December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: AP [was: Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet] [NOISE]
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: hallam(a)vesuvius.ai.mit.edu If you don't very clearly reject his murderous ideas you are going to regret it just as the left regreted having the USSR or the RAF associated with them. ........................................................................ ........... They wouldn't have to be repudiated in public. They could be repudiated in private, and he would never know what hit'im. <joke> There's so much hypocricy in the world, anyway, with groups not doing what they say or not saying what they really do, how can anyone believe what any group claims to believe in unless and until they engage in some kind of action. You might as well spend your time believing John Anonymous MacDonald. It's best to be prepared to defend yourself against anyone, regardless of what virtuous conduct they claim to believe in. .. Blanc > > > >

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Re: AP [was: Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet] [NOISE]
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 05:48 PM 9/23/96 -0400, hallam(a)vesuvius.ai.mit.edu wrote: > >When the IRA attemoted to assasinate my cousin I was in no > >way intimidated and neither was he. He continued as a senior > >poitician for over a decade despite continued danger. I can think > >of no less effective method of bringing about change in attitudes. I don't think you truly understood the *mechanism* of AP. Your cousin was threatened from an outside attack. Protection is relatively easy in that case. AP generates a threath * within * every * part * of every structure (family, work, friends, etc). As an analogy, when specialized demolishing team blows a building down, they don't use one big charge, they use hundreds of them to severe every load bearing member of the structure. AP would work the same, turning every person a potential motiveless assassin. I say "motiveless" because AP makes the motive not traceable to peoples or assets. Some AP assassins will get caught, but it is predictable that it will only be a minority and that with time, the percentage of caught assassins will get smaller as more professionnal assassin gets seriously into the business. JFA Please reply by e-mail as I am not anymore on Cypherpunks. Thanks Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists and engineers, LabView programming PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Portal remailer shutting down
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The ISP which I have used for over five years, portal.com, is going out of business at the end of this month (September, 1996). This means that my remailer at hfinney(a)shell.portal.com will cease operations. I had asked that it be removed from the remailer lists a few weeks ago due to some problems, so hopefully not many people have been using it lately. But now it will go away for good. This remailer has been in operation since the fall of 1991. I believe it has been the longest continually running remailer on the net. It was one of the first "cypherpunk" remailers, based on Eric Hughes' code, to which I added support for PGP messages. (Actually there was a remailer running out of Australia for a short time earlier in 1991 which was the first to use PGP. It was a very nice system but got shut down supposedly due to traffic concerns, although there seemed to be some politics involved as well.) I have also been running a remailer from my account at hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu. However that one cannot tolerate abuse complaints, hence I have been forwarding all mail out of that remailer through the portal one, for a number of years. Now that Portal is gone, this will be a problem. I plan to restrict the alumni remailer to only send mail to other addresses on a fixed list, which will initially be just the other remailers. That way the remailer can be used to form chains, but not to send to end users. This limited functionality should still be useful. It may be possible to create a web page where people can sign up to say they would not object to receiving anonymous mail. Most people are open minded and curious enough that they wouldn't mind signing such a list. Make it easy enough and you will collect thousands of names. Now people who want to create nyms using remailer chains for return addresses can add their names to the list without feeling that they are compromising their identity. They can use a remailer which only sends to people on the list as the last remailer in their chain, with some confidence that the remailer is unlikely to be shut down due to abuse complaints. Hal

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Re: AP [was: Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet] [NOISE]
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 23 Sep 96 at 22:10, hallam(a)vesuvius.ai.mit.edu wrote: > People like Jim want to impose their will on others by > force. Mr. Bell pushing the AP scheme does not mean that he wants to impose his ideas by force since he will have *no* mean of controlling what ideas will be favored. It is strictly market forces that will dictates what will happens. As many, including Mr. Bell have pointed out, he might very well be one of the first victim of the AP system. Mr Bell is pushing AP because he believe that the bulk of human race wants to live peacefully and he therefore concludes that AP, being led by the demand of ordinary people, will lead to a more peacefull world. When you'll get to learn how AP operates, your conclusions of an AP regulated world will, IMO, be dependent on the specifics of your definition of human race. > Despite prolonged attempts by each faction to assasinate the > leaders of the other they have been unsuccessful. As I mentionned in my other post to you, this is not a reference since the operating mode of AP is entirely different. > If terrorists trained by Lybia and Syria are unable to assasinate > at will then we can be sure thaqt Jim's band of kooks is not going > to get any further. Again, absolutely irrelevant to AP. Go read the book again. > It is suprising that someone from the press has not seized upon > Jims ideas as cause for another cyber-scare. I suspect this is > because people like Markof are somewhat more responsible. No, it is not surprizing at all, but you did not seem to have understood why: 1) The dissatisfaction of the population is such that many would actively seek where to send their buck to have somebody offed. 2) The way AP works, journalists would be priviledged victims, paid for by the same disgruntled population 3) More than everything else, they (the journalists) probably understood *exactly* how AP works and thus fully realised point 2) > This is not going to stop me from producing an op-ed piece linkiing > the net libertarians to assasination politics unless I hear a few > more repudiations of Bell's ideas. That would be the best way of promoting AP. Every peoples who favor it would say: "Go ahead, it'll be our pleasure!" AP will not die for several reason. The first one is that it only requires knowledge and a little coding. The second is that there is a demand. Prostitution could never be eliminated. Yet, it does not menace the system itself. AP will be tougher than prostitution and it will probably actively seek the system's destruction (as we know it). I suggest you try to understand the mechanics of AP. jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists and engineers, LabView programming PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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ICI_96x
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A fax appeared of the International Cryptography Institute, 1996, October 25-26, in DC. Here are excerpts: _________________________________________________________ What are the different national policies and regulations governing cryptography and how might these evolve? What cryptography technologies are on the market in different countries, what is being used, and for what purpose? What problems is cryptography causing law enforcement? What are the requirements of business and other organizations? What are the new trends in cryptography and what will be their impact on society? What efforts are leading toward an international cryptography framework? _________________________________________________________ Sample sessions: The International Cryptography Experiment Export controls on Encryption Software Cryptography: Recent Developments in the EU Towards an Australian Policy on Encryption New Russian Encryption Policies and Regulations International Regulation of Cryptography: Update U.S. Government Cryptography Policy Law Enforcement Requirements for Encryption Transnational Key Escrow Commercial and International Key Escrow Digital Cash _________________________________________________________ Some of 38 "Invited Faculty" Dr. Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University Mr. John Droge, Mykotronix Mr. Louis. J. Freeh, Director, FBI Mr. Michael Gilmore, FBI Mr. David Kahn, Author, NSA Dr. Kwok-Yeo Lam, National University of Singapore Dr. Anatoly N. Lebedev, LAN Crypto, Ltd. Mr. Ronald Lee, General Counsel, NSA Mr. Yves LeRoux, Digital Equipment Mr. Nick Mansfield, Shell International Petroleum Mr. Michael Nelson, White House Office STP Dr. Jean-Jacques Quisquatier, University of Louvain Mr. John Young, National Computer Board [Nope] ----- http://jya.com/ici96x.txt ICI_96x

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Universal Avatar spec
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IBM, Velocity, and Chaco team up for identity on the net: http://www.chaco.com/avatar/avatar.html > The real power of Universal Avatars comes from the inclusion of > other capabilities into the system. First, consider the implications > of embedding a public key, or Netscape certificate, into the > Universal Avatar file. By introducing secure communications, the > avatar can effect instantaneous financial micro-transactions > seamlessly in a virtual world. For example, an avatar could walk > through a virtual mall and transparently purchase items. Since his/her > profile is under the strict control of the user, s/he could declare > an interest in modems. Virtual stores could then automate the process > of discovering where the potential customer's interests lie, while > keeping the customer's personal information strictly confidential and > email address safe from spamming.

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Bernstein hrg in the news
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Feds on the Ropes In Suit Challenging Arms Export Law (Dan Goodin, The Recorder (SF), 9/23/96, p.1) A professor who says federal restrictions on the export of encryption software violate his right to free speech seemed to get a sympathetic hearing from a federal judge on Friday. In a closely watched case challenging export restrictions on encryption software, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel did not rule on summary judgment motions. But she appeared impatient when a U.S. Department of Justice attorney attempted to revive an issue settled months ago in that case. Patel handed plaintiff Daniel Bernstein a big victory in April, ruling that software is protected speech under the First Amendment. But the ruling in _Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State_, 95-0582, didn't deter government attorneys Friday from trying to reargue the point. Justice Department trial attorney Anthony Coppolino argued that the government controls on the export of software are not based on the content of the computer code but rather on its functionality. Therefore, he argued, the restrictions are not a prior restraint of speech protected under the Constitution. Patel replied: "You'll get a chance to argue that in another courtroom." Cindy Cohn, an associate with San Mateo's McGlashan & Sarrail representing Bernstein, said she was pleased with the way the hearing appeared to go. "My impression is the fact that [Patel] was asking more questions of [Coppolino] than me meant that he was the one who needed to convince her," Cohn said. Coppolino declined to comment. LICENSE TO 'SNUFFLE' Filed in February 1995, the suit challenges provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation Act, which classifies encryption programs as "munitions" and subjects them to strict export controls. In October 1993, the U.S. State Department told Bernstein he would need an arms export license to post his "Snuffle" encryption program and accompanying documentation to an Internet discussion group. He subsequently filed suit seeking to have the requirement declared unconstitutional. After Patel's April ruling, the case now turns on whether restrictions on the export of such software and accompanying "technical data" amount to prior restraint, which can only be exercised extremely narrowly. High-tech companies are closely watching the case, having complained bitterly for years that the law has crippled their ability to compete in the global software market. Particularly in the burgeoning arena of Internet and network-related software products, encryption features are considered essential to protect sensitive data transmissions from unauthorized access. Legislative attempts at relaxing export laws so far have been unsuccessful. A bill now before the Senate Commerce Committee has received stiff opposition from the Clinton administration, and even its supporters say it is unlikely the bill will pass this term. But Stanton McCandlish, a spokesman for the Electronic Frontier Foundation - a group that advocates extending civil liberties into digital media such as the Internet - said the so-called Pro-CODE bill sponsored by Sen. Conrad Burns, R-Mont, could be made moot by Bernstein's case. "If we get the ruling we're looking for," he said, "and it's affirmed at the Supreme Court level, which is pretty likely, the Pro-CODE bill is probably not needed at all." (retyping by NLA, newspaper liberation army.)

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Good article on inevitability of unregulated crypto ...
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/print/960624/cover/doc1.html This, of course, is not any indication that we should not stay vigilant. As is clear from every public statement by the past and present administrations, they have an agenda to protect their monopoly on intelligence gathering. They clearly have a strong interest in hamstringing every single challenge to the current regulations. If ITAR is torn down, then they will use the OECD and other international organizations to stop the flow of encryption. It is NOT useful to reason with them. It takes direct confrontation using legislation and court case battles to fix this problem. Ern

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Barlow/Taylor censorship debate
by rod＠wired.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Come join in John Perry Barlow's Brain Tennis debate (www.wired.com/braintennis/) versus CDA supporter and president of the National Law Center for Children and Families, Bruce Taylor, over government censorship and free speech. Taylor has also been a Justice lawyer and prosecutor for the city of Cleveland, where he prosecuted, among others, Larry Flint. Their debate will last from today through next Wednesday, October 2. To post, go to: http://www.hotwired.com/cgi-bin/interact/replies_all?msg.25733 See you there! Roderick Simpson Associate Producer Wired Online

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Banning annoying users
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The not allowing unsubscribed individuals to post is logical, for a time. But that basically outlaws anon remailers that don't allow you to send to an account, and a lot of them don't, from my limited understanding. Besides, if we set up the list to ban people who are 'undesirable', instead of just using our own killfiles to do the dirty work for the list, then what is to stop someone from banning you? Sure, you move on to another list, but, personally, I wouldn't want it done to me, and so I would not do it to someone else. But, like I said, personal killfiles are more than encouraged. It resolves these kinds of conflicts a lot faster and cleaner than debating who and who should not be banned. --- Daniel. -- If in fact we are the only intelligent life on this planet, why the fuck are we in this goddamn mess? -- Find my public key on the World Wide Web -- point your browser at: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html

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