December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Making encoding out of an authentication cipher
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: EVERHART(a)Arisia.GCE.Com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Jul 18 12:44:15 1996 > Suppose you have a secure hash function H(msg) that delivers a random > long period set of hash bits for msg, which is computationally infeasible > to invert and such that the value of H(msg) depends very sensitively on > all bits of msg. These things are used for authentication and tend to > be > all over the world. > > Now suppose I have a key and apply the following transform, where "+" > will mean binary exclusive OR. > > Cipher: > H(key) + M(1) = C(1) > H(key+M(1)) + M(2) = C(2) > H(key+M(2)) + M(3) = C(3) > > and so on where M(n) is the message and C is the enciphered message. > > Decipher: > > H(key) + C(1) = M(1) > H(key+M(1)) + C(2) = M(2) > H(key+M(2)) + C(3) = M(3) > > and so on. > > If the hash function is cryptographically strong, is this or is this > not > a strong cipher? Are there fast hash functions around? > This, along with several other methods (Karn, Luby-Rackoff and MDC are some others) have been suggested in order to convert a hash function into and encryption algorithm. And while the method you suggest has not been broken (at least to my knowledge) there are at least two major problems: 1. It is slow. This method would appear to be approximately the speed of MDC. And MDC (using SHA, what appears to be the most secure hash) is (very roughly) 5 times slower than Blowfish and 3 times slower than IDEA. And although MDC is faster than 3DES in software, 3DES could easily outpace MDC in hardware. 2. (To directly quote Bruce Schneier from Applied Cryptography, page 353) "While these constructions can be secure, they depend on the choice of the underlying hash function. A good one-way hash function doesn't necessarily make a secure encryption algorithm. Cryptographic requirements are different. For example, linear cryptoanalysis is not a viable attack against one-way hash functions, but works against encryption algorithms." (Any typos are mine.) - -- David F. Ogren | ogren(a)concentric.net | "A man without religion is like a fish PGP Key ID: 0x6458EB29 | without a bicycle" - ------------------------------|---------------------------------------- Don't know what PGP is? | Need my public key? It's available Send a message to me with the | by server or by sending me a message subject GETPGPINFO | with the subject GETPGPKEY -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMe5p4uSLhCBkWOspAQFzLQf+J7VGyboBIb4/x2uT3ACs/xgMP11EnggF 6xnrT/TalqJofF1KcEGa3+DgfRRSAn0lxe2jGnLRCAj85zNwXNBy6V4A9pr/0Ldg lD0aHpDFBRXZngqHtCANce8OJvC/EwPbotOuFR+V2vwrB7CHD+4XlNxcfcWDZN7i /ffD6YdUnOpKtvj5ElmPmbOfODC10XD35nRbu1NMurmJQESA14Ohzk9KhRzVkNtv pYkwcCqkR2kWGnWSkew9Zfw4U+IOdFiwb9etgiOEl86hM38cK1SM1RxArEfW3vIw k2EM6o/rF4OIiDUYlJ3STxYAn7kAnOQ6PeYeUu48WmX1Y3q05qmFrQ== =Hj2r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: US versions of Netscape now available
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 AM 7/17/96 -0700, Yap Remailer wrote: >Have you heard any reports of anyone successfully downloading it >period? Netscape always times out in the middle of a download. I >think the server is so overloaded that it's actually impossible to >download the software. Yep. Got it just after the announcement. Came through fine. (After that, i could not get it to download anything, but the first try worked fine.) Sounde like it is overloaded. (Of course, since it is mentioned on their homepage and they only have one machine serving it, what do you expect?) >I sure wish there were an ftp site overseas somewhere, then I could >actually get the damned thing. Give it a week and i am sure that someone will have it available. Something announced this far and wide will manage to leak out somewhere... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE?
by Steven Seyffert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Part of original message below Well Stig, the world is getting crazier by the second..... What about the dutch man that made a trademark out of the name 'Route 66' combined with the highway sign. He got it and now has a nice swimming pool.........of about 100 meters long.......and it's heated! -- ________________________________________________________________________ Steven Seyffert Webmaster at http://www.sale.nl/ Korenbloemstraat 17 3551 GM, Utrecht Utrecht, the Netherlands +31 (0)30-2441251 webmaster(a)sale.nl private: steven(a)knoware.nl ---------- : From: Stig <stig(a)hackvan.com> : To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com : Subject: Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE? : Date: woensdag 17 juli 1996 5:00 : : > btw: I'm surprised DigiCash didn't file for a European Trademark, : > but opted for Benelux and US protection. : : Perhaps this has already been voiced on the main list (I get a filtered : helping or two of cypherpunks), but *I'm* surprised that such a generic name : as 'Ecash' was granted trademark status anywhere. : : It's like giving Microsoft a trademark on the term 'Email'... It's nuts! : Was the term ecash not in use before DigiCash showed up on the scene? : : Stig : : :

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Borders *are* transparent
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:51 AM 7/18/96, snow wrote: >On Tue, 16 Jul 1996, David Sternlight wrote: >> At 3:36 AM -0700 7/16/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >> >At 04:18 PM 7/15/96 -0700, sameer wrote: >> >> Not like that's tough to figure out. Congrats. It's cool to >> >>actually be able to connect to my webserver using real encryption. >> >>Glad the lawyers don't think Barksdale is going to jail anymore. >> >I'm glad too. So how many minutes did it take to leak overseas? >> It doesn't "leak overseas" as if there were some regrettable lapse in the >> plumbing. Someone has to commit a felony violation of Federal law. > > No they don't. If they are French, Russian, English, Greek, etc. They > _may_ be violating their countries laws, but they are not necessarily >violating ours. This is a terribly important point: if a citizen of Foobaria succeeds in connecting to the Netscape site--perhaps by experimenting with various combinations of domain names and submitted address/zipcode combinations--and Netscape sends him the file, he has not committed a crime in his own country. (Unless they have their own laws....) Ironically, under the ITARs, as I understand them, a citizen of Foobaria who "exports" (= retrieves from Netscape's site) such materials actually *has* violated our ITARs. (It is possible for persons outside the U.S. to violate U.S. laws, of course. You can all imagine examples.) Prosecuting a person in Foobaria for violating U.S. ITAR regs would of course be problematic, and unlikely. Likewise, much "export-controlled" software is freely purchasable without any form of identification or proof of citizenship/residency in any of thousands of U.S. software stores. (I don't know if the copies of Netscape Navigator on the shelves in U.S. stores are now the "U.S." version, as opposed to be a somwhat-crippled version, but I sure do know that a *lot* of nominally-export-controlled software _is_ freely purchasable.) Much of this software goes out of the country in luggage. In my various flights out of the U.S. over the years, never have my bags been so much as glanced at, except presumably for bombs with sniffers, scanners, etc. Further, I have mailed optical disks out of the country--a single one of these can store a whole lot of stuff. (As I said in a 1992 interview, a DAT is like a shoulder-fired Stinger missile.) On a trip to France and Monaco last year, I deliberately carried several optical cartridges and couple of DATs, all crammed with software, PGP, RSADSI's MailSafe, Mathematica, etc. To make a point, and as props for my talk on crypto anarchy. Certainly there was no checking on the way out at SFO, and no checking whatsoever at Charles de Gaulle in Paris. (On my return trip, the bored inspector in San Francisco asked what my purpose in being overseas has been. Had I said "tourism" I would've been waved through. Instead, for interest, I said "Meeting with Russian cryptographers in Monte Carlo," just to see what would happen. He asked me what "cryptographers" are or do... "They make secret codes." He then waved me through. Sigh.) None of this is surprising, of course. Borders _are_ transparent. There are so _many_ degrees of freedom for getting stuff across borders. The hope that a bunch of *bits* can be stopped in ludicrous. _This_ is why I expect the Netscape beta to arrive overseas pretty soon. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Steganography
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There has been some discussion on steganography in the past few days. I've been thinking about the subject so here is a list of my random thoughts: 1. Steganography "standard": Current steganography software relies almost totally on security through obscurity. The problem with such an approach is that there is no standard way to extract data from .gif or .jpg files. If two people want to communicate using stego, they have to have some secure channel through which they could negotiate a protocol that could extract information from data files. This brings up the same Catch-22 situation that exists with conventional cryptography. My idea is that there should be some common, well-known way to de-stego data files. This really doesn't weaken the security of any stego software because if strong crypto that doesn't append any headers on to the message is used in conjunction with stego software, then the output of a stego program would just appear to be random garbage. There would be no way for the feds to prove that the random data was encrypted. I don't know much about graphic and sound file formats, but I think that in most cases the least-significant bit of a graphics or sound file should be pretty random anyway. 2. Recognizing stegoed data: Another problem with stegonography is that while many programs use some kind of identifying header so the recipient can tell whether the file contains hidden information or not, this also allows a snooper to determine the same thing. I think that the ability for the recipient to identify whether the data is stegoed or not is important. So I came up with the idea of using a MAC keyed with the session key used to encrypt the hidden data for checking if the picture contains stegoed data. With this approach, an attacker would not be able to verify if a file contained hidden data or not since the session key would be encrypted with the recipient's public key. 3. Message pools: With steganography more widespread, the use of message pools becomes a lot more interesting. People could communicate anonymously using one of the alt.binaries.* groups with everyone else reading the group completely oblivious to this fact. The posts would be pictures that would decode normally, but only the recipient would be able to decrypt the hidden data. Since the binaries newsgroups are among the most popular on the Usenet, reading one of the binaries newsgroups would draw less suspicion then reading alt.anonymous.messages. I don't know how reliable some of the binaries groups are since many NNTP servers don't carry them or expire the articles early, but since cross-posting seems to be fairly common on those newsgroups anyway, a cross-posted file with stegoed data would have a good chance of reaching the recipient. - -- Mark PGP encrypted mail prefered Key fingerprint = d61734f2800486ae6f79bfeb70f95348 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMe6OdLZc+sv5siulAQHMOAP/Yv6SLWY/CCXzXj/91q0hh2M3oVjMr7a6 RBEKCaExosbjJojoTlM9epyzO/gC4jrAj+3IIeciPLHyJPgF2CJmW3NU4bRHPls5 d2kEUPCIc/mLVcbieEC4OO7QlYeFY0vIBn+y1CO3V0kLN20N6Y3845p4a7BY6Wa+ u7dE12QbZLc= =8xQ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Mac Crypto/ internet commerce workshop , sept 5-6, cupertino..
by Vinnie Moscaritolo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Mac Crypto / Internet commerce workshop,( gathering, conference) will happen...YES (if more like machack than anything else.) The dates will be Sept 5/6, Here in Cupertino, CA at Apple. In addition I will also host the Aug (late) or Sept Cypher-punks meeting one of those nights too. My goals are: 1) to provide a vehicle to educate any and all Apple employees and Developers who are responsible for apple's future on the internet about what is going on in the Internet commerce world. 2) To provide a forum where developers can work together to create internet commerce producs for the Macintosh platform. I am responding to the copious feedback that I have recieved from developers both at WWDC and MacHack, through the various mailing lists that I run (Mac-crypto, net-thinkers etc) and through personal contacts. >>>>>>>> I am looking for folks to talk, papers etc.. <<<<<<<<< The (real) prelminary agenda goes something like: (day one) Introductions and overviews: 1) Introduction to crypto technology, what is it who are the players. 2) Introduction to electronic commerce (Finacial cryptograpy), e-cash, e-checks, digital bearer bonds, etc. 3) How to use this technology today, where is the oppertunities. 4) What needs to be done on the Mac, oppertnunites. (day two) Tech stuff. 1) Random number generation on the Mac, (the key to strong crypto) 2) Password management and the Mac (How to get something better than the Powertalk keychain) 3) Optimizing crypto on the PPC. 4) How to write a OT network server that will give you the performance required for transacting business. remember this is a totatly grass-roots thing, but we are gathering momentum. Look at how effective Internet-config is on the Mac. The conference will materialize more in August, consider this an official anouncement. So book your air tickets, while they are cheap.. (bring a parachute?) be there, aloha! Vinnie Moscaritolo Developer Tech Support http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 4FA3298150E404F2782501876EA2146A

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Secure IRC conversations
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi there, does anybody know of a way to have encrypted conversations on the IRC or via ytalk? Thanks, Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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Re: Opiated file systems
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:05 AM 7/18/96, jim bell wrote: >It has long occurred to me, considering the size and low power of the >typical 3.5" hard drive compared with the size of the typical house or >apartment, that it might be an interesting project to remotely connect such >a (hidden) drive to your computer using a reasonably surreptious link that >is difficult to trace. Say, an IR optical link, a single bare (unjacketed) >optical fiber, a LAN with hidden nodes, or a similar system. Maybe an >inductive pickup. In any raid, they'll have to decide what to take, and >chances are very good that they won't find every hidden item. I think the druggies call this a "rat line": two apartments next to each other, with the humans living in one and the drugs stored in the other. The drugs are gotten through a hole in the wall. (Hey, I'm not saying it works, or that it stops raids, prosecutions, convictions, etc. Just noting the existence.) Any multi-unit apartment can do this already, with data. The hard disk can be upstairs and two units away, connected with Ethernet (as many apartment buildings out here in California already are), or whatever. Any raid on Unit 3B, for example, finds that no files are stored locally. A separate investigation and/or search warrant for whereever the files actually are stored would be of course problematic and/or delayed. (Friends of mine have worked on "remote storage" ideas for exactly such applications. Clearly there are many options: storage in other local sites, storage in offshore sites, encrypted storage, even storage by a "priest" functionary ("Son, I am ready to receive your digitally transmitted confession.").) Lots of possibilities. For various reasons, few have been pursued. (Mostly because, I think, there have been relatively few raids on data, and when there have been raids, there were usually other HUMINT-type factors involved. E.g., few child porn rings are going to be broken only on the basis of seized disks. As this situation changes, expect more "data archival" services to evolve.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Internet Through Radio
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know how to Internet through radio using packet modems? By next year, our telephone company will be implementing metered phones, this will be unfair to modem users since they do that to prevent people from talking to the phone for long hours.

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RE: Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:13 AM on 96/07/18 Timothy C. May wrote: >It's a mark of what has gone wrong with this country that >ordinary citizens actually fear the midnight raids, the no-knock >searches, the "threat suppression" by ninjas. I recommend an article sub-titled: Fourteen ways of looking at a blackshirt. I've excerpted particularily relevant pieces below. Eternal Fascism by Umberto Eco New York Review of Books (June 22, 1995) In spite of some fuziness regarding the difference between various historical forms of fascism, I think it is possible to outline a list of features that are typical of what I would like to call Ur-Fascism, or Eternal Fascism. These features cannot be organized into a system; any of them contradict each other, and are also typical of other kinds of despotism or fanaticism. But it is enough that one of them to be present to allow fascism to coagulate around it. [...] 3. Irrationalism also depends on the cult of action for action's sake. Action being beuatiful in itself, it must be taken before, or without, reflection. Thinking is a form of emasculation. [...] 4. The critical spirit makes distinctions, and to distinguish is a sign of modernism. In modern culture the scientific community praises disagreement as a way to improve knowledge. For Ur-Fascism, disagreement is treason. 5. Besides, disagreement is a sign of diversity. Ur-Fascism grows up and seeks consensus by exploiting and exacerbating the natural fear of difference. The first appeal of a fascist or prematurely fascist movement is an appeal against the intruders. Thus Ur-Fascism is racist by definition. 6. Ur-Fascism derive from individual or social frustration. [...] 11. In such a perspective everybody is educated to become a hero. In every mythology the hero is an exceptional being, but in Ur-Fascist ideology heroism is the norm. This cult of heroism is strictly linked with the cult of death. It is not by chance that a motto of the Spanish Falangists was Viva la Muerte ("Long Live Death!"). In nonfascist societies, the lay public is told that death is unpleasant but must be faced with dignity; believers are told that it is the painful way to reach a supernatural hapiness. By contrast, the Ur-Fascist hero craves heroic death, advertised as the best reward for a heroic life. The Ur-Fascist hero is impatient to die. In his impatience, he more frequently sends other people to death. [...] Franklin Roosevelt's words of November 4, 1938, are worth recalling: "If American democracy ceases to move forward as a living force, seeking day and night by *peaceful means* (emphasis mine) to better the lot of our citizens, fascism will grow in strength in our land." Freedom and liberation are an unending task. ---------------------- If you set out to defeat an enemy because you despise what they do or say, make sure that you are different - not just stronger. Ciao, James

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