December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Query on "secure databases"
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Peter - here's my previous posting, with an addendum, Cc: cypherpunks At 04:43 PM 2/11/97 -0500, Peter Swire <swire.1(a)osu.edu> wrote: > Can you point me to anything I can read on "secure databases"? I >hadn't hit that term before. I am curious to what extent they are secure >due to cryptographic approaches, or to what extent you rely on other >mechanisms for keeping out unauthorized users. It's been a long time since I've looked much into it, since I was getting out of phone-company-defense-contractor mode at the time the field was developing. I think the NCSC Rainbow Book that deals with secure databases is the Purple Book, though it might be the Gray. Oracle and/or Sybase have done some work trying to do databases at the B1 or B2 level, but I don't know details. I'll talk about secure databases a bit, but for the real world there's more useful stuff that isn't related to them. =================== Begin "Secure Database" Section ============== At the time, the Orange Book (security for standalone computers) was well-understood, though there weren't really any systems above B2 level, and the Red Book was written, but nobody really had a clue how to implement multi-level machines on a multi-level LAN, though you could use encrypting Ethernet cards to get single-level machines of different levels on the same LAN, if they were all administered by the same group of people (so user-IDs and security levels worked across the entire system.) At the lower security levels, Orange Book techniques mainly involve removing bugs and adding accounting features. At the higher levels, the key is to come up with a good mathematical/logical model of interactions in your computer system, and then design a computer system that only does the things permitted by the model and prove it does that. Some of these systems use cryptographic techniques, including some of the capability-based systems - see Bill Frantz's KeyKOS work, which he's referred to on Cypherpunks occasionally. The objective is to have databases that can be accessed by multiple users with different sets of security permissions. In the military vernacular, this mainly means having UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and maybe TOP SECRET data in the database, where not all users are cleared to the highest security level, and maybe projects X, Y, and Z, where users of project X may not have a need to know for project Y, etc. The easy problems are probably solved by now - either you do a good job of verifying the design and bug-free-ness of your database software so you can be sure that each request includes, and obeys, security levels, or you use crypto to encrypt the data items for each security level (e.g. everybody with a SECRET or PROJECT Z clearance shares a key for that data, which isn't really ideal for non-small groups of people, the database just tries to do a good job, and you only do operations in the database that make sense when the data is encrypted, though that's annoyingly restrictive for many applications.) The sticky problems are aggregation-related. It may be ok if an uncleared person knows that military base A has missile types 1, 3, and 5, and if the uncleared person knows where all your military bases are. But is it ok if the uncleared person knows about _all_ the missiles at _all_ the bases, and can tell that nobody's using Type 2 missiles any more, and that all the Type 4 missiles got moved to New Jersey last week? =============== End "Secure Database" section ================= =============== Begin "Real-World and Crypto" section ========= For the average person, though, the simple military models aren't really useful. You really care more about groups of people, though the multi-level stuff is sometimes a good way to keep machines from being hacked. But the real problem is that computers are very good at correlating information - if two different companies know your Social Security Number, and they share their data with each other (maybe for a price), then they can all tie together everything they each know about you. And there's no way to stop it, except by limiting the information you give people (which limits the transactions they'll do with you), or contractually limiting what they can do with it (good luck), or using multiple identities - and even then, computers are often good at guessing that the John Doe at 1234 Main Street is the related to Jane Smith at 1234 Main Street, and maybe the foreign car parts Jane bought on her American Express are for the Porsche registered to John, so there's a junk-mail opportunity. There's really only one technology that lets you avoid this, which is crypto and its relatives - though you still have to get people you use business with to use it, which is an uphill game. Some of the fundamental work on this is David Chaum's papers on Credentials without Identity (or something about like that, from ~1985.) For instance, you can have a voter registration number that's cryptographically signed by the voting bureau, but uses blinded signatures so they can't correlate the known good unique number with the Peter Swire who walked in and showed a picture ID one day. A driver's license smartcard could keep a pointer to your driving records, but wouldn't give your True Name, and would only show a cop that the person whose picture is on the front is a Licensed Driver, and maybe could demonstrate that the bearer knows the card's PIN. One big issue is that the government is pushing banks to demand SSNs, and requiring employers to demand SSNs (makes them easy Employee IDs), and pushing medical insurers and providers to use SSNs (makes it easy to collect Medicare data.) You can gain a lot of privacy just by having employers use their own employee-ID numbering system, so the travel agent subcontracting to Corporate Travel doesn't need your SSN on every form they fill out. But suppose the Social Security Administration and IRS issued you a bunch of separate numbers, that were either related using a cryptographic key, or just randomly picked and kept in a big database (maybe pointing to your old SSN), so you could give everybody who needs a Tax ID a different number, and only you and the IRS could correlate them. (To some extent, you can do this yourself by creating lots of companies, but it's a real pain and costs a certain amount of money.) =============== addendum ===================== Of course, for many transactions, the way to reduce the privacy problems is to use bearer certificates rather than book-entry approaches - pay cash, or digicash, rather than credit cards, use on-line anonymous delivery of bits, or picking up stuff in person, rather than mailing stuff to a snail address, etc. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

1 0

Proposed info file
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, The text below is what I wrote for cypherpunks(a)algebra.com to be sent to new subscribers. Feel free to criticize. - Igor. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ About cypherpunks mailing lists ------------------------------- * * * ATTENTION: PLEASE SAVE THIS MESSAGE IN A MAIL FOLDER!!! IT WILL BE * * * HELPFUL FOR YOU WHEN YOU WANT TO UNSUBSCRIBE FROM cypherpunks MAILING * * * LIST. * * * * * * DO NOT JUST DELETE THIS MESSAGE. I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list cypherpunks(a)algebra.com is one of the cypherpunks mailing lists discussing cryptography, privacy, and social issues relating to them. These lists are connected to each other in such a way that all messages appear on all of these lists. All of these lists are high-volume mailing lists. There are several reasons for existence of multiple mailing lists that are inter-subscribed. The main reason is the large number of subscribers and limited bandwidth of each of the participating list nodes -- each node can take on only that many users. Most people will not want to subscribe to more than one of these lists. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)algebra.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-request(a)algebra.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. Also, please realize that there will be some cypherpunks messages "in transit" to you at the time you unsubscribe. If you get a response that says you are unsubscribed, but the messages keep coming, wait a day and they should stop. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude ans stupid. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)algebra.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is a meta list which discusses the architecture and other issues of the distributed cypherpunks lists. It is not intended to be used for crypto discussions. if you want to be added or removed to the metadiscussion list, send a message "subscribe cypherpunks-hosts" to majordomo(a)algebra.com. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. alt.cypherpunks is indended as a mirror USENET forum for this mailing list. III. Posting Policy. Please note that some members of cypherpunks mailing list may surprise you as very rude people. You may see views that sound very offensive to you. You will also see many articles that make no sense to you, are very stupid, or appear to be commercial advertisements. Consider such situation to be a price of YOUR freedom to post anything you want. Remember that speech that pleases everyone needs no protection: it is the offensive speech that is most often assaulted and thus needs to be protected. Also, speech that you find silly and distasteful may seem to be of great use for others. If you feel that some poster's articles are not useful and offensive to you, you can set up your mail reading software to ignore all articles coming from that person. Ignoring them silently has shown to be the best way of dealing with them. It will save you a lot of your own time. Even though you are free do write anything, please consider not following up to their posts with suggestions to shut them up. It only decreases usefulness of this mailing list. Eudora for Windows is known for its mail filtering capability. Procmail is a tool of choice for Unix users who want to filter their articles. Please read the documentation for these programs to find out how to set them to filter and delete unwanted messages. None of the above precludes the administrator of this mailing list to use tools protecting his hardware and bandwidth from denial of service attacks. If someone maliciously mailbombs cypherpunks mailing list, the mail bombs may be silently ignored and not passed on to the list. IMPORTANT: the list owner does not monitor the content of the messages appearing here. I disclaim any liability whatsoever for the content of articles on cypherpunks(a)algebra.com. If you have a problem with any materials posted here, please contact the poster to resolve them. Your use of the resources of this list constitutes an agreement with these terms. You have been warned. IV. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk (and there are no non-technical cypherpunks). An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. Enjoy and deploy. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Sun Feb 16 13:10:56 CST 1997 ichudov(a)algebra.com] [Adopted from the original version by John Gilmore and Eric Hughes]

1 0

NEW "Black Box" Technology!!
by omex＠cyberservices.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message is being brought to you by EMAIL BLASTER 2.0 software. If you would like a FREE copy of this software or any of our other HOT programs ABSOLTELY FREE call our FAX ON DEMAND number at 213-960-7822. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I am sending this to you because I feel that you are an honest person, with a sincere desire to improve your station in life. If I am incorrect, please excuse my intrusion, and simply hit reply to be removed from my database. If you would like additional information, simply send me email with "info" in the subject area. Thanks!! NEW "Black Box" Technology !! GET IN ON THE TOP LEVEL of the Hottest New Program 1. GLOBAL COM TECHNOLOGY -GCT- is the name of the new company created to handle the basket of telecom- munications breakthrough technologies we're going to represent. It is based in Chesapeake, VA. GCT has been put together by a highly seasoned group including MAJOR individuals in the Telecom industry. They have selected Kerry J. Young, a skilled executive and administrator, to be President and CEO. They have also assembled a blue ribbon support team headed by a top level executive from one of the "big three" telephone companies. This combined powerhouse of high-level Telecom experience, management, administration, marketing and financial depth promises to make GCT one of the world's premier telecommunications companies. Their mission: To create the world's largest MLM network to deliver advanced Telecom technology at the most competitive price. In short, they plan on delivering products that will stand the industry on its ear! 2. GCT has set up a 24-hour information line: 415-273-6121. Call it NOW! It is powerful. It will introduce several of the key players and answer questions about the products, how they work and how our business will be structured. 3. The company has announced the official launch date: Monday, March 3, 1997. On Saturday, the 15th of March, GCT will be holding simultaneous training's/meetings in eight cities across the United States. The locations are: Atlanta + Chicago + Dallas + Honolulu + Los Angeles + Orlando + Seattle + Washington, DC. The company will add additional cities as you indicate your preference. Seating is extremely limited and must be reserved in advance by calling an 800# which will be made available within a few days on the GCT hotline. Price: $59 - includes Distributor Kit! 4. What will we be offering? We will have a FULL RANGE of products -- with far more advanced technology and far better pricing than is currently being offered by the several, hastily launched GCT wannabees. The first products announced include a prepaid calling card at 9.9 cents per minute, long distance service at 7.9 cents and WE HAVE the long awaited "black box" technology! It comes in three versions (from basic to advanced) and will wholesale: $39 - $69. In addition, there are several more advanced products which will be brought into our portfolio. As more information becomes available, it is increasingly clear: We are poised to bring the world what everyone has been promised -- but ONLY WE CAN DELIVER! 6. Beware of other companies who have attempted to preempt GCT by implying they can duplicate the various products that we already have on board. This program is not merely an application form and compensation plan offering a single, 7.9 cent product. GCT is a major new Telecom company assembling a full range of leading edge telecommunications technology. The success of this program requires the contacts and know-how of the Telecom industry that can only come from years of experience at the highest levels. Bringing these exceptional products to market is not a project for well-meaning amateurs. 7. The only way to participate in the program described above is to join GCT. They are the ONLY COMPANY with the contracts in hand, technical skill and telecommunications experience to deliver. Global Connections is a group of very experienced marketers and networkers who have an Independent Distributorship positioned directly at the top level of GCT. 8. We are signing up the frontline on Monday & Tuesday... I can place you on the top levels... Email me for registration form at: omex(a)cyberservices.com Put "BLACK BOX" in the subject box.

1 0

Re: DES and RSA crypto hardware from the free world
by bs-org＠c2.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:32 1997-02-15 -0200, John Ioannidis wrote: Sorry to correct you, but uti-maco is an old german company ... >I believe uti-Maco (a belgian company) has been using the Pijnenburg chips >for their boards. However, last I checked with them (about half a year ago) >the price of the boards was pretty steep -- of the order of $1K. > >Anyway, if the boards Peter is referring to are ready in the next couple >of months, I volunteer to write drivers for Linux and *BSD*. > >/ji >

1 0

Re: Excerpt on SPAM from Edupage, 11 February 1997
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:45 PM 2/15/97 -0600, Igor Chudov wrote: >Roy M. Silvernail wrote: ... >> Or that the money wasn't there in the first place (absent a trusted >> signature system), or the key doesn't exist, or the wrong key is >> offered, or the sender put the same e-dollar on all 60000 mails sie >> sent and it's already been redeemed. > >Well, if the trusted party performs the encryption by both recipient's >public key and the "retrieval key", the problem that you mention can >be avoided. Yeah. I as a spam artist send the "proof" message through the e-cash verification center with the Send To: field returning it to a mail exploder. Each receipient gets the same dollar. This assumes that the To: field is not hashed into the verification signature, and that the verification works like a glorified remailer. (cash added on a separate channel).

1 0

Re: DFA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul Bell wrote: >does anyone know what has happened to DFA, and the people who >just a few months ago were publishing such encouraging results? There seems be sustained investigation of DFA, offensive and defensive, by Biham and Shamir, by Anderson and Kuhn, by the Bellcore team, by Quisquater and others. However, the smartcard manufacturers appear to have a role in dampening publicity about the ongoing research, or at least diminishing the claims of effectiveness of DFA. Carol Francher, of Motorola, for example, writes in February IEEE Spectrum: Technology is a wonderful thing but criminals, too, can use it as new equipment and techniques become available or less expensive the barriers to cracking a system may weaken. Recently Bellcore announced a paper, "Cryptanalysis in the presence of hardware faults" (available at www.bellcore.com) that proposed a theoretical method for breaking an asymmetric encryption code once a computer (or a smartcard microcontroller) had been forced into faulty behavior. The Smart Card Forum, a multi-industry membership organization headquartered in Tampa, Fla., has stated that it does not regard this approach as a real-world risk, since in smartcard applications more than one technique is used to protect the security of the entire system. But the Bellcore methodology for breaking algorithms -- as well as similar theoretical approaches, such as the one taken by two Israeli researchers, Eli Biham and Adi Shamir -- highlights the need to analyze and evolve the security of any system continually. -- "In your pocket: smartcards." <http://jya.com/tee08.htm> Several of the DFA-type researchers have commented on the smartcard industry's reluctance to publicize security weaknesses when the push is on to increase consumer trust and use; see, for example, Anderson and Kuhn at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tamper.html Quisquater and the SG group also note the reluctance of smartcard mass-marketers to own up to security shortcomings of which their own engineers know and fret. Meanwhile, the DFA proponents and opponents are eagerly absorbing the continuing DFA-relatged reports, quietly watching one another, and both sides eying the booming smartcard market for lucrative rewards, as Ms. Francher suggests: licit and il.

2 1

Thanks to John Gilmore for running cypherpunks mailing list
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, cypherpunks(a)toad.com goes down in four days. I would like to thank John Gilmore for all his efforts that he spent to run the list. Administering a huge mailing list like cypherpunks is a tough job, requiring a lot of dedication, time and patience. John, along with other cypherpunks, created a unique online community that generated many valuable ideas. This community helped a great deal to increase crypto awareness of the masses. I personally joined cypherpunks for very arkane reasons, but later found out a lot of useful information. The moderation experiment failed by many reasons, but the last month should not distract us from what John did over last several years. Again, thanks to John for his work. - Igor.

1 0

Re: Moderation experiment almost over; "put up or shut up"
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kent Crispin writes: > Dave is offering a single mailing list, which, while I am sure Dave is > a great person, still represents a single point of control and a > single point of failure. A distributed mailing list has a potential > for being much more robust, and for supporting a wide range of > viewpoints. I can also offer my participation in the distributed mailing list, if that is what it takes to get cypherpunks free of control interests again. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet A poor man shames us all.

1 0

Bad Headers Added to John Young postings via owner-cypherpunks@sirius.infonex.com
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! The following headers are from a posting by John Young that looks like it was sent to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, forwarded to cypherpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com and/or cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net, and has the Reply-To: header set to reply to cypherpunks(a)toad.com instead of to John Young.... It looks like the obvious implementation of cypherpunks-style mail header patching, but isn't quite right..... Leads to people sending their John Young mailbot requests to cypherpunks(a)toad.com instead, as some well-known cypherpunks have mistakenly done recently :-) ===================================================== Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com> X-Sender: jya(a)pop.pipeline.com Date: Sat, 15 Feb 1997 09:04:14 -0500 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> Subject: FBI_100 Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com Reply-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com X-List: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net 2-15-97. NYP: "Phone Companies Balk At Latest Plan by FBI." Markoff. ============================================== # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

1 0

Re: Moderation experiment almost over; "put up or shut up"
by ISP_Ratings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave Hayes wrote: > >> censorship on cypherpunks. However, I think most peoples' opinions >> didn't really turn, or at least people didn't realize how serious >> things were and didn't really care, until Tim May [someone the many >> freedom-knights hate] started criticizing this censorship in extremely >> reasonable messages that were suppressed from both the -edited and >> -flames mailing list. > > Assuming that is true, that people do not care about censorship until > a person with an arbitrary reasonability says something, I would say > that such a group cares not about free speech...even if they think > they do. I agree--and again that is sad. Hopefully many have learned from the experience--that does on occassion really happen. Steve

1 0