December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

send me mail
by spatterson＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, In the happy mutant handbook it said your name on the crypto section so what do you do? And can you send me some cool, info? Thanks, scott **Rember to see scotts page at*** WWW.GEOCITES.COM/HOLLYWOOD/HILLS/3108

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Forwarded mail....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was cute. -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 11:39:52 -0400 (EDT) From: Mail AutoResponder <abusebot(a)answerme.com> To: black unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> Please do not send messages to this autoresponder using foul language.

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Your Majordomo request results: unsubscribe my ass
by Tom Lojewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had sent this one in also... >Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 20:11:21 -0700 (PDT) >To: lojewski(a)switzerland-c.it.earthlink.net >From: Majordomo(a)toad.com >Subject: Your Majordomo request results: unsubscribe my ass >Reply-To: Majordomo(a)toad.com > >-- > >Your request of Majordomo was: >>>>> unsubscribe cypherpunks lojewski(a)germany-c.it.earthlink.net >Your request to Majordomo(a)toad.com: > > unsubscribe cypherpunks lojewski(a)germany-c.it.earthlink.net > >has been forwarded to the owner of the "cypherpunks" list for approval. >This could be for any of several reasons: > > You might have asked to subscribe to a "closed" list, where all new > additions must be approved by the list owner. > > You might have asked to subscribe or unsubscribe an address other than > the one that appears in the headers of your mail message. > >When the list owner approves your request, you will be notified. > >If you have any questions about the policy of the list owner, please >contact "cypherpunks-approval(a)toad.com". > > >Thanks! > >Majordomo(a)toad.com >Your request of Majordomo was: >>>>> >Your request of Majordomo was: >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------- >END OF COMMANDS > > --------------------------------------------------------- Tom Lojewski - ProNet Consulting - lojewski(a)earthlink.net

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Censorship?
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What say ye?? :From: Zimm2(a)gnn.com (Zimm2) :Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp :Subject: Cypherpunks engaged in censorship? :Date: Wed, 02 Oct 1996 08:39:50 : :It has come to my attention that Cypherpunks no longer allows users of :Microsoft browsers to access their archives. : :Is it contradictory for an organization who proclaims an interest in the free :exchange of ideas through the mechanism of the Internet to limit the exchange :of ideas using an individual's software decisions as the criteria? : :Are issues of annonymity and privacy and the encouragement of private use of :powerful encryption and remailer tools secondary to and less important than a :crusade against a software manufacturer? : :Should corporate users of the Internet or individuals unable to access the :Internet through any other means than corporate or public computers be denied :access to information because the computer owner insists on a particular, and :freely chosen software package? : :Will the Internet continue in the direction of propagating propaganda or will :the original rule of releasing all information to the public and letting the :public decide be the rule of the Internet? : :I, of course, know my own feelings on these issues but want to know how far :out of the pale I am. :

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No Subject
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some idiot said, > who cypherpunks Heh. Sorry guys. I was testing to see if toad was up or not. Of course, I should have sent it to majordomo, right? ;-) Cheers, Bob

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[IMPORTANT] GAK
by Dustbin Freedom Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May is a convicted child molester.

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Re: NYT on IBM GAK
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:26 AM 10/2/96 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: > > >On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, John Young wrote: > >> The New York Times, October 2, 1996, pp. D1, D8. >> Executives of the International Business Machines >> Corporation said late yesterday that they were still lining >> up the final list of companies in the alliance. Those >> involved will include Digital Equipment and smaller >> data-security companies including RSA Data Security, Cylink >> and Trusted Information Systems. > >We are in deep trouble. >--Lucky Wouldn't a letter-writing campaign be in order here? How often do these companies get protest letters? Generally, my experience has been that people actually listen to such objections, if for no other reason than they are usually so rare. The moment I first heard of "Clipper," I looked up the manufacturer of the "Clipper" microprocessor (assuming that there was a connection) and called that company, fully prepared to "ream them a new one!" It turned out that they had nothing to do with the chip, etc, appreciated my call, and were entirely sympathetic. While that was an uninvolved company, I think it's likely that some corporate decisions are based on the assumption that the public won't notice. Give them enough feedback and they'll react. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Utah as a Religious Police State
by John C. Randolph 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Moroni says: >I never cease to be surprised by the interest that gentiles show >in working mormon communities while totally neglecting their own >failing areas. I don't do a lot of nit-picking on this mailing list, but: I am a Jew. *You* are a gentile. So are all the rest of the mormons. Get this point straight. -jcr

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:55 PM 10/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 8:32 PM -0800 10/1/96, jim bell wrote: >>At 09:39 AM 10/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >>>(Else what's to stop Giant Corporation from using Non-GAKked software >>>within the U.S., which is perfectly legal (under the "voluntary" system), >>>but then "happening" to have their foreign branches and customers obtain >>>"bootleg" versions at their end? All it takes is a single copy to get out, >>>and be duplicated a zillion times. Voila, interoperability, with the only >>>"crime" being the first export...which is essentially impossible to stop, >>>for so many reasons we mention so often. Conclusion: Government must make >>>this very mode illegal, perhaps by making it a conspiracy to thwart the >>>export laws....) >> >>If this solution were really practical, it would have been tried already. > >And just what would you call PGP? The "impractical" I was referring to is the impracticality of the government implementing and enforcing restrictions on communications using (non-GAK) crypto. The only place this seems to exist is in ham radio. The crypto itself is eminently practical, as the PGP example makes absolutely clear. >Long before the MIT deal, people in the U.S. were using their "OK in >America" (not counting RSADSI's issues) software to communicate with >"illegally exported" copies in foreign lands. > >This model--leaking a U.S. version and then communicating freely between >U.S. sites and the "leakee" sites--worked for PGP. I believe the USG fears >this will happen again. > >Hence my speculation that they may try to illegalize the mere communication >with an offending product. "I predict they won't be able to do it." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 14:56:21 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late I just got back from the White House, where Gore's office held a roundtable plugging the administration's long-awaited and already widely-derided Return of Clipper proposal. Gore announced that jurisdiction over crypto exports would move to the Commerce Dept; that the export embargo on 56-bit DES would be lifted in part for two years only; that to be approved for export firms must submit a detailed proposal describing how they will move towards key escrow; that the new regulations would go into effect on January 1. The true problem with this plan is that 56-bit DES is woefully inadequate. But much of the media coverage I've read of the plan doesn't even mention that. Take Elizabeth Corcoran's article, which ran above the fold on the front page in today's Washington Post. (It's what almost certainly prompted Gore's office to move the announcement to today rather than hold it later this week.) The thrust of the article is that the administration's new proposal balances the needs of privacy, business, and law enforcement. But it doesn't. The Feds, foreign governments, and determined attackers can crack anything encrypted with 56-bit DES -- the strongest crypto that can be exported under the plan. This vital fact appears nowhere in the Post article. That's why Bruce Schneier, author of Applied Cryptography, recommends against using DES in favor of a more secure algorithm. According to Schneier: "A brute-force DES-cracking machine [designed by Michael Wiener] that can find a key in an average of 3.5 hours cost only $1 million in 1993." More recently, in January 1996 an ad hoc group of renowned cryptographers including Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Ronald Rivest and Schneier, released a report going even further. They said: "To provide adequate protection against the most serious threats - well-funded commercial enterprises or government intelligence agencies - keys used to protect data today should be at least 75 bits long. To protect information adequately for the next 20 years in the face of expected advances in computing power, keys in newly-deployed systems should be at least 90 bits long." What's even more disturbing is what the administration might do next. After the roundtable broke up, I chatted with Michael Vadis, one of the assistant deputy attorneys general who oversees national security issues. He said an international consensus is forming that terrorists can use crypto; therefore crypto must be controlled. The U.S. is certainly pushing this line at the OECD talks. "But it just takes one country to decide to export strong crypto," I said. "You're missing something," said Vadis. "What?" I asked. "Unless you're talking about import restrictions." "Exactly," he said. -Declan ******* Some background: Linkname: Brock Meeks on White House plan -- 6 Sep 96 Filename: http://www.muckraker.com/muckraker/96/36/index4a.html ******** http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1996-10/01/041L-100196-idx.html U.S. TO EASE ENCRYPTION RESTRICTIONS Privacy Advocates Wary of Proposal For Software Exports By Elizabeth Corcoran Washington Post Staff Writer Tuesday, October 1 1996; Page A01 The Washington Post The Clinton administration is cutting off an emotional four-year-old debate with the computer industry over the export of information-scrambling technology with a plan that it says will help U.S. companies boost sales overseas and still allow law enforcement agencies to unscramble messages, officials said yesterday. President Clinton has decided to sign an executive order that changes the rules restricting the overseas sale of the technology, the officials said. Although the full details of the plan had yet to be revealed, privacy advocates and some industry executives contended that it would be difficult to put into practice. Under current rules, companies can sell only relatively easy-to-crack scrambling technology. Under the plan, they would get permission to export somewhat more sophisticated versions of the software and hardware, which prevents eavesdroppers from looking at information. The issue has caused enormous friction between the government and computer industry and privacy groups, which contend that keeping any restrictions in place will harm the protection of personal information everywhere and slow the development of on-line commerce, which relies on keeping credit card numbers and other sensitive information secure. The administration counters that it has come a long way in meeting such objections. However, last night some companies and privacy advocates were still worried that the constraints will leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage abroad and will not ensure that individuals will be able to protect their communications. The government's plan preserves what has been its unnegotiable cornerstone since the debate began in the early day of the Clinton administration -- that law enforcement officials must have the means for peeking at encrypted information when they are properly equipped with court authorization. Earlier versions of the plan tightly limited what kinds of technology could be sold abroad. They also called for makers of encryption technology to deposit "keys" with approved third parties so that law enforcement authorities could decode material. The new plan doesn't specify who would have the keys. Last night, several companies, led by International Business Machines Corp., said they have a technical plan that they believe could comply with the new rules on keys. [...] Industry officials say they ultimately want to be able to use the most sophisticated encryption technology available. "It's really critical to doing business around the world," said an IBM source. "But governments exist. It's a balancing act . . . to satisfy the needs of the governments and make sure that markets and individuals trust the integrity of what's being sent over the networks." [...]

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