December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Drive the SF Central Freeway, have your license plate
by Bob Jonkman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >At 21:55 8/8/96, i am not a number! wrote: > >>CBS radio news this morning: 80,000 commuters traveling the > >>central f'way in SF will have information mailed to them > >>regarding the quake retrofit How? Their license plates have > >>been photographed. > At 10:45 PM 8/8/96 -0700, Lucky wrote: > >You *are* making this up, right? Please say you did. Maybe '!number' was making it up, but license plate photography exists today in the Great White North. A new freeway is being built through Brampton, the 407ETR, for Express Toll Route. At each on and off ramp there are electronic pickups and video cameras. You can subscribe to the toll by buying a transducer that sits behind your rear-view mirror, signals from which will be picked up by the the toll gates as you enter and leave the freeway. If you elect not to subscribe your license plate will be photographed and you'll get a bill in the mail. If you elect not to pay the bill you'll be nabbed for it the next time you go to get your drivers license or car registration renewed... Big Brother is not only watching, he's recording your location and destination, measuring your distance travelled, and charging you for the privilege of driving... ===== Bob Jonkman SOBAC Microcomputer Services 4 Gold Pine Court mailto:bjonkman@sobac.com Brampton ON L6S 2K6 Canada Voice: 905-793-4537 Networking -- Office & Business Automation -- Consulting Key fingerprint: 9F AF A6 AC B5 67 BC 10 89 73 7C F0 CB 27 03 17 finger -l bjonkman(a)sobac.com or send mail with subject 'send key'

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Re: Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" >to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. I certainly don't support the person or people responsible for this and it may very well end up having an overall negative impact. Since it has happened, however, I think those in a position to do so should start with the spin control. Some suggestions: The fact that even the U.S. Justice Department is unable to adequately protect it's own site from intruders underscores the need for widely- available strong encryption. While this is certainly a major embarrassment for the Justice Department, at least the mandatory "key escrow" program the Clinton administration is insisting upon has not yet been implemented; no private citizens' data appears to have been compromised this time. It's doubtful that a new law or government bureaucracy would have prevented this from happening but it's entirely possible that tools such as strong encryption could have. It's ironic that the U.S. Government is focusing on the former while fighting use of the latter. This event could potentially draw a lot of interest from the general public. Since we're dealing with public perceptions largely created through the main- stream media, it's important to remember that "sound bites" are more important than carefully reasoned arguments. | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: | It always takes longer than you expect, even Frank Stuart | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Re: Ad Hoc Bay Area Cypherpunks Thing--Sat., 24 Aug, 3 pm, Menlo Park
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:17 PM 8/17/96, Simon Spero wrote: >On Sat, 17 Aug 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> There is no Cypherpunks event scheduled for that Saturday, but we can have >> an ad hoc gathering, informally arranged. I suggest meeting at 3 p.m. at >> Cody's Bookstore, on El Camino Real in Menlo Park (hard to miss). Or at the >> coffee shop next to it...either should be sufficient Schelling points to > >Do you mean Kepler's? That's the one right near Menlo Park caltrain >station; the coffee shop next to it is Cafe Borone. Get the Mocha. > Yeah, I was thinking of Kepler's. (Cody's is in Berkeley, of course.) Once again: KEPLER'S BOOKS. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Final release of Navigator (with strong crypto) now available
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff Weinstein (jsw(a)netscape.com) wrote: : The final release of Navigator 3.0, complete with non-exportable : strong crypto, is now available for download by US citizens. Note : that this is the released version of 3.0, so it will not expire. : You can get it from: Would it be possible to both supply an Linux ELF and a.out binary ? : http://wwwus.netscape.com/eng/US-Current/ : --Jeff -- Alex de Joode | Replay IP Service & Web DZign -- The Netherlands usura(a)replay.com | http://www.replay.com mailto:info@replay.com

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Re: FCC_ups
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:36 AM 8/18/96 +0000, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: >> >First flat rates would have to go out. >> >If Alice uses her phone for 5 hrs in month and pay _x_ dollars and Bob uses >> >his for 100 hrs and pays _x_ dollars, then Alice is subsidising Bob, which >> >is not really ethical. Everyone should pay for the amount of bandwith >> >one is using. >> >> I'm afraid you're promoting what I consider a rather old (and, now, odd) way >> to look at it. Unlike old mechanical telephone switches, the new hardware >> does not "wear out" and thus a person who uses it more doesn't cost the >> phoneco any more bucks. If that's the case, I don't see the logic in >> charging a person more for greater use. >> >Machinery 'wear and tear' is a small part of Infrastructure maintainance costs. There are tons of other things. Hidden costs, management, laying new pipes,etc. Well, let's consider such costs. Most of which (maintenance, management, rolling stock) are unrelated to amount of telephone usage. So there is no reason that these costs should be unequally attributed to a person who makes local calls 1 hour per day, as opposed to another who only calls 15 minutes per day, for example. As for the "laying new pipes" issue: Years ago in the the US, when inter-central-office trunk connections were all implemented using large bundles of copper pairs, it would have been _correct_ to say that higher telephone usage resulted in larger costs, since more trunk lines were necessary. Today, on the other hand, inter-office trunks (at least the new ones, and I presume that even many of the old ones have been switched over) are implemented in fiber optics. Extra capacity is either automatically available (since the capacity of a given fiber is unlikely to be fully used) or can be fairly simply added by converting old fiber from about 450 megabits per second to 2.4 gigabits, or even faster rates which have become more recently available. >But you miss my point, if a phoneco is not getting a penny for its long distanceservices (which subsidise the flat rate local calls) then the choice would >be to close down. Which would be a severe attack to the local internet usage. That's an entirely unsupported claim. Nobody claims that telephone usage (term used generically) is on the way out. "Closing down" is only going to happen if local phonecos cease to be able to provide a service that people are willing to pay for. And as for the amount of the subsidy, let's look at it. I've read around here recently that the amount of the charge is 3 cents per minute. If we assume an average LD rate of 15 cents per minute, that's 20% of the bill. If an average LD bill is $15 per month, that's only $3 per line, per month. It seems to me that those local phonecos could simply raise their local charges by this and totally compensate for the loss of that subsidy. However, an even more likely outcome is that they will make structural changes which they've been able to avoid after decades as a regulated, monopolized business: Reduce personnel levels, especially in areas other than those in which they are actually providing telephone service. Reduce salaries from "comfy" to "competitive." Before it was broken up in 1983, AT+T was a regulated monopoly and was, more or less, guaranteed a profit. Extra costs, such as higher staffing levels and higher salaries, simply increased the rates, they didn't reduce the profits. This system is still in force with the local phoneco side of the business. Anther thing which could be done, from the government's side (as part of an industry restructuring) is to allow phonecos to greatly accelerate their tax write-off of existing depreciating equipment, perhaps down to as low as 5 years or so. The theory is, these phonecos are going to start competing with companies who are only buying their equipment today, and it would be unfair to saddle the older companies with old, inefficient equipment without allowing them to completely write it off quickly. (This, of course, doesn't mean that they need to actually take it out of service...) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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_Secret Power_ (re: "world communications being monitored")
by Paul Foley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forewords from Nicky Hager's book _Secret Power_: Once upon a time life was easy for the intelligence community. Michael Joeseph Savage made a mark in the sands of history with his `where Britain stands we stand' declaration. It was only right that we saw the world through British eyes and, when Britain retreated, only sensible that we should go all the way with LBJ as an Australian Prime Minister (in whose memory a swimming pool in Melbourne was named) once declared. The cold war kept us in line and on line. In the mid-1980s we bucked the system. We may have been ahead of our time on matters nuclear, but we were out of step with what was called the `Western Alliance'. It took a break with the United States and Britain to make the people of New Zealand aware that we were part of an international intelligence organisation which had its roots in a different world order and which could command compliance from us while withholding from us the benefits of others' intelligence. Life at the time was full of unpleasant surprises. State-sponsored terrorism was a crime against humanity as long as it wasn't being practiced by the allies, when it was studiously ignored. In the national interest it became necessary to say `ouch' and frown and bear certain reprisals of our intelligence partners. We even went the length of building a satellite station at Waihopai. But it was not until I read this book that I had any idea that we had been committed to an international integrated electronic network. It was with some apprehension that I learned Nicky Hager was researching the activity of our intelligence community. He has long been a pain in the establishment's neck. Unfortunately for the establishment, he is engaging, thorough, unthreatening, with a dangerously ingenuous appearance, and an atonishing number of people have told him things that I, as Prime Minister in charge of the intelligence services, was never told. There are also many things with which I am familiar. I couldn't tell him which was which. Nor can I tell you. But it is an outrage that I and other ministers were told so little, and this raises the question of to whom those concerned saw themselves ultimately anwserable. It also raises the question as to why we persist with the old order of things. New Zealand doesn't have much in common with Major's Britain and probably less with Blair's Britain. Are we philosophically in tune with Clinton's USA? Is he? Does all of that prejudice our new orientation to Asia? There will be two responses to this book. One will take the easy course of dumping on Hager. He is quite small and can easily be dumped on. The other will be to challenge the existing assumptions and to have a rational debate on security and intelligence. I have always enjoyed taking the easier course but we may have been the poorer for it. David Lange Prime Minister of New Zealand 1984-89 ------------------------------------- The world of signals intelligence is one that governments have traditionally tried to keep hidden from public view. The secrecy attached to it by the United Kingdom and its allies in the Second World War, particularly codebreaking operations, carried over into the Cold War. Whether their adversaries were attacking them with weapons or diplomatic strategies, the concern was the same --- that revelations about methods and successes would lead an adversary to change codes and ciphers and deny the codebreaker the ability to read the foe's secret communications. Another aspect of the Second World War that carried over into the Cold War era was the close co-operation between five countries --- the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand --- formalised with the UKUSA Security Agreement on 1948. Although the treaty has never been made public, it has become clear that it not only provided for a division of collection tasks and sharing of the product, but for common guidelines for the classification and protection of the intelligence collected as well as for personal security. But over the last 50 years, codebreaking has become far more difficult, and often impossible --- due to the use of computer based encryption. At the same time, the interception of unencrypted communications (for example, air-to-ground communications) and other electronic signals --- particularly radar emanations and missile telemetry --- has grown dramatically in importance. This expanded role for signals intelligence was made evident in the construction and operation of a vast networkof ground stations spread across the world, aircraft equipped with intercept antenna patrolling the skies (and sometimes being shot down), and eventually the launch of eavesdropping satellites. This activity did not escape the notice of the Soviet Union, which also was busy establishing its own elaborate network. It also became very evident to outsider observers that signals intelligence was an important and very expensive part of the Cold War. That signals intelligence became more noticeable did not, for many years, alter the attitudes of the authorities about the necessity for strict secrecy. In the United States, the National Security Agency, established in 1952, was officially acknowledged only in 1957. For years, what were well known to be US operated signals intelligence stations have been officially described as facilities engaged in the research of `electronic phenomena' or the `rapid-relay of communications.' It took the US over 20 years after the Soviet Union obtained detailed information on a US signals intelligence satellite even to acknowledge the existance of such satellites. Other nations have been equally reticent --- the very existance of Canada's Communications Security Establishment was first revealed by the media in 1975. In recent years some of the UKUSA governments have been somewhat more forthcoming about signals intelligence sometimes with regard to historical events, sometimes with respect to organisation structure, and sometimes about some aspect of current operations. But secrecy is still intense (although no more than in other countries). What the public does know, it knows largely because of the efforts of industrious researchers who have collected and analysed obscure documents and media accounts, and interviewed present and former intelligence officers who can shed light on signals intelligence operations. These researchers have included Desmond Ball in Australia, James Bamford in the United States and Duncan Campbell in the United Kingdom. Nicky Hager's _Secret Power_ earns him a place in that select company. Indeed, he has produced the most detailed and up-to-date account in existance of the work of any signals intelligence agency. His exposé of the organisation and operations of New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) is a masterpiece of investigative reporting and provides a wealth of information. The reader of Mr Hager's book will learn about not just New Zealand's signals intelligence activities, but those of its partners. Specifically, the reader will learn about the origins, the evolution, and internal structure of the GCSB; the Tangimoana and Waihopai ground stations and their operations; New Zealand's role in the UKUSA alliance, and some of the signals intelligence operations of the other UKUSA nations. _Secret Power_ also serves as a fascinating case study of the role of a junior partner in an intelligence alliance. Some, undoubtedly, will object to the unprecendented detail to be found in the book, taking the traditional view that secrecy is far more important than public understanding of how tax dollars are being spent on intelligence. Certainly, revelations that defeat the purpose of legitimate intelligence activities are unfortunate and waste those tax dollars. But the UKUSA governments and their intelligence services have been far too slow in declassifying information that no longer needs to be secret and far too willing to classify information that need not be restricted. A Canadian newspaper made the point rather dramatically a few years ago --- after being denied access to a Canadian signals intelligence facility, the paper promptly purchased on the open market, and published, a satellite photograph of the facility, and its antenna system, first obtained by a Soviet spy satellite. There are many individuals within the services who would prefer greater openness, but they frequently cannot overcome the intense opposition of those preaching the need for tight secrecy. The internal bureaucratic battle to get information declassified can be a long and intense one and those opposing disclosure have an advantage --- often they are those in charge of security, who have developed a mindset which views any revelation as damaging. In the meantime, the public is kept in the dark. A free press, as manifested in books such as Mr Hager's, is large step towards alleviating the problem. Jeffrey T. Richelson Alexandria, Virginia May, 1996 Jeffrey Richelson is a leading authority on United States intelligence agencies and author of _America's Secret Eyes in the Sky_ and co-author of _The Ties That Bind_.

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Orbiting Datahavens
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> How about an orbiting DataHaven. No jurisdiction to bother with, In> extremely difficult to get to (except by large governments...). You In> could put together a couple of Linux boxes with a RAID system, some In> backups and a large solar panel and have a very nice, secure DataHaven. I bet one of those "weather" satalites would blow that thing out of the air in no time flat... :) P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... "Very funny, Scotty. Now beam down my clothes." ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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New type-I middleman!
by John Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following message is a courtesy copy of an article that has been posted as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Everyone! I just completed beta testing my Type-I (ghio-style) Middleman remailer and I'm ready for it to go online publically. Just like the Middleman type-II (mixmaster) remailer, the type-I Middleman randomly selects a remailer path to send messages based on Raph Levien's remailer list. Additionally, to foil traffic analysis, the Middleman type-I remailer also supports message reordering. This means that middleman(a)jpunix.com is now a fully functional type-I/type-II remailer that uses the middleman random remailer feature in additon to reordering. All of the available functionlity that you would find in either a Mixmaster remailer as well as a Cypherpunks remailer is available in the middleman(a)jpunix.com remailer. Below is the public PGP key for middleman(a)jpunix.com. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzIXHroAAAEEAPLBq/n4a5ldzm8F51Lk63iHyOJfm+lmxW8PgjbKdAPAJBHk xUHXEeOX/gQ8RXV0W6vYwmiFcQBA7b4w3iJwptC8GN98t4o31SVHlouQozjMwaVH eu5dDUg/CJ9P2Wnwc0AtP4s9cBxQho3FK7mjeqhMXKhB2oqliX+quM/iBuHlAAUR sAGHtD5NaWRkbGVNYW4gVHlwZS1JIFJlbWFpbGVyIGF0IEpQVW5peC5Db20gPG1p ZGRsZW1hbkBqcHVuaXguY29tPrABA4kAlQMFEDIXMfh/qrjP4gbh5QEBc2kD/1hw oHPcTasnlSVzMxD68hoCI1GYNNM4JSU+rHS+3PVy++992PcyuhqdH8PhuDozeYkz C8Q5y4tmddg30ED+/W2QJwYS0iySG3yH4jrvOstws+Kn5LpD1JQJT1qGLVWHpTxG n5MZO014NGT+wVkySRCornpuaqevTum8ygp+lyPIsAHH =/xR/ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMhdusVOTpEThrthvAQErOwQAqBZo5D7RaSAiymovj7Y/FU649scaYI+v JwP9Nm1T9ZQ1rX3mscN/a37PpohKKoLHf9gYvgkJm5kPdODd9HRNoSdBcp72xrxo JDnhYdAW6iw4c6xZOde7o54maIWuITiN8X1kQcZ591Ava7DaVSdjMypm9hGzq9tx PRqQEvVDb2I= =lN7a -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES STRONGHOLD VERSION 1.3
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Immediate Release - August 19, 1996 Contact: Sameer Parekh 510-986-8770 COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES STRONGHOLD VERSION 1.3 Oakland, CA - Community ConneXion, Inc., the leader in uncompromising security for the Internet, today announced the version 1.3 release of Stronghold, the commercial version of Apache-SSL. Stronghold is based on the popular Apache server, the most popular webserver on the Internet, according to the Netcraft server survey at http://www.netcraft.com/survey/. Stronghold 1.3 is a significant improvement from the Stronghold 1.2 product. The latest version is based on Apache 1.1.1, which supports features such as Keep-Alive, server information modules, a proxy server, an easier to use API, more flexibility in authentication, and greater configurability. "We're happy to have a final release version of 1.3 available," said Sameer Parekh, President of Community ConneXion. "Because of our close involvement with the Apache Group, we can quickly track new Apache releases. We expect to have an Apache 1.2-based server available soon after the Apache 1.2 release." Stronghold 1.3 is the result of an extensive Internet-wide beta test, which started soon after the full release of Apache 1.1.1. Apache 1.1.1 includes features such as the status module, which gives the server administrator the ability to monitor in real time the server's activity. An information module is also available which gives administrators easy access to a list of which modules have been installed on their server, as well as their configuration directives. The latest version includes modules which support database access, including mSQL and Postgres95. Apache 1.1.1 has much more flexible configuration with regards to virtual hosts and multiple IP addresses. This feature allows such innovations as the ability within Stronghold 1.3 to serve both SSL and nonSSL documents from the same server instance. The latest version of Stronghold supports "Session ID Caching," which allows for dramatic performance improvements. Session caching allows servers to process connections much faster because the processor intensive calculations happen less often. Limited performance tests have shown speed improvements of eight hundred percent. "With Session ID Caching, the SSL protocol is not noticably slower than not using the encryption protocol. There is no excuse not to encrypt everything," said Parekh. Community ConneXion is now shipping binaries for Sparc Solaris 2.5, x86 Solaris 2.5, Sparc SunOS 4.1.3_U1, FreeBSD 2.1, BSDI 1.1, AIX 3.2.5, IRIX 5.3, HP/UX, OSF/1, Ultrix, BSDI 2.0, and Linux (ELF & a.out). More platforms will be available soon, and even more may be supported on request. Stronghold may be ordered and downloaded at http://www.us.apache-ssl.com/. Existing commercial licensees may download the latest version free of charge. Portions developed by the Apache Group, taken with permission from the Apache Server http://www.apache.org/. This product includes software developed by Ben Laurie for use in the Apache-SSL HTTP server project. This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)mincom.oz.au)

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Whereis is the shell scsh?
by qut＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, I printed and skimmed through the Secure Shell FAQ. Is there a version for csh instead of sh? -- OBC

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