December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Kiddie porn on the Internet
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"News" stories are now circulating on radio about child pornography on the Internet, and how an organization called "Save The Children" is working very hard to identify the trafficers and their accomplii. Save The Children is complaining that they can't find all of the dirty dealers of kid-porn, since much of the traffic is encrypted! So who is Save The Children? First, since they're an international organization raising funds in the U.S., they obviously operate at the pleasure of the State Department. Ho hum. Remember the incidents at the Denny's restaurant chain where Denny's was sued for discrimination against minorities? Did it seem a little bizarre for the 1990's? At the close of the litigation, Denny's suddenly sprouted tons of free fund-raising advertising for Save The Children, including placemats at each table with beautiful logo and address and phone number. Just send the money, etc. My questions to interested persons included whether someone may have approached Denny's for such cooperation BEFORE the discrimination suits, and whether Denny's may have refused at first. Well, don't jump to conclusions, and this is *NOT* a veiled accusation. I merely suggest that interested parties extend their inquiries into the various Internet-Monitors to include Save The Children. And by the way, I wonder what World Vision and National Medical Enterprises are up to these days?

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[NOISE] More From Rumor-central
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [This has nothing to do with cryptography, but it is related to other posts seen here recently.] Miami Herald reports today on page 3A that the National Transportation Safety Bureaucrats are "investigating an American Airlines pilot's report that a missile zoomed by his 757 on Aug. 29 as it flew near NASA and Navy facilities in Virginia on its way to Boston." An NTSB spokesman has confirmed an investigation (termed a 'preliminary probe') is ongoing. Not to be outdone, the FAA is investigating as well. All this is according to the Herald, and I offer no opinions about veracity or trustworthiness of this particular media organ or what caused the crash of flight 800. JMR Regards, Jim Ray -- DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy Thursday, September 5 is the day when, in 1698, Russian Czar Peter the Great imposed a tax on...beards. Please, don't tell Congress. [Source: The Advocates for Self-Government.] "As govt.s grow arithmetically, corruption grows exponentially." -- Ray's Law of official corruption. Defeat the Duopoly! Stop the Browne out. Harry Browne for President. Jo Jorgensen for Vice-president. http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ http://www.twr.com/stbo ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 <mailto:liberty@gate.net> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMjLU4m1lp8bpvW01AQHB3AP/ROTTRCtg4LBrDwVSml2isdcm2GmFd01I 63dQg3o+ixBFldjXC3oHkQDUWSTyrpj/QXvUy43EGIdJMQ8MRI1+NCIu2R1ikF63 LasufEIvbCIzTcX1s+/n6vxciU6CYj2e5akbw4qBIK+eOr2roOoFADAKyQQbDdxx JvOvUzMVj/M= =WQHz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PAPERS - 1998 USENIX Security Conference
by Aviel Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************************************************************************* ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PAPERS 7th USENIX Security Symposium January 26-29, 1998 Marriott Hotel-- San Antonio, Texas Sponsored by the USENIX Association, the UNIX and Advanced Computing Systems Professional and Technical Association In cooperation with: The CERT Coordination Center. Important Dates for Refereed Papers Papers due: September 9, 1997 Author notification: October 8, 1997 Camera-ready final papers due: December 9, 1997 Registration Materials Available: End October, 1997 (Authors, see "How to Submit a Refereed Paper" below.) Program Chair Avi Rubin, Bellcore Program Committee Carlisle Adams, Nortel Dave Balenson, Trusted Information Systems Steve Bellovin, AT&T Research Dan Boneh, Princeton University Diane Coe, Mitre Ed Felten, Princeton University Li Gong, JavaSoft Peter Honeyman, CITI, University of Michigan Hugo Krawczyk, IBM Watson Labs Jack Lacy, AT&T Research Hilarie Orman, DARPA/ITO Mike Reiter, AT&T Research David Wagner, University of California, Berkeley Readers Katherine T. Fithen, CERT Trent Jaeger, IBM Watson Labs Invited talks coordinator: Greg Rose, Qualcomm Conference home page: <http://www.usenix.org/sec/sec98.html> OVERVIEW The goal of this symposium is to bring together researchers, practitioners, system programmers, and others interested in the latest advances in security and applications of cryptography. This will be a four day symposium with two days of tutorials, followed by two days of refereed paper presentations, invited talks, works-in-progress presentations, and panel discussions. TUTORIALS Monday and Tuesday, January 26-27 Tutorials for both technical staff and managers will provide immediately useful, practical information on topics such as local and network security precautions, what cryptography can and cannot do, security mechanisms and policies, firewalls and monitoring systems. If you are interested in proposing a tutorial, contact the tutorial coordinator, Dan Klein: phone (412)421-2332 email <dvk(a)usenix.org>. TECHNICAL SESSIONS Wednesday and Thursday, January 28-29 In addition to the keynote presentation, the technical program includes refereed papers, invited talks, a work in progress session, and panel sessions. There will be Birds-of-a-Feather sessions the last two evenings. You are invited to make suggestions to the program committee via email to <security(a)usenix.org>. Papers that have been formally reviewed and accepted will be presented during the symposium and published in the symposium proceedings, published by USENIX and provided free to technical session attendees. Additional copies will be available for purchase from USENIX. SYMPOSIUM TOPICS Refereed paper submissions are being solicited in areas including but not limited to: * Adaptive security and system management * Analysis of malicious code * Applications of cryptographic techniques * Attacks against networks/machines * Computer misuse and anomaly detection * Copyright protection (technical solutions) * Cryptographic & other security tools * File and file system security * Network security * New firewall technologies * Security in heterogeneous environments * Security incident investigation and response * Security of Mobile Code * User/system authentication * World Wide Web security Note that this symposium is not about new codes, ciphers, nor cryptanalysis for its own sake. Papers must represent novel scientific contributions in computer security with direct relevance to the engineering of secure systems for the commercial sector. HOW TO SUBMIT A REFEREED PAPER (Please read carefully.) The guidelines for submission are a bit different from previous years. Authors must submit a mature paper in postscript format. Any incomplete sections (there shouldn't be many) should be outlined in enough detail to make it clear that they could be finished easily. Full papers are encouraged, and should be about 8 to 15 typeset pages. Submissions must be received by September 9, 1997. Along with your paper, please submit a separate email message containing the title, all authors, and their complete contact information (phone, fax, postal address, email), including an indication of which author is the contact author. Authors will be notified of acceptance on October 8, 1997. All submissions will be judged on originality, relevance, and correctness. Each accepted submission may be assigned a member of the program committee to act as its shepherd through the preparation of the final paper. The assigned member will act as a conduit for feedback from the committee to the authors. Camera-ready final papers are due on December 9, 1997. If you would like to receive detailed guidelines for submission and examples of extended abstracts, you may send email to: <securityauthors(a)usenix.org> or telephone the USENIX Association office at (510) 528-8649. The Security Symposium, like most conferences and journals, requires that papers not be submitted simultaneously to another conference or publication and that submitted papers not be previously or subsequently published elsewhere. Papers accompanied by non-disclosure agreement forms are not acceptable and will be returned to the author(s) unread. All submissions are held in the highest confidentiality prior to publication in the Proceedings, both as a matter of policy and in accord with the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. There will be one or two prizes awarded for best paper(s). WHERE TO SUBMIT For reliability, please send one copy of your paper to the program committee via each of two of the following methods. All submissions will be acknowledged. o Preferred Method: email (Postscript) to: <securitypapers(a)usenix.org> o Alternate Method: postal delivery to Security Symposium USENIX 2560 Ninth St., Ste. #215 Berkeley CA 94710 U.S.A. Phone: (510) 528-8649 o Fax: (510) 548-5738 Vendor Exhibits Demonstrate your security product to our technically astute attendees responsible for security at their sites. We invite you to take part in the Vendor Display. The informal, table-top display allows you to meet with attendees informally and demonstrate in detail your security solutions. Contact CynthiaDeno Email: cynthia(a)usenix.org Phone: 408.335.9445 Fax 408.335.5327 Works-in-Progress Session (WIPs) The last session of the symposium will be a Works-in-Progress session consisting of five minute presentations. Speakers should provide a one or two paragraph abstract to the program chair by 6:00 pm on January 28, 1998 at the conference. These should be provided in person, not via email. The chair will post the schedule of presentations by noon on the 29th. Experience at other conferences has shown that usually, all of them are accepted. The five minute time limit will be strictly enforced. INVITED TALKS There will be several invited talks at the conference in parallel with the refereed papers. If you have suggestions for possible speakers, please send them to <security(a)usenix.org>. REGISTRATION MATERIALS Materials containing all details of the technical and tutorial programs, registration fees and forms, and hotel information will be available at the end of October 1997. To receive the registration materials, please contact: USENIX Conference Office 22672 Lambert Street, Suite 613 Lake Forest, CA USA 92630 Phone: (714) 588-8649 Fax: (714) 588-9706 Email: <conference(a)usenix.org> Information can also be found under the Conference home page: <http://www.usenix.org/sec/sec98.html>.

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Re: talker
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:03 AM 9/8/96 +0000, attila wrote: >=Dear Whoever, > > cypherpunks are *not* crackers; this is a crytographic > and political issues relating to cryptography mailing list. > > Well maybe, political issues galore certainly, but very very little to do with cryptography. I mean what does TWA 800 have to do with this list. I mean lets be completely honest here, whatever the original purpose of the list was for its been allowed to shift away from its intended purpose considerably. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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Re: Clipper III on the table
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:31 PM 10/1/96 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: > > > >On Tue, 1 Oct 1996, Robert Hettinga wrote: >[as to why HP and others support GAK in exchange for DES export] > >> I agree with Lucky's earlier hypothesis that HP's doing this to curry >favor >> for government contracts in lieu of an actual marketing strategy, and I >> leave TIS's motives up to the list as an exercise. ;-). > >This not a hypothesis. A policy person from HP told me that > >1. HP as well as TIS and other companies sell single DES products that >they would like to be able to export. >2. He was directed by HP's marketing department to find a way to make >that happen. >3. He therefore supports a GAK for export "compromise". HP, then, might be a good company to approach as a potential donor on a DES-cracker. While they want to be able to portray their products as reasonably secure, at the same time they want to be able to de-fuse any export limits. Showing that, say, $25,000 of hardware could crack DES in a year (and thus, presumably, $25 million could crack DES in 1/3 of a day, a budget available to the NSA et al.) would demonstrate that there's no strong reason to keep it restricted in any way. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Can we kill single DES?
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei writes: > Since it looks like the US government will be allowing the export of > 56 bit espionage-enabled software, it's time to kill single DES. Yes. It's an obsolete cipher with a woefully small key. Only a catastrophic failure will cause the ABA to undergo religious enlightenment. > As some of you will recall, a while back I wondered aloud about the > feasibility of brute-forcing DES on general purpose machines, ala the > RC4-40 crack last year. I'm a firm believer in "work smart, not hard." It might be interesting to run a wiring diagram of DES through a superoptimizer and see how many algebraic identities fall out. An analytical crack that could be published on the Net would be far more impressive than harnassing gigacycles on every available machine, which might very well awe the gullible into thinking DES was difficult to break. > On this type of processor, it would still take 9133 years to exhaust > a 56 bit key space. On the other hand, on 20,000 processors of this > power it would take less than 6 months. If the target is encrypted > in a chaining mode with an unknown 8 byte IV, the time more than > doubles. I can see the headlines now. "Cypherpunks show DES can withstand up to 9,000 Pentium-years of torture and keep on ticking." Remember the Law of Unintended Consequences. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: Clipper III on the table
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Allow me to say here that I do not belive that Netscape will be amongst > those fooled so easily. But IBM, HP, TIS, and others have already been > fooled. The USG does not need to get every software company to agree with > their proposal. Divide and conquer. Seems that the USG has done a > marvelous job of D&C so far. > If anything, it would not be in their best _marketing_ interests to support GAK. Rejecting GAK in favor of promoting strong crypto will make them look like "good guys". This is also true of Micro$oft. And contrary to an earlier opinion, I think Bill & Co. have been soured by their experiences with DoJ. While their are far larger motivations involve, I certainly don't think Micro$oft will skip at the chance to thumb their noses at the government if it's to their advantage. Both of these companies may be willing to support a DES-crack effort me -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:39 AM 10/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >Now that the shoe is dropping on "Clipper III" (or "Clipper IV"), the >"voluntary, for export, key escrow system," how might it be enforced? > >Some possibilities: [snip] >(Else what's to stop Giant Corporation from using Non-GAKked software >within the U.S., which is perfectly legal (under the "voluntary" system), >but then "happening" to have their foreign branches and customers obtain >"bootleg" versions at their end? All it takes is a single copy to get out, >and be duplicated a zillion times. Voila, interoperability, with the only >"crime" being the first export...which is essentially impossible to stop, >for so many reasons we mention so often. Conclusion: Government must make >this very mode illegal, perhaps by making it a conspiracy to thwart the >export laws....) If this solution were really practical, it would have been tried already. One of the biggest problems with enforcing anti-export laws is that there is no guarantee that anybody currently within the jurisdiction of the country involved (for concreteness, the US) is actually responsible for a given export. Let alone KNOWN to be responsible. And it's even less likely that it be "provable" within the standards of court cases. Worse, doing the prosecution does nothing about returning the copies of the program to the country of origin, making the whole exercise pretty damn futile! >Any other ideas on how the government plans to enforce GAK, to make GAK the >overwhelmingly-preferred solution? Clipper I was, I think, their best hope for promoting GAK. It would have engineered distorted-market pressure by making it artificially easy to use GAK, hard to use non-GAK. Subsequent proposals have all been weaker, less effective, less practical, and less encompassing. And the "worst" part, from the point of view of the USG, is that it's now 3.5 years after the announcement of Clipper I, and they're no closer to foisting this turkey onto us. Nobody in Congress is under the illusion that the public likes this stuff, unlike 1993 where they could at least imagine that there were no emotions running high on the subject. In 1993, they were under the impression that they could implement their fondest desires with legislation; now the only likely legislation is either anti-GAK or non-GAK. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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FUCK!!!!!!;-)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to be worse than we thought? Apple and *Sun*? Doesn't *Whit Diffie* work for Sun? Curioser and curioser... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text From: sombody... Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 15:41:38 -0400 To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: FUCK!!!!!!;-) NEW YORK AND PARIS--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Oct. 2, 1996--Eleven major information technology vendors and user organizations today announced the formation of an alliance to develop an exportable, worldwide approach to strong encryption. The goal of the alliance is to enable companies to conduct secure international electronic commerce. The alliance was formed in response to demand from customers who are conducting more and more of their business processes electronically. Internationally available strong encryption would enable these firms to send sensitive information securely over the Internet and other international networks. The companies forming the alliance will achieve this by developing modern, high-level cryptographic "key-recovery" solutions that meet the requirements of business and could allow easing of restrictions of cryptographic import/export around the world. Members of the alliance are Apple Computer, Inc., Atalla, Digital Equipment Corporation, Groupe Bull, Hewlett-Packard Company, IBM, NCR Corp., RSA, Sun Microsystems, Inc., Trusted Information Systems and UPS. The alliance is also open to other companies with an interest in key recovery. "Keys" are strings of computer code that lock and unlock data. Key recovery is an approach that permits the recovery of lost or damaged keys without the need to store or "escrow" them with a third party. This approach could also meet the needs of law enforcement to act under the authority of a court order without risking the confidentiality of business data. Modern, high-level cryptography works to ensure four critical elements of security -- Confidentiality: prevents against unauthorized parties from seeing information; Integrity: determines that information has not been changed during transit; Authentication: verifies the identity of the user and the user's eligibility to access and use information; Non-Repudiation: provides evidence that a transaction took place, for example, that a customer actually placed an order. "Apple recognizes and supports the need for key recovery, and we are pleased to be a part of the alliance," said Ellen Hancock, chief technology officer and executive vice president of R&D for Apple Computer, Inc. "We believe that this alliance will help industry lead in developing solutions for secure transactions while prompting the evolution of the Internet as a business environment." "Securing commerce over the Internet using strong encryption technologies will require a common set of standards and approaches to fundamental security issues such as key recovery and key management," said Robert Gargus, Atalla president and general manager. "Once these standards are accepted and globally deployed, public networks such as the Internet will provide a secure, multi-national commercial trading environment for worldwide electronic commerce." "The alliance has struck a balance between government and business needs," said CommerceNet Chairman Marty Tenenbaum. "Allowing encryption to this degree opens the door to the proliferation of electronic commerce." "Strong encryption is a necessary element in delivering secure network business solutions to our customers worldwide. Key recovery is a mechanism that addresses government policy concerns about the export of strong encryption while at the same time meeting growing commercial needs," said Sam Fuller, vice president and chief scientist for Digital Equipment Corporation. "Digital sees this alliance as an effective means to develop open and interoperable key recovery standards." "Electronic Commerce is planned to be $1T by the year 2010 according to experts. The capability to have secured transactions is a prerequisite for the market," said Alain Couder, senior executive vice president of Groupe Bull. "Groupe Bull had been actively involved in the search for a solution to provide a balance between the legitimate need for users to have privacy, for corporations to protect their trade secrets and relationships and for governments to maintain national security. Bull has the ambition to be a leading provider of this capability with key encryption technology, smart cards and its Internet products and services." "HP is pleased to be a founding member of the alliance," said Richard W. Sevcik, HP vice-president and general manager of the Systems Technology Group. "Exportable strong encryption is a key enabler for international electronic commerce and provides businesses with the ability to perform secure transactions and other communications regardless of geography. Key recovery is one of several technologies that will be important." "Key recovery will truly open the Internet for serious business," said Irving Wladawsky-Berger, general manager, IBM Internet Division. "Once businesses are confident that their electronic transactions are safe and they control the recovery of keys, a flood of new market opportunities will open. The Internet is rapidly shifting from a place to browse for information to an environment for conducting real business." "Export controls are a fact of life," said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security. "The key recovery alliance's approach will allow companies to use cryptography with differing levels of security in an interoperable way. When the alliance implements this technology it will give the user a new level of flexibility that did not exist before. In an imperfect world this technique will at least allow you to take advantage of what governments around the world will allow." "We're delighted to be part of the alliance because we believe the adoption of a worldwide standard for key recovery is essential to solving current network security problems," said Stephen T. Walker, president and CEO of TIS. "User-controlled key recovery systems including our own products have already demonstrated that user privacy concerns and exportability requirements can be successfully addressed. But there must be worldwide interoperability. And it is our hope that the alliance will be able to accomplish that." "The work of the alliance could have a profound impact on conducting international business over the Internet," said Joe Pyne, UPS vice president of marketing. "UPS is committed to improving the movement of both information and packages in secure and time sensitive manners. The alliance allows us to combine our expertise, energies and financial strength to quickly develop standards that will open the door for rapid development of products and services." CONTACT: Apple Computer, Inc. Maureen O'Connell 408-862-6689 or Atalla Gary Lefkowitz 408-435-5715 or Digital Equipment Corp. Patrick Ward 508-493-9441 or Groupe Bull Jean-Jacques Roulmann 33-1-39-66-3970 or Hewlett-Packard Kimberly Daniel 408-447-4587 or IBM Mike Corrado 914-766-1162 or NCR Bob Farkus 513-445-2078 or RSA Data Communications Ginny Kirkley 415-595-8782 or Sun Microsystems Inc. Ray Nasser 415-786-4395 or Trusted Information Systems Homayoon Tajalli 301-854-6889 or UPS Pat Stephen 201-828-6103 KEYWORD: NEW YORK INDUSTRY KEYWORD: COMPUTERS/ELECTRONICS COMED BW0153 OCT 02,1996 --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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[SPAM] Timmy May's tentacle thinks I'm Timmy May's tentacle?
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May lies, rants, posts off-topic, and pollutes the cypherpunks mailing list with his kinky sexual phantasies. Why is this cocksucking limey faggot dying from the combination of AIDS and the mad cow disease accusing me of being Timmy's tentacle? How could Timmy create a tentacle that knows something about crypto when Timmy doesn't? >Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 17:40:49 +0000 >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT >Subject: Re: [AP] Afghanistan >Priority: normal >X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) >Message-Id: <844193561.12763.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > > >> > And this would accomplish???? And this has what to do with cryptography?? >> >> Nothing, of course - neither do Timmy May's stupid rants, lies, and personal >> attacks. >> >> By the way, your abuse of your native language suggests that you're probably >> a product of U.S. public education. > >Then it would appear that you are ranting here, your post is off >topic, you are lying, and in addition you have posted a personal >attack.. Haha! - I`ve found Tim`s secret pseudonym!!!! > > > > Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security > Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk > Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org > Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ > Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 > "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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