December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Moscowchannel.com hack
by pjb＠23kgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FWIW, not even root can unmount a file system that is busy. -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Sun Sep 1 18:17:12 1996 > Subject: Re: Moscowchannel.com hack > To: snow(a)smoke.suba.com (snow) > Date: Sun, 1 Sep 1996 10:09:32 -0500 (CDT) > Cc: joelm(a)eskimo.com, Cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Reply-To: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov) > From: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) > X-No-Archive: yes > Organization: Bool Sheet Software > X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL24 ME7] > Content-Type> : > text> > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 689 > > snow wrote: > > > > On Sat, 31 Aug 1996, Joel McNamara wrote: > > > > > Not really crypto, but related to the DOJ hack in a way. > > > > > > Moscow Channel is a pretty slick, Russian news/commentary page. Their Web > > > site was hacked and altered by someone who didn't seem to like Russians all > > > Just a matter of time before some builds a dedicated Satan type tool that > > > scans for HTTP server holes or messed up file permissions to make locating > > > potential victims easy. > > Write your web site to a CD-ROM and hard-code the base directory into the > > webserver. > > A hacker who has root can forcibly unmount the cdrom and mount another > directory on that node. Not a good solution. > > - Igor. >

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desubscribe
by Brett Eitland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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by Christopher Carper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Sharp Knives
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:38 PM 9/2/96, Dave Harman OBC wrote: >In California, it's a felony to merely *own* a Ninja star. It's a >felony to carry a *concealed* knife, but carrying it openly in a >holster is legal. It's a felony for most people to carry a >concealed loaded handgun on the street only on a *second* offense. >It'a a felony to merely *own* a switchblade, brass knuckles, etc. >Do our weapons laws sound strange? Are many of our weapons laws >stricter than countries like Sweden? Yes! Most laws about knives, dirks, daggers, brass knuckles, saps, etc. were devised to control the coloreds, who could not afford the weapons of choice of whites and other gentlemen. Hence, a colored who gets picked up on some charge, or detained, can be jailed on a felony charge for having a pocketknife, or a sap, or brass knucks. Coloreds from Asia can be jailed for having the martial arts sorts of weapons. A white gets a misdemeanor charge for carrying a gun. (This analysis is not original with me. The gun magazines have noted the racist origins of misdemeanor/felony dichotomies for many years. One article I read a few years ago traced the precise times at which these laws came into being...mostly the times in various states corresponded with periods of high immigration of coloreds to major cities.) Here in California there's a bill pending in the legislature which would decriminalize the carrying of a pocketknife that can be opened with one hand (a la the Spyderco, Benchmade, Buck, Cold Steel, etc., knives with thumb holes or studs). Even though such knives are openly sold in every sporting goods store I have ever been in, and are carrried by a truly large fraction of the population, such knives are currently classified as "switchblades" and can be prosecuted as a felony. A good way to selectively harasss someone. Interestingly, it was the District Attorneys lobbying group in California which made the difference: they argued that such laws are unenforceable or are selectively enforced. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Censorpore as a Terror State
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:29 AM 9/2/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >While Tim's article title was clearly intended to be provocative, Indeed, I write many things to be _provocative_. Not to be insulting, but to challenge orthodoxies. And when I hear mealy-mouthed platitudes along the lines of "foreigners do not understand the special needs of our nation, and do not understand why Benevolent Father Yew channels our thoughts in more productive directions," I have to call a spade a spade. (quoting James Seng) >>In addition, you need to see the method of censorship deployed in >>Singapore. For press media like papers and magazine, it is done in a >>passive manner. They _do not_ read every issue of every magazine available >>in Singapore. They only do so when there is enough complains. > >This also means you don't know what is safe to print and what isn't. >You have to restrict yourself very strongly, because otherwise >some politically influential person will complain to the government, >and you go to jail. At least if the government tells you what >the rules are, you know it's safe to say things that don't violate them. Yes, what James Seng calls a "passive manner" is often worse than censorship in a direct manner. Psychologists would mention "random reinforcement" at this point. When there is _direct_ censorship, with clearly defined rules, publishers will skate as close to the edge of the envelope as they can, and even test the limits. When there is _passive_ or _vague_ censorship, with rules not carefully spelled out but with the possibility of prosecution and jail time always looming, then publishers and others will rein themselves in, taking the cautious route. This is, of course, often the result desired, that people invoke "the policeman inside" (to use the Burroughs term). This is really the essence of a "terror state." The rules are not known, the fear of a knock on the door is omnipresent, and the Beloved Ruler may dispatch his enforcers on a whim. >>ps: Sorry for the off-topic discussion. > >It's not off-topic. Building tools to prevent censorship is >distinctly on-topic for cypherpunks, and an occasional digression into >whether it's a good idea is worthwhile. Exactly. A discussion of routing-around Censorpore's policies is at least as on-topic as the 17th discussion of some snake oil cipher. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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National ID Card Web Pages
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EXTENSIVE NATIONAL ID CARD WEB SITE IS NOW ON LINE The London-based human rights watchdog Privacy International (PI) has just opened an extensive web page on National ID cards. The initiative comes in the wake of pending efforts in the United States, Canada and United Kingdom to implement national ID card systems. The page contains a 7,000 word FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) on all aspects of ID cards and their implications. Also included in the PI documents is a paper describing successful campaigns opposing to ID cards in Australia and other countries. The page also has links to numerous other sites and documents. PI Director Simon Davies said he hoped the page would help promote debate about the cards, "ID cards are often introduced without serious discussion or consultation. The implications are profound, and countries planning to introduce them should proceed with caution." "The existence of a card challenges important precepts of individual rights and privacy. At a symbolic and a functional level, ID cards are often an unnecessary and potentially dangerous white elephant. They are promoted by way of fear-mongering and false patriotism, and are implemented with scant regard for serious investigation of the consequences." he said. The URL is : http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/ PI has also set up an auto response function for the FAQ document. Its address is: idcardfaq(a)mail.privacy.org Privacy International is an international human rights group concerned with privacy and surveillance issues. It is based in London, UK. For further information contact the Privacy International Washington Office at +1.202.544.9240 or email pi(a)privacy.org. PI's web page is available at: http://www.privacy.org/pi/ _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: National ID Card Web Pages _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)privacy.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Privacy International Washington Office * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.privacy.org/pi/ Washington, DC 20003

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Modem tax again?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I recall, the alleged "subsidy" consists of lack of payments so rural areas can have subsidized phone service - thus making their costs borne by everyone else. -Allen > _________________________________________________________________ > Avis > _________________________________________________________________ > INTERNET IS HURTING PHONE NETWORKS, STUDY SAYS > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 San Francisco Examiner > SAN FRANCISCO (Aug 27, 1996 3:11 p.m. EDT) -- Hoping to reduce or end > a subsidy that has kept down the cost of on-line service, local phone > companies here have presented the Federal Communications Commission > with studies arguing that Internet users are overtaxing phone networks > and ought to pay more for monthly service. > The studies, one of which was published on the Internet, argue that a > 13-year-old subsidy lets Internet service providers (ISPs) pay a > fraction of what a long distance company pays to get a phone line, > even though Internet calls may use more phone system capacity than > voice traffic. [...] > For their part, ISPs are alarmed at the remote possibility that the > FCC might let phone companies raise their monthly costs from the > current monthly average of $30 to anything approaching the $600 that > some long distance carriers pay for a phone line. > "If we had to pay anything like long distance access charges, it would > put all the ISPs out of business," said Ronald Plesser, the > Washington, D.C., attorney who represents the Commercial Internet > Exchange, an ISP trade group. > FCC staff attorney Kevin Werbach said the subsidy began in 1983, when > the five-member federal commission created a special rate to encourage > the growth of on-line services, voicemail companies and other emerging > industries that offered enhanced electronic services over phone lines. > In 1987, the FCC considered ending the subsidy but backed down after > public protest over what came to be characterized as the "modem tax." > Given the growth in on-line usage, ISPs assume any talk of ending the > subsidy would create a bigger backlash today. > "There are a minimum of 20 million and perhaps as many as 40 million > on-line and Internet users and many of them are registered voters," > said William Schrader, president of PSI Net, an ISP in Herndon, Va. > Schrader said when he visited several FCC members recently, he > suggested that many of those users would be happy to send a letter of > protest to FCC Chairman Reed Hundt. [...] > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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The Earliest CP Remailer *DID* Emphasize Anonymity
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:22 AM 9/2/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >>From what I know of remailer history, the main original goal >of the cypherpunks-style remailer was to provide >security against traffic analysis by eavesdroppers, rather than to >prevent the recipient from knowing the sender's address, though >everybody pretty quickly realized that the latter was an interesting >feature, especially coupled with posting to Usenet. No, the focus was at _least_ as much on providing anonymity as on protection from eavesdroppers or traffic analysts. More so, actually. How do I know this? Well, I was the one who did the presentation on Chaumian mixes at the first meeting, describing them as remailers and using paper envelopes-within-envelopes to illustrate the concept. Later that day, in the "Crytpo Anarchy Game" we played to educate the attendees, remailers were used to post anonymous offers of goods and services, to make contact in message pools, and to generally implement a crypto-anarchic, distributed system. (With some obvious flaws, stalls, and other weirdnesses.) Still, it embodied most of what we see today (and a lot more that we still haven't managed to implement). The next afternoon, Hugh Daniel, Eric Hughes, and I went out for some bagels and talked about what had been learned. Either Hugh or Eric had the idea of coding up the remailer in C or Perl. As it turned out, Eric was the one to do it, a few weekends later, using Perl (which he learned enough of on Saturday to then do on Sunday). The first remailer was put for use and immediately began to be used for anonymous postings. And all of the early uses were explicitly to anonymize the sender, not to deter eavesdropping (which conventional crypto works well for, anyway). The Kleinpaste-style remailer was in a nascent stage, and Julf was running one on his site. But we all knew the longterm advantages of chained remailers, and, of course, even the very first Hughes remailer supported arbitrary chaining. And we also knew of the central defect of the Kleinpaste-style anonymizer, that law enforcement would seek the records through subpoena. As it turned out, penet lasted longer than I for one thought it would. PGP encryption was added soon after to the Hughes-style remailer, by Hal Finney, as I recall. Later developments, by Matt Ghio, Lance Cottrell, etc., added to the capabilities. So, the anonymizing and arbitrary chaining (which is for protection against collusion of the remailers and subpoenas of logs) features were there from the start. Even before the start, as the "Crypto Anarchy Game" had them. (I've been clear that it was Eric Hughes who coded the first Perl version, but I feel I have to make my own role clear. There are some critics of me here on this list who have claimed "Tim has never done a thing for Cypherpunks except talk." Well, besides organizing the first meeting with Eric, and giving the morning talk on the topics mentioned, and demonstrating the role of mixes and digital cash, and writing articles on many topics, and setting up BlackNet (which actually works, and is not just an idea), and on and on, I'm satisfied with my contributions. Your mileage may vary.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Sharp Knives
by qut＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

! How do these Ninja stars work anyway? ! ! I've heard about them, but do not know much. I don't know either, they're as illegal to own as it is to rip off a car!

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EFF chairwoman: Anonymity proven not to be a positive factor
by um＠c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a Scientology magazine: Esther Dyson, member of the board of directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and member of the National Information Infrastructure Advisory Council, spoke on the anonymity issue at the fifth Computers, Freedom & Privacy (CFP) conference in San Francisco. [...] "I have a concern about the spread of bad behavior on the Net," said Dyson. "Anonymity figures into this, and I feel that it has proven to not be a positive factor. It breaks down the community which we are seeking to build, and cout protection and privacy laws already exist and should be applied in a broad way, such that they are transparent to new wrinkles in the technology. It is not necessary to view the world of the Net as different from the rest of the world." http://www.anonymizer.com:8080/http://www.theta.com/goodman/hijack.htm [For EFF's former position on anonymity, see http://ftp.sterling.com:80/COAST/doc/law+ethics/EFF-Anonymity]

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