bca9163ce04966 *README.1ST 473d455178341f5f6e5f53394fd5a1d9 *README.2ND 1a22a466840f14025a5de0118d6daa0d *CONTRIB\README e8e9f513a273e86170e886c730a73307 *CONTRIB\ELM_NN\MAILPGP 56776ba15d847d005da2c95caa13744f *CONTRIB\ELM_NN\MOREPGP 8ae0fd91ea7ca5e041a5da4b78dce2c1 *CONTRIB\ELM_NN\POSTPGP a2e4b46d2b0a6613a19061e8755024ca *CONTRIB\ELM_NN\README 0bf0ac13b4d019ed8b010ac3c0d30241 *CONTRIB\EMACS\PGP.EL1 52f5921095dd385796ae5fe6b2badbc6 *CONTRIB\EMACS\PGP.EL2 8de46004960bbca27de290a814fa6585 *CONTRIB\EMACS\RAT-PGP.EL 0188d65c58e003d50871a60412a86e58 *CONTRIB\EMACS\PGPEMACS.DOC 3a256a88091276b667a8283614122a76 *CONTRIB\IDEA\IDEA.ASM fb995ab5c86fd45fcccc9c385d03c551 *CONTRIB\IDEA\README 1061623e095426e6ece416f75a15c643 *CONTRIB\IDEA\TEST.C 488b1cece84dd0853f491a5d10362ca4 *CONTRIB\MAIL_TIN\MAILPGP 994c5848ed0457eaf60ec086ad86048e *CONTRIB\MAIL_TIN\MOREPGP f3afdb4e57ea645e7bfdbb1eb969a48c *CONTRIB\MAIL_TIN\POSTPGP 746f7fcfb23fc18974f06243201957eb *CONTRIB\MAIL_TIN\README c037a9119d14999dc445ea47a75e7d48 *CONTRIB\MAILX\MAILER 06cebf8214342e286a7f3245c724ff4d *CONTRIB\MAILX\PGPMAIL2 eac85d75f64fef85da9afa399368890d *CONTRIB\MD5SUM\MD5SUM.C 5ca3e58ba621523b0d3feb026820fa63 *CONTRIB\MD5SUM\PGP23.MD5 6242095b32ea68409929194ad7e157bd *CONTRIB\MD5SUM\README 7bf7d12fe520767019a71d4f963fa6c8 *CONTRIB\MD5SUM\PGP26UI.MD5 501fc6ccb4e8405d75a72d9acb6a019c *CONTRIB\MH\PGPMAIL.MH bff01f6723fac1145074f6cce81ef1b8 *CONTRIB\MIME\MIMEPGP.DOC ded0f233729d58e001746708fb0ecec6 *CONTRIB\MISC\PGPNOHDR.SH a860741049e3b3285c4d96996a7e59f0 *CONTRIB\MISC\PGPPAGER.C 3af9ddacbe85b67fd3a02ce8a9421a04 *CONTRIB\VI\VIPGP.DOC 01a94cd84d68ea1cb905ce29caf0961e *DOC\BLURB23.TXT ad4652e2dcfd4a0ecf91a2c01a7defd5 *DOC\COPYING fbdd95ba04c9d2be5c4b8e2769482c32 *DOC\KEYSERV.DOC 8ab813656498102101d55b9ecfddde98 *DOC\NEWFOR22.DOC cf12a2daac04470b6ad2b311cc514431 *DOC\NEWFOR23.DOC 5413061db46b1379a5489296c214ee38 *DOC\PGFORMAT.DOC 2a6c84401fc0c3b9febd77dd965c7b4f *DOC\PGP.1 33eeab5a938d0d33b8ca8ecf97038d73 *DOC\PGPDOC1.TXT ff0d028f72c4632c2b87c099dce92180 *DOC\PGPDOC2.TXT ca6253109c92944d44a9a1767f0b58ff *DOC\POLITIC.DOC b648ac7c1c3aa7b0c92f80dc18dc9bcc *DOC\README.VMS e4cfe2f3c28aab747f2396ae5e0a8ba8 *DOC\SETUP.DOC a75c34297e3915242232242aa0147bb8 *SRC\3B1_6800.S baf854e4fd40d02a7b7b7fa2911382be *SRC\68000.S 557168162e418489bc245ab5c4030add *SRC\68000_32.S 57900fde67a6039f1b218972e74bf806 *SRC\80386.S de3f8236644a00ca45d1c41f400b2fc3 *SRC\8086.ASM 69f8d2757e5c13a1ebf17998a756e8ba *SRC\ARMOR.C 80f3854e9b76eee4167503893135839e *SRC\ARMOR.H 5b9cd4b55699685f37dd594382dda8a7 *SRC\CCC 7fb0b40db91d6da79d38b2f475110fc4 *SRC\CCC.X28 66b7d0786b5d426644591fa347a7e205 *SRC\CHARSET.C 35bbbe1de78008abae59bf12fed41291 *SRC\CHARSET.H 04b95ec3860bc3ecaf56d2fe5d837a68 *SRC\CONFIG.C eb57f96eea26bee3152fb82a5006e133 *SRC\CONFIG.H c0741f9f07cb9f7f7dff2be9ac6ed3a0 *SRC\CRYPTO.H df233c3e5793cae25adc82bd51ffe9c5 *SRC\CRYPTO.C 1c51db6958288d475e066f4b428d1324 *SRC\DESCRIP.MMS 067b372f3f13365acca772f307dd73c9 *SRC\EXITPGP.H 243453889c70b37d7444d29a162ba9bb *SRC\FILEIO.C bc273e19f5900cac30bfe8d1bc29907a *SRC\FILEIO.H a0bebb371176f8fd5ea2c34e14be8106 *SRC\GENPRIME.H 4f3f1ca25c8ad16536ba9fa4f2fa07ba *SRC\GENPRIME.C 12fb2c21d044f5cc1264d4e2f8e35d17 *SRC\GETOPT.C 70bc995b674a1041f006e0c85ad128bc *SRC\GETOPT.H 891c95125020cc39df1cfaf531baeac4 *SRC\IDEA.C cbf974a9968d4cccb3dbbb8c6e197fb3 *SRC\IDEA.H be2862fa4e729caed7f5284d0a068c2d *SRC\KEYADD.C a31d39f665562103f27fd51943eb9f80 *SRC\KEYADD.H fcd92da1ef03062aaaf4a32e9c0bfe1c *SRC\KEYMAINT.C e8b97adb23122b1e61d1c876d44405f5 *SRC\KEYMAINT.H b51b6f358baecddf27d2af1f1325b8a8 *SRC\KEYMGMT.H 55f0e339489a329813568e9e43d44087 *SRC\KEYMGMT.C 378c2c04399840ff19a1c428c86b31a3 *SRC\LANGUAGE.C fa3757f2e65cce62ccd16cf4fa71f0dc *SRC\LANGUAGE.H 2194f583f62eff5db4dacc1d032fd391 *SRC\LMUL.H 465c44debfabb9433c6b0d6416d29ff9 *SRC\M.BAT 46377c4b4ff7deb2bac93c5eee2bbbad *SRC\MAKEFILE.TC 5a7e71d8c85f7cd95825c55cd3f1bae7 *SRC\MAKEFILE.AMY 625825b93e4230440371ee2bc32616e8 *SRC\MAKEFILE.MSC 0fd62dae064f53b0c9caa7ac9302a926 *SRC\MAKEFILE.UNX 08781b63fa78e8743be80da9aace6f9f *SRC\MC68020.S 021582f73d3324be77267a0c60890e6e *SRC\MD5.C 3b254fd2c035f3081ca2ec96ea120f9a *SRC\MD5.H 517550a4f55b76767a524f8997310bae *SRC\MDFILE.C f54f6dc8ab01cb256d23f59824c38ee7 *SRC\MDFILE.H 5fbaf7195aadb77916f02c6fe3260a45 *SRC\MORE.C ad3274da77b334827113f23ba7e85730 *SRC\MORE.H 9cb7caf58ca015e4a2a88deb056c539d *SRC\MPIIO.C 4d1446ac5992abe2cf1ea12a8f2d9310 *SRC\MPIIO.H 5b5f0174cdc8d2dcf6c48240ea4bf055 *SRC\MPILIB.H f86467788e24b8484c9f9c71b8bfb692 *SRC\MPILIB.C 5db4340956609ac9debb9a517371bf9e *SRC\PASSWD.C 9344f7fe246c52d04105ddfae09de625 *SRC\PASSWD.H 8fe5084f2924836c655e84ef7f835674 *SRC\PGP.C 614f9234b18231bf92219c8a257e78cc *SRC\PGP.DEF 88c06903fc5386160e34291da980c421 *SRC\PGP.H 851e15e93234d3c466af5f9c9c932d79 *SRC\PGP.MAK 64459d86a1069f98ed6d471b39614561 *SRC\PGP.OPT 2def18122c0cf2b56e0e8caff3e3ecb5 *SRC\PGP.PRJ abf28ba7832d89abeac494e3cec45a7c *SRC\PGPPWB.MAK dbb569238f082bb4048264ffd0eb117a *SRC\PLATFORM.H 19be9bade48954274b84408fa18d4ad0 *SRC\R3000.C e64d1a208d148cd3c2400f9301360df2 *SRC\R3000.S 766825310519ca3c70395c2ccf986aa7 *SRC\R3KD.S ba19b4d87c1f1d36f00e1f180b4b9a72 *SRC\RANDOM.C 1aad27b13005436b9e2e9c7537a641e0 *SRC\RANDOM.H 62542804547db44fabdf36bc31d0802e *SRC\RSAGEN.C 6d3eb1bb77e53c7020dc6180c95adeb2 *SRC\RSAGEN.H d026b1e2ef561bf20790c81578159449 *SRC\RSAGLUE.C a62a4b12a3837571e13419559c385747 *SRC\RSAGLUE.H b13fc1755a4d36109604dd027d9a5d36 *SRC\SPARC.S e01ca7bf8ff1b5fb55b95b762569430d *SRC\SPARC5.S 9d47b06b192c264dcbf2184c1890f05f *SRC\STDLIB.H 1efd1412a867be2b00a0cd66f036c314 *SRC\SYSTEM.H 329e9a279a9cdd4ae241d03839970a6d *SRC\SYSTEM.C 270fa89c0ff884ee10d1a02a1ff9040d *SRC\USUALS.H 30861dd65fdde4a5980b7d4cdf77ffdf *SRC\VAX.MAR 4d38b8dd3fa590edac0c2c9ccbfa2c0f *SRC\VAXCRTL.OPT 0bfbf4243329095d8bedb43e9222c6f4 *SRC\VMSBUILD.COM 1f09c5096052dd04a23f82fbfbf3f735 *SRC\ZBITS.C 9ff737184ab3697105e63c314ee291bb *SRC\ZDEFLATE.C 6ce4f6a3d9a62c1f188a2c22c171242a *SRC\ZFILE_IO.C 20cc87c569e4a1ef96b700f733190201 *SRC\ZGLOBALS.C 7cf642c7a28dab19b5b257d6f06fa3a4 *SRC\ZINFLATE.C 28d41c5aea7551e8c6c3d12e69141adb *SRC\ZIP.C 6e4e3f4ae03d0d6a9d466716bafe719f *SRC\ZIP.H 1602f1e2f0836b7d2af3e071fca8a47e *SRC\ZIPERR.H d196f856bc08b1740b2679c5f5fd1411 *SRC\ZIPUP.C 988ca6b0f63791ca02524048e666cb72 *SRC\ZIPUP.H fb27196aa99cf8b47fba10581db5aa24 *SRC\ZMATCH.S 8f5d690f2652a4d4ceab1b41d1b40d01 *SRC\ZMATCH.ASM 56b97156406d0adb0e9b714c2d5bf6c6 *SRC\ZREVISIO.H 7c2f8a376a30a72eb71eff212f1a8b14 *SRC\ZTAILOR.H 17fac9f3271a8650256da28bf31b584b *SRC\ZTREES.C 3f114dac8098c09167d2d2c540520415 *SRC\ZUNZIP.C d211d2be3334c216808c376cc5b5812e *SRC\ZUNZIP.H This version of PGP has not been approved by MIT or Phil Zimmerman. Please do NOT send any questions or bug reports about this version to either pgp-bugs at MIT or directly to Phil, but rather to me, Steve Crompton <100645.1716(a)CompuServe.COM> London, 23rd November 1996 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Requires PGP version 2.6 or later. iQCVAwUBMpc+1Qc2DukbwCfhAQHi8gP+LCT2tFyzHf54CCkzeqQKbfQdFlldddtO RwwyVLOE6R7HnHuwz8HPFOEKjz85z158Rq0RbpmZqG+G0ynChuqm/80ocEfB83PI PXLjgTzeOxqdEum9tWpa45UUlMEuC4Puni7t9AUMyNlTmNrunbRMFdcDxIajsV+j U/0r1tRhPA4= =G+nz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

Re: Sameer R.I.P.
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>C2 has a nice corporate-style fig leaf on its site. Sameer has decided, it >seems, to get out of the anonymity business and pursue other interests. > >Nice run while it lasted. > >FYI, Sameer does mention that his recent legal brouhaha had nothing to do >with this decision. C2 is still appears comitted to anonymity, they just don't want consumer accounts which were unprofitable. C2 will still support anonymous Web pages and offers the Web-access Anonmizer.

1 0

Re: Star Trek: First Contact
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:02 AM 11/23/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: >> OBMoney: Picard states the they don't have money in the 24th century. >> Instead they work for the good of mankind. Nanotechnology must have made >> everything material possible, so the only reward left is status (aka >> reputation). > >Why doesn't everyone have a starship? (Tongue firmly in cheek) It seems some feel that their best route to high status is to be the crew member who beams down and dies. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

1 0

Re: how much entropy in common answers
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Pat Farrell <pfarrell(a)netcom.com> > Clearly there are cultural issues involved. The entropy in a question > such as "what is your favorite brother's name?" is low in an Irish > family like mine where names cluster arround choices such as are Patrick, > John, Sean, and Dan. > > So how do we measure the entropy objectively? You have to estimate the probability that the attacker will guess what you have chosen. This will depend on how much the attacker knows about you. If he knows that you're Irish, it will help in the question above. If he knows the names of your brothers, it will help a lot more. Probably it is best to be conservative in assuming what your attacker knows. If you have four brothers and nobody whom the attacker could ask will know who is your favorite, but you think he could find out there names, then he has probably a 1/4 chance of guessing right. (Actually he might do better by preferring older brothers rather than younger, etc.) The amount of entropy is then negative log 2 of the probability, or 2 in this case (2**-2 is 1/4). For cars, if 50% of people like you would have chosen Mustangs, 40% Camaros, and the remaining 10% scattered among other brands, then if your favorite car was a Mustang that is only worth about 1 bit. But if your favorite car was an Oldsmobile there might be only 1/100 chance of the attacker guessing that, so it could be worth 6 or 7 bits. Hal

1 0

This is your last warning
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 23 Nov 1996, Firebeard wrote: > >>>>> aga writes: > > a> It just "looks" that way on the net. I do live-fucking, newsgroup > a> flooding, mailbombing, vote-tampering and defamation all legally, > a> and OPENLY on the InterNet. > To be truly honest about this, (since you keep putting that cypherpunks address in the header) I have not really done any of the above yet, but they are all perfectly legal in cyberspace. Just get the fucking point, there are no laws which can cross borders. > a> The more you PGP, the worse you look. Nobody reads your e-mail, so > a> stop being so paranoid. > > Hate to disabuse you, but I've had it done. I've had military > investigators hand me copies of email I've received, and ask me to > explain them, and the actions I took (and did not take) in response. > Just what kind of 'military investigators?' Since you are a civilian, they should not have even asked you that question. You answer by privete email. The net is clearly not military property but belongs solely to international anarchists which can not be stopped by any laws. > -- > #include <disclaimer.h> /* Sten Drescher */ > ObCDABait: For she doted upon their paramours, whose flesh is as the > flesh of asses, and whose issue is like the issue of horses. [Eze 23:20] > ObFelony: President Clinton, you suck, and those boys died! > Unsolicited solicitations will be proofread for a US$500/KB fee. > Now look, I have told you before. Stop writing to me and using the cypherpunks address as a cc in the header. I told you before that I am not going to write to that fucking list any more, and if I receive any more e-mail from you with their address in the header, well... You have been doing this for a number of days now. This is your last warning.

1 0