December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Dimitri
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM sez: > Sounds like a crontab job, or Timmy May, or both. THIS sounds like our friend SternFUD. {Who, BTW, is back attacking folks in the pgp groups..} -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Re: Wrap Up: Conference on Law Enforcement and Intelligence
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:13 PM 10/20/96 -0600, C Kuethe wrote: >On Sun, 20 Oct 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: >> (3) The devil is in the details. I still am not convinced that MacPGP has >> enough sources of entropy for its IDEA key generation. (But I am not >> convinced that it doesn't either.) I put integrating Jon Callas's entropy >> manager into MacPGP as a high priority. > >Tell me more... I use macpgp. I just built some new keys tonight, a 2048 >bit monster. PGP wanted 1496 bits of rand info... where is it's entropy >"Hole" > >And what is the "Entropy Manager"? When you build RSA keys in PGP it uses keyboard timings to acquire "true randomness" or entropy. This kind of randomness is related to quantum mechanical uncertainty. It probably has enough entropy to safely generate RSA keys by the keyboard technique it uses. In addition to RSA keys, it generates symmetric IDEA keys whenever you send a message. It uses keystrokes accumulated during normal operation and saved in a file called randpool (or something like that) to generate these keys. Since you almost never enter keystrokes during the normal operation of MacPGP, I am concerned that randpool does not have enough entropy. Entropy Manager is a program Jon Callas of Apple is working on. It uses well-known sources of entropy in the computer to build up a pool of entropy for use by programs that need it. The last I heard, it was nearly ready. I would trust it more than the ported PGP since Jon has examined sources available in the Macintosh specifically. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Tired of Dole/Clinton? | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | Vote 3rd party. I'm | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | Voting for Harry Browne | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Usenet and Re: extortion via digital cash
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> As an already existing, widely >disseminated and easily used message pool, Usenet is very valuable to us. >I'm concerned that it may not last though. Many people now complain about >how low the signal to noise ratio is [...] So, if it gets too bad, might it >just fade away? Or, if it remains but becomes unpopular, will it be easy to >restrict if we use it for anonymous messages? I haven't read all of Usenet in 10+ years :-) But it keeps growing, and if you're trying to piggyback anonymous messages on it, then it's great to have VOLUME, VOLUME, VOLUME, as the talk.bizarre folks put it. On the other hand, there are technical difficulties with using the current modes of Usenet for real applications, and volume may make it worse. Usenet used to work by flooding - every message goes to every machine, so it's not suspicious your machine receives an Anonymous Message. Most machines had multiple users (Unix, after all), and didn't log who accessed what files in the news spool (which you could do directly as well as through your newsreader.) Now, however, most users use NNTP to fetch news articles from their ISP, and the number of machines receiving the whole Nx100MB/day flood is probably smaller, though perhaps businesses and universities are putting up with it, and perhaps the usage patterns are different outside North America. Fetching material by NNTP is probably logged by many ISPs, and can also be detected by sniffers in the places where security is weak enough for them, which probably includes many major ISPs. So it's easier to detect who's reading alt.anonymous.messages, especially if some government agency subpoenas logfiles. azur(a)netcom.com (Steve Schear) wrote: >In the U.S., at least, attempts to enforce identification of Internet users >or anonymous posters to newgroups and such are likely to meet with stiff >legal resistance. The Supreme Court has ruled that anonymous use of >protected speech (e.g., political handbills) must be permitted. No legal resistance at all, if it's done by ISPs or businesses or individuals - only if the government tries it does it get into "protected speech" territory. There may be market resistance, and the Internet and Usenet are fundamentally worldwide cooperative efforts, so if the protocols support anonymity, then participants in the nets can choose to have their systems cooperate with or refuse to cooperate with anonymous messages, and you'll find some people doing each one. This may mean that small-ISP.net and xs4all.nl will permit anonymous users and aol.com, compuserve.com, and proxy.gov.sg will demand Internet Driver's Licenses to let your postings through, while nihilism.net won't allow any non-anomymous messages. Spontaneous order is like that. And the US government could probably get away with sponsoring Internet access for Real American Citizens and Green-Card Holders that requires positive identification because you can file your tax forms over it, as long as they don't prevent anonymous messages on _some_ part of the net. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Re: [crypto-philo]OTP or DES?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:45 AM 10/20/95 -0500, walrus <walrus(a)tcgcs.com> wrote: >I would argue that the security of an OTP is >derived not from the fact that it really is secure, but from the fact that >it is claimed to be an OTP. The meaning of "Security" depends on your threat model. Are you worried about - having your message noticed? - having your message decoded? - being able to deny a possible decoding of your message? Whether your message noticed or not depends a lot on the environment; in some places "pure noise" is not noticeable, while in others it really stands out (posting it to a text newsgroup, for instance.) If you simply remove the "----- BEGIN PGP" etc. headers/trailers from a PGP message, it's still got a well-defined format, including magic numbers indicating what kind of data is in each block, block length indicators, etc. They're both noticeable to someone who's trying to find them and strong evidence that something is a PGP message. That's why there's a Stealth-PGP, though even it's not perfect. As far as "Secure" meaning "They can't decode the message", if you use a One-Time-Pad more than once, you can lose (viz. VENONA.) If you use a pad that's not true random numbers, but is some simple LFSR or LCM PRNG, or some random English-language book, it's pretty easy for skilled cryptanalysts to decode it. If you use something that has a well-defined structure as a pad, and the Bad Guys notice your message and decode it, it's not credible to say "oh, no, it's just a one-time pad, the fact that there's one chance in 2**168 of that particular series of random numbers matching the output of triple-DES shouldn't influence you any, Judge".... You're gonna go to jail. What gives you deniability with OTPs is that they _can't_ produce a meaningful message that's any more probable than any other meaningful message of the same length, so you can argue that it really says "BUY MORE" instead of "RUN AWAY" or "ATTACK!!" and even if they guess you're lying, they can't tell what the true message was. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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lambda 2.11 - Short-circuits in Burma
by -Jerome Thorel- 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

netizen's --> Lambda Bulletin 2.11 <-- contents + Short-circuits in Burma + Medical privacy and PGP + New York's CDA on tracks * * * * * SHORT-CIRCUITS IN BURMA The military regime in Burma decided last month to ban information technology use and possession, in order to sustain its new iron fist on dissidents and members of the National League for Democracy. Among other news here's a message sent through the mailing list of the US organisation CyberPOLIS. ---fwd message--- >>From: George Sadowsky <George.Sadowsky(a)nyu.edu> >>Subject: Re: Burma Bans modems >>RANGOON, BURMA, 1996 SEP 27 (NB) -- Burma has made owning, using, >>importing or borrowing a modem or fax machine without government >>permission a crime, punishable by up to 15 years in jail, according to a >>report by United Press International. >>Burma's military government has imposed what's called "The Computer >>Science Development Law" which empowers the Ministry of Communications, >>Posts and Telegraphs to specify what exactly can be restricted, UPI >>reports. >>UPI quotes the government-run newspaper New Light of Myanmar as saying >>the same punishment is prescribed for anyone who sets up a link with a >>computer network without the prior permission of the ministry, or who >>uses computer network and information technology "for undermining state >>security, law and order, national unity, national economy and national >>culture, or who obtains or transmits state secrets." >>UPI reports that in July a diplomat, Leo Nichols, died in prison after he >>was sentenced to a lengthy term for illegal possession of fax machines. >>It's clear from this action that the SLORC, i.e. the "State Law and Order >>Restoration Committee" (sic!) understands full well the benefits and >>importance of the Internet and other forms of electronic communication to >>open societies, and is determined to deny these benefits to its citizens. >>Given its recent history and the quasi-imprisonment of Daw Aung San Suu >>Kyi, this new action is perfectly consistent with the government's >>previous abysmal record. >>Countries who would deny open Internet access to its citizens might well >>pause to consider if they wish to be associated with the current >>government of Myanmar in doing so. ... c y b e r P O L I S ----------------------------------------------- C o m m u n i c a t e T h i s C u l t u r e ( Christopher D. Frankonis -- baby-x(a)cyberpolis.org ) ---end of fwd message--- ------------------- FURTHER INFOS According to other sources--international press reports and electronic forums like Usenet's *soc.culture.burma*--it turns out that Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, 1991 Nobel Peace Prize and NLD leader, saw her telephone line cut on Friday, Sept. 28 on the evening. That was the beginning on a widespread crackdown on dissidents and a ban of NLD meetings. University Street, where Ms Suu Kyi lives, was blocked to avoid demonstrations. Hundred of citizens and NLD supporters were detained, some were released by mid-October. The Web site http://freeburma.org is a well known relay for the Burmese diaspora, especially the daily newsletter BurmaNet, which offers a rich compilation of dissidents' communiqués and Western newspapers articles and editorials. Ms Suu Kyi writes a daily letter from her home in Rangoon which is published in the Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun (in japanese, http://www.mainichi.co.jp) - a translation appears daily in soc.culture.burma. It seems that the letter (surely copied on an audio tape) continues to be shipped ouside the country to be published in the Tokyo-based newspaper. Furthermore, other reports claimed that Burma doesn't have any official connection to the Internet. It seems to be true, but a Burmese and US resident found that the domain name "mmnic.net" (mm for Myanmar) was reserved by the Burmese governement in February, 1994. The operation was made possible with the help of the Internet provider Asia Pacific NIC based in Tokyo, Japan. A spokesman confirmed he reserved the domain on the behalf of Burma's State, and that it was dedicated to a future Internet connection. * * * * * MEDICAL PRIVACY AND PGP ---fwd message--- >Sender: dfickeisen(a)cpsr.org (Duane Fickeisen) > Subject: cr> Health Info Database Misused > >An AP story from Tampa Bay appearing in the Palo Alto Daily News asserts >that a public health worker took a laptop and disks with confidential >lists of people with AIDS and HIV home and to a gay bar to check out the >HIV status of potential dates and offered to look up names of people his >friends were interested in dating. One person asserted that he had warned >friends away from potential dates, telling them that their names were "on >the list." Another claimed that people interested in dating him backed >away after the health worker talked to them. The County Health Department >has fired him, although he claims he did nothing wrong. The former health >worker also owns and lives in a funeral home. The state had permitted such >databases to be removed from offices and taken home until they changed >their internal rules two weeks ago. > >Raises anew questions about privacy and confidentiality of records, >security, and misuse/abuse of information for personal and private gain. >This ought to be raised up as an example of abuse in response to the >announced plans for a national health information database. > >Duane H. Fickeisen, Interim Director >Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility ---end of fwd message--- As far as I can remember, Phil Zimmermann, speaking during the international encryption conference in Paris on Sept. 25, mentioned this story to explain how easy it was to have his privacy on personal medical records beached. And that to encrypt this sensitive information may be the ultimate solution. Zimmermann is president of PGP Inc., which develops computer security software based on his popular program Pretty Good Privacy (http://www.pgp.com) * * * * * NEW YORK's CDA ON TRACKS ---fwd message--- >============== >VTW BillWatch #61 > >VTW BillWatch: A newsletter tracking US Federal legislation >affecting civil liberties. BillWatch is published about every >week as long as Congress is in session. (Congress is in session) > >BillWatch is produced and published by the >Voters Telecommunications Watch (vtw(a)vtw.org) > >Issue #61, Date: Thu Oct 17 01:17:52 EDT 1996 > ... > >FREE NOV. 3RD SEMINAR ON NY STATE INTERNET CENSORSHIP BILL > >To learn more about this free cybercast seminar see http://www.vtw.org/speech/ > >New York state recently passed a bill that criminalizes expression >online that is currently legal in print. When it goes into effect on >November 1, World Wide Web pages, Usenet postings, and email lists that >fall under the law may become subject to criminal prosecution, as might the >Internet providers that host them. > >But don't panic! VTW and the Netly News (http://www.pathfinder.com/Netly/) >are putting on a seminar to educate you on the history of the bill, the ins >and outs of it and what you should ask your own lawyer, as well as the >status of any pending legal challenges. > >Who should attend? >------------------ >Anyone who publishes information on the Internet, including through >World Wide Web pages, Usenet, Email lists, or interactive chats. >Attorneys whose clientele include any of the above. >Journalists whose beat include the Internet or online services. >....and you! ... >Who will be there? >------------------------------- >Speakers marked as "invited" have told us they intend to come, but have >informed us of potential conflicts that same day that might interfere with >their attendance. > >Live speakers . Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) invited: Opening remarks . >Shabbir J. Safdar, President (VTW Center for Internet Education) . >Steve Barber, Legislative Counsel (VTW): How will this bill affect you, and >what you should ask your own attorney . >Ann Beeson, Litigation Staff (ACLU) invited > >Speakers available online through interactive chat >Diana Jarvis, Staff Counsel (VTW Center for Internet Eduation) >Stephen Filler, Law Offices of Stephen C. Filler invited ... >Where and when is this seminar? >------------------------------- > >The seminar will be held at Outernet, Inc, home of bway.net at, > >Outernet, Inc. >626 Broadway, Suite 3-A >(Very close to the Broadway/Lafayette stop on the F train) ... ---end of fwd message--- -------------------------------- the lambda bulletin, 2.11 http://www.freenix.fr/netizen =+= the lambda bulletin -> www.freenix.fr/netizen =+= =-= Jerome Thorel, Journalist, Paris (Planete Internet Editor) =-=

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Re: Blue Box Plans & hacker bbs's
by Pyros Everflame 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out these sites: L0pht heavy industries <a href="http://www.softaid.net/nuke/marks.html">Mad Dingo's Bookmarks</a>

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RE: Goodbye
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> wrote: >It all depends, as usual, on the individuals involved - on the quality >they bring to the subject, to the list, to the enterprise. >Interesting question: what do elite sophisticates *do*, once they've >reached their pinnacle? Harlan Ellison suggests one possibility in his 1967 story titled: The Prowler in the City at the Edge of the World. James

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RE: Q.E.D. reply to petty MESSger
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Deadwood <ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net> wrote: >To paraphrase John Dean, the truth will always come out and your >ass braying will never stop that truth. >Don Wood Be careful of what you wish for. You may just get it. James

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Crypto Raid
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a coincidence with the Biham/Shamir smart card attack, AP reports October 20 on an Israeli raid of News Datacom Research for $150 million tax fraud, allegedly because locally developed crypto products were smuggled out of the country. News Datacom develops and markets encryption systems for pay-TV based on Shamir's work, and he is a part-owner. Recall that Markoff's story on DFA cited Bahim's experience with pirate-TV and smart-card tampering. FiTi ran stories last May about the company's financial derring-do, which we've placed with the AP report at: http://jya.com/keylok.txt We've also put the Biham/Shamir DFA post and NYT article at: http://jya.com/dfa.htm

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord post"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The winsock remailer does not accept plaintext messages. The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 21 Oct 96 6:48:54 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca *-***-****** 21:15 100.00% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +-*++-****** 35:41 99.99% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com --+++--+-+++ 1:18:22 99.97% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com -##+##**### 5:20 99.95% winsock winsock(a)c2.org ---__----.-- 11:50:31 99.90% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --++--+++++ 2:21:46 99.88% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +-+++-+++ ++ 43:41 99.56% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * ********** 8:52 99.21% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ._- --+--++ 2:53:38 98.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com +- * *+***** 10:30 98.49% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +-*#+# +*## 7:47 94.62% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com --++++++ 2:07:07 51.53% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ------- 10:39:07 50.37% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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