December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by Mark Neely 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PLEASE TAKE ME OFF YOUR MAILING >LIST!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I'm sorry Jayme, but you didn't include the requisite number of !'s, so we cannot process your request. Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Internet Consultant, Professional Cynic & Author BizWeb: For Serious Intrepreneurs - www.maximedia.com.au/bizweb

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 10 Nov 96 21:45:56 EST, SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP(a)smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil wrote: >---------------------------------------------------------------------- >dave kinchlea wrote: >>As said in "Hair" (the movie), "Don't do it for me man, 'cause >>if the shoe was on the other foot, I wouldn't do it for you!" > >>It's a lie anyway, you do it for yourself. > >That's an _easy_ judgment to make (and i definitely have to stop >adding anecdotes from my life in these things!), but you missed the >point - the freedoms the Cpunks diligently try to preserve (or seem to >want to create...) are protected _by_ the military. who was it that >said: "law, without force, is impotent" -? The military's sole purpose is to destroy things and kill people. Freedom is protected by the poeple for the people some of which are in the military. The force is not nessasary to enforce laws in most circumstances. How many gun battles erupt at speed traps? Granted, there are instances where some force is required in arresting violent individuals, but it is still illeagal for the police to use ecessive force. > >keep in mind that even "bad" laws have to be enforced. you can scream >all you want about "good, strong" cryptostuffs, but if the phone lines >are slashed, the satellite links are down, the elcerticity is off and >you've got a foreign soldier waving a .45 around - just how are you >going to boot up that pretty little computer and make it encode >information for you, much less get it anywhere? anarchy implies >ruthlessness - you going to practice cryptostuffs from a prison cell? You are wrong about bad laws being enforced. Many laws are not enforeced by the police. Have you never been "let off" or "givin a warning" by the police? How many times have you seen people j walk in front of the police who did nothing? Computers are not nessasary to encode data, they just make it a lot eaiser and faster. Where did I put that secret decoder ring???? mhayes(a)infomatch.com It's better for us if you don't understand It's better for me if you don't understand -Tragically Hip

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GAK?
by Mark M. Lacey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Could someone please fill me in on what GAK stands for since it seems to be central to some of the on going conversations. Thanks, Mark M. Lacey <mml(a)halcyon.com> "Speaking for nobody but myself." [Finger mml(a)halcyon.com for my PGP public key.] [If you don't have 'finger', e-mail me for it.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMobmyB/Hx+OuZC/tAQGRTAf/R2t+/JC1k3lhQcqIcRWO2HyxHgf6+ko2 2ngQBXyMrInQtaXorcZ2LFrfie4GD68S0nLWKlwqaN09+/O72Bze1pyGd3dHBI4b vazgQZq1zxWuHcCYg1r5QDwt0NJOZg4tRHROHmUiuLLeNfFwusWPnW+RMI2nTo39 g/sXWhRUF83vhyztC5+zOKmxjEQOBf3Wxq0FLBAoSUjzuJKnRNV87Fnf2vzezqc4 cK+A8DcRN0c0kX/LuNO9pnXo+3J8gMMDsoZAOS5KAgWQjJT3fdroTLX4xmRcBVJ3 NanTSXWsFIMlnXAjBS7V+5S/3gAml+y5tqLiNJAhoVVD/nvyvQDmAg== =QyM4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sifting data; looking for "strong crypto"
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As far as bit patterns go, is executable code random? mhayes(a)infomatch.com It's better for us if you don't understand It's better for me if you don't understand -Tragically Hip

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two bogus messages to this list
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I did not write the two messages below. I did have a small party yesterday, probably some of my guests did that... - Igor. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Mon Nov 11 06:35:19 1996 Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) with UUCP id GAA16814 for ichudov(a)algebra.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 06:34:44 -0600 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with ESMTP id CAA20037 for <ichudov(a)algebra.com>; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 02:34:30 -0500 (EST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id VAA01399 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:49:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from www.video-collage.com (www.video-collage.com [199.232.240.107]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id VAA01394 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:49:47 -0800 (PST) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with UUCP id AAA19874 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 00:51:53 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ichudov@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) id XAA15989 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 23:47:00 -0600 Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1996 23:47:00 -0600 From: "Igor Chudov @ home" <ichudov(a)algebra.com> Message-Id: <199611110547.XAA15989(a)manifold.algebra.com> Subject: FUCK ME HARD Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Status: O FUCK NME HARD >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Mon Nov 11 00:35:29 1996 Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) with UUCP id AAA16188 for ichudov(a)algebra.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 00:35:24 -0600 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with ESMTP id BAA19940 for <ichudov(a)algebra.com>; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 01:37:38 -0500 (EST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id VAA00961 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:03:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from www.video-collage.com (www.video-collage.com [199.232.240.107]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id VAA00956 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:03:03 -0800 (PST) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with UUCP id AAA19793 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 00:05:09 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ichudov@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) id WAA15563 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 22:36:03 -0600 Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1996 22:36:03 -0600 From: "Igor Chudov @ home" <ichudov(a)algebra.com> Message-Id: <199611110436.WAA15563(a)manifold.algebra.com> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Status: RO manifold::~==>premail -t cypherpunks(a)toad.com Chain: haystack;jam Subject: I urgently need a lot of money. Please share your money-making secrets, I am in a desperate need for cash.

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Re: Pyramid schemes and cryptoanarchy
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:39 PM 11/10/96 -0500, Rabid Wombat wrote: >On Sun, 10 Nov 1996, Clay Olbon II wrote: > >> Pyramid schemes could be a growth market in a crypto-anarchic world. It is >> yet another market such as gambling, or the lottery, that could be conducted >> with anonymity. And it appears to be much more widespread on the internet > >How is it like gambling? If I get a pyramid letter instructing me to send >money to five people on the list, add my name to the bottom, send to 5 >people, or whatever, there's nothing stopping me from removing all the >names, adding my name and those of four friends, and passing the letter >along. With an anonymous system, I could easily be all five people, >without even the bother of getting five different post office boxes. I was not saying that chain letters are like gambling. My point was that they could be conducted with anonymity - like gambling and the lottery. Your other point is well made. Anyone have ideas on a protocol to prevent this problem? > >There's no gambling involved; only blantant stupidity. Agreed. Although I think gambling and the lottery are pretty stupid as well ("The lottery is a tax on people who are bad a math" - from a friend's .sig). >The "airplane" game was an interesting slant, though. Because of the >in-person "airplane" parties, people were able to make contacts and >network while participating. It was still the same old trick, but some >may have found the ability to "buy" (and "sell") face time worth the price >of admission (Some of the "airplane" games going around were to the tune >of $2500, rather than the usual $5). Your anonymous slant on >this removes the only economically viable excuse for participating, >though - I don't even get to meet the head of the umptysquat dept. in >return for getting fleeced. > >The "airplane game" was big around Washington about a year ago, and >involved a number of highly placed people who aught to have been able to >recognize a Ponzi scheme when it bit them in the ass. Makes me wonder how >many people are stupid enough to "play" these games. I'm not familiar with the airplane game. Sounds like a DNC fundraiser to me ;-) And yes, I think there are a lot of stupid people out there (ex. I started a new job recently and noticed that a warning about the "Good Times Virus" was posted on the bulletin board). I'm not sure that the game would even have to be close to fair for plenty of people to participate - especially if it involves digital cash and email, which may be much easier than snail-mailing letters. Clay ******************************************************* Clay Olbon clay.olbon(a)dynetics.com engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. Dynetics, Inc. **********************************************tanstaafl

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 11/10/1996, Adam Back wrote: >Peter Hendrickson <ph(a)netcom.com> writes: >>At 3:30 AM 11/9/1996, Adam Back wrote: >>>Peter Hendrickson <ph(a)netcom.com> writes: >>>> Where will you keep your secret key? Remember, when they go through >>>> your house they bring 20 young graduates from MIT who are just dying >>>> to show how clever they are and save the world at the same time. >>> Keep your secret key in your head. >> I think this is hard to do in practice. I have tried. > You could probably keep a hashing function around plausibly, then you > could do as usual and remember the passphrase and use the hash > function to construct the actual key. 9 words selected from a pool of 25,000 has an entropy of about 131 bits. I could probably remember that. > If your stego techniques are any good, the feds will never get beyond > that point. They will then be left with the option of doing random > `spot-checks'. Having been on the cypherpunks list probably would > increase your chances of having your system checked. Yes, if things go sour, I doubt many cypherpunks will be practicing cryptoanarchists. >>> Your real challenge is keeping your stego programs safe. Boot >>> strapping a stegoed encrypted file system while leaving no stego code >>> lying around isn't that easy. >> Excellent point, especially since you don't have an encrypted virtual >> disk. Can anybody resolve this? >>> rc4 in C: >>> >>> #define S,t=s[i],s[i]=s[j],s[j]=t /* rc4 key <file */ >>> unsigned char s[256],i,j,t;main(c,v)char**v;{++v;while >>> (s[++i]=i);while(j+=s[i]+(*v)[i%strlen(*v)]S,++i);for( >>> j=0;c=~getchar();putchar(~c^s[t+=s[i]]))j+=s[++i]S;} >> (Under 3.3) I would have a hard time memorizing these programs. This >> pretty much guarantees that the number of cryptoanarchists will be small. > That program is optimised for size rather than ease of memorizing. > RC4 is an elegantly simple algorithm, and I sumbit that you could > remember it. Barring that you could just leave around a few > cypherpunks archives, or sci.crypt archives or whatever, and cut and > paste it form one of my posts :-) I am willing to accept that I can remember it. > Because RC4 is a stream cipher, you shouldn't reuse the key. However > you shouldn't need to for this application. You just use it to boot- > strap the real code. You are beginning to convince me. >> (I am deeply envious of your legal right to post this code, however. >> Now, why was it that we broke away from the Mother Country?) >> I would like to see a longer exposition of your approach. Given >> a hostile environment, how would I operate a small anonymous perl >> coding service using your techniques? > Once you've bootstrapped to your cryptoanarchists toolkit, you can > have anything you want, even a virtual TCP/IP layer, a hidden level of > TCP/IP in stego data. TCP/IP itself is a likely candidate for a stego > carrier. Non-predictable sequence nos are required to stop things > like the spoofing attack, and so are perfectly plausible. > Once we get to everyone having enough bandwidth, lots of people with > permanent connections, lots of people using video conference software, > audio, downloading feature length films, etc. there's no stopping > crypto anarchy. The LSbits in that lot would make a fairly responsive > subliminal channel by todays standards. I am finding this all very persuasive, although I am still suspicious of stegonagraphy. It would be cool to have an exact specification and working machine. This might even be easy enough to operate that non-technical people could learn how to do it, which implies that there could be large numbers of practicing cryptoanarchists. What we need is an experiment. Let's pick a country with a near police state and design a system so that people in that country can freely and securely communicate with each other and the outside world with minimal chance of arrest. Once the system is available, we can see if it succeeds in the field. I'll leave others to suggest the target. >> Don't forget to tell me how I get paid and when I get to spend my >> "ill-gotten" gains and how nobody will notice that I am doing it. > You get paid in ecash, paid on the BlackNet bank. You take a holiday > to a tax-haven and get paid off by a getting "lucky" at a BlackNet > affiliated casino. The casino takes a their "currency exchange fee", > and you get US$. Translations into paper currencies, I'll admit are > the weak link if you need paper currencies. > However there are two ways to get anonymous electronic cash, either > you start with anonymous electronic cash, or you add the anonymity > afterwards via `privacy brokers', once there are a few dozen systems, > and trillions flowing around using these systems, it's going to be > hard to keep track of it all. I still think the eventual payoff is a weak point, but it does make me think that in order to stop cryptoanarchy, foreign travel and foreign communication would have to be tightly controlled. If steganographic evidence is the only evidence that can be collected (and RC4 is strong) then it would be necessary to give the authorities great flexibility. Which means that it is beginning to look more and more like a bona fide police state as Tim suggested. While payment is a weak point, there are many cryptoanarchic activities that don't involve payment, such as participating in mailing lists, which people may like to do even when their governments disapprove. Anyway, you have certainly given me a lot to think about. I still have some doubts about safety from tempest attacks and the like, but my basic claim that you can stop cryptoanarchy without full deployment of a police state is looking weak to me right now. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 11 Nov 96 6:49:56 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******** *** 14:49 99.77% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -.--__..--- 17:21:56 99.28% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * **+**- *** 7:35 99.23% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net + +*-- +** 39:50 99.18% replay remailer(a)replay.com +++* --- *** 22:22 98.78% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - -- - -+ 1:18:14 98.56% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ++#. + - *** 47:04 98.24% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +----+-- +++ 2:15:31 97.94% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com +----- - 2:51:34 94.38% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu - +++-- +++ 42:54 93.75% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++ +++-- + + 56:13 89.49% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++-- -+ 1:10:46 84.64% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ++# + - 10:34 43.55% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RE: His and Her Anarchies
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >Well, I think there clearly _is_ a gender gap on these sorts of issues. Technologies that matter make daily life less obnoxious, and you can leverage them all the time. The Net is going to start mattering in a significant way when it relieves people of the burden of dealing with the garbage inherent in the information flow of everyday life. The net is going to matter when I can rely on it to store the information I now keep on disk, and the computer is a completely transparent object. All the documents that are important to me are maintained by the Net with sufficient reliability that I can unplug my computer and smash it with a hammer without affecting anything. Under this scenario, strong, reliable crypto becomes similar to electricity. The entire infomration infrastructure is built on it, but hardly anyone gives it a second thought. What kind of people use the Net and what are their activities doing to the country, the world, the culture? It may sound like a parochial issue that women don't much like computers, but they don't, and the issue is a tremendously important one. They're not attracted to this world, certainly not to the extent that men are, and that's one of the reasons why it is such a spiritually impoverished world. Most reasonable sophisticated men are happier in an environment that included women. One of the problems with the computer society is that not only is it an almost all-male society, but it's part of a little-boy society, part of an ongoing infantilization of the society over the past half century. Excerpt from Digerati: Encounters with the Cyber Elite (HardWired 1996) where David Gelernter, a Yale computer scientist, comments on the Web. >This may sound sexist. But sexism, like other "isms," is often based > on plain old truth, however politically incorrect it may be to some. >--Tim May Galileo, you must recant. You are in blatant disagreement with the truth. Ciao, James

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Re: Pyramid Schemes
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Benjamin Grosman <bgrosman(a)healey.com.au> writes: > this is all well and good, but what I'd like to know is: do these schemes > actually work? In theory they same to... In depends on what you mean by "work". If you're asking whether MMFs result in substantial amounts of money being sent to the originators, the answer is, I don't know for sure, but I doubt it very much. (I've never tried it myself but I interviewed a couple of people who did, for the research I did a few years ago.) Similar MLM schemes (such as Amway or Herbalife) seem to result in substantial profits for the owners/folks at the top of the pyramid, and losses to most people who join later, as the theory would predict. So why do so many people stay in programs like Amway despite their financial losses? In my opinion, _all memetic communications work very well not as a scheme for making money, but in the sense that people in the professions that involve person-to-person networking (such as public relations, recruiting, real estate and other sales) use them as a pretext to remind their business contacts of their existence. E.g. a headhunter might pass on copies of the Craig Shergold appeal to hundreds of potential recruits, with a note on his letterhead saying "I'm passing this on on behalf of the dying boy". Moreover he'd probably pass along photocopies of half a dozen letterheads from the chain of people who passed the memetic letter along to him. Most recipients reaction can be summarised as "What a nice person, what a good deed he's doing, do I need a headhunter now"? And by the way the reaction of the vast majority of Americans to a MMF snail letter is "I'm so grateful to the sender for passing along this business / networking opportunity." :-) which is why they're spread so eagerly by high school kids in search of popularity. I'm convinced that the good-luck chain letters (which just ask for the letter to be passed along, with no money changing hands) and the various MMF variants and MLM schemes are more about making/maintaining contacts than about money. Likewise most Amway/Herbalife peddlers lose money but gain the satisfaction of personal contact with the purchasers (which could be used for something else) and also the sales experience that they can later use to sell something else. How would Internet memetics be affected by wider availability of anonymity? We observe that snail mail anonymity is available now, but is apparently seldom used for memetics distribution. In the running example the p.r. person already has the ability to make hundreds of photocopies of the Craig Shergold letter and to snail-mail them to everyone s/he knows with no return address on the envelope and the cover letter. I've never come across such behavior, which is consistent with my belief that the sender is really interested in distributing his/her letterhead more than in distributing the memetic letter. When John Doe multi-posts the Craig Shergold's letter to thousands of Usenet newsgroups (as was done again a few weeks ago), s/he's more interested in splattering his own name around than in getting postcards/business cards to the dying boy. (Of course the poster's intent is to be widely seen as someone doing a good deed on behalf of Craig Shergold; instead he loses his Internet account and is widely viewed as a clueless spammer. Such is life. :-) At present someone could (ab)use the remailers to post anonymous Craig Shergold appeals on Usenet and on various mailing lists. I believe that one of the reasons why this has never been done (as far as I know) is because this would deprive the poster of the satisfaction of having his own name splattered all over the network. MMFs are a slightly different story because the poster can't get money from the "downline" without revealing some contact address to send the money to. Out of curisority, I looked at several different MMF spams that came this way; in many cases the sender's e-mail address is crudely forged; the money is requested to be sent to a postal address that's often a P.O.Box; and the name associated with the postal address is often missing, obviously phoney, or just has the initials. There's clearly interested in anonymity on the part of MMF posters.

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