December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SSL weakness affecting links from pa
by ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See http://www.Microsoft.com/security/ under "Credit Card Security Concerns and Microsoft's Response" for Microsoft's response on the SSL GET/POST weakness. ¿Any opinions? Art Grapa agrapa(a)banamex.com ---------- From: Mark M. To: ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA; Bill Stewart Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; cryptography(a)c2.net Subject: Re: SSL weakness affecting links from pa Date: Saturday, March 29, 1997 1:11AM Microsoft Mail v3.0 IPM.Microsoft Mail.Note De: Mark M. Para: ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA Bill Stewart Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com cryptography(a)c2.net Asunto: Re: SSL weakness affecting links from pa Fecha: 1997-03-29 01:11 Prioridad: 3 Ident. del mensaje: 83A07AD005A0D011AF8C006097838CEB ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Fri, 28 Mar 1997, Bill Stewart wrote: > http://www.zdnet.com:80/intweek/daily/970327x.html > has an article about an SSL problem that affects both Netscape > and MicrosoftIE browsers, leaking "secure" data such as > credit card numbers from web pages with GET-based SSL forms on it. > It was discovered by Dan Klein. > > There isn't specific detail about how the flaw works, > but it says that it affects GET forms but not POST. > Commentary from NS, MS, Gene Spafford, and Steve Bellovin. > > "It's like you've gone to the restaurant with your lover," Klein said. > "The restaurant is there, it's private, yet when you leave the restaurant > you have the menu in your hand and there's food all over your shirt." I would guess that this means that Netscape and Explorer send the complete URL of the page that linked to another site in the "HTTP-REFERER" header in the clear when SSL is used. The only temporary solution is to use a local web proxy that removes this header, or, as the article suggests, manually type in an URL that is linked from a page using SSL. I can't think of too many situations where one might follow a link to another site immediately after sending sensitive information, but the contents of the "HTTP-REFERER" header are often logged, and the log is often world-readable... > > > > # Thanks; Bill > # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com > # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp > # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) > > Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMzytJyzIPc7jvyFpAQE3gAf/frvfAWg44mEeg2AyhxlFKBmmh3yWEtmq l8np9nTMz20/PHcF2uzDHrpSEcAY2WPcvEvu+57QGelU0H2LoH2qGFNeVisPQURE 9F5gUZvFeyubL9UVLlUoxVIMCumLM+y31zqVaMb8GwwGnHWNcHc1rqnUhchYamiJ BbU04U3xaF5b5/mMBzKTU/tfTajeIDsAl0dhk0rzvXAMN2n26idoWic39ZzhHnsE QOOfi4oI8XK4cMbjOKbwnSR7Xbt78800vilyp+mvkfgp/bR6ygougYzYz1s9dNY3 HgGpnuxDzFoHnqlIQ7in3N+QXXzSNh8TiVfU6w3PjoRk3RNZHX+DTQ== =QOto -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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None Mondex
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a rumor that Timothy Mayhem sells his dead relatives as fertilizer as they constitute the best shit in California. ||||||||||| \~0/ \0~/ < (0) > --oOO--/|||\--OOo- Timothy Mayhem

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Swedish Narcotics Police Demand Telephone Card Database
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to an article in the Swedish newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet <http://www.svd.se/svd/ettan/ettan_97-04-11/narkotikapolisen.html>, the Stockholm narcotics police has asked the national police and State Prosecutor to require that purchasers of a new telephone card used for mobile telephones be registered, and that the police have access to the purchaser database. "Since the card is purchased anonymously, the owner cannot be determined, which makes wiretapping impossible." The new card is pre-paid with 250 or 550 kroner (very roughly $32 or $70) air time and a telephone number, but does not require any other subscription. The card can be used on an ordinary GSM mobile telephone "which can be borrowed or stolen" and can be re-loaded when the air time runs out. A similar card is in use in France. However, the French security service made the government force the telephone company to require that purchasers show an id card when tbey purchase the card. Quickly translated and summarized by Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Re: KC post per Alec
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> writes: > Crispin: > > Personally, I am in favor of absolute personal privacy, but I don't > > define that to include economic dealings -- as far as I am concerned, > > business or economic privacy is at a lower level of concern than > > personal privacy. This puts me at odds with the prevailing > > What's the difference? > > I suppose (and I'm no mind reader) that Kent feels that who you fuck/suck (for kicks, not for money) is your business, but what you do for a living is the gubmint's business. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Grumpy Old Cypherpunks
by David Gilchrist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:31 AM 4/11/97 CST, TruthMangler wrote: >Kent Crispin wrote: >> >> Toto, thanks for your thoughtful comments. Your touching defense of >> Tim is interesting. <yammeryammersnip> >> list. Like most people, I tend to respond in kind. > > This list is one of the few places where the dogs still bark (and >bite, as well). Smarmy "gumming" of the logic and opinions of others >on this list will not get you many doggie bones. I like that. Bite me. > My personal pet peeve is the fucking happy faces that abound in >posts everywhere. If you can't figure out whether a comment is an >insult or humor, then take it as an insult, because any professed >difference between the two is only an illusion. I like that, too. Happy face me. > I suppose that it is only a matter of time before I walk into a >happy-face factory and start blowing people away at random. A barking >gun is only the final result of years of govement and societal >suppression of our natural instinct to bark loud and long when >intruders invade our personal space. You must work for the post office. Shoot me. >TruthMangler > >

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Jim Bell / Columbian News Articles
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A variety of articles on Jim Bell are available at: http://www.columbian.com -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: A rant about economic distortions
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May, sounding much like 'The Bok', which is not hard for rational people to do these days, wrote: > And Big Brother gets more intrusive every year. A person like me who wants > to hire some Mexicans for work out at my house faces a triple whammy. > > First, I'm supposed to fill out various forms to hire them And so long as folks > aren't in line to become Attorney General, or the Feds are not looking for > an excuse to bust them, this ignoring the reporting laws is probably not > too dangerous. The purpose of many laws seems to be to ensure that anyone, anywhere, at any time, is breaking at least a few of them, in case the government chooses to come after them. > Second, I'm supposed to verify the "right to work" of any applicant. I'm > supposed to demand documentation, and to somehow be able to detect > forgeries. Thus, anyone who is not Houdini, or who doesn't have access to the same records/databases as covert government agencies, is probably committing criminal actions without knowing it. > Third, I'd better watch what questions I ask, though. Gotcha either way, don't they? > There are other whammies, too. Tim gives an example, but he would have to fill an entire book in order to cover a even a modicum of situations applicable to the average person. > (Somewhere along the line we lost the right to hire and fire whom we chose > to. Now all such decisions must be documented, and produced on demand. The safest route is to fire the white guy. Anything else is an obvious act of discrimination. (I am not making any claim that the reverse has not been the case in the past, but only that the situation is equally as evil in either situation. 'Revenge' does not equate to 'Justice'.) > Used to be that the economy had plenty of "niches" for people unable or > unwilling to compete for more demanding/mechanical/factory jobs...the > aforementioned handymen and maids, etc. I know a businessman who had to lay off twenty disabled/retarded employees because he couldn't afford the cost of defending himself against charges that he was somehow taking advantage of them. They kept showing up for work, however, so he turned to me to set up a system whereby he could reward them for their 'volunteer' work. Now, even that is being challenged, even though their lives are immeasurably better as a result of his effort to enable them to be productive, functional members of society. > In my view, this was a more natural, normal, almost "tribal" way of living. > Those with lesser mental or ambition skills could still do something of use > for those who worked hard or had skills in demand. The fact of the matter is, many who have become 'rich' have done so by working night and day, as well as going broke a number of times, with no more resources to work with than those who choose to squander their own resources on drink, drugs and wanton living (Trust me, I am somewhat of an expert in the latter.) > The further result: those who can't fit into jobs worthy of minimum wage > (which is actually more than the official rate, given the need for tax > accountants to manage them, forms to be kept current, training to be given > because the public schools failed, insurance, etc.) are unemployable. Then > the State steps in and pays them not to work. At the tender age of 19, I received massive amounts of electroshock and given a lifetime pass to government assistance as a person who would never be fit to work in even the simplest of positions. Since that time, I have worked in a multitude of fields, including becoming a recording artist, mob figure, and president of a computer company. (None of which negates the fact that I am, indeed, crazy as a fucking loon.) In my mind, those stuck in the social welfare-state are not in any way different from those stuck in the corporate welfare-state. They have all bought into the government world-view and are merely pawns in different aspects of the game. I see no real difference in the ghetto resident who is paid not to work, and the Congressman who is paid not to grow cotton on his plantation. > Here in Kalifornia, garbage is strewn around the freeways. Convicts no > longer are sent out (though drunk drivers, being politically incorrect, > sometimes are). Nor are welfare recipients sent out to pick up garbage. No, > this would all be demeaning. Better to have CalTrans employees do the work. > Oh, and these CalTrans "transportation engineers" have starting salaries of > $32,000 a year. A bit high for garbage collectors, but, hey, if it was any > lower they could go on welfare and make just as much. This is how skewed > our economy has become, thanks to government meddling in economic > transactions. Some of those who see the world from this realistic viewpoint walk into a Denny's and blow people away, for no apparent reason. Some join an organization to 'change' things. Others write letters to the CypherPunks list. Some just change their name to Nero, and learn to play the violin. Still others, making their mark in the world as movers and shakers in the burgeoning world of eca$h, come to their senses and realize that the safest harbor of reality, in the midst of madness, is in the center of the storm, and they post messages saying, "I *love* this list." > Other rants are obvious, such as why in 48 out of the 50 states a person on > welfare earns the equivalent of $1500 or more a month, far, far higher than > minimum wage....in other words, the taxpaying shlubs working for $5.75 an > hour at Taco Bell are subsidizing others to stay at home watching t.v. and > smoking crack and getting paid more than they're making.... > For most American coloreds, the situation is hopeless until welfare as we > know it is ended. (And people are free to engage in economic transactions > of their choosing.) Some innocents will suffer, of course. But there's no > other way. It is just as hopeless for those 'in power'. We are all trapped on a runaway train, trying desperately to hang on, in the mistaken notion that someone is 'in control' of the situation, and will soon find some way to 'fix' it. Bad news, Bubba--the 'train' is in control, and there is no one at the wheel. I could go on and on, but I'm running low on Crayolas. It is getting harder and harder to find the 'old' colors, and the 'new' colors are part of the plot against me. Everyone at the 'home' says, "Hi!" -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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german crypto laws
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a press release of the german Forum of Computer Professionals for Peace and Social Responsibility (FIfF). It discusses the crypto-proposals of the german government, which are similar to the UK and US proposals. Please note, that this is my own "unofficial" translation of it. All phrases in [] are either my additional comments or are phrases, that I couldn't translate directly. If you want the original german text, e-mail me. Ciao Harka ==================================================================== P R E S S R E L E A S E of the Forum of computer professionals for peace and social responsibility Bonn, in April, 1997 Cryptography proposals reverse constitutional rights The Forum of computer professional for peace and social responsibility declare the following to the recently made-public plans and intentions to regulate cryptography internationally and nationally: Very obvious are the efforts to the regulation of cryptography. After several tries guide lines to crypto-politics were worked out at the end of march by the OECD[1]. Almost simultaneously plans from the United States[2] and the United Kingdom[3] for new national crypto regulations became public. Further developments suggest, that also the [german] Federal Government has worked out specific plans to regulate cryptographic technology in Germany. On the current level of planning the [german] Federal Government is considering three variations of regulation[5]: 1. A key-escrow-solution, in which providers of cryptographic services have to provide the keys of customers to law-enforcement, if necessary. 2. A key-escrow-solution, in which only federally licenced providers of cryptographic services are permitted to operate. 3. A key-escrow-solution with simultaneous prohibition of all not federally permitted technologies. The FIfF is seeing herein a serious threat to the developement of society, that is increasingly dependent on information transfer. Not only is the protection of privacy now ranking below federal surveillance wishes, but also the protection of all interactions and transactions, that happen on electronic networks. This not acceptable interferance [with privacy] is for technical reasons not even accompanied by any plus sides for federal investigators. The planning of crypto regulations make clear not only the complete neglect of civil rights in our [german] constitution. It is becoming a symbol for the huge deficits in understanding the problems, possibilities and challenges of [...] an information society. The FIfF sees five areas, where arguments for the damage of crypto regulations can be made: I. Crypto regulations as last building block of surveillance Why does cryptography have to be regulated by law? From the official side a crypto regulation in Germany is necessary, because it's the last missing piece to surveillance of [long distance] information traffic. The law for "Long-distance information traffic surveillance" (FUeV)[6] forces providers of information traffic installations to provide the clear-text of monitored traffic to law enforcement. This can be avoided by end-to-end cryptography by single users. Since telefone and fax [communication] are rarely encrypted, a regulation of cryptography would mainly affect users of electronic networks, who can ensure the postal privacy only through encryption. It's underlying suggestion is, that encrypted data traffic of suspects [of crime] in electronic networks is the norm and can't be under surveillance. This is not true. The current laws and regulations are forcing providers of electronic networks to guarantee a surveillance of law enforcement and intelligence services; this is already happening[7]. Up until now no case is known, where the investigation of a crime was made impossible through cryptography. Nevertheless vague threat-scenarios are mentioned, to make an increased surveillance of information traffic more plausible. In Germany though it's hard to observe an under-development in surveillance. While in the United States and it's 240 million citizens 1229 telefone surveillance requests were granted in 1995, Germany with 80 million citizens had in the same time 3667 requests granted[8] - per citizen 6 times as many surveillance activities as in the USA. In 1996 the number of granted requests increased again 175 percent to 6428 [9]. No comparison of the crime rates in Germany and the USA can possibly explain these differences [...]. In which way these methods [of surveillance] have contributed to crime investigation is not known, since here a control of the [surveillance] activities is not done, as opposed to the USA. Although deficits [in surveillance] aren't noticable, the Great Listening Attack and crypto law are to open new fields for surveillance. Through that basic civil rights are increasingly limited. II. Basic rights are reversed The protagonists of a crypto law say, that such a regulation would be nothing new, but only a adaption of [existing] info surveillance to technical developments. This is wrong. Outlawing all not licenced crypto technology is reversing current principles of civil rights. The limitation of postal secrecy is only permitting the control of sendings. There are no forced ways of writing, nor are certain languages or ways of expression prohibited. No law is prohibiting to write with secret ink or to use any other means to make messages secret. Somebody opening letters has to do all work of analysis himself - no sender has to help him with a [correct] letter written according to law. A prohibition of cryptography, despite all current systems of law, would throw the law-conform electronic communication under the dictat of governmentally sanctioned syntaxes. No dictatorship in Germany has ever demanded that. III. After all, it's your money.... Electronic networks are transporting not only letters, even the politicians got that. Using cryptographic technologies therefore is not limited only to postal secrecy, but also other things worthy of protection. Those who make crypto laws also want the control over the electronic variants of transactions, that are currently under special privacy protection rights. The electronic service law of the IuKDG makes it obvious by stating explicitly electronic banking as an electronic service. For users of online-banking, online-work and online-medicine the bank-, service-, and medical secrecy gets reduced to the information traffic secrecy [law]. Thus the information traffic secrecy [law] is becoming a strategic basic [constitutional] right. A crypto law would not only undermine this basic right, but many others as well. Such a law is a trojan horse [for the democratic state] in an information society. IV. Additional problems in reality Let's assume, a crypto law would be formulated. How would it be [constitutional] and would it be practicable? To note is a law to digital signatures in the IuKDG, that indicates [a limitation of asymmetric] cryptography technologies. This leads to characteristic problems. 1. A handing-over of an escrowed key to law-enforcement means with currently available systems, that a unlimited surveillance of the key-owner is possible, as long as he uses the same [unchanged] key. This is even in the practice of surveillance an un-precedented limitation of citizens-rights, which [out-of-proportion nature] is also clear to cryptography experts and supporters of a [crypto] law: No one less than Otto Leibrich, Ex-President of the Federal Agency of Information Technology Security (BSI), publicized, how through introducing a time-variable in cryptography technologies timely limits should be set to surveillance[10]. But could the security agencies have an interest in [such] a lawful technology, that could not be decrypted anymore, when users could prevent investigation already through a changed system date? 2. The [available to law-enforcement] private key of a suspect makes only his incoming data traffic readable, but not his messages to third persons. In respect to the nature of asymmetric crypto technologies [...] proofs for an communicated agreement with third persons to commit a crime are only to be won, if also the keys of his communication partners are available, and beyond that in certain circumstances even their partners. The result is a tendency of an exponential increase of the [circle of] suspects, the surveillances and the work-load for the investigators. Here is no proportionality anymore nor effective Investigation. 3. Due to the lack of competent institutions, the federal government will not be able to avoid using the infra-structure, that it's currently creating for introducing and issuing digital signatures, to control crypto keys as well. No law will balance the loss of trust, when one one side the institution has to hand over private keys to law-enforcement and on the other hand guarantees for the security of the digital signature. Would the digital signature get into the wrong hands, any document could be lawfully signed. The fear of citizens is understandable, to be [powerless] to manipulations of federal key mighties. With such a loss of trust the federal government and companies [that support the digital signature] shouldn't even bother [to set up the infra-structure]. 4. A national crypto law is not able to adress accordingly the problems of international traffic typical for electronic networks. To get the crypto keys of a "Mafia Organization", the agencies of several countries would have to be mobilized. Are the supporters of a crypto law really serious, that an international co-operation in getting escrowed keys would function better than the current bad co-operation in investigating crimes, where electronic networks were used? 5. Compared to that it's almost neglectable, how such a crypto law would make harder the life of the software industry. To guarantee a relation of crypto key and user on the grounds of the law, the makers of Internet-browsers, for example, [...], would have to refrain from distributing their products in Germany via the Internet and instead sell software packages only [in stores] to persons with ID. Such an effort is affordable only for a few and wouldn't necessarely strengthen the position of the legal use of secure systems. When beyond that different and technically incompatible national regulations were enacted, the much cheered upon global Electronic Commerce would remain an illusion. V. A crypto law doesn't make the investigators smarter either Nobody can overlook this fact: a crypto law can be easily [routed around]. A legal cryptographic system can be used several times on a message, in fact, a with an illegal technology encrypted message could be "packed" in a legal system. Also a crypto law can be avoided, so that nobody knows: Steganography and other means to use covert channels hide messages in plain-text files, for example, and put a veil around the very existence of an encrypted message. - From the routing around of the crypto law, the federal security experts hope to actually gain advantages, because out of the circle of users of illegal crypto technologies, they could win worthy hints about the organizational structure of the suspected circle of people. With the use of steganography such a group of persons is never to become known [to law-enforcement]. But what would be won, even if a group of people would be found, that uses the same illegal crypto system? Their communication would not be decryptable, thus has to be won through other means. As investigators today are already sinking in a mountain of papers with protocols of phone surveillances, in the future they will have to spend even more effort to investigate groups, who have done nothing wrong but to use an non-permitted crypto system and communicate incidently with people, who are suspected of something. Such an effort can't even be justified by employment-market reasonings. To stamp the users of non-permitted cryptography automatically to suspects would be therefore even from an investigative perspective nothing but nonsense. - From a technical and practical perspective, a crypto law is nonsense and un-enforcable. [Some] lawyers though have the opinion, that independent from the enforcement the law has to be obeyed in any case. But such a dogmatic viewpoint is hard to balance with a democratic society. VI. Conclusion The FIfF has the opinion, that a crypto law would even more increase the already not shyly used surveillance of information traffic in Germany. It reverses constitutional rights and principles. It threatens drastically the constitutionally protected citizens-rights in electronic transactions and interactions. It would lead in practicality to severe additional problems with laws and will certainly not make the work for investigators any easier. The problems that come with such a regulation will also not be solved through law-dogmatism. The severe damage for civil rights, democracy, but also economical interests, are opposed by a very thin advantage. With that background, every rational analysis would therefore have to come to the conclusion, to avoid a regulation of cryptography. That the federal government is not doing that, despite consultations with acknowledged experts over several years, is either a proof for lack of knowledge or the willing neglect of the consequences. The very similar regulations of the OECD, Great Britains, the USA and the West-German plans are out-of-sync with the visions of a global, democratic information society. VII. Demands Instead of a limitation of cryptography it is according to the FIfF necessary to: 1. increase the availability and use of cryptography, 2. not hinder the use of cryptography through limitations or prohibitions, 3. make the free choice of crypto systems possible, 4. support the development of secure crypto systems, 5. increase the protection for electronic transactions and interactions, 6. evaluate the use of federal surveillance of communication regularly, independently and in-depth. -------------------------- 1 Cryptography Policy Guidelines; Recommendation of the Council, http://www.oecd.org/dsti/iccp/crypto_e.html 2 http://www.cdt.org/crypto/admin_397_draft.html 3 Minister for Science and Technology: Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services; http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dti.html 4 Presserklaerung des forschungspolitischen Sprechers von Buendnis 90/Die Gruenen, Dr. Manuel Kiper: http://www.gruenebt.de/aktuell/pm/indizes/in970236.htm 5 am konkretesten: C. Schulzki-Haddouti: Kanthers Kurs auf das Kryptoverbot; in: http://www.heise.de/tp/te/1146/fhome.htm 6 vgl. die Stellungnahme des FIfF zur FUeV unter http://hyperg.uni-paderborn.de/0x83ea6001_0x0036ce9 7 Erste Faelle einer Ueberwachung von Internet-Accounts wurden bekannt in: 30.000 Telephonate mitgehoert; in: Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2.12.96, S. 15 8 USA: Newsweek 20.5.96, Bundesrepublik: Bt-Drs 13/3618 9 Bt-Drs. 13/7341 10 Otto Leiberich: Verschluesselung und Kriminalitaet II, in: BSI-Forum der KES 1/95 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Forum InformatikerInnen fuer Frieden und FFFF I fff FFFF gesellschaftliche Verantwortung (FIfF) e.V. F I f F Reuterstr. 44, D-53113 Bonn FFFF I fff FFFF E-mail: fiff(a)fiff.gun.de F I f F Tel.:xx49-228-219548 Fax: -214924 F I f F CL/GRUPPEN/FIFF und http://hyperg.uni-paderborn.de/~FIFF forum computer professionals for peace and social responsibility * * * * * * * * * * * * * PGP-Key on request * * * * * * * * * ==================================================================== /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM08quzltEBIEF0MBAQEn1gf/Ww87W3y3SrI6bK6Qg9iCgC6E40HSCkrB 2tFV3Zy+k7KtegHPrLikKhX1inJ+vEYPadHLhH1K45eGRJ/4lr4G3Pg+ozYNRalQ KAIeoD4XQNY4nOvm6+vMlg5lOhkObB5z4pf7H5P6j48c0HSKEITPk5ExBo7g5Hcv gl+yOrXYioEbSEScFkGYjvTh6zPNEqsr7Ma7nucON5OlqRe71Rdtn9FiGWSkxgTZ rRg1bnB6geksL/OeKz6neYXIfWuyFEoHs19sLo7gqGcCaib6nn+bs+qrWikJeY5L dWNzpoeqUSW46mZtUwC3IastDE2YhKuh7ffYPCG1v5AvaBG0NCZ4Sg== =fpKk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: The Balance of Terror
by TruthMangler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May wrote: > At 12:22 AM -0400 4/12/97, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: > > >peace. No logical holes there. However, the premise that a large nuke > >will keep some 3rd world dictator from lobbing some Exocets at your > >ships is, well, provably false. > > Given that the peace was kept, for whatever ultimate reasons, saying the > Peacekeeper had a "provably false" mission or name is unsupported. The same could be said for Charles Manson's aims being "provably false". The country has been going downhill since the 'Communist plot' to flouridate the water supply. "Provably false" has little meaning in this context, as well. > (We never have the luxury of running history over and over again, under > different controlled conditions, so we can't say for sure what caused > things to happen the way they did. I am persuaded that the balance of > terror in the 1950s-80s played a major role in the avoidance for 50 years > of any major wars. At horrendous cost to the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to be sure, > and better ways could probably have been found. But major wars _were_ > avoided.) I know it's midnight, the drugs are kicking in, and there are few posts to respond to on the weekend, but please make an attempt to start a new thread, as opposed to taking the easy way out and piling new drivel on top of old drivel. Dr. TruthRoberts

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One-time pads
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[reep] Mayonnaise studied yoga back-streching exercises for five years so he could blow himself (nobody else will). ///// | @ @ Timmy C[reep] Mayonnaise C _) \ o

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