December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Entrepreneur's Candy Store
by MailMan＠mail1.access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You're about to discover that not *everything* that lands in your e-mail box is a scheme. If you've been thinking about making a lasting change in your financial destiny, you owe it to yourself to get the FREE facts, at: http://www.windansea.com [x] The *truth* about your financial security, schemes and scams [x] How Safe is Your Job? Take our revealing CyberQuiz and find out [x] EntrepreneURLs: Packed with valuable links, resources and articles [x] Internet Marketing Strategies of the Pros [x] Get your own 3D Home Page [x] And Much More! _/_/_/_/ What the Experts Say _/_/_/_/ " You will be astonished!" --Brian Tracy, best-selling author of MAXIMUM ACHIEVEMENT and THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS "Goes much deeper than it's competition." --OPPORTUNITY Magazine "Based on tried and true strategies, that, for the most part, the experts have kept secret." --Author Anthony Trupiano, in THE BEST DEALS IN AMERICA TODAY "Literally shouts professionalism in every sense of that over-used term." --Stew Caverly, STEW'S REVIEWS _/_/_/_/_/ THE KITCHEN TABLE MILLIONAIRE Online _/_/_/_/_/ Check It Out Now, at: http://www.windansea.com ***NOTE*** While we are proponents of sending legitimate information to targeted recipients by e-mail, if this message has reached you in error, please accept our sincere apologies, and kindly send a reply with "Remove" in the subject to be excluded from future contact.

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New USG Privacy Initiative
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Administration has issued today for public comment a major new paper on privacy: "Options for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure" Opening paragraphs: This Options Paper explores the growing public concern about personal information privacy. The paper describes the status of electronic data protection and fair information practices in the United States today, beginning with a discussion of the Principles for providing and using personal information issued by the Information Infrastructure Task Force in 1995. It then provides an overview of new information technologies, which shows that personal information is currently collected, shared, aggregated, and disseminated at a rate and to a degree unthinkable just a few years ago. Government is no longer the sole possessor of extensive amounts of personal information about U.S. citizens; in recent years the acquisition of personal information by the private sector has increased dramatically. We next consider in more detail the laws and policies affecting information privacy in four specific areas: government records, communications, medical records, and the consumer market. This examination reveals that information privacy policy in the United States consists of various laws, regulations and practices, woven together to produce privacy protection that varies from sector to sector. Sometimes the results make sense, and sometimes they do not. The degree of protection accorded to personal information may depend on the data delivery mechanism rather than on the type of information at issue. Moreover, information privacy protection efforts in the United States are generally reactive rather than proactive: both the public and the private sector adopt policies in response to celebrated incidents of nonconsensual disclosure involving readily discernable harm. Sometimes this approach leaves holes in the fabric of privacy protection. We then turn to the core question: in the context of the GII, what is the best mechanism to implement fair information practices that balance the needs of government, commerce, and individuals, keeping in mind both our interest in the free flow of information and in the protection of information privacy? At one end of the spectrum there is support for an entirely market-based response. At the other end of the spectrum, we are encouraged to regulate fair information practices across all sectors of the economy. In between these poles lie a myriad of options. In response to public concern, both government and private industry seem to be taking a harder look at privacy issues. As government and consumers become more aware of the GII's data collection, analysis and distribution capabilities, demand could foster a robust, competitive market for privacy protection. This raises the intriguing possibility that privacy could emerge as a market commodity in the Information Age. We recognize ongoing efforts to enhance industry self regulation to carry out the IITF Privacy Principles. We also discuss ways this self regulation might be enforced, and discuss a number of ways that government could facilitate development of a privacy market. We then consider a number of options that involve creation of a federal privacy entity. We discuss some of the many forms that such an entity could take and consider the advantages and disadvantages of the various choices. We also consider the functions that such an entity might perform, as well as various options for locating a privacy entity within the federal government. This paper presents a host of options for government and private sector action. Our ultimate goal is to identify the means to maintain an optimal balance between personal privacy and freedom of information in the digital environment. The next step is to receive and respond to public comment on the report in order to develop consensus regarding the appropriate allocation of public and private sector responsibility for implementation of fair information practices. --------- http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/privacy.htm (216K) We've mirrored it at: http://jya.com/privacy.htm

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NII Privacy Paper Notice
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See today's Federal Register notice for the NII Privacy Paper: http://jya.com/omb042897.txt It gives the cut-off date for comments, where to send them and background of the paper.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 28 Apr 97 6:45:41 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hidden remailer(a)hidden.net +####*##+#*# 2:43 100.00% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #**#****+*#* 6:22 100.00% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.---------+ 3:46:09 99.97% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+.-+++++.-+ 4:43:57 99.95% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++++++++++* 34:08 99.93% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #### .#*#### 4:06 99.89% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de --+-+--+-++ 1:59:30 99.81% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --+++--+-++ 1:58:54 99.78% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net **-*+ +-+.-- 1:22:46 99.72% replay remailer(a)replay.com * *+ * **** 6:38 99.57% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++ +++++ 35:57 99.56% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** * **** 11:25 89.98% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .- 20:55:08 19.68% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com # 1:06:10 18.60% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - 2:47:22 7.22% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org 21:34 1.15% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Cato forum on liquor advertising and electronic media
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote: >The Center for Media Education is trying to accelerate this process. In a >fearmongering report earlier this year, the group demanded that a slew of >government agencies -- the FCC, FDA, FTC, CDC, NCI, and the WHO -- take >"urgent agction" to "protect" America's children from tobacco and liquor >advertising online. ............................................... I wish these people would go live in the U.S.S.R., or something.(*) They are the ones who give the Censors of the World support for the idea that it's okay to instigate restrictions against free expression, because obviously the people want it - they're calling for it. It doesn't matter that it's not a Good Thing to limit expression; it's a matter of majority interest. I wish they would all go down to the sea together. But I'm being depressingly negative. Anyway, who cares. As long as there are innovators creating high techology and useful software, one can always stay steps ahead, right. (*) yes, I know it doesn't exist anymore. Too bad. Some people belong in a State like that. Where they can live with each other and never grow up, but only wither away from atrophy of the mind. .. Blanc

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Re: Accounts payable
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 28 Apr 1997 From: Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> To: Huge Cajones Remailer <nobody(a)huge.cajones.com> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Accounts payable Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com Reply-To: Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> On Mon, 28 Apr 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him. > Here, Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise descends into total inanity. > He should have a cold shower and/or Graham-John Bullers. > > /////// > \-oo-/ Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise > \--/ > \/ > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Modulator of alt.2600.modulated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756(a)freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Accounts payable
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here, Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise descends into total inanity. He should have a cold shower and/or a Turkish coffee. /////// \-oo-/ Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise \--/ \/

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Don Wood -- IPG
by Lester Gordon (temp) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have you seen what the notorious Don Wood of IPG infamy is up to now? He has a new web page up at `http://www.seymourtex.com/newisrael/ni.htm'. You won't believe it..

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Corrected Printing of Applied Cryptography Now Available
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wiley has finally published a corrected printing of Applied Cryptography, 2nd ed!!! They didn't correct everything, only changes that didn't affect page breaks. Still, I counted over 250 individual corrections. And under a dozen errors remaining. I'm thrilled that they finally did this. The fifth printing (or greater) is the corrected printing. To find what printing you own, turn to page iv (it's opposite the "Contents in Brief" page). The last line (under "Printed in the United States of America") is a series of numbers, counting down from 10. The lowest number is the printing. You have a fifth printing if your last line looks like: 10 9 8 7 6 5 If you want to buy a fifth printing, you have two options. One, you can go to a bookstore and find one. You can't ask the bookstore to buy a fifth printing; all he can do is order a copy of the book and hope for the best. I believe that the fourth printing is sold out (in softcover, at least), but I cannot be sure. The other option is to buy it from me. I have a large supply of fifth printings that I will sell at the usual 15% discount: softcover - $42.00 hardcover - $59.00 Postage is as follows: surface to US - $3.00 air to US - $5.00 Canada - $5.00 surface elsewhere - $5.00 Contact me if you want airmail overseas. It's expensive. Cheers, Bruce ************************************************************************ * Bruce Schneier 2,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,002,000, * Counterpane Systems 000,000,000,000,000,000,002,000,000,002,293 * schneier(a)counterpane.com The last prime number...alphabetically! * (612) 823-1098 Two vigintillion, two undecillion, two * 101 E Minnehaha Pkwy trillion, two thousand, two hundred and * Minneapolis, MN 55419 ninety three. * http://www.counterpane.com ************************************************************************

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ALERT: Groups urge passage of pro-crypto legislation (4/28/1997)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================== ___ _ _____ ____ _____ _ / _ \| | | ____| _ \_ _| | THE HOUSE PREPARES TO ENSURE ENCRYPTION | |_| | | | _| | |_) || | | | AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET; SAFE | _ | |___| |___| _ < | | |_| BILL (HR 695) ABOUT TO BE VOTED ON! |_| |_|_____|_____|_| \_\|_| (_) April 28, 1997 Do not forward this alert after June 1, 1997. This alert brought to you by: Americans for Tax Reform Center for Democracy and Technology Eagle Forum EF-Florida Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Privacy Information Ctr. Voters Telecommunications Watch Wired Magazine _____________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents What's Happening Right Now What You Can Do To Help Privacy And Security On The Internet Background On SAFE (HR 695) Why Is This Issue Important To Internet Users? About This Alert / Participating Organizations _____________________________________________________________________________ WHAT'S HAPPENING RIGHT NOW HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE TO VOTE ON "SAFE" PRO-INTERNET PRIVACY BILL The House Judiciary Committee is set to vote on a bill designed to protect privacy and promote electronic commerce on the Internet as early as the second week of May. The SAFE bill will also be considered by a Judiciary subcommittee this week and is expected to pass without difficulty. The House Judiciary committee vote on HR695 will mark a critical stage in the effort to pass real reform of US encryption policy in a way that protects privacy, promotes electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Although no bill is perfect, Internet advocates including CDT, EFF, EPIC, VTW and others, including the Internet Privacy Coalition, have expressed support for the bill. Supporters agree that the SAFE bill holds great promise for enhancing privacy and security on the Internet and have offered their strong support and suggestions to improve it in a detailed letter at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html Please take a moment to read the attached alert, and make a phone call to urge the committee to pass the bill. _______________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO TO HELP PRIVACY AND SECURITY ON THE INTERNET 1. Check out the information on the SAFE bill below. 2. Call the Representative on the Judiciary committee from your state. Note that there may be more than one person from your state on the committee. The list is enclosed below the telephone script. SAMPLE SCRIPT You: <dial Capitol switchboard +1.202.224.3121> May I speak to the office of Rep. (INSERT NAME FROM LIST BELOW) Them: Hello, Rep. Mojo's office! You: May I speak with the staffer who deals with Internet or telecom issues? Them: One minute.. SAY You: Hello! HR695 will be voted on by the Judiciary committee in a THIS-> couple of weeks. I'm calling to urge Rep. Mojo to pass the bill because it's important to security and privacy on the Internet. Them: Thanks, goodbye! You: Goodbye! <click> If you have concerns about specific improvements to the bill, bringing them up when you're on the phone with the staffer is a good opportunity for raising issues. Judiciary Committee Members (from committee Web page) MR. HYDE (ILLINOIS), CHAIRMAN Mr. Sensenbrenner (Wisconsin) Mr. Conyers (Michigan) Mr. McCollum (Florida) Mr. Frank (Massachusetts) Mr. Gekas (Pennsylvania) Mr. Schumer (New York) Mr. Coble (North Carolina) Mr. Berman (California) Mr. Smith (Texas) Mr. Boucher (Virginia) Mr. Schiff (New Mexico) Mr. Nadler (New York) Mr. Gallegly (California) Mr. Scott (Virginia) Mr. Canady (Florida) Mr. Watt (North Carolina) Mr. Inglis (South Carolina) Ms. Lofgren (California) Mr. Goodlatte (Virginia) Ms. Jackson Lee (Texas) Mr. Buyer (Indiana) Ms. Waters (California) Mr. Bono (California) Mr. Meehan (Massachusetts) Mr. Bryant (Tennessee) Mr. Delahunt (Massachusetts) Mr. Chabot (Ohio) Mr. Wexler (Florida) Mr. Barr (Georgia) Mr. Rothman (New Jersey) Mr. Jenkins (Tennessee) Mr. Hutchinson (Arkansas) Mr. Pease (Indiana) Mr. Cannon (Utah) 3. *IMPORTANT* Touch base with us at http://www.crypto.com/feedback/ and let us know how the phone call went. Fill out the easy to use form to let us know what happened during your phone call. 4. Pass this alert on to others until June 1 You've taken the first step to being a part of the powerful political force of Americans concerned about the health and safety of the Internet, but have your friends? Forward this alert to them until June 1, 1997 and urge them to adopt their legislator at http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ 5. Be proud of yourself and relax! You've done more to protect the Internet in five minutes than many people will do this year. ________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND ON SAFE (HR 695) In early May, the Judiciary Committee will be voting on whether to send HR 695, the Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, on to the full House of Representatives. The SAFE Bill, introduced by Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Anna Eshoo (D-CA), would promote privacy and security on the Internet by: * relaxing current export controls on encryption technologies; * prohibiting the government from imposing "key-escrow" or "key- recovery" inside the United States, and; * addresses concerns from law enforcement about the use of encryption in the furtherance of a crime. The SAFE bill enjoys broad bi-partisan support and currently has 78 co-sponsors. Although no bill is ever perfect, the SAFE bill, along with Pro-CODE, a similar bill in the Senate sponsored by Sens. Burns (R-MT) and Leahy (D-VT), represent the best chance yet of passing real reform of US encryption policy. The Senate Commerce Committee is expected to hold a markup on Pro-CODE soon. The Clinton Administration, through the FBI and NSA, is working hard behind the scenes to block passage of SAFE and Pro-CODE. The Administration favors an approach which would limit the availability of privacy-protecting encryption technologies and compel American Citizens to ensure law enforcement access to their private online communications. By passing the SAFE bill and sending on to the floor, the House Judiciary Committee will send a strong signal to the Administration that Congress is serious about passing real reform of US encryption policy, and would represent an important victory in the fight for privacy on the Internet. Detailed background information, including the full text of the bill, and analysis is available online at http://www.crypto.com/ ______________________________________________________________________ WHY IS THIS ISSUE IMPORTANT TO INTERNET USERS? Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age -- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net. Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative. The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the US. A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations. This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has proposed DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online. All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy. What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse. _____________________________________________________________________________ ABOUT THIS ALERT / PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS For more information, contact the following organizations who have signed onto this effort at their web sites. Americans for Tax Reform http://www.atr.org Center for Democracy and Technology http://www.cdt.org Eagle Forum http://www.eagleforum.org EF-Florida http://www.efflorida.org Electronic Frontier Foundation http://www.eff.org Electronic Privacy Information Center http://www.epic.org Voters Telecommunications Watch http://www.vtw.org Wired Magazine http://www.wired.com _____________________________________________________________________________ end alert ==============================================================================

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