December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm > > argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off > backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization > will have to extend beyond the proposed period. I take a slightly different moral. Baker (former NSA attorney) writes: > If buying key-recovery encryption means customers must give up all > of their legacy encryption systems, key recovery products will carry a > near-fatal burden in many markets where encryption is now used widely. The > transition to key recovery will have to be gradual or it won't happen > at all. What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery") technology. The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model. The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the applications themselves, just the OS. Maybe there could be a transition period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more. As Baker goes on to say: > Three years ago, no one in the PC world would have bought an operating > system that didn't run MS-DOS. Three years from now, we'll be happy to buy > an operating system that is backward-compatible with Windows 95 but not > with MS-DOS. And then, at last, we'll throw out all our old DOS programs. This suggests to me that we need to be vigilant in watching for systems that will allow for easy "drop in" of key escrow. Hal

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RE: Mass-market crypto phones
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: Clay Olbon II on Thu, Nov 21, 1996 15:20 >A while back, Eric Blossom posted a URL for a mass-market, phone encyrption >device (http://www.comsec.com/) The point of this post is to posit a The above mentioned crypto phone was incredibly expensive, if I remember correctly. What it basically was (Please keep in mind I may be thinking of a different product) a box containing a modem and a crypto-crunching CPU. Phone in one end, processed by said CPU, and send out other end. I have/had a similar idea, but I want to try make it a totally software product (assuming you have the necessary hw requirements on your computer) where you talk in through a microphone (can something be wired so you can use a regular phone plugged into your computer/modem/soundcard???) your CPU crunches code, and spits out the encrypted data. Obviously, the complementing steps would be done on the receiving end. Has anyone ever tried anything like this? >I think we need to keep a couple of goals in mind. The first, is to get >encrypting phones (or phone add-ons) into Wal-mart, K-mart, etc (where >probably most Americans now buy their phones). The prices need to be low >enough that people will want to buy them (<$100?). Is this technically >feasible? The comsec device from the above URL already demonstrates the >needed capability. Is the cost target possible? My guess is soon, given >the lowering costs and increasing capabilities of current processors. Goals sound good. I feel it *definately* has to be below $100. Personally, I use a phone bought at K-Mart that cost $12 _after_ tax... I wouldn't mind paying $50 for a techno gizmo that made my conversations, inane as they may be, private. The price would also have to be low to assure the other end has a similar techno-gizmo, or I would have wasted my money. Anyone else see the *immediate* need for a standard? >The second goal needs to be to push a similar product for cell-phones. If I'm not mistaken (and I've been known to be from time to time :-), cell phones are already encrypted between the phone and cell tower. That way, they are no less private than a regular phone. Of course, you may be referring to further end-to-end encryption built into the phone in addition to this, but as far as they being less secure than a house phone, I'm not sure about that one. >Given that these goals are met, I think widespread use of crypto over phone >lines would become almost inevitable. However, the fun part would be the >introduction of such products. The FUD coming from police, the government, >etc. would be amazing to behold. Agreed! > Clay >******************************************************* >Clay Olbon olbon(a)ix.netcom.com >engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. >**********************************************tanstaafl PM USER ERROR: REPLACE AND STRIKE ANY KEY WHEN READY

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Re: U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 18 Nov 1996 17:05:47 -0500 (EST), Tim Scanlon wrote: >This is on the local DC news; >Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today >at Dulles airport. He allegedly has been working for the Russians >for the past 2 years. Here's a good question to ask: "Why are we getting security policy from the [un]intelligence agencies?" What will get mentioned, however, will be: "If he'd been using PGP we'd never have caught him. This is why we need GAK!" # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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CAVE Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've put the CAVE-based report at: http://jya.com/tr453.htm (46 kb with 7 images) CAVE = Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption algorithm. Nokia, for one, uses a CAVE algorithm to secure its latest toy.

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Re: Database law... silver lining??
by Richard L. Field 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not suggesting patent-like protection. Rather, I'd argue that there is very little "independent creation" with respect to my personal database. Provided it is considered my database to begin with, information that I give on a warranty card, when I ask for credit, etc. remains mine under the proposed U.S. law. Just because a third party tries to assemble it from those sources doesn't mean it suddenly becomes free data, from a non-database source. By that line of reasoning, any protected database would lose all protection upon its publication by a licensee, so long as you copied it from the licensee and not the originator. This is not how I read the proposed law, and it is not how big database publishers would want it read. - Richard Field (Nothing in this line of argument is meant to imply that I am in favor of the proposal.) At 11:47 PM 11/21/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: [my proposal snipped] > >Cute, but any such proposal is almost guaranteed to allow for independent >creation from a non-database source - e.g., warranty cards, info extracted >from you when you ask for credit, public records, etc. For example, one >comment to Article 3 of the proposed WIPO treaty on sui generis protection >of databases provides: > >"3.02 The protection provided does not preclude any person from >independently collecting, assembling or compiling works, data or materials >from any source other than a protected database." > >(see <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/wipo6.html> for more.) > >It's very unlikely that Congress (or the PTO) intends to do anything >that'll screw up what's already working well for big database publishers. >Your theory is similar to a patent flavor for databases, while the >proposals floated out so far are much more like copyright - e.g., >independent creation is OK, but copying is not, even with wide public >distribution, and long protection times. With patent, independent creation >is not OK, copying (the information, not the device) is encouraged/allowed, >and protection time is short.

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Re: 1996 Codebreakers
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> writes: >> I just got a review copy of the new (1996) ed. of Kahn's The >> Codebreakers from my local used bookstore. Its a little disapointing, >... >> & DH. Nothing on Cypherpunks, little on how privacy can be enhanced. The above was stripped from a reply made by Dr Dimitri Vulis. I have just one question, was the copy that you purchased hardcopy or paperback? I found the paperback in a school library and found that it said that the technical portion had been abridged to save space, (and money). I cannot say that I read the whole text, only the first half chapter and then some skipping around trying to find the RSA algorthim. I later found it in a periodical to which I am subscribed.

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Re: Anderson & Kuhn's "Improved DFA" paper
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HP just announced their big new plans for international exportable crypto using tamperproof PCM-CIA smartcards with multiple tamperproof GAK plugins. Anderson&Kuhn just announced the latest in a series of attacks on "tamperproof" hardware crypto modules by Israeli, UK, and US cryptographers. Obviously it must be a conspiracy :-) It's also an opportunity for some well-timed press releases. Clipper 1's reputation was severely damaged by Matt's attack. Anybody know if HP's giving out samples, and if there are real or test GAK plugins for them? HP URL http://www.dmo.hp.com/gsy/security/icf/main.html The paper was posted to coderpunks, and it's on ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dfa Here's the intro: --------------------------------------------------------------------- Improved Differential Fault Analysis Ross J Anderson, Markus G Kuhn In [1], Biham and Shamir announce an attack on DES based on 200 ciphertexts in which one-bit errors have been induced by environmental stress. Here we show an attack that requires less than ten ciphertexts. Furthermore, our attack is practical in that it uses a fault model that has been implemented in attacks on real smartcards. In [2], Biham and Shamir show how their method can be extended to reverse engineer algorithms whose structure is unknown. Our attack can also be extended to such cases and is more efficient there too. In [3], Boneh, De Millo and Lipton discuss how such techniques can be used to attack RSA. Again, their attack is theoretical only, We show how to do it in practice. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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BIS E-money Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to IG, we've put a copy of the BIS report on E-money at: http://jya.com/bis_emoney.html Here's a blurb from the intro: Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money October 1996 Since the end of 1995 the central banks of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries have been studying the development of electronic money and the various policy issues which it raises. Much of this work has been carried out by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) or by monetary policy experts from G-10 central banks. Electronic money was discussed by BIS member central banks at meetings in Basle in July and September 1996. In August, the BIS published a report on the Security of Electronic Money prepared by the CPSS and the Group of Computer Experts. This report provides a definition of electronic money and a description of its key features. It discusses the factors influencing the development of e-money products. Finally, it reviews the policy issues raised by e-money developments, as seen from a central bank perspective, and discusses the possible policy responses. --

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New Paper: Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
by Craig H. Rowland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All, I have released a new paper entitled: Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite This paper demonstrates several methods of encoding secret data into the headers of the TCP/IP protocol. Main topics of interest include: - Encoding data into IP headers. - Encoding data into TCP headers. Specific areas of focus allow encoding of data into the IP identification fields and TCP sequence number fields for clandestine transmission of data to a remote host. Packets of data appear normal to network sniffers and packet filters, yet can contain hidden messages in either plaintext or ciphertext. Other methods revealed include a new technique where forged packets can be "bounced" off any Internet connected site to establish a communication path that appears to originate from the "bounced" host. Additionally, several methods are discussed regarding bypassing of packet filters with encoded data for communication with hosts inside a protected network. This paper contains actual demonstrations as well as source code for Linux 2.x systems to allow encoded transmissions between sites to be tested. If you are interested in reading this paper, please visit my website: http://www.psionic.com/papers.html This site has VERY limited bandwidth so please be patient if it is slow. Thank you for your time.. -- Craig

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:09 PM 11/20/96 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: >What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues >realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working >on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", >a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. "A Fire Upon the Deep", Vernor Vinge presents one time pads as the most valuable item in intersteller commerce. Crypto also plays an important role during the final battle. He also has a new take on exceeding the speed (of light) limit, and a well drawn group-mind species. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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