December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: WinKrypt
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

By way of JYA: > >"WinKrypt's marriage of highly sophisticated technology -- such > >as the advanced, not-for- export 256-bit GOST encryption > >algorithm contained in the KeyMail program -- with a > >user-friendly interface virtually redefines the PC security > >category," said Syncronys. >> >> http://www.syncronys.com. ROTFL! Marvelous. This from the folks who brought us SoftRam95, arguably the most blatant fraud ever perpetuated on the software buying public. For that, they recently got off with a remarkably soft slap on the wrist from the FTC. (See http://ftp.uni-mannheim.de/info/OReilly/windows/win95.update/softram.htm l for the story.) I wouldn't buy a _screen saver_ from these folks, let alone a mission critical piece like email encryption! Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ====================================================================== >

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Rush disses anonymity
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sitting here listening to Rush, and he's talking about Pierre Salanger's recent "discovery" ;-) of the anonymously posted friendly-fire TWA800 internet message of a few months back. In the process of discounting the story, and praising FBI pal Kalstrom, he bemoans the anonymity of the net, calling it a "nest of kooks", (mixed in with all the other "right thinking people", of course...). Given this, and, of course, our own fun and games with anonymous, er, slander, on this list, I'm frequently tempted to agree with him. After all, if someone says something wrong about you, how do find them and punish them? How do you know what the truth is, unless you know who said it? (What? An appeal to authority? Moi? I'm *shocked* you would assert such a thing...) Until, of course, I remember that anonymity is unpreventable, and, frankly, economically necessary for true internet commerce. Remember what agrarianism did to try to stop industrialism (up to, and including, socialism <he said, trolling for leftists>), and expect the worst, folks. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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RE: Validating a program
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> wrote (regarding PGP's security): >> In short, if you're paranoid, feel free to look over the >>source. But the fact that most people have never peeked under the >>hood is not a strike against pgp at all. Ed replies: >Maybe you missed my point, or I miss-communicated. My question is as >follows: If PGP and DES are as secure as thought to be, then why is it >not ruled illegal software, just as they do with silencers, narcotics, >certain type weapons, etc..... My opinion is "NOT A PARANOID VIEW, BUT >RATHER A REALITY". I find it impossible that software that could be a >National Security Threat, being shared by the masses! I believe >either people are nieve, or ignorant of the capability of the NSA. If >there are "back-doors to the algorithms, you can bet your life you and no >one else will find out. The conceivability that encryption on the Net >is safe, is ludicrous! > >Just my thoughts, and not paranoia. > > >Ed Why does it follow that these must be crackable, or the government would have outlawed them? Despite recent moves to limit encryption, there are currently NO domestic (U.S.) restrictions on crypto. Nothing prohibits you from using a true One Time Pad, which is mathematically proven to be unbreakable, now and forever, even against infinite resources. If this is not prohibited (and it isn't), doesn't that refute your argument? You may find it impossible that the masses are allowed to use truly unbreakable crypto, but it's true -- for the time being, anyway. Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ======================================================================

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: > Peter's point: If everyone in the US wants a ban on strong crypto, > excepth the people on this list and the million-odd terrorists who are > using strong crypto to murder, rape, pillage, etc., then strong crypto > will be banned. Yes, you've mostly got it. I would quibble a little bit - if any of the real bad things happens (id est, Assassination Politics) even many of the members of this list will be calling for GAK. > Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure > communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in > isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key > cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who > are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would > allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10 > feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them. Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy make. > So, you're right. Given the proper conditions, strong crypto could > probably be mostly stopped. However, these conditions are quite > unlikely to arise. I agree that they are unlikely to arise. But, this raises a sticky point for the GAKers - what's all the hurry? Why don't we work with the technology for awhile and see what develops before scurrying off to outlaw it? Here's what they cannot say: "We want to ban cryptography now because it won't be that bad and people will want to use it." Maybe that's part of the classified debriefing that the Star Chamber gets to see. Outlawing cryptography has some obvious problems. It is expensive. It impedes activities which are nearly universally seen as positive, such as net commerce. Combined with the increasing capability for mass surveillance and computer assisted population management, it has Orwellian implications. Outlawing cryptography - at this time - has a high political cost because there is so little justification for it. That means indecisive judges, indecisive politicians, and an increasingly vocal pro-crypto movement. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 AM 11/8/1996, Douglas B. Renner wrote: >[snip] >> The key here is that in these cases the practice has become widely >> accepted. By widely accepted, I mean that very significant numbers of >> people believe that there is nothing all that wrong with the practice. >> Those who disagree do not feel it is worth the trouble to put a stop >> to it. >[snip] > While this might be the case, I don't believe it is "key". > Also, I'm not sure why you used this as a counterpoint. Are you saying > that there are not a significant number of people who think there is > nothing wrong with sending truly private messages? I would disagree > with such an assertion based on my own converastions with crypto-ignorant > aquaintances. Most people either trust the gov't implicitly or haven't > thought about it or (erroneously) consider it irrelevant - but deep down > they definitely value their privacy. They also definitely value their safety. Sure, right now there are lots of people who think strong cryptography is a good idea. If the Four Horsemen scenario is correct, that will change very quickly. The reason I used this as a counterpoint is that the premise of my discussion is that it would be possible - maybe even easy - to suppress the use of non-GAKed cryptography were it unpopular. A commonly shared belief among GAKers and Cypherpunks is that strong cryptography is a magic bullet. It isn't. If it's not obviously a disaster, strong cryptography will be widely used. But if it is a disaster and requires GAK, that's a policy option we will always have. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Clinton
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone asked, >>How the result of the election will affect crypto etc.? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:46 PM 11/8/96 +0100, Matts Kallioniemi wrote: >At 17:12 1996-11-07 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>Simple analogy: Suppose you put two people into a room with a deck of >>playing cards and a table, instructing "Person A" to build a house-of-cards, >>and telling "Person B" to stop him from achieving his goal. Who do you >>think will win? Obviously, the latter will win: It's vastly easier to >>knock such a structure down than to build it in the first place, and all >>"Person B" has to do is occasionally take a whack at the structure. > >What if Person A is better armed? Could that change the outcome? Well, okay, I sorta assumed a non-violent scenario. But adding that as a possibility actually strengthens the argument: Generally, it's easier to stop somebody doing something out in the open, than to do it. It's easier to knock down a house of cards than to build it up. But it's also easier to shoot the person doing the knocking down, etc. On the other hand, it's easier to DO something...if it can be done in secret. And it's harder to keep somebody from doing something, if that something can be kept secret. That's why it's so important that good cryptography remain legal. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Exon Countdown Clock and farewell messages
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some of you might find this amusing. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 6 Nov 96 00:40 EST From: Michael Page - Fade to Black <mpage(a)fadetoblack.com> To: mpage(a)fadetoblack.com Subject: Fade to Black Update The Fade to Black Pages have been updated. This week we started the official Senator Exon Countdown Clock. (Days till retirement on Jan 3 1997). We also made it available for you to submit your own personal message to the Senator. All the messages will be delivered via certified Fed-X on his last days in office. Now you to can send a personal greeting to the Senator allowing him to know how much you appreciated all he has attempted to do for the Internet. We would attempt to send it via a Email, but the respected Senator does not have Email. (The Irony). http://www.fadetoblack.com/exon/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ If you encounter any problems with the pages feel free to drop us a line. f2b(a)fadetoblack.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ Thank you again for your support Michael Page Editor Fade to Black http://www.fadetoblack.com mpage(a)fadetoblack.com

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Re: RICO - (Was: Group order for Secret Power)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:13 AM 11/8/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Thu, 7 Nov 1996, jim bell wrote: >> But the odd thing is, the one entity we can't seem to attack using RICO is >> the Federal government, and probably most other governments levels. Looked >> at purely objectively, it should be easy to demonstrate that the Federal >> government (and its representatives) have engaged in plenty of crime as a >> pattern of activity, and certainly enough to rise to the level of the >> standards of RICO. (It takes only a few instances of such crime satisfy the >> standards of RICO.) > >Incorrect. Employees of the Federal Government can be, and have been, >prosecuted under RICO. Many political corruption cases involve some RICO >aspects. This should make Mr. Bell a big fan of the statute, unless he >just likes the flash of murdering officials instead. No, I meant the ENTIRE government Not just individual government officials. Remember, RICO is _supposed_ to apply to any organization with a pattern of criminal activity, and has been used (in fact, probably mostly used) against organizations where many of the members are "merely" employees, quite analogous to the Federal government. If RICO applies to anything, it should apply to the Feds, and that means conviction of the entire organization if it or its employees have a pattern of illegal activity. Since RICO only requires a relatively tiny number of criminal acts to meet its standards, it should not be difficult to show enough criminality. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:44 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 5:12 PM -0800 11/7/96, jim bell wrote: >>accessible to the common man? Suppose, say, the approval of one million >>citizens was the only thing necessary to have an assassination legally >>accomplished? Or, more likely in practice, the vote of a million citizens >>was interpreted as a kind of terminal veto over that particular politician >>or government employee, who would have to resign or face the (lethal) >>consquences! In that case, assassinations wouldn't be seen as bad, they'd >>be the natural consequence of a politician who overstays his welcome and >>ignores numerous warnings. > >Nothing in any version of AP I have seen makes any stipulation that the >payment is "one person, one vote." That's because my hypothetical was intended to reflect a very non-AP situation, although maintaining the assassination/resignation angle. The issue was whether people would see political assassination as being desirable or undesirable. Conventional wisdom is that it's undesirable. On the contrary, I speculated that to a great extent, the desirability of it depends somewhat on who is getting killed (or forced to resign) but also whether or not the average citizen has a say in selecting the target.* Unlike AP, which seems (to a few people, at least; not me!) to have a problem that "any" arbitrarily small number of people could buy a hit, the hypothetical alternative I presented at least requires a million people to agree. If we assume there are 180 million adults in the US, for example, and assuming that the votes are limited to adults, letting 1 million people make such a decision is somewhat akin to giving 0.6% of the population veto power over the rest's attempts to manipulate (regulate, tax, etc) them. This isn't as good, in my opinion, as "pure" AP, but it would be far better than what we have now. I contend, but I can't prove, that if you give the ordinary citizen a say in the matter, and also if you ensure that the target always has the option of resignation, at that point this could turn into a very popular system that is seen as being the norm. There would be little sympathy for politicians who resist; just as there is little sympathy now for a politician who, despite losing the election, barricades himself in his office and refuses to turn over power to the winner. "It's just not done!" * A few years ago, I recall reading a study where test subjects were asking to individually perform some task requiring thought and concentration, but were exposed to loud irritating music. One half of the subjects had no control over the music, the other half could turn it off if they wanted to. It turned out that merely having control over the music made people feel better about the situation, EVEN IF they _didn't_ choose to exercise that control by turning the music off! If this effect worked in the political arena, the ability to bump off (or force to resign) an official would make people feel better about the government, even in situations where they didn't exercise this option. This might make you think that nothing might happen, until you realize that the officialdom will have to adjust to the new reality as well, and they'll just have to (in this hypothetical) get used to the fact that one million people could bounce them out on their collective asses...or worse. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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