December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Excusing Judges for Knowing Too Much
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:54 AM 11/8/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 8:20 AM -0500 11/8/96, Jim Ray wrote: >> been decided and appealed, because of this very possibility. I am already >> concerned that an ambitious U.S. Attorney, using Alta Vista, could attempt >> to argue that "cypherpunk terrorists have been secretly trying to subtly >> influence Kozinski's thinking, and that therefore he should be removed from >> the case in favor of some judge who has no clue whatsoever about the 'Net, >> encryption, anonymous remailers, etc." [I am sure the argument wouldn't be >> put quite that way <g> but that's what the U.S. Attorney would mean.] There >> is now a judge with some idea of these issues who will IMNSHO probably be >> fair to "our" side. It is a rare opportunity, and I don't want to "blow it." > A valid fear, given the times we live in. > If jurors can be dismissed for knowing "too much" about the O,J. > case--knowing how to _read_ ensures this--then we are probably > fast-approaching the point where judges are recused (or whatever the word > is) from hearing cases where they've had any education whatsover on. > (An exaggeration, of course.) This issue has been discussed recently by a prominent author. "The men who murdered Virginia's [The city in Nevada. -- ph] original twenty-six cemetary occupants were never punished. Why? Because Alfred the Great, when he invented trial by jury, and knew that he had admirably framed it to secure justice in his age of the world, was not aware that in the nineteenth century the condition of things would be so entirely changed that unless he rose from the grave and altered the jury plan to meet the emergency, it would prove the most ingenious and infallible agency for {\it defeating} justice that human wisdom could contrive. For how could he imagine that we simpletons would go on using his jury plan after circumstances had stripped it of its usefulness, any more than he could imagine that we would go no using his candle clock after we had invented chronometers? In his day news could not travel fast, and hence he could easily find a jury of honest, intelligent men who had not heard of the case they were called to try - but in our day of telegraph and newspapers his plan compels us to swear in juries composed of fools and rascals, because the system rigidly excludes honest men and men of brains. "I remember one of those sorrowful farces, in Virginia, which we call a jury trial. A noted desperado killed Mr. B, a good citizen, in the most wanton an cold-blooded way. Of course the papers were full of it, and all men capable of reading read about it. And of course all men not deaf and dumb an idiotic talked about it. A jury list was made out, and Mrs. B. L., a prominent banker and a valued citizen, was questioned precisely as he would have been questioned in any court in America: "`Have you heard of this homicide?' "`Yes.' "`Have you held conversations on the subject?' "`Yes.' "`Have you formed or expressed opinions about it?' "`Yes.' "`Have you read newspaper accounts of it?' "`Yes.' "`We do not want you.' "A minister, intelligent, esteemed, and greatly respected; a merchant of high character and known probity; a mining superintendent of intelligence and unblemished reputation; a quartz-mill owner of excellent standing, were all questioned in the same way, and all set aside. Each said the public talk and the newspaper reports had not so biased his mind but that sworn testimony would overthrow his previously formed opinions and enable him to render a verdict withou;t prejudice and in accordance with the facts. But of course such men could not be trusted with the case. Ignoramuses alone could mete out unsullied justice. "When the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of twelve men was empaneled - a jury who swore they had neither heard, read, talked about, nor expressed an opinion concerning a murder which the very cattle in the corrals, the Indians in the sagebrush, and the stones in the streets were cognizant of! It was a jury composed of two desperadoes, two low beerhouse politicians, three barkeepers, two ranchers who could not read, and three dull, stupid, human donkeys! It actually came out afterward that one of these latter thought that incest and arson were the same thing. "The verdict rendered by this jury was, Not Guilty. What else could one expect? "The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honest, and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity, and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a {/it thousand} years ago. In this age, when a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that the testimony given under solmen oath will outweigh, with him, street talk and newspaper reports based on mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity, and justice would be far safer in his hands than theirs. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants? Is it right to show the present favoritism to one class of men and inflict a disability on another, in a land whose boast is that all its citizens are free and equal? I am a candidate for the legislature. I desire to tamper with the jury law. I wish to so alter it as to put a premium on intelligence and character, and close the jury box against idiots, blacklegs, and people who do not read newspapers. But no doubt I shall be defeated - every effort I make to save the country `misses fire.'" >From "Roughing It" by Mark Twain, Chapter XLVIII. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

2 1

Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It appears to be widely believed that cryptoanarchy is irreversible. Everybody believes that the race to deploy or forbid strong cryptography will define the outcome for a long time. I can't think of a reason why this should be so. If the wide use of strong cryptography results in widely unpopular activities such as sarin attacks and political assassinations, it would not be all that hard to forbid it, even after deployment. I am curious why many people believe this is not true. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

9 10

Who owns cypherpunks
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Nov 08 02:39:25 1996 Jim Choate writes: > There is one important legal aspect which the operator of the Cypherpunks > mailing list has opened themselves up for with this action. In short > they > have now opened themselves up for defamation and liable suites by > imposing > an editorial policy on the contents of this list (1). I fear you mean "libel," and I think not. (see below.) <snip> > Censorship is censorship, irrespective of the source of the limitation. Oh good. I think I'll sue the Miami Herald for not printing my last letter to them. After all, they "censored" me, right? NOT!!! > Free expression is impossible in an environment of censorship. The right > to > speak not only implies a right to not speak, it also implies the right > to > emit complete mumbo jumbo. I'm afraid we have an excess of living proof around here, lately. <sigh> I am beginning to see why people vote the way they do... >The actual content of the speech is irrelevant. > > The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and press. This does not > imply > in any way an abrogation of responsibility by the party speaking or > distributing it. Only that they would not have limitations on their > actions > imposed by the federal government. I am beginning to wonder if you are serious about promoting John to the level of "the federal government." If this was a joke and I don't get it, I ma sorry to have taken you seriously. > ARTICLE I. > > Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, > or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of > speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to > assemble, > and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. [Would that it were so, but...] John is not in the U.S. Congress, and even if he were, this list is _his_ property, not mine, and not yours. He can do with it what he likes. <snip> > I have argued in the past that this list is a defacto public list because > of > the way it is advertised and to the extent it is advertised. All the > protests > by the operator to the contrary will not convince a court. Name one ad for cypherpunks. This list is John's property, and he could cut us all off tomorrow for any reason or no reason. Deal with it. I seriously doubt that even the most socialistic judge in the U.S. (and there are plenty) would buy this kind of garbage. > Hope you folks have a good lawyer. I'm sure John's quaking in his boots. Reread my campground analogy, and try to refute it. You can't. Go start your own list with no moderation. Go start a more moderated list than John's, like Perry's will be. Do whatever, but this moronic thread must end! It is very strange to me that the people asserting some sort of "implied contract" among cypherpunks have yet to offer to pay even *one* month of John's costs. If you want to call the tune, then pay the piper (if he lets you). If you don't, then be quiet about what you're obviously ignorant about. JMR Please note new 2000bit PGPkey & new address <jmr(a)shopmiami.com> This key will be valid through election day 2000. PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5 57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71 Please avoid using old 1024bit PGPkey E9BD6D35 anymore. Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMoLjsTUhsGSn1j2pAQFE6AfQgbWxLHSqdGMsKEg+jUSlMIsctR8MIQ6i ZU+7JFoSiAREYIrsrlMs7AYsuzLvaGYLTdlT3reC9EvmWPchfawV+tYzBlKZkLs3 vS6PTghqovDheIiEmwr+E4zq9yuV/ElGs7ZOuO4Ob9LuwSx7Tm+m6OQNGuOoGjpV Y6Gc6vFZ2fEb/Yt3qadQF1Q2Zlf+qjVjglilOefoe2Q+7y7FhYysTvlLGqc42h0P M5J/fbZ3RtpT6dtkT7sqHvj4eZtDMpdn+bXseJkQv4jsbolTyTGR88ee3HU1P/I7 ywWPtOZdoPpP6lSraF0S+PxBOEpkeTRI84Xxw1Jbtblx9Q== =014g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:22 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >It appears to be widely believed that cryptoanarchy is irreversible. >Everybody believes that the race to deploy or forbid strong cryptography >will define the outcome for a long time. > >I can't think of a reason why this should be so. >If the wide use of strong cryptography results in widely unpopular >activities such as sarin attacks and political assassinations, it >would not be all that hard to forbid it, even after deployment. Simple analogy: Suppose you put two people into a room with a deck of playing cards and a table, instructing "Person A" to build a house-of-cards, and telling "Person B" to stop him from achieving his goal. Who do you think will win? Obviously, the latter will win: It's vastly easier to knock such a structure down than to build it in the first place, and all "Person B" has to do is occasionally take a whack at the structure. BTW, some of your confusion is probably based is the false assumptions in your last sentence above. "..wide use of strong cryptography results in widely unpopular activities such as sarin attacks and political assassinations." First, I contend that the unpopularity of political assassinations is based far less on their presumed undesirability, and much more so on the fact that the average citizen (currently) has no input on who is being killed. He might well suppose that the killings are trying to deny him the little power and influence he has in the political system. ("They shot [fill in the blank}! I voted for him!") But what if assassination was made far more accessible to the common man? Suppose, say, the approval of one million citizens was the only thing necessary to have an assassination legally accomplished? Or, more likely in practice, the vote of a million citizens was interpreted as a kind of terminal veto over that particular politician or government employee, who would have to resign or face the (lethal) consquences! In that case, assassinations wouldn't be seen as bad, they'd be the natural consequence of a politician who overstays his welcome and ignores numerous warnings. Second, things like "sarin attacks" are, in fact, the classic example of actions which WOULD NOT HAPPEN under a crypto-anarchy. Over the last 30 years or so, "terrorism" has come to be associated with random attacks on innocent citizens. But I propose that such attacks only occur because the better, more appropriate targets are purposely made hard to attack. Most people don't realize this. But consider: Wouldn't the people who bombed the OKC Federal building have preferred to kill, for example, the top 50 government officials responsible for Waco and Ruby Ridge, rather than 150 ordinary government employees? Of course they would! If crypto-anarchy means anything to the future of terrorism, it's about helping to ensure that the people truly guilty of oppression get targeted in preference to anybody else. Naturally, such a point of view will be wildly unpopular...with the guilty few. The rest of us should like it just fine. This is why crypto-anarchy will be so popular with the public once it's in place. No more taxes, governments, militaries, wars, holocausts, etc. _THAT'S_ yet one more reason why it's irreversible: people will have seen the results of both systems, and they'll be damned if they're going to allow crooked politicians back in the game! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:13 PM 11/7/1996, Jim McCoy wrote: > Getting a program to recognize a subliminal message channel is even > harder than teaching a human to do so, check out the book Disappearing > Cryptography or do a web search for "mimic functions" to see how easy it > is to hide messages in text which a program parses as regular English. > The other problem is that more and more of the data being tossed around > the net are images and sound files in which it is incredibly easy to > hide encrypted messages. I doubt it is as easy as you say. Truly noisy sources are unusual. You don't have to be 100% sure you have a crypto-terrorist on your hands to search their house, interrogate them, and talk for awhile to everyone they know and then watch them carefully from then on. You don't have to have very many convictions with life sentences to discourage most experimenters which means that you can afford to spend a lot of time and effort on those that you can find. The perpetrator need only mess up once to be put in jail where he belongs. Assuming that it is possible to identify most crypto-anarchist-terrorists as suspects (possibly through informants or surveillance or tax audits) it should be fairly simple to find their contraband disks and data when you search their house. The problem with executables is that they have to execute so you can tell if they are encryption software. How will you handle this problem? >> In the absence of strong cryptography, remailers do not offer much >> anonymity. > Except for the fact that US law stops at the US border (modulo kidnapping > Mexican doctors or strongarming the rest of the world to obey US > dictates...) Information, on the other hand, is very easy to transport > across national boundaries and such transmission is impossible to stop. > With remailers outside the US I can send a message to a free nation and > have it delivered to whomever I want. Cross border transmissions of illegally encrypted information is as hard to stop as the use of strong cryptography. If you can stop, for the most part, the use of strong cryptography, then you can stop the use of foreign remailers, errrr, I mean espionage mailers. Were there strong support for it, even cross border activity could be significantly curtailed. This would complicate the practice of carrying stego'd materials across by hand. That may seem improbable, but I know that in the late 1960s the Johnson Administration seriously considered limiting U.S. tourism because of the negative impact it had on the dollar. In the model I am positing, there would be broad popular support for such policies. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

2 1

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:55 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > "Truly noisy sources" are not at all unusual. Actually, the hard part is > ever proving a source is _not_ noisy. (There are deep issues involving > randomness here, and I usually go into the work of Kolmogorov, Chaitin, and > others at this point. Consult the archives, or see a book on information > theory.) Truly, I am out of my depth. But, I will plunge ahead nonetheless. I think it is hard to show that a source is noise. Using only the signal itself, I believe it is impossible. That means there may be patterns which you cannot prove do not exist. That is surely less than ideal, especially if you are betting your life on it. And there are all sorts of ways you can blow your cover. Maybe your traffic patterns are sort of odd. Maybe you are up at odd hours. The weakness is stego does not have to be great before you are put on the suspect list. If cryptoanarchy is unpopular, you are in big trouble because the government can afford to watch you intensively. > The legal issue is this: can we pass laws and have them upheld by the > courts which impose severe penalties on people for the supposed crime of > having in their possession sequences of numbers which cannot be converted > to meaningful English sentences? I maintain that the Constitution says we > cannot. Of course, if the Constitution is thrown out, then the old > Cypherpunk joke may come into play: "Use a random number, go to jail." (An > Eric Hughes quote, from 1992-3.) What Tim May maintains may be more reasonable that what the Supreme Court maintains. But it's the Supreme Court that will rule. We have laws which state, in essence, that certain large numbers cannot be copied legally if they are related to copyrighted executables. >> In the model I am positing, there would be broad popular support for >> such policies. > I think you are assuming a lot. I think I am, too. I don't subscribe to the Four Horsemen scenario. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

1 0

Anonymous remailer client in Java
by Geoffrey KEATING 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have set up a Java client for type 1 anonymous remailers at <http://www.ozemail.com.au/~geoffk/anon/anon.html>. The client features a simple type-and-click interface, PGP encryption, automatic remailer chaining, and a 100% java implementation---no native code required. It has been tested under Netscape and Sun's AppletViewer on MacOS and Solaris. It will let you create simple reply blocks (those which don't encrypt the message). This is intended as a better way to post mail anonymously via the web (especially since Community ConneXion's https service seems to have shut down). Flaws: - Persons in the US will not be able to use it unless they have a license from RSA (which is unlikely). - It doesn't do Mixmaster remailers yet (but it will soon). - It can't actually send the mail if you're behind a firewall, but it will PGP encrypt a message for you to send. - It has to send all its mail via the HTTP server's machine because of applet security restrictions---you can fix this by making a local copy, or (if you're brave) giving it more permissions. The mail is encrypted from your machine, so this isn't insecure, just slow and a waste of bandwidth. Ideally, it would run from a web site on the same machine as an anonymous remailer, and use that as the first hop in the chain. If anyone (outside the US, of course) would be interested in setting this up, please e-mail me at the address below. Please CC any followups, as I am not presently subscribed to cypherpunks. -- Geoff Keating <geoffk(a)ozemail.com.au>

1 0

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:46 PM 11/7/1996, Mark M. wrote: >On Thu, 7 Nov 1996, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> If mandatory GAK were imposed, reviewing messages is easy, even with >> inter-agency fighting. Or, encryption in general could just be >> forbidden if GAK created too much hassle. > > How would this be possible? The latest GAK proposal is for companies to store > keys instead of the government. There is the potential for colaboration > between a TLA and an "escrow" company. It is also possible for a TLA to > illegally obtain the keys from the company's database. However, it would > still be impossible to review every message. Even if the government had full > access to all encryption keys, it would still be technically infeasible to > review every message. The latest GAK proposal is not under discussion. What is under discussion is the policy options that are possible when there is strong public support to suppress strong cryptography. The Four Horsemen scenario would likely generate such mass support, even among cypherpunks. >> In practice I suspect that good stego is hard. You don't have to be >> right every time when you look for it, just some of the time. When >> you see packets that seem kind of funny to you, the judge issues you >> a warrant and you search the suspect's house and computer very carefully. >> If stego is in use, the software that generated it can be found. Then >> you hand out a life sentence. > Good stego is possible. Stegoing data in jpegs is very secure and probably > infeasible to detect. I am not convinced, but I am not expert in this area. > However, I find the life sentence idea pretty unrealistic. You are assuming > that there will be wide support for tough restrictions on crypto. This is > not currently the case and I doubt it would ever get to this point. Yes, I am assuming that the Four Horsemen scenario would stimulate strong public support for extraordinarily tough restrictions on crypto. Yes, I doubt it would ever get to this point because cryptoanarchy will be far less dramatic than many people believe. It may cause dramatic changes, but they will be subtle and gradual, like the Net's influence. For instance, I don't think Ruby Ridge would ever have been an issue raised in Congress if it hadn't been for the Internet. This is a subtle and positive change, but most people hardly noticed the effect of the Net. The way in which the agenda is set has moved out of New York and Washington. Strong cryptography promotes this because it enables people to discuss issues which are important to them without fear of retribution. > Not very many people are currently supporting any life sentence for anyone > who is in possession of explosives, despite the increase in terrorist > activity. Gun-control advocates aren't supporting laws that will give a life > sentence to anyone who owns a gun. Given that many people who believe in > gun-control and tagants in explosives are against GAK, why do you think there > will be such a revolt against strong crypto? I don't think that there will be a strong revolt against crypto. From the point of view of the GAKers that's a problem. That is why they have to act before the public discovers it's an asset, not a liability. But, if the GAKers are right about the Four Horsemen scenario (which I doubt they believe themselves) there would be great public support for drastic measures and these measures could be quite effective. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

1 0

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:48 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 7:20 PM -0800 11/7/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >... >> I cannot speak for the GAK advocates. However, you could establish a >> system where messages between two countries are encoded with keys >> which are made available to only the two countries in question. >> >> A really simple scheme to do this would be for each country to publish >> a public key. You would be required to encrypt the key to the message >> with the national public key. That scheme would be fast to deploy. > Well, this is not what the proposals for GAK involve. If it were _only_ a > matter of each country requiring GAK for communicatons entering its > country, then this would be as you describe (not that many of us would > approve of it). > What complicates matters is that the U.S. proposes that _it_ keep > records/escrows of communications with, say, recipients in Libya. Or > Russia, or Burma, or Tazbekinoya. This means automatically that simplistic > models ("encrypt to the public key of Tazbekinoya" will not be sufficient). The U.S. would have to concede this point, and it would be a likely one for it to concede. The reasonable Schelling point for inter-governmental relationships on this matter is for the each government to have access to whatever communications it likes within its borders but that the contents of communications between governments is shared. This could be set up exactly the same way tax treaties are set up now. Technically, this is not hard to do. For instance, I think PGP encrypts messages for multiple recipients by encrypting the same session key with each recipient's public key, and then attaching the same IDEA encrypted ciphertext: <Session Key with Alice's Public Key><Session Key with Bob's Public Key> <IDEA encrypted message> All GAK requires is that you also encrypt the session key with the government's key: <Session Key with Alice's Public Key><Session Key with Bob's Public Key> <Session Key with Eve's Public Key><IDEA encrypted message> For multiple government access to keys, you encrypt the session key with the foreign government's key, too: <Session Key with Alice's Public Key><Session Key with Bob's Public Key> <Session Key with Eve's Public Key><Session Key with Yvette's Public Key> <IDEA encrypted message> >> In a more complicated and secure scheme, you would be given a public key >> from each country that was unique for your communications at the same >> time you were granted your international communications license. The >> unique public key would be managed by a small group of people. This >> means that if it was ever compromised, most message traffic would be >> secure and those who were responsible would be easy to find. >> >> The only way you are at the mercy of the Libyans is if you do business >> in Libya. > No, I think you are missing the point. The issue about Libya is that the > GAK system must make decisions about when and under what conditions it > accedes to government wishes--for governments we may be hostile toward. > Or governments may be hostile toward us. Yes, there is a problem with uncooperative foreign governments who won't prosecute people who send in non-GAKed messages. So, we simply terminate communications with those countries. It's something the government wants to do anyway, so it's not a painful pill to swallow. > As I said in another message, I don't think there can be a unified GAK > policy. I believe the U.S. Administration hopes to browbeat enough nations > into compliance such that it--the U.S. government--controls which keys are > released and which are not. My point about "rogue" governments is that the > problems of Burma, Libya, etc. will not vanish. Clearly the U.S. government > will not settle for waiting for Libya or Burma to co-release keys.... The scheme I described above does not require co-release of keys. It may be the case that the USG is trying to pull a cypherpunk maneuver on other less sophisticated governments. That is, they are probably telling the other governments, "You've got a real problem here. You will be overthrown if you don't get our help fast with our sophisticated encryption technology! And if you don't let us help, you'll lose most favored nation status." By the time other policy makers figure out the implications of this, it will be too late. Sad for them, but good news for the U.S. consumer. > And nothing in GAK says one gets to communicate with Libyan parties by > encrypting with the public key of Libya, thus bypassing the U.S. decryption > capabilities! Nothing stops you from sending fully encrypted messages to Libya except your fear of social disgrace and a long prison term. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

1 0

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:03 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > However, if guns are not outlawed, are not hard to get, may be bought and > sold at flea markets and gun shows (which is where most of my guns have > come from, and which is where over the years I bought and sold about a > dozen or so various guns, none of them transferred with any paperwork, > identities asked for, etc.), and once gun ownership reaches some threshold, > later attempts to ban guns, seize them, halt ammunition sales, etc., > require draconian steps. (This is why so many gun owners have schemes to > bury spare guns in plastic pipes deep underground, place them in safe > deposit boxes, etc. And why so many of us reload our own ammo.) > Without taking a stand on the issues of whether guns should or should not > be restricted, the situation is quite similar to the ongoing deployment of > strong cryptography. Once widely deployed and "ingrained" in the habits of > many, later attempts to seize the newly-outlawed items are problematic. > Speech is similar to this. Once mechanisms for free speech are present in a > society, once people are used to having the "right" to speak freely, once > many channels of communication are widely available, and so on, it becomes > well nigh impossible to go back to a non-free-speech situation. > I believe, Peter, that your arguments naively ignore this sort of point. > Those in D.C. actually understand it well, and would laugh at your argument > of "If crypto turns out to be a problem, we can always ban it later." The key here is that in these cases the practice has become widely accepted. By widely accepted, I mean that very significant numbers of people believe that there is nothing all that wrong with the practice. Those who disagree do not feel it is worth the trouble to put a stop to it. If the Four Horseman of the Crypto-apocolypse were real, we could certainly put a stop to cryptoanarchy if we wanted to. Very few people would be willing to tolerate strong cryptography if it meant that it was real easy to have people killed, resulted in many sarin attacks, or widespread kidnappings. I doubt you could find many readers of even this list who would find such scenarios acceptable. You are right that the people in D.C. understand your point quite well. And I am naive for expecting them to honestly discuss their policies. The reason they fear cryptoanarchy is not because it will be something people won't like - quite the opposite. If they are to succeed they have to stop it now before it is widely recognized to not be a problem for people who earn their living. I believe that if the people in D.C. honestly believed that the Four Horsemen were coming, they would wait for the first real evidence of it to rally the society behind their cause and write themselves into the history books as heroes. Today, strong cryptography has caused no noticeable problems. People who want to forbid it can only justify such intrusive and politically risky policies on the grounds that something irreversible occurs after deployment. But, I don't believe I have yet seen any sort of explanation for irreversibility that is not based on "well, it won't be all that bad." > I don't imagine the parallel argument, for free speech, would go over well > in, say, China: "We'll let people say what they want, publish what they > want, set up newspapers, buy whatever foreign magazines they want, use > computers, and gather as they wish to make whatever plans they wish to. If > we don't like the results, we'll just go back to what we had before." This argument would certainly not go over well with the leaders of China. The people of China may have another point of view. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

2 1