December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A SPANIARD IN THE WORKS? (non-crypto)
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Is there anyone on the list who lives in Spain? If so, please reply by private e-mail. Thanks, S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Tolerance (fwd)
by peter honeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh writes: > This is attempted proof by credentalism. I call him on it. > > Okay, Jim, what _do_ your lawyers say on this? Have you asked them? I, > too, have an attorney, a civil liberties specialist and a graduate from > Princeton law. So what? declan, you are a fucking liar, and i am calling you on it. princeton does not have a law school. peter

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Re: Corporate e-mail policy
by James C. Sewell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:22 PM 8/3/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat wrote: > What you >publish as a use policy, and what you actively enforce do not have to be >the same. > Unfortunately this is a problem in many companies. There are policies which are enforced to the letter, guidelines which are just suggestions, and fake-rules which are not even attempted to be enforced. The problem comes when the employee and employer can't distinguish them from each other. Personally I think I would approach it as the privacy we have with the eontents of our car's trunk. If an officer has probable cause to search the trunk then he can, otherwise he can't. It's not a perfect system but it does work better than other alternatives I can think of. Write into your policy: "Electronic mail may be monitored if there is sufficient reason to believe that it is being improperly used which includes, but is not limited to: mail to competitors, more than 20 recipients (spam), and incoming mail from questionable sources. If such monitored mail is encrypted the employee must provide a clear text version of the mail which is to be unencrypted under supervision to avoid substitutions. Any employee refusing to make available such mail will be ...." Just remember, as was said, once you make a policy it becomes precedence and will stick with you forever... longer if it's a bad one. Best Wishes Jim Jim Sewell - jims(a)tansoft.com Tantalus Incorporated - Key West, FL

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Re: crypto CD source
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Aug 05 10:08:19 1996 I'm looking for contents for the crypto CD. Since this CD will (might) be mastered in Switzerland, no ITAR applies to the CD, but if anyone wants to include some restricted stuff, send it to me (dat, disk or encrypted email) Address: Pini Computer Trading "Crypto CD" Hofwiesenstr. 234 8057 Zuerich Switzerland My wish list: - - PGP - - A lot of algorithms in C, Pascal, ASM (for diverse processors) - - Private Idaho - - Pronto Secure - - a suite of html pages describing all files (I'll probably have to do that myself) - - Netscape (the secure versions, if its legally feasable -> Netscape?) - - Crypto papers - - Crypto analysis papers - - Lawtexts concerning crypto (ITAR, France, ...) Anything else? - --------< fate favors the prepared mind >-------- Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/remopini/rpcrypto.html - ------< words are what reality is made of >------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMgWr9BFhy5sz+bTpAQEOuQf+PAfJrxDLo4mEDsC8QelbBE5WHqNecmcq soPN0ZDSDzSEdbofALHBEiAW8SHVT4h1XWPNG1QjNvuCsluLN4HX1IQSfCjjCNzO /T9jqNqKbwDL5ssluD9nc/tbjaTN2zdXIVRE2/1QZmyrysT5MK5tiHzbbkrFjSy2 tVwUmEk9W+gTAzNBxLE5ni2Q6oLLuf+jnzw0jBn15nA3S7USN+G+dMsNG2ROR7ZI Lp1a9XvqtjZ41Ju1C0QVR6u53a7mB8unrxxALewF2TjJUXxJOA0W1QbxM8/aI6cb jjePr0NoohyCORLNh+pGaBQ+DXYY28JL5keCyGCr8k/INXHIksbEIQ== =aTqo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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viruss'
by Zero Cool 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know where thre is good virus page???? I know that there is one out there, but dont have the add. Zero Cool

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FUCK YOU, SHITOPUNKS
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUCK YOU, SHITOPUNKS DAVID STERNLIGHT

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Imprisoned for Not Having a Gun?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:35 PM 8/8/96, talon57(a)well.com wrote: >Jonathon <grafolog(a)netcom.com> wrote: > >>Said ordinance being passed, as a protest against Elk Grove, IL >>passing an orinance, banning handguns. Anybody know when Elk >>Grove revoked their ordinance? Crime went down for six months >>there [ Elk Grove ] after the ban was passed, then it went up >>far surpassing previous crime levels, for all types of crime. > >Pardon me Jonathon, but I believe you are confusing Morton Grove >with Elk Grove. I do not have the statistics for the crime rates >there, but several friends who have moved from there insist the >crime rate has continued upwards as you mentioned. Also there are >a couple of other interesting facts. Regarding that town nearby that passed a _requirement_ that all households have a gun: "Ma'm, I'm Deputy Uptite, of the Dork's Grove Sheriff's Department. I'm here to check on reports that you haven't obtained a gun, as required by law. Could I come in and take a look around?" "But I don't like guns, and I don't want one in my house." "I'm sorry, ma'm, but it's the law. According to the People's Self-Protection Act of 1997, you _must_ have a gun. Now what I'm going to do is give you a break. Think of this as a "fix-it ticket." Take this down to my cousin's gun store, right off of Main and 10th, and he'll get you set up with a Glock 23 or maybe a nice little Beretta. Shouldn't cost you more than $400, and it'll save you a 6-month stretch at the work farm. Have a nice day. Oh, and be sure to spend at least an hour at the week at the range...that's part of the law, too." --- Pro-gun fascism is just as bad a anti-gun fascism. I do recall that the "you must have a gun" town had some exemptions for folks opposed to guns, blah blah, but it still is intensely revolting to me that any town could ever pass such a law. Much as I think being armed is useful and all that, allowing such a law to go unchallenged feeds into the same approach that tries to ban guns...if guns can be required, they can be banned. What part of the Second Amendment did they not understand? (Legal quibblers will perhaps say the Second applies to _Congress_ (as in "Congress shall make no law"), and not to states and communities. I disagree. Can a town restrict free speech just because it is not the Congress?) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Boom!
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, if it turns out that TWA 800 was an accidental wing tank explosion, will they give us our civil liberties back? If not, why not? DCF "'It Takes a Village to Raise a Child' -- an unemployed hausfrau living in public housing in Washington, D.C."

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Edited Edupage, 1-Aug-1996
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"educom(a)educom.unc.edu" 1-AUG-1996 17:11:49.07 To: IN%"edupage(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" "EDUCOM Edupage Mailing List" >***************************************************************** >Edupage, 1 August 1996. Edupage, a summary of news about information >technology, is provided three times a week as a service by Educom, >a Washington, D.C.-based consortium of leading colleges and universities >seeking to transform education through the use of information technology. >***************************************************************** [...] >CELLULAR PHONE COMPANIES FIGHT CLONING >To fight the illegal practice called "cloning," cellular telephone carriers >will be adopting new "smart phone" technology intended to foil high-tech >criminals by matching calls with encoded passwords. In cloning, pirates >use portable scanners and computers to intercept the cellular phone user's >phone and serial numbers as they are being broadcast to a transmitting >tower or "cell site." The new digital phones will contain a non-clonable >''smart cards'' that encrypt the identifying information to prevent >scanners from eavesdropping or cloning the customer's telephone number. >(San Jose Mercury News 1 Aug 96) It sounds like the "smart cards" will have some chip oddities to try to prevent reading them - something in TCMay's department. I do wonder whether they're going to have one key for all of them, or differing keys for each user. If the former, then cracking one (which I get the impression is quite possible) equals cracking all, of course. >G7 LEADERS & THE INTERNET >Experts on electronic communications said ideas presented by G7 leaders for >fighting terrorism by restricting access to the Internet are "naive and >probably unworkable" because there are too many ways to circumvent >censorship on the Net to believe regulation could prevent terrorists from >using the technology for communications. (Toronto Globe & Mail 1 Aug 96 >A4) Yes... although it could be rather inconvenient. >CANADIAN SERVICE PROVIDERS TACKLE OBJECTIONABLE MATERIAL >Canadian access providers are developing guidelines for dealing with >potentially objectionable material and have set up a code of conduct >committee, with goals that include establishing guidelines members can use >to determine if information stored on their servers is illegal. (Toronto >Globe & Mail 1 Aug 96 B1) [...] >CERTIFIED WEB SITES >The National Computer Security Association in Carlisle, PA., will certify >that a Web site meets minimum security specifications, including the >presence of firewalls, use of passwords, and encryption of sensitive data >transmission. Certifications costs $8500 a year and requires that the site >submit to remote tests, an NCSA site visit, and random compliance audits. >(Computerworld 29 Jul 96 p2) One hopes that the level of encryption will be required to be above single DES, at least... >Edupage is written by John Gehl <gehl(a)educom.edu> & Suzanne Douglas ><douglas(a)educom.edu>. Voice: 404-371-1853, Fax: 404-371-8057. >Technical support is provided by Information Technology Services at the >University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. >*************************************************************** >Edupage ... is what you've just finished reading. To subscribe to Edupage: >send mail to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu with the message: subscribe edupage >Gene Fullmer (if your name is Gene Fullmer; otherwise, substitute your >own name). ... To cancel, send a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu with >the message: unsubscribe edupage. (If you have subscription problems, >send mail to manager(a)educom.unc.edu.)

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Re: PGP public key servers are NOT useful!
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What I want to prevent is some person I dislike uploading his > signature on my key Yes, that's unpreventable. It still does not change the fact that it is up to the person using your public key to determine if you are indeed that actual owner of that key. > How would you like it if I added a new ID to your key containing sort > of insult, certified that ID, and uploaded the new signature to the > key servers. RTFM. Look, go into PGP and try to change your key ID. You will note that PGP asks you to provide the passphrase to your secret key before allowing an id change. Someone could not get your public key off of a keyserver and change the id of the key. The need both your secret key and your passphrase to do that. Now someone could create a key-pair themselves and falsely assign your e-mail address and some miscellaneous crap as the ID. They could then upload the"rogue" public key portion of this keypair to the servers. However, the falsity of this "rogue" public key can be easily determined by you and anyone who is trying to communicate securely with you. All of this is explained with great clarity in the PGP documentation. Think about this... Suppose I knew who you were and knew your e-mail address. What's to stop me from creating a "rogue" key-pair with your address as the e-mail id and uploading it to the keyservers? Just because you don't utilize the keyservers, doesn't mean your public key can't be placed there. "Controlling" the distribution of your public key is giving you a false sense of security where none is really needed. Ponder: why is a public key called a "public" key? "Controlling" the distribution of you public key is a pointless exercise. Controlling authentication is what you and those who communicate securely with you whould be concerned about. me -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <omega(a)bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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