December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: IBM_gak
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 9-13-96. BuWi: > > "Revolutionary Intranet security product to be > demonstrated at Interop DotCom " > > DSN's NetFortress fully automates hardware-based > authentication, encryption and key exchange into a > plug and play solution. It completely eliminates the > possibility of IP spoofing, eavesdropping and > break-ins. "After installing it, I couldn't even tell > which service a given packet was from - everything but > the packet header itself was rendered undecipherable > as it traversed the Internet." DSN Technology was > founded by Dr. Aharon Friedman and Andy Savas. Thanks, John, for forwarding. I spoke with the DSN folks today. They developed NetFortress in the U.S. and have recently found a substantial overseas market for it. "That's definitely a problem for us. We're actively lobbying senators to pass procode, to get it out of committee." Since of course multinationals would be unwilling to use DSN stuff under current export-control regime. -Declan

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Snake Oil FAQ 0.4 [comments appreciated]
by C Matthew Curtin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Snake Oil FAQ version 0.4 is waiting for you to look at it and comment on http://research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil/snake-oil-faq.html The text version follows... -matt --------------------------- snake-oil-faq ---------------------------- Snake-Oil Warning Signs Encryption Software to Avoid $Id: snake-oil-faq.html,v 0.4 1996/09/16 13:52:26 cmcurtin Exp $ Distribution Please do not distribute this beyond the circles of cryptographic competence yet. This is an incomplete work-in-progress. Feedback is greatly appreciated. The Snake Oil FAQ is (to be) posted monthly to cypherpunks, sci.crypt, alt.security, comp.security, and comp.infosystems. We're targeting those who have influence over or direct involvement in the purchasing decisions of computer security software and equipment in the corporate and academic worlds, as well as individual users who wish to assert their privacy through the use of good cryptography. Disclaimer All contributors' employers will no doubt disown any statements herein. We're not speaking for anyone but ourselves, based on our own experiences, etc., etc., etc. This is a general guideline, and as such, cannot be the sole metric by which a security product is rated, since there can be exceptions to any of these rules. (But if you're looking at something that sounds familiar on several of the 'things to watch out for,' you're probably dealing with snake oil. From time to time, a reputable and decent vendor will produce something that is actually quite good, but will use some braindead marketing technique, so be aware of exceptions.) Every effort has been made to produce an accurate and useful document, but the information contained herein is completely without warranty. If you find any errors, or wish to otherwise contribute, please contact the document keeper, C Matthew Curtin <cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com> Introduction Good cryptography is an excellent and necessary tool for almost anyone. However, there is a multitude of products around. Many good cryptographic products are available, both commercial (including shareware) and free. However, there are also some extremely bad cryptographic products (known in the field as "Snake Oil"), which not only fail do their job of providing security, but are based on, and add to, the many misconceptions and misunderstandings surrounding cryptography and security. Superficially, it is difficult for someone to distinguish the output of a secure encryption utility from snake oil: both look garbled. The purpose of this document is present some obvious "red flags" so that people unfamiliar with the nuts and bolts of cryptography can use as a guideline for determining whether they're dealing with snake oil or the Real Thing. For a variety of reasons, this document is general in scope and does not mention specific products or algorithms as being "good" or "Snake Oil". When evaluating any product, be sure to understand what your needs are. For data security products, what do you need protected? Do you want an archiver that supports strong encryption? An E-mail client? Something that will encrypt on-line communications? Do you want to encrypt an entire disk or partition, or selectively some files? Do you need on-the-fly (automatic) encryption and decryption, or are you willing to select when and which files you want encrypted? How secure is "secure enough?" Does the data need to be unreadable by third parties for 5 minutes? One year? 50 years? 100 years? Different products will serve different needs, and it's rare that a product will serve every need. (Sometimes a product won't be needed: it may be better to use a utility to encrypt files, transmit them over a network using standard file transfer tools, and decrypt them at the other end than to use a separate encrypted utility in some cases.) Some basics The cryptography-faq (found at ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/cryptography-faq/) is a more general tutorial of cryptography, and should also be consulted. In an effort to make this FAQ more complete, some very basic topics are included below. Conventional vs. Public Key Cryptography There are two basic types of cryptosystems: symmetric (also known as "conventional," sometimes also called "private key") and asymmetric (public key). Symmetric ciphers require both the sender and the recipient to have the same key. That key is applied to encrypt the data by the sender, and again by the recipient to decrypt the data. Asymmetric ciphers are much more flexible, from a key management perspective. Each user has a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The public key is shared widely, given to everyone, while the private key is kept secret. If Alice wishes to mail Bob some secrets, she simply gets Bob's public key, encrypts her message with it, and sends it off to Bob. When Bob gets the message, he uses is private key to decrypt the message. Asymmetric cryptosystems are much slower than their symmetric counterparts. Also, key sizes must be much larger. See the cryptography FAQ for a more detailed discussion of the topic. Key Sizes Some ciphers, while currently secure against most attacks, are not considered viable in the next few years because of relatively small keysizes and increasing processor speeds (making a brute-force attacks feasible). The tables below should give some general guidelines for making intelligent decisions about the key length you need. If the key is too short, the system will be easily broken, even if the cipher is a good one. In [1] and [2], we're presented with some guidelines for deciding appropriate key length. (It is important to note that this is based on the ability to predict computing power 40, 65, and 100 years from now. Major breakthroughs in computing power 30 years from now might render everything on this chart kiddieplay.) Security Requirements for Different Information Type of Traffic Lifetime Minimum [Symmetric] Key Length Tactical military information minutes/hours 56-64 bits Product announcements, mergers, interest rates days/weeks 64 bits Long-term business plans years 64 bits Trade secrets (e.g., recipe for Coca-Cola) decades 112 bits H-bomb secrets >40 years 128 bits Identities of spies >50 years 128 bits Personal affairs >50 years 128 bits Diplomatic embarrassments >65 years at least 128 bits U.S. Census data 100 years at least 128 bits As mentioned earlier, asymmetric ciphers require significantly longer keys to provide the same level of security as their symmetric cipher counterparts. Here is a comparison table, again, from Applied Cryptography, second edition. Symmetric and Public-Key Lengths With Similar Resistance to Brute-Force Attacks Symmetric Key Length Public-key Key Length 56 bits 384 bits 64 bits 512 bits 80 bits 768 bits 112 bits 1792 bits 128 bits 2304 bits Some Common Snake-Oil Warning Signs The following are some of the "red flags" one should watch for when examining an encryption product * Technobabble The vendor's description of the product may contain a lot of hard-to-follow use of technical terms to describe how the product works. If this appears to be confusing nonsense, it may very well be (even to someone familiar with the terminology). Technobabble is a good means of confusing a potential user and masking the fact that the vendor doesn't understand anything either. A sign of technobabble is a descrption which drops a lot of technical terms for how the system works without actually explaining how it works. Often specifically coined terms are used to describe the scheme which are not found in the literature. * New Type of Cryptography? Beware of any vendor who claims to have invented a "new type of cryptography" or a "revolutionary breakthrough". Truly "new break-throughs" are likely to show up in the literature, and many in the field are unlikely to trust them until after years of analysis, by which time they are not so new anymore. Avoid software which claims to use 'new paradigms' of computing such as cellular automata, neural nets, genetic algorithms, chaos theory, etc. Just because software uses to different method of computation doesn't make it more secure. Anything that claims to have invented a new public key cryptosystem without publishing the details or underlying mathematical principles is highly suspect. Modern cryptography, especially public key systems, is grounded in mathematical theory. The security is based on problems that are believed, if not known to be hard to solve. The strength of any encryption scheme is only proven by the test of time. New crypto is like new pharmaceuticals, not new cars. * Proprietary Algorithms Avoid software which uses "proprietary" or "secret" algorithms. Security through obscurity is not considered a safe means of protecting your data. If the vendor does not feel confident that the method used can withstand years of scrutiny by the academic community, then you should be wary of trusting it. (Note that a vendor who specializes in the cryptography may have a proprietary algorithm which they'll show to others if they sign a non-disclosure agreement. If the vendor is well-reputed in the field, this can be an exception.) Beware of specially modified versions of well-known algorithms. This may intentionally or unintentionally weaken the cipher. The use of a trusted algorithm, if not with technical notes explaining the implementation (if not availability of the source code for the product) are a sign of good faith on the part of the vendor that you can take apart and test the implementation yourself. A common excuse for not disclosing how a program works is that "hackers might try to crack the program's security." While this may be a valid concern, it should be noted that such 'hackers' can reverse engineer the program to see how it works anyway. If the program is implemented properly and the algorithm is secure, this is not a problem. (If a hypothetical 'hacker' was able to get access you your system, access to encrypted data might be the least of your problems.) * Experienced Security Experts and Rave Reviews Beware of any product claiming that "experienced security experts" have analyzed it, but it won't say who (especially if the scheme has not been published in a reputable journal). Don't rely on reviews in newspapers, magazines or television shows, since they generally don't have cryptologists (celebrity hackers who know about telephone systems don't count) take the software apart for them. Just because the vendor is a well known company or the algorithm is patented doesn't make it secure either. * Unbreakability Some vendors will claim their software is "unbreakable". This is marketing hype, and a common sign of snake-oil. Avoid any vendor that makes unrealistic claims. No algorithm is unbreakable. Even the best algorithms are breakable using "brute force" (trying every possible key), but if the key size is large enough, this is impractical even with vast amounts of computing power. One-time pads are unbreakable, but they must be implemented perfectly, which is, at best, very difficult. See the next section for a more detailed discussion. * One-Time-Pads A vendor might claim the system uses a one-time-pad (OTP), which is theoretically unbreakable. That is, snake-oil sellers will try to capitalize on the known strength of a OTP. It is important to understand that any variation in the implementation means that it is not an OTP, and has nowhere near the security of an OTP. A OTP system is not an algorithm. It works by having a "pad" of random bits in the possession of both the sender and recipient. The message is encrypted using the next n bits in the pad as they key, where n is the number of bits in the message. After the bits are used from the pad, they're destroyed, and can never again be used. The bits in the pad must be truly random, generated using a real random source, such as specialized hardware, radioactive decay timings, etc., and not from an algorithm or cipher. Anything else is not a one-time-pad. The vendor may confuse random session keys or initialization vectors with OTPs. * Algorithm or product XXX is insecure Be wary of anything that makes claims that particular algorithms or other products are insecure without backing up those claims (or at least citing references to them). Sometimes attacks are theoretical or impractical (requiring special circumstances or massive computing power running for many years), and it's easy to confuse a layman by mentioning these. * Keys and Passwords The "key" and the "password" are often not the same thing. The "key" generally refers to the actual data used by the cipher, while the "password" refers to the word or phrase the user types in, which the software converts into the key (usually through a process called "hashing" or "key initialization"). The reason this is done is because the characters a user is likely to type in do not cover the full range of possible characters. (Such keys would be more redundant and easier for an attacker to guess.) By hashing a key can be made from an arbitrary password that covers the full range of possible keys. It also allows one to use longer words, or phrases and whole sentences as a "passphrase", which is more secure. Anything that restricts users' passwords to something like 10 or 16 or even 32 characters is foolish. If the actual "password" is the cipher's key (rather than hashing it into a key, as explained above), avoid it. If the vendor confuses the distinctions between bits, bytes and characters when discussing the key, avoid this product. Convenience is nice, but be wary of anything that sounds too easy to use. Avoid anything that lets anyone with your copy of the software to access files, data, etc. without having to use some sort of key or passphrase. Avoid anything that doesn't let you generate your own keys (ie, the vendor sends you a key in the mail, or it's embedded in the copy of the software you buy). Avoid anything by a vendor who does not seem to understand the difference between public-key (asymmetric) cryptography and private-key (symmetric) cryptography. * Lost keys and passwords If there's a third-party utility that can crack the software, avoid it. If the vendor claims it can recover lost passwords (without using a key-backup or escrow feature), avoid it. If there is a key-backup or escrow feature, are you in control of the backup, or does the vendor or someone else hold a copy of the key? * Exportable from the USA If the software is made in North America, can it be exported? If the answer is yes, chances are it's not very strong. Strong cryptography is considered munitions in terms of export from the United States, and requires approval from the State Department. Chances are if the software is exportable, the algorithm is weak or it is crackable (hence it was approved for export). If the vendor is unaware of export restrictions, avoid the software: the vendor is not familiar with the state of the art. Because of export restrictions, some legitimate (not-Snake Oil) products may have a freely exportable version for outside of the USA, which is different from a separate US/Canada-only distribution. Also note that just because software has made it outside of North America does not mean that it is exportable: sometimes a utility will be illegally exported and posted on an overseas site. Other Considerations Interface isn't everything: user-friendliness is an important factor, but if the product isn't secure then you're better off with something that is secure (if not as easy to use). No product is secure if it's not used properly. You can be the weakest link in the chain if you use a product carelessly. Do not trust any product to be foolproof, and be wary any product that claims it is. Contributors The following folks have contributed to this FAQ. Jeremey Barrett <jeremey(a)forequest.com> <geeman(a)best.com> Jim Ray <liberty(a)gate.net> Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> References 1. B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, second edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996 2. M. Blaze, W. Diffie, R. L. Rivest, B. Schneier, T. Shimomura, E. Thompson, M. Wiener, "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security," available via ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.ps ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- C Matthew Curtin Last modified: Mon Sep 16 09:51:41 EDT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -- C Matthew Curtin MEGASOFT, INC Chief Scientist I speak only for myself. Don't whine to anyone but me about anything I say. Hacker Security Firewall Crypto PGP Privacy Unix Perl Java Internet Intranet cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com http://research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/

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Re: The Living and the Dead
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:54 AM 9/16/96 GMT, John Young wrote: > The Washington Post has two heart-breaking pieces today > on a new book about Vietnam, "The Living and the Dead: > Robert McNamara and Five Lives," by Paul Hendrickson. > > The book tracks the disaster being formulated in 1965 by > DC top-down policy interleaved with savagery to five > grunts in bloody battle. > > There's a laudatory review of the grim book, and a long > magazine piece gives an excerpt which includes some of > Life's photos of a Marine copter gunner's transition from > happy-go-lucky, to butchery of buddies, to grief-stricken > collapse. It reawakens what's never forgot. > > That April, 1965, Life photo-essay, "One Ride With Yankee > Papa 13," turned up in a sidewalk stall today so we'll > put 18 photos on our Web page for a glimpse back to the > future of power-mad policy begetting slaughter. ObAP comment: A few weeks ago, the tv show "60 Minutes" ran an item about a group of Jews who, after the end of WWII, vowed revenge on the Nazis, down to German soldiers, plotting to kill as many as they could. In their biggest coup, they killed hundreds of Germans in a POW camp by poisoning their bread. My reaction? As you might expect, I think that the main thing they did wrong was to not kill enough of them, but more particularly to not target the higher-ups. The way I see it, the fundamental reason that people will continue to participate in holocausts, even today, is that they see no real prospect of being punished for their crimes. Unfortunately, society has been conditioned if not to "forgive and forget," at least to not punish where it has an opportunity to punish. I suggest that this is no accident: It is in the interest of tyrants everywhere to let the other guy off easy, lest he be in the same position someday. This is why numerous African and South American dictators were allowed to "retire" in peace, rather than being killed. How would an AP-type system treat Robert McNamara? He'd be dead in a second. To those who say, "What good would this do?" I respond: Anyone in the American government today who is considering an adventure which MIGHT turn into another Vietnam should be deterred by the knowledge that sometime, in 30 minutes or 30 years, he could be killed for what he did. Robert McNamara, presumably, did what he did because he thought he'd never be punished. The best way to deter future governmental abuse is to remind these people that they _will_ be punished. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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IBM Boosts Encryption Initiative
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.pcweek.com/news/0916/16enc.html IBM will roll out several security initiatives next month that include a new way to build encryption into software and technology that could enable U.S. companies to export products with strong encryption algorithms. and uhhh... IBM also will introduce several "key-recovery" technologies that could enable businesses to export encrypted data or software beyond the current 40-bit limit--without breaking U.S. government restrictions and whoa... The sources also added that the technology may satisfy the requirement imposed by the U.S. government that it be able to access encrypted data on demand. Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/~weld L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > Crypto Anarchy means getting rid of deadwood the old-fashioned way. dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) wrote: >Starting with the lying old fart himself. You shouldn't be so hard on Tim. I tried giving up farting years ago but I found I gained a lot of weight. It's also become more socially acceptable as evidenced by the new farting section in many English pubs. They even have a special section for me on some international flights. And unlike smoking, you *can* do it in the toilet. Besides, it can't be worse than smoking. Unless, perhaps, you do both at the same time... Cheers, James

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CDT Policy Post 2.31 - Join Rep. Eshoo Online, Tues. 9/16, 8:00 EDT
by editor＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 31 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 31 September 16, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) Join Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) Live Online Tuesday Sept 17, 8:00 pm EDT (2) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe (3) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) Join Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) Live Online Tuesday Sept 17, 8:00 pm EDT Representative Anna Eshoo (D-CA) will be live online on Tuesday September 17 at 8:00 pm EDT (5:00 pm PDT) to discuss her efforts bring privacy and security to the Internet through the reform of US encryption policy. Eshoo will also take questions from Netizens during the discussion. Representative Eshoo, who represents the heart of California's Silicon Valley, is a co-sponsor of HR 3011, the "Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1996", a founding member of the Congressional Internet Caucus, and a strong advocate for enlightened Internet policies. Momentum in Congress for real reform of US encryption policy remains strong. The House Judiciary Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing on HR 3011 on Wednesday September 25, 1996, and the Senate Commerce Committee is expected to vote on the Burns/Leahy "Pro-CODE" bill (S. 1726) soon. DETAILS ON HOW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION: At 8:00 pm EDT (5:00 pm PDT), point your browser to: http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ To participate you will need to have RealAudio installed on your computer (available free at http://www.realaudio.com/) You also need to be a registered HotWired member (there is no charge for registration - visit http://www.hotwired.com/ for details). This forum is the 6th in a series of events organized by the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Voters Telecommunications Watch with the purpose of bringing the Internet Community into the debate over critical Internet policy issues. For further information, please visit the following sites: * For Background on the Encryption Issue: The Encryption Policy Resource Page: http://www.crypto.com/ CDT's Encryption Policy Issues Page: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ * For details on Congress and the Internet: CDT's Congress and the Net Page http://www.cdt.org/net_congress/ Voters Telecommunications Watch: http://www.vtw.org/ HotWired's WiredSide Chat: http://www.hotwired.com/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by nearly 10,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.31 9/16/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: PRESS RELEASE: GERMANY CENSORS DUTCH WEBSITE WWW.XS4ALL.NL
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"gnu(a)toad.com" "John Gilmore" 16-SEP-1996 10:13:36.24 >While you are at it, you could move just the censored material to a >separate IP address from the rest of the archives, and issue Web >redirects for requests sent to the old address. In fact it might be >interesting to redirect readers to various mirror sites automatically, >at random and in rotation. Thus, when someone connects to your web >site to read censored material, they will be automatically redirected >to one of dozens or hundreds of other places where the material can be >found. The German censors will likely find it impossible to block >access to all those sites (and each such site can also be changing its >IP address periodically). The first part (redirection at random) can be done via a CGI script; this may be useful for those wishing to put in links to a mirror site without having to choose a particular one or host it themselves. Incidentally, speaking of mirror sites, I'd be interested in locating scripts to do the following: A. Automatically redirect someone to an appropriate mirror site based upon closeness to their originating IP address B. Automatically poll (via crontab or similar mechanisms) between mirror sites (and to the anonymizer) to see if they're up, using the first part to redirect accordingly. -Allen

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RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:18 PM 9/16/96, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >I don't think that a reasonable person would argue that medical insurance >should >be outlawed because everyone should take care of their own needs. A social >safety net is simply a form of health and life insurance. Statistical arbitrage >if you will. By spreading the risk you minimize the cost. Yes, some people will >take advantage of the system. But like a virus, a robust system should be able >to withstand this form of attack. I have never argued against insurance! People who wish to buy insurance are welcome to, obviously. As to the "social safety net," things are far, far beyond a simple safety net. When 14-year-old pregnant inner city girls are given money to set up their own households (cf. Charles Murray's "Losing Ground"), this is not a "safety net," this is subsidized breeding. And so on. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:43 PM 9/15/96, attila wrote: > NO, it does not need to be or do either, BUT, it means > that everybody independently attempts to succeed and the > 'community' takes care of itself --and in the standard > sense, the ne'er do wells fall off the path of *their own > free choice.* There will always be sickness and calamity, > but that is what the community is for. > > BTW, it still works today; I live in one of 'em. And lest there be any doubt, I _do_ support certain kinds of charities, and will not of course stop anyone from practicing charity. While I have no religious beliefs to speak of, I strongly support the mechanisms some churches have for taking care of their own members, recruits from the street, etc. (Including Salvation Army and "mission" sorts of inner city things--note of course that most such entities also insist on prayer and/or Bible readings as part of the deal...I wonder how long it will be before a class action lawsuit is filed to stop the prayer part? This would effectively shut the missions down, of course.) The thing about _traditional_ charity, of the religious or community sort, was that it was not treated as an "entitlement," as something the resentful masses could "demand" as part of their "human rights." A parish priest, for example, might extend charity to a poor person, or a widow, or whatever, but not to an able-bodied person who simply decided to not work. Nor to an unmarried woman who kept getting pregnant and having more mouths to feed. (I surmise that most such women either died of diseases related to sexual promiscuity, died in childbirth, died of disease brought on by malnutrition, or ended up in convents (Catholic birth control).) The point is that even in an "age of charity," strings have to be attached by the givers of charity. People will simply not give 40-60% of what they earn to support a growing population of people who say it's their "right" to welfare, AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), WIC (Women, Infants, and Children), food stamps (*), and suchlike. (At certain supermarkets I sometimes shop in on the way back to my town, people in front of me in line put their nice cuts of meat down, their fine loaves of bread, their frozen dinner entrees, their "Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream," and then pay for it with books of blue "Department of Agriculture" food stamps. They use their own cash (perhaps gotten by cashing their welfare and "disability" checks) to buy their smokes and booze, as food stamps are not allowed to be spent on this stuff. My impression is that they eat more expensive food than I do, perhaps because they're buying the food with "play money," whereas I'm buying my food with money that's what's left after I had to pay 40-50 taxes, so I seek to economize when I can!) > Now, I don't intend to be Scrooge, but I'll fight for my > rights to cut off at the knees the knee-jerk liberals and > government slavemeisters who want to tell me that I, and > 2 others are required to support 100 freeloaders. And speaking of Scrooge, I like "A Christmas Carol" about as much as anyone I know, and try to take the lesson of what Scrooge learned as a general lesson about life and living it. (As with "Robin Hood," the message is often confused. Robin Hood was not "stealing from the rich," he was taking back what was stolen from the peasants and farmers by the King and his tax collectors, notably the Sheriff of Notingham. At least this is how I read the myth.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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HipCrime as MetaSPAM
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Hippie Of Crime <robert(a)precipice.v-site.net> also asked that remailer operators not block HipCrime SPAM deliveries and all mail to HipCrime because people might be interested in his cool fractals and Java neural net lotto-predicters and anarchist pages. If he wants to advertise to people about his other cool products, he doesn't need to do it anonymously. Furthermore, he doesn't provide any method in his web pages for users to anonymously request information, or to have information delivered anonymously. So blocking him from the remailers won't lose him anything. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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