December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: crypto CD source
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Aug 05 10:08:19 1996 I'm looking for contents for the crypto CD. Since this CD will (might) be mastered in Switzerland, no ITAR applies to the CD, but if anyone wants to include some restricted stuff, send it to me (dat, disk or encrypted email) Address: Pini Computer Trading "Crypto CD" Hofwiesenstr. 234 8057 Zuerich Switzerland My wish list: - - PGP - - A lot of algorithms in C, Pascal, ASM (for diverse processors) - - Private Idaho - - Pronto Secure - - a suite of html pages describing all files (I'll probably have to do that myself) - - Netscape (the secure versions, if its legally feasable -> Netscape?) - - Crypto papers - - Crypto analysis papers - - Lawtexts concerning crypto (ITAR, France, ...) Anything else? - --------< fate favors the prepared mind >-------- Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/remopini/rpcrypto.html - ------< words are what reality is made of >------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMgWr9BFhy5sz+bTpAQEOuQf+PAfJrxDLo4mEDsC8QelbBE5WHqNecmcq soPN0ZDSDzSEdbofALHBEiAW8SHVT4h1XWPNG1QjNvuCsluLN4HX1IQSfCjjCNzO /T9jqNqKbwDL5ssluD9nc/tbjaTN2zdXIVRE2/1QZmyrysT5MK5tiHzbbkrFjSy2 tVwUmEk9W+gTAzNBxLE5ni2Q6oLLuf+jnzw0jBn15nA3S7USN+G+dMsNG2ROR7ZI Lp1a9XvqtjZ41Ju1C0QVR6u53a7mB8unrxxALewF2TjJUXxJOA0W1QbxM8/aI6cb jjePr0NoohyCORLNh+pGaBQ+DXYY28JL5keCyGCr8k/INXHIksbEIQ== =aTqo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

Getting serious: Crypto CD
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: secure(a)commtouch.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Aug 05 10:43:16 1996 Dear Sirs I want to put together a CDROM containing "everything" a cryptographically interested person needs. I would like to include your cryptographically relevant products. The CD will be organized the following way: - - the user interface consists of HTML-pages - - one of these pages will include a directory of files - - one directory entry will be your product (whatever you prefer as a name) and leads to a page/pages of your design. - - you can use a directory named after your company (but in compliance with CDROM restrictions -> 8 letters, no special chars, i.e. "mycompny" or so) and any subdirectories you want. - - binary program space is restricted to 25 MB - - html space is restricted to 1 MB Dos and Donts: - - program limitations (stuff you only get when you register/buy the full product) must be declared. - - export/usage restrictions must be declared (US/nonUS) Further info: The CD will be sold at around USD 15 (including shipment) Advertisement: Seperate advertisment (html pages and graphics) can be made for USD 50.- per page (<200K). A link on the index page will be included. Legalese: - - This CD will be mastered and shipped outside US, so whatever you send us (if you send it from outside US) will not be affected by ITAR. - - The copyright will remain in your hands, you only grant Pini Computer Trading (PCT) the permission to duplicate and distribute the content on a CDROM and, should we choose to do so, on the internet. - - The legality of your content is your responsiblity. If you are interested, mail me... Sincerely yours, Remo Pini Pini Computer Trading PS: This message may have been forwarded by anyone. If you receive it several times, ignore the redundant mails. PSS: This message may be forwarded to anyone offering a cryptographically relevant product. (-> forward ahead, cypherpunks) - --------< fate favors the prepared mind >-------- Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/remopini/rpcrypto.html - ------< words are what reality is made of >------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMgW0JRFhy5sz+bTpAQFdsQgAsxz04ridQ+urdvMVQzpBVkjonuc0ek4Q GihsyATZi2U0Fi73UleJsOz9rsnmodvcJYvkQ2Omtp7mQOFHYWBi7nihELMb06OQ YXduCr/0BQWRX+ORrJtQtehMdctzHnQcTV1AEcCR400YQlBu2YLiB7MLWsEtvqoK 15q0q3Hu7TMOVvplgSMjAT2yAevI5iKEn1AJ5q+kqjQ81fT3KTtuJh2U06TLtSQp 2PecOIk8rPq6fy+wyQN6/PssLrbKkPIKDzMwpupDUb4rEMGNJYP/wykF4BN+vBBE 8pvpD+qd5iODCZplsQ1lY95t48xqBsZ4AQHl8W5WKha5LMBuIFVmIQ== =RdAm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a protocol for anonymous message broadcast which supposedly detects disruption, can someone tell me how it works? Applied Cryptography lists a reference to "Advances in Cryptology, Crypto '89 Preceedings" (page 690) but I dont have a copy of it, I'd appreciate it if someone could fill me in on what it says. Thanks! - Lester

2 1

gathering bandwidth through spam
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Maybe I'm dense, but it didn't really "click" until the other day that the Netscape mail reader, which renders html pages mailed as attachments right there in the mail reader window, would also run any Java applets (and, I guess, Javascript code) referenced by the page. If you're using Netscape as a mail reader, and this isn't old news to you, you can try it: point the browser at a page with an applet, and then use the "File->Mail Document" menu command to mail it to yourself. Thus: if you want to gather some free compute cycles, just spam a document out to a few thousand hapless victims. Those using Netscape for mail (and you can find them pretty easily by looking at the "X-Mailer" field when creating your mailing list) will click on your message, pull your applet, and give you some cycles without realizing it. Of course, your applet will be free to connect back to home base and relay any results it gets. Cool, huh? ______c_____________________________________________________________________ Mike M Nally * Tiv^H^H^H IBM * Austin TX * For the time being, m5(a)tivoli.com * m101(a)io.com * <URL:http://www.io.com/~m101> * three heads and eight arms.

1 0

FUCK YOU, SHITOPUNKS
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUCK YOU, SHITOPUNKS DAVID STERNLIGHT

5 4

International Conference on Electronic Markets !
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: Ram Chellappa <ram(a)yama.bus.utexas.edu> Subject: International Conference on Electronic Markets ! To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Date: Mon, 5 Aug 96 2:54:04 CDT Reply-To: ram(a)cism.bus.utexas.edu X-Hpvue$Revision: 1.8 $ Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Message/rfc822 X-Vue-Mime-Level: 4 Mailer: Elm [revision: 70.85] Seventh Conference on Organizational Computing, Coordination and Collaboration International Conference on Electronic Markets ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR MORE INFORMATION: http://ecworld.utexas.edu/others/flyer.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Theme : Electronic Markets Date : November 6-8, 1996 Location : IC2 Institute, 2815 San Gabriel, Austin, Texas 78705 Questions About program: contact Dr. Andrew Whinston at 512-471-8879 About registration/logistics: contact the RGK Foundation at 512-474-9298 or jhampton(a)zilker.net Sponsors : * IC2 Institute * Center for Information Systems Management * College and Graduate School of Business Administration at The University of Texas at Austin; * RGK Foundation * National Science Foundation Who should attend * Software developers and managers in the electronic commerce area * Executives concerned with developments in banking and finance * Executives concerned with developing on-line customer service and logistics support * Executives who make investments in next generation technology * Executives who develop internal operations support * Academics in information systems, marketing, finance, organizational behavior, and service management concerned with the emerging research topics in the electronic commerce domain. -- RAMNATH K CHELLAPPA Ph: 512-467-7813 (home) Doctoral Candidate 512-471-7962 (office) Center for Information Systems Management Department of MSIS University of Texas, Austin. Web: http://cism.bus.utexas.edu/ram email: ram(a)cism.bus.utexas.edu --Some people have 10 years of experience, while some have one year of experience, 10 times over !!! --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

1 0

Re: Implementing DSS Fortezza KEA
by John Anonymous MacDonald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: > There ws a paper presented at the rump session of Crypto '95 > entitled the k1 Key Exchange Algorithim. The origin of the algorithim > is not clear, however, if you're getting bitstreams from a Fortezza, > you might want to find a copy of the paper. The web says the paper was presented by one Carl Ellison. How about it Carl, is it online somewhere??

1 0

Destroying client/server model, anonymous broadcasting.
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Getting back to the Dining Crypto Problem, is it possible to complete a round by passing information around the circle of participants (each individual communicates and maintains a connection with the person on the left and right) rather than sending the round results to everyone via a central server that everyone is connected to? In effect no one would be a server, or everyone would be a server depending on the way you look at it. A circular linked list would be maintained and kept in sync by every client so that error recovery could come into play if someone mysteriously disconnects. Could it work? How would the protocol differ. Also I need info on the Disco problem, detecting if someone is tampering. Thanks. - Lester

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 5 Aug 96 6:48:42 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *##+-*+++### 3:25 99.99% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org *+++++++-+*+ 1:18:11 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+--+++-++- 1:28:16 99.96% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+---++++-++ 1:35:49 99.93% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++ ++++++++ 38:48 99.87% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ###++***+*## 3:13 99.85% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -..-------- 4:26:36 99.85% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ----------- 8:31:00 99.83% replay remailer(a)replay.com ********** * 5:01 99.67% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com -**-+###+** 7:24 99.56% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++-+++--+ 1:12:03 99.53% c2 remail(a)c2.org +++++++--+- 1:36:27 99.34% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ###+*+-*## # 2:55 99.28% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net --.._-_-.. * 17:16:16 98.94% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +********+ 29:19 98.24% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.---__ 26:57:48 97.25% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -- --- --- 2:58:14 96.19% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ********** 16:40 95.51% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com -*#-**#* 13:17 57.14% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Bombs & bomb threats in LA
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"picric acid is indeed more powerful than TNT. it was the primary explosive used in WW-I. it was also the primary cargo on a ship, i think it was the "Montblac", that exploded in Halifax harbor and nearly wiped-out the city. this was in the 1917 - 1919 timeframe. -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Fri Aug 2 19:04:53 1996 > Date: Fri, 2 Aug 1996 13:12:30 -0500 (CDT) > From: Sean Walberg <umwalber(a)cc.UManitoba.CA> > To: Conrad Walton <conrad(a)walton.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Bombs & bomb threats in LA > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type> : > TEXT/PLAIN> ; > charset=US-ASCII> > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 1357 > > I remember seeing an item on TV that had mentioned an acid bomb (it was a > news report about a public access TV show that was showing people how to > make bombs). In this example, some common chemicals were mixed together, > tightly closed, and moments later an explosion occured. They never said > the chemicals, for all I know it could have been lemon juice and baking > soda in a sealed container, a la Dry Ice bomb... It didn't look like a > bomb of mass destruction, more of a loud bang and a smallish explosion... > > Sean > > > On Fri, 2 Aug 1996, Conrad Walton wrote: > > > >and everyplace else all the news.answers FAQs are stored. What, precisely, is > > >an acid bomb? Also note the standard blame-the-Internet (not, say, increased > > >irritation with government after the Republicans failed to reduce it) > > >rhetoric. > > > > i'm not exactly sure what an acid bomb is, but according to my book, The > > Anarchist Cookbook, that I bought in 1972 (was the internet around back > > then?), there is a compound called "picric acid" that is "more powerful > > than TNT, but has some disadvantages". > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Sean Walberg umwalber(a)cc.umanitoba.ca > The Web Guy http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~umwalber > UNIX Group, U. of Manitoba PGP Key Available from Servers > >

1 0