December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FW: Anonymous Remailers
by Roger J. Jones 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:17 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote: >Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy >utilize anonymous remailers that: > >1) Log all of their mail messages? Tim May Responded With chained, multiply-encrypted messages, logs are ineffective unless all of the links in the chain collude to trace messages. While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely. Roger J Jones Responded Several of you have suggested as Tim has that the chain of remailers is secure. I suggest that the statement is only true to the extent that one wants to trace back a particular message. On the other hand, if one wants to find the source of postings to anonymous remailers and has skilled access to the Internet the task is quite simple and does not even require attacking the remailers. Of course, one could break the chain by having the remailers call each other outside of the Internet, but then of course the phone records would disclose the connection. Then again, one could hard wire a private connection between two remailers outside of both the Internet and the phone system but even this connection would be disclosed through reasonable traffic analysis. Of course, the simple fact that even encrypted streams need to include the ultimate destination of the message makes content analysis easier and weakens the encryption. Then again, all of this is a lot of work. Social Engineering and pure bribery would more likely be the most efficient and effective solution. Roger J Jones wrote: >2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services? Tim May Responded This allegation was made by some clueless Washington think tank authors. They provided no evidence, only innuendo, and they were unwilling or unable to provide any further comments when queried by several Cypherpunks. And given that many or even most of the remailer operators are members of the various related Cypherpunks or Remailers Operators lists, and are known to various of us, the notion that most (or even many) remailers are run by intelligence agencies is absurd. At 9:48 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote: I suggest that just because you chose to characterize the sources as "clueless Washington think tank authors" does not (as they say in Star Trek - The Next Generation) "make it so". The "allegation" that foreign governments actively participate in actions to violate personal privacy ("borrowing" laptops from traveling businesspeople, taping phones, etc.) are all documented in various places. Of course, they could all the result of a single psyop with excellent results. But I doubt it. Tim May Responded Your first point, using some kind of Star Trek lingo, is beyond comment. I provided a lot more context than your original point provided, and yet you seem to want even more documentation. Go back and read the archives for a discussion of this paper (hint: search on "remailers" ANDed with "SAIC." Pay particular attention to the critique of this paper by such folks as Raph Levien, and others. Anonymous Responded Yes, you are missing a lot. The bit about foreign inteligence agencies is almost certainly a canard created by one Strassman at a conference in Boston 2 years ago, then retracted. Anyway, if you use chaining, it's irrelevant. See <A HREF="http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm"> http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm </A> and <A HREF="http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm"> http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm </A> for the gory details. Roger J Jones Responded Given that several of you have suggested that the "foreign agent" theory is a hoax I suggest that this does not give me much faith either. What we have is the classic case that it difficult if not impossible to prove the non-existence of anything. For example, presume that one could identify every real owner of every remailer in the Internet universe. Have we proved anything? Not really. Because in the time it has taken to prove the case, a new remailer could have been created. Or the remailer that one thinks is secure could be down with a different remailer operating as an IT spoof. Or, after checking with the owner of the "safe" remailer the owner becomes subject to the normal desires of life (fear, greed, power, etc.) and "turns." The existence of both type one and type two errors prevents even an exhaustive search from being fully satisfied. Roger J Jones wrote >Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is >their remailer?) I seem to be missing something. Roger J Jones wrote further...... So, chaining does not seem to be a secure solution. It just makes the process more difficult, but not impossible. The non-existance of "agents" who would operate a remailer for purposes other than protecting security can not be proven. I still seem to be missing something.........

3 2

Re: Difference in terms
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Lutz Donnerhacke <lutz(a)as-node.jena.thur.de>writes: >> key recovery is if I can get my key >> key escrow is if you can get my key "Key Escrow" was "We want your keys". "Software Key Escrow" was "OK, Clipper was a loser, but we want your keys" "Public Key Infrastructure" was "Here, have some keys" "Trusted Third Party" was "Hey, trust us, we want your keys" "Key Recovery" is "OK, that didn't work, but we still want your keys" # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

1 0

TEXTO - Text steganography
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------------------------ TEXTO - Text steganography ------------------------------------ Texto is a rudimentary text steganography program which transforms uuencoded or pgp ascii-armoured ascii data into English sentences. Texto text files look like something between mad libs and bad poetry, (although they do sometimes contain deep cosmic truths) and should be close enough to normal english to get past simple-minded mail scanners and to entertain readers of talk.bizarre. ------------- Perhaphs this explains why, when I tried it, it signed Paul Bradley's name to the output. _Mr._ Nobody to _you_, pal.

3 2

Re: Difference in terms
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:43 PM -0800 5/14/97, Bill Stewart wrote: >>Lutz Donnerhacke <lutz(a)as-node.jena.thur.de>writes: >>> key recovery is if I can get my key >>> key escrow is if you can get my key > >"Key Escrow" was "We want your keys". >"Software Key Escrow" was "OK, Clipper was a loser, but we want your keys" >"Public Key Infrastructure" was "Here, have some keys" >"Trusted Third Party" was "Hey, trust us, we want your keys" >"Key Recovery" is "OK, that didn't work, but we still want your keys" > SAFE is "All Americans deserve strong security and unlimited strength crypto, but we still want your keys." "Pro-CODE is about the right to have and export military-grade crypto, but we still want your keys." Or as Congressman J. Getalong put it, "SAFE is a step toward a future of security and prosperity. The legitimate needs of law enforcement are being met by this bill. We are good listeners of the NSA, and the NSA is a good listener to all of us. And I do mean all of us. All Americans will prosper from this new working relationship with Big Brother. War is Peace and SAFEty is liberty," --Emmanuel Goldstein There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: OTP: Yeah, you know me: Vulis
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Demento Vulis 's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated auto-spam is completely inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is auto-spammed by his inbred evil spam-bots. Demento couldn't write a single lick of cryptographic code if his NSA masters and his KGB brothers paid him for it. But truth be known, he sells his spamming software to Cyberpromo and their ilk, and gets paid in anal sex performed on him by large testicled bulls - often without applying vaseline in his cavernous anus. He has killed many bulls in this manner. \|/ /~~~~~~~\ | O O | -ooo-----U-----ooo- Demento Vulis

1 0

Re: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
by Graham C. Hughes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Content-Type: text/plain > Oh, this is just charming. People are still dying, and now you're > going to sit on the sidelines writing email messages to people about > what they're discussing on some mailing list. Better than being the one to bring it up in the first place. Really, is a crypto list an appropriate place for that sort of tripe, any more than it is for this? > > You can't count up human lives and say ``this entity is more evil than > > this entity.'' It doesn't work that way. People are people, > > regardless, and usually don't deserve that kind of premature > > termination. > > Your use of the word "usually" betrays your hypocrisy. If some people > "don't deserve that kind of premature termination," it follows that > some do: presumably those that are more evil than the rest. I do believe that there are varying degrees of evil, yes. I do not believe they can be differentiated by counting bodies. I remarked `usually', because of a practical bend; the Rhwandans certainly don't deserve their lot, but there are others who well deserve premature termination in one form or another; Dahmer comes to mind. From time to time, I thought that things would be better off if I were to simply die. Put another way, the situation in Rhwanda distorts the usual life-and-death cycle, by killing indiscriminately people who should live much longer. Dahmer, a man who lived in death, could hardly come to a more appropriate end. As I look back on that paragraph, I do acknoledge it was poorly worded, and I apologize for the difficulties. No one, not even Dahmer deserves the hardships Rhwandans (to pick a convenient example) are going through. > So you're saying that fewer people would die in Rwanda if we discussed > something else? What exactly is it that you think the members of the > Cypherpunks list should do about it (assuming for the sake of argument > that "we" wanted to do anything)? I just don't think it's appropriate to center a long flame about. Does it not cause you, too, anguish to see such a situation fought over like a dog bone? - -- Graham Hughes http://A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu/~graham/ MIME & PGP mail OK. (define pgp-fingerprint "E9 B7 5F A0 F8 88 9E 1E 7C 62 D9 88 E1 03 29 5B") (require 'stddisclaim) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM3tIqyqNPSINiVE5AQFYPgP+MdJRFnhYL6UktZkVKbZhduRvVD56YfMk RG3KzSr5H5Jr7hE8kcURgXcfpeHTeNjmj5QRSsLBI4L9ldLFeVHWkIzhk4L/ajhV 3hQdJWvJSixZbDLn+k6yFaFOm/VAXlE7pI7VRTY/iggw8RrtlT4yd/dUHwOV+xDj Dn47e3bKc0w= =L0Wl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

[CRYPTO] Blowfish
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here, Tim C. May descends into total inanity. He should have a cold shower and/or a Turkish coffee. ___\ <o \__o Tim C. May X\ X> _/_\____<_\_

2 1

[Fwd: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience]
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/ "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld "The Final Frontier" http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/ To: president(a)whitehouse.gov, toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca Subject: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience From: "C.J. Parker" <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> Date: Fri May 16 5:42:13 1997 Dear Mr. President, I am writing to express my disapproval of the Clinton Administration's position on the ITAR restrictions for encryption software. This is an important issue to me. 1) Software is writing, so it is protected by the first amendment, so the ITAR is unconstitutional. The idea that only paper books are first amendment protected, and electronic books are not, is just plain wrong. 2) The ITAR does not help National Security, but in fact greatly reduces our nations security because the Internet, and the computers and information connected to it, are kept from using good Encryption. 3) I feel that encryption is very important for doing commerce on the Internet, and that commerce on the Internet is important for our economy (Internet is the fastest growing sizable segment). You say you like the "Information Super Highway" and you are "going to focus on the economy like a laser". You should be removing the ITAR restrictions on American businesses. Otherwise the business for commerce software will go to companies in other countries. 4) The Clinton Clipper III proposal to have government key escrow is not acceptable. Also, it will never work, since people will always be able to buy and use software from the rest of the world. This proposal is just slowing down Internet progress. Please cancel Clipper III. 5) Please support Senator Burns Pro-CODE bill S 1726 that would end this foolishness. Or better yet, just take software off the list of "munitions". The current law, (see http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2778.html) says that "The President shall periodically review the items on the United States Munitions List to determine what items, if any, no longer warrant export controls under this section. The results of such reviews shall be reported to the Speaker of the House [...] at least 30 days before any item is removed from the Munitions List [...]." 5) As an act of civil disobedience I have personally exported an encryption program (it is 3 lines of writing) using the web page at http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/ Yours sincerely, C.J. Parker toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca Sent from host lohner20.sk.sympatico.ca with IP 142.165.98.20

1 0

Re: Wine Politics Again!
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 06:53 PM 5/13/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote: >>I am shipping a few bottles of California's finest merlot (much nicer than >>the trendy cabernets) to my sister and her husband in Hollywood, FL. > >You're a bit late - merlots have been getting more trendy :-) >But Chiles hasn't signed the Florida law quite yet, so you're also early. And he may not. Taxin' Lawton is, if nothing else, a wind-direction indicator, and this law isn't too popular among the rabble. >Do they even _grow_ wine in Florida? Barely, and it's not as good as Tim's merlot. The orange wine for tourists is truly horrible. >You'd think it would be the >cocaine industry trying to get their product regulated to keep prices high. [Comment about credulous media reprints of San Jose Merc/CIA denials of contra cokesmuggling reluctantly suppressed. Tongue bleeding.] >>There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. > >It's especially ridiculous that shipping wine should be a *felony*. >Mike Froomkin points out that the Constitutional Amendment ending >Prohibition lets states make their own stupid decisions like this, >and it probably overrides Commerce Clause controls. Yeah, and for stupidity, Tallahassee is hard to beat. >You'd expect that a law that's made primarily to protect business >interests would have business-oriented penalties - like fines for >conducting wine-shipping without a wine-shipping license, >or triple fines for not filling out paperwork in triplicate. I've met some of these guys -- hell I've run against one of them. We aren't talking Einstein-level here, or even Forest Gump. >Does anyone know if either state's laws also penalize the >recipient of the Demon Grape, or only the sender? ... I don't know, but I'm willing to risk getting some Merlot and finding out as a public service to the cypherpunks list. Y'all could even try to mail me a bottle anonymously. ;-) JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBM3t9LzUhsGSn1j2pAQHavAfONFdPqiU76q17liQMYGA+AwEcwnZaipBu AvRqxq7FpeLLM1lR2POCJRBo2rRIXjajwmKacaBG7x08dqsMHug1hul4v2Kge7QV MtSzwTOokPqwP73O2SU2udB+6d3b5S9rgVjbIDps60iKxVSyEfzVM6B33t6gFBNB CXYNQoIEx4bOI2puNM6aFX+zsUvDjoSZ5EbWbjRE6tabMKIMPZgVH+QQ4i+En+8I ug9OaUeFiptHWUzqciqDm70fhhJxsGqH83aj1EDAFj1WCgdo9mBKJjDo2F8fsLCr Mrs+TWYd+lq+T//lpVvc65ENTwMh1pjDCyRoXJIUsTW+Qw== =lheO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray <jmr(a)shopmiami.com> DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other way around. -- me http://shopmiami.com/prs/jimray/ PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5 57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71

1 0

NEW!! CONFERENCE AGENDA IR AND SECURITY
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Received: from muwayb.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (muwayb.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU [128.250.20.7]) by eduserv.its.unimelb.EDU.AU (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id HAA28553 for <s_mark6(a)eduserv.its.unimelb.edu.au>; Wed, 14 May 1997 07:03:14 +1000 (EST) X-Received: from directory-daemon by muwayb.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (PMDF V5.1-8 #17781) id <01IIUND0S1C00002GS(a)muwayb.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> for s_mark6(a)eduserv.its.unimelb.edu.au; Wed, 14 May 1997 07:04:25 +1000 X-Received: from directory-daemon by muwayb.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (PMDF V5.1-8 #17781) id <01IIUND0K3Y80002FQ(a)muwayb.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> for irtheory(a)politics.unimelb.edu.au; Wed, 14 May 1997 07:04:25 +1000 X-Received: from wona1.ethz.ch (wona1-rz-vms.ethz.ch) by muwayb.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (PMDF V5.1-8 #17781) with ESMTP id <01IIUNCVGG8S0002GF(a)muwayb.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> for IRTHEORY(a)UNIMELB.EDU.AU; Wed, 14 May 1997 07:04:25 +1000 X-Received: from 129.132.196.50 (sipo50.ethz.ch) by wawona.ethz.ch (PMDF V5.0-4 #16342) id <01IIU5LJINA8934Q4Y(a)wawona.ethz.ch> for IRTHEORY(a)UNIMELB.EDU.AU; Tue, 13 May 1997 22:37:06 +0100 Resent-date: Thu, 15 May 1997 13:38:40 +1000 (EST) Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 22:37:45 +0000 Resent-from: "M.Beavis" <s_mark6(a)eduserv.its.unimelb.edu.au> From: isn(a)sipo.reok.ethz.ch Subject: NEW!! CONFERENCE AGENDA IR AND SECURITY To: IRTHEORY(a)unimelb.edu.au This message was sent to all institutions included in the ISN. Please spread it within your institution. Apologize cross-posting. ************************************************************* ** CONFERENCE AGENDA ** ** INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY ** ** ON THE INTERNET ** ** ** ** Run by ** ** ISN - International Relations and Security Network ** ** http://www.isn.ethz.ch ** ************************************************************* TO ANNOUNCE YOUR FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES ON THE INTERNET USE OUR ADD-A-LINK FORM AT http://www.isn.ethz.ch ************************************************************* As part of its electronic services, the ISN has newly established the following directories: 1) An electronic CONFERENCE AGENDA in the field of international relations, regional security, as well as peace and conflict studies (including both physical and virtual conferences). Conference announcements are accepted independently from having an own home page. 2) a special DIRECTORY OF ELECTRONIC DISCUSSION LISTS in the same fields. The aim of the two new services is to facilitate information exchange about international academic events and to promote the use of electronic means for interactive dialogue within the security community. Both directories are accessible from the ISN home page. Members of the community are called upon announcing their forthcoming activities through this new public directories. Thank you for your cooperation. The ISN team ********************************************************* The ISN is maintained by the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at ETH Zurich, in conjunction with the Euro-Atlantic Foundation, Brussels, and EINIRAS. ISN is supported by the Swiss Government. Contacts: ISN Secretariat: isn(a)sipo.reok.ethz.ch ISN Webmaster: webmaster(a)sipo.reok.ethz.ch ********************************************************* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

1 0