December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Key Security Question
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> My computer went into the shop a few days ago, and I was unable to take >> my PGP keys off it before it went in. What are the security risks here? >> If the repairman chooses to snoop through the files, what would he be >> able to do with my key pair? Will I need to revoke the key and make a >> new one, or will I be relatively safe since he doesn't have my >> passphrase? Passphrases are MD5-hashed into 128-bit IDEA keys and used to encrypt the secret key; there's a "pgpcrack" program out there that does dictionary-style searches to find if you've got wimpy passphrases. So if your passphrases is "secret", you lose, but if it's "fjhw;doifvjuc-[09efiu v` 2 4rnhc;ljoipcvjpoiewujfgv;loik" you're probably pretty safe, unless that's written on the yellow sticky you left on the side of the PC. On the other hand, if the "repairman" replaced your pgp executable with version 2.6.3kgb, which uses your hashed passphrase as the session key, you're hosed. Or if he installed a keystroke sniffer, or added a small radio transmitter to your keyboard, or whatever. Depends on your threat model. If you need to be paranoid, they've already gotten you.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:23 PM 1/31/97 -0800, William Knowles wrote: >.. Primeco digital phone which uses CDMA technology to scramble >the calls and makes passive listening next to impossible. > (Primeco is a PCS phone) >I have been having one helluva a time trying to find more >information on the encryption used with Primeco, I have >spoken to customer service twice & the local rep told me that >the the Chicago FBI asked Primeco to shut off a phone this >week because they can't listen in on what is been said, >To which the the Primceco guys reply, If the feds can't listen >in then I shouldn't be worried. Many low-level phone company people don't know from encryption, and consider just being digital to be enough to satisfy their market's demand for privacy :-( On the other hand, if they're telling the truth that the FBI had somebody's cellphone shut down because they couldn't wiretap it, that's pretty outrageous, and would seem to constitute a "taking". >Excuse me if this posting is a little off topic, But I have >nearly looked everywhere on the WWW to no avail. CDMA is Code Division Multiple Access, a spread-spectrum technology that lets them manage bandwidth efficiently as well as providing a certain level of privacy (assuming they really are using CDMA, as opposed to TDMA). If there is encryption, it's probably the IS-136 stuff. Phil Karn from Qualcomm was on the standards committees when the NSA was arm-twisting them into making sure it's too wimpy to keep out the NSA, and of course the spread-spectrum is a bit less private when you can subpoena the spreading codes... But it really is much better than nothing. Here's a posting from John Young; you'll also want to look at the CAVE material on www.jya.com. ================================================================= Date: Sun, 26 Jan 1997 17:44:49 -0500 From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Cellular Encryption Docs Thanks to David Wagner and Steve Schear, we've learned about the latest documents on cellular encryption which supercede the 1992 CAVE document, Appendix A to IS-54, which contained the CAVE algorithm. Here are the latest, followed by ordering information. TIA/EIA/IS-136.1-A -- TDMA Cellular/PCS - Radio Interface - Mobile Station - Base Station Compatibility - Digital Control Panel, October, 1996, 372 pp. $350.00. Addendum No. 1 to IS-136.1-A, November, 1996, 40 pp. Free. TIA/EIA/IS-136.2-A -- TDMA Cellular/PCS - Radio Interface - Mobile Station - Base Station Compatibility - Traffic Channels and FSK Control Channel, October, 1996, 378 pp. $310.00. TIA/EIA-627 -- 800 MHZ Cellular System, TDMA Radio Interface, Dual-Mode Mobile Station - Base Station Compatibility Standard, June, 1996, 258 pp. $120.00. These documents can be ordered from: Global Engineering Documents 15 Inverness Way East Englewood, Colorado 80112 Telephone: 1-800-854-7179 However, each of the documents lists the following related supplements which contain "sensitive information" and may be obtained by US/CA citizens from TIA by signing a Non-Disclosure Agreement and acceptance of export restrictions: Appendix A to IS-136. Appendix A to 627. Common Cryptographic Algorithms. Interface Specification for Common Cryptographic Algorithms. These controlled documents can be requested by calling Ms. Sharon Vargish at 1-703-907-7702, who will fax an NDA, and upon receipt of the completed form, will send the controlled documents at no cost. Here's the NDA: AGREEMENT ON CONTROL AND NONDISCLOSURE OF COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS REVISION A TO IS-54, IS-95, AND IS-136 [Note: 627 supercedes IS-54; IS-95 is for CDMA] "I, _________________________, an employee/consultant/affiliate (typed name) of __________________________, hereafter, "the company," (Company name) _____________________________ (Company address) _____________________________ and a United States or Canadian citizen, acknowledge and understand that the subject documents, to which I will have access contain information [which] is subject to export control under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 120-130). I also understand that the subject documents represent valuable, proprietary and confidential business information of TIA and its members. I hereby certify that this information will be controlled and will only be further disclosed, exported, or transferred according to the terms of the ITAR. ______________________________ _____________________________ Signature Date ______________________________ _____________________________ Printed Name Witness ______________________________ _____________________________ Title Printed Name of Witness [End NDA] ============================================================================ # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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More on Cellular Encryption Docs
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's more on the controlled documents for cellular encryption from TIA/EIA we described in a 26 January post to cpunks: Sharon Vargish of TIA (1-703-907-7702) sent the documents after I signed and returned the NDA: TR45.0.A Common Cryptographic Algorithms, Revision B June 21, 1995, 72 pp. (With ITAR notice on every page) TR45.0.A Interface Specification for Common Cryptographic Algorithms, Revision B, August 6, 1996, 15 pp. (No ITAR notice, but "sensitive information should be protected from general distribution.") TR45 Appendix A to PN-3474 (IS-36) October 16, 1995, 10 pp. (ITAR notice on every page.) TR45 Appendix-A to TIA/EIA 627 December 23, 1996, 7 pp. (No ITAR, but "sensitive"notice) "Common Cryptographic Algorithms" (CCA) supercedes the 1992 CAVE document, but is considerbly longer -- 72 pp. for the latest compared to 25 pp. for the 1992 version. Here're the CCA's TOC and Introduction: Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1. Notations 1.2. Definitions 2. Procedures 2.1. Authentication Key (A-Key) Procedures 2.1.1. A-Key Checksum calculation 2.1.2. A-Key Verification 2.2. SSD Generation and Update 2.2.1. SSD Generation Procedure 2.2.2. SSD Update Procedure 2.3. Authentication Signature Calculation Procedure 2.4. Encryption Key and VPM Generation Procedure 2.4.1. CMEA key Generation 2.4.2. Voice Privacy Mask Generation 2.5. CMEA Encryption/Decryption Procedure 2.6. Wireless Residential Extension Procedures 2.6.1. WIKEY Generation 2.6.2. WIKEY Update Procedure 2.6.3. Wireline Interface Authentication Signature Calculation Procedure 2.6.4. Wireless Residential Extension Authentication Signature Calculation Procedure 2.7. Cellular Data Encryption 2.7.1. Data Encryption Key Generation Procedure 2.7.2. Data Encryption Mask Generation Procedure 3. TEST VECTORS 3.1. CAVE Test Vectors 3.1.1. Vector 1 3.1.2. Vector 2 3.1.3. Test Program 3.2. Wireless Residential Extension Test Vectors 3.2.1. Input data 3.2.2. Test program 3.2.3. Test Program Output 3.3. Data Encryption Test Vector 3.3.1. Input data 3.3.2. Test Program 3.3.3. Test Program Output 1. Introduction This document describes detailed cryptographic procedures for cellular system applications. These procedures are used to perform the security services of mobile station authentication, subscriber message encryption, and encryption key and subscriber voice privacy key generation within cellular equipment. This document is organized as follows: §2 describes the Cellular Authentication, Voice Privacy and Encryption (CAVE) algorithm used for authentication for mobile subscriber equipment and for generation of cryptovariables to be used in other procedures. §2.1 describes the procedure to verify the manual entry of the subscriber authentication key (A-key). §2.2 describes the generation of intermediate subscriber cryptovariablcs, Shared Secret Data (SSD), from the unique and private subscriber A-key. §2.3 describes the procedure to calculate an authentication signature used by cellular base station equipment for verifying the authenticity of a mobile station. §2.4 describes the procedures used for generating cryptographic keys. These keys include the Voice Privacy Mask (VPM) and the Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) key. Thc VPM is used to provide forward link and reverse link voice confidentiality over the air interface. Thc CMEA key is used with the CMEA algorithm for protection of digital data exchanged between the mobile station and the base station. §2.5 describes the Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) used for enciphering and deciphering subscriber data exchanged between the mobile station and the base station. §2.6 describes the procedures for key and authentication signature generation for wireless residential extension applications. §2.7 describes the ORYX algorithm and procedures for key and mask generation for encryption and decryption in cellular data services. §3 provides test data (vectors) that may be employed to verify the correct operation of the cryptographic algorithms described in this document. ... [End CCA Introduction] The related CCA Interface Specification "describes the interfaces to cryptographic procedures for cellular system applications" described in the CCA. Its purpose "is to describe the cryptographic functions without revealing the technical details that are subject to" ITAR. The two Appendices A to IS-136 and 627 "contain requirements for message encryption and voice privacy for cellular systems" supplemental to those described in the main documents, the CCA and the CCA Interface Specs. ----- This note will be put with other CAVE info at: http://jya.com/cave.htm Thanks to TIA/EIA for prompt and courteous reply to our requests. Maybe they welcome help persuading USG/NSA to allow stronger crypto and boost the market for cellular systems.

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Junger web site
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PJ sent me his web site which others may be interested in, with pointers to Karn and Bernstein: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/crypto_export/ so, essentially, there are now 3 pretty significant cases challenging ITAR on constitutional grounds, which I find highly encouraging. of course the Bernstein case has already had very positive results so far.

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Re: "Secret" Postal Device stolen
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 1 Feb 97 at 9:39, Duncan Frissell wrote: > Mail Storage Box keys? I think they use combination locks, actually. Supposedly it's the same combination nationally too. There was an article in 2600 Magazine about that. The locks are actually 'insecure' and you can test every possible combo in about 10-20 minutes. - --Rob -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAgUBMvPFpgTNlSxdPy6ZAQF7QAf+IFPhGavlD7p5WFsmhESHi+PKd9msqYhN pxl8ZdUZMDJg61F6nLF4Oa7rfoCmzDXqP4w0WU1pk8MkkwwVb9oTTJg2k4hY4AKr IixesiAcDlGc9+11314Nao+PuU6epJYmLddGSIc0Ra3FKrqamyueW6qunsJQT1Z6 5E/BiqpEGAiEGqog9J/xXtSra4q9g1SzrMCGcR5z077gCzb5ONxIgWzQ6zlL0leb X1Y9pzABnm1iJbq7Q2HRAVAQVBiPC/vg+hW8COfao4XHGqsqVg2UBcZWT8TdbV4N cwqVw5fDpoZXPyQtzRynmq55xH4OIJWZ2HnNNK3KHdRcyS+JW24MBQ== =oAVd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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Libel, Times v. Sullivan
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone (Igor?) suggested I said that libel can't be criminalized. I don't think that's correct, but I may have been unclear. I haven't researched the question and can't call to mind a case directly on point, but my hunch is that states may criminalize libel, but a conviction would require that the state prove, beyond a reasonable doubt (because it's a criminal case), and that the defendant acted with actual malice (because the state is seeking to punish speech, and punitive damages in civil cases require proving actual malice). "Actual malice" means that the defendant said something s/he knew was untrue or recklessly disregarded the truth of what s/he said. (This excludes, for example, an "honest mistake" about what's true.) _Times v. Sullivan_, the case which introduced the actual malice standard, discussed Alabama's criminal libel statute - so the Supreme Court, in the mid 60's, didn't seem to have a problem with criminalizing libel. I can't seem to find a criminal libel statute in California; and if I remember correctly the Oregon Legislature contemplated but did not pass one during its last legislative session. Also, people interested in _Times v. Sullivan_ and the interplay between defamation and the First Amendment might find "Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment" by Anthony Lewis (ISBN 0-697-73939-4) of interest. The decision itself is online at <http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&navby=case&vol=376&invol =254> - the factual summary of the Sullivan case posted here was not correct, and the first few pages of the opinion provide a description of the underlying facts. Since we've now got Jim Bell arguing that it's obvious that a free and open society must tolerate anything which might be defamatory, and Jim Choate arguing that it's obvious that a free and open society cannot tolerate anything which might be defamatory, I think I'm going to wander away from this discussion confident that the answer is, at least, nonobvious. :) -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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RE: Cyphernomicon by Tim May
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Toto, quoting the Cyphernomicon 3.5.1 Contrary to what people sometimes claim, there is no ruling clique of Cypherpunks. Anybody is free to do nearly anything, just not free to commit others to course of action, or claim to speak for the "Cypherpunks" as a group (and this last point is unenforceable except through reputation and social repercussions). ......................................................................... Toto, I'm surprised at how seriously you take the underlying anarchist philosophy of the list; you identify so closely with it, and have responded to its moderation as though it really would be "the end of freedom", even though you seem to have appeared, or else come out of lurking, only recently. Is this because you value anarchy, or free speech, or the existence of the Cypherpunks as a unique group of stray cats [ :>) ]? Side note: Since Tim isn't on the list and hasn't been for a month, I've been wondering if it had anything to do with the moderation experiment, although it is unlike him to have left without either an argument or at least some kind of statement about it. .. Blanc

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Re: Crypto in New Zealand - an update
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:03 AM 2/2/97, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: [...] >The following week Andrew Mayo wrote a letter to the editor of the NBR >containing an eloquent defense of the use of encryption to protect personal >privacy. MFAT replied to say that they were only following orders, and were >required by the Wassenaar agreement to restrict crypto exports: [...] Just for clarification, it is the Wassenaar *arrangement* (somehow the term is more fitting anyway...) and it does *not* require the signatory countries to implement crypto export controls. Not that this will make any difference, since it would be the first time that a government would allow facts to stand in the way of politics. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Degaussing diskettes
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dopehead L[ice] Vilus K[rust]OfTheMoment wears satin lingerie embroidered with pink swastikas, prancing around for his faggot, AIDS infected lovers. \|/ @ @ -oOO-(_)-OOo- Dr.Dopehead L[ice] Vilus K[rust]OfTheMoment

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by Steven Bellovin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many low-level phone company people don't know from encryption, and consider just being digital to be enough to satisfy their market's demand for privacy :-( On the other hand, if they're telling the truth that the FBI had somebody's cellphone shut down because they couldn't wiretap it, that's pretty outrageous, and would seem to constitute a "taking". And an illegal wiretap besides, most likely -- with a warrant, they could simply put the tap at the base station. The story may be true, but it doesn't sound quite right to me. I recently got a TDMA phone (a Nokia 2160), which is capable of doing some sort of encryption, though I'm not sure what algorithm. It doesn't always encrypt even when in digital mode (it can handle AMPS, too), but there's a configuration option to tell the user whether or not encryption is in use.

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