December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

International Conference on Electronic Markets !
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: Ram Chellappa <ram(a)yama.bus.utexas.edu> Subject: International Conference on Electronic Markets ! To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Date: Mon, 5 Aug 96 2:54:04 CDT Reply-To: ram(a)cism.bus.utexas.edu X-Hpvue$Revision: 1.8 $ Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Message/rfc822 X-Vue-Mime-Level: 4 Mailer: Elm [revision: 70.85] Seventh Conference on Organizational Computing, Coordination and Collaboration International Conference on Electronic Markets ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR MORE INFORMATION: http://ecworld.utexas.edu/others/flyer.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Theme : Electronic Markets Date : November 6-8, 1996 Location : IC2 Institute, 2815 San Gabriel, Austin, Texas 78705 Questions About program: contact Dr. Andrew Whinston at 512-471-8879 About registration/logistics: contact the RGK Foundation at 512-474-9298 or jhampton(a)zilker.net Sponsors : * IC2 Institute * Center for Information Systems Management * College and Graduate School of Business Administration at The University of Texas at Austin; * RGK Foundation * National Science Foundation Who should attend * Software developers and managers in the electronic commerce area * Executives concerned with developments in banking and finance * Executives concerned with developing on-line customer service and logistics support * Executives who make investments in next generation technology * Executives who develop internal operations support * Academics in information systems, marketing, finance, organizational behavior, and service management concerned with the emerging research topics in the electronic commerce domain. -- RAMNATH K CHELLAPPA Ph: 512-467-7813 (home) Doctoral Candidate 512-471-7962 (office) Center for Information Systems Management Department of MSIS University of Texas, Austin. Web: http://cism.bus.utexas.edu/ram email: ram(a)cism.bus.utexas.edu --Some people have 10 years of experience, while some have one year of experience, 10 times over !!! --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Implementing DSS Fortezza KEA
by John Anonymous MacDonald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: > There ws a paper presented at the rump session of Crypto '95 > entitled the k1 Key Exchange Algorithim. The origin of the algorithim > is not clear, however, if you're getting bitstreams from a Fortezza, > you might want to find a copy of the paper. The web says the paper was presented by one Carl Ellison. How about it Carl, is it online somewhere??

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Destroying client/server model, anonymous broadcasting.
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Getting back to the Dining Crypto Problem, is it possible to complete a round by passing information around the circle of participants (each individual communicates and maintains a connection with the person on the left and right) rather than sending the round results to everyone via a central server that everyone is connected to? In effect no one would be a server, or everyone would be a server depending on the way you look at it. A circular linked list would be maintained and kept in sync by every client so that error recovery could come into play if someone mysteriously disconnects. Could it work? How would the protocol differ. Also I need info on the Disco problem, detecting if someone is tampering. Thanks. - Lester

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 5 Aug 96 6:48:42 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *##+-*+++### 3:25 99.99% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org *+++++++-+*+ 1:18:11 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+--+++-++- 1:28:16 99.96% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+---++++-++ 1:35:49 99.93% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++ ++++++++ 38:48 99.87% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ###++***+*## 3:13 99.85% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -..-------- 4:26:36 99.85% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ----------- 8:31:00 99.83% replay remailer(a)replay.com ********** * 5:01 99.67% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com -**-+###+** 7:24 99.56% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++-+++--+ 1:12:03 99.53% c2 remail(a)c2.org +++++++--+- 1:36:27 99.34% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ###+*+-*## # 2:55 99.28% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net --.._-_-.. * 17:16:16 98.94% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +********+ 29:19 98.24% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.---__ 26:57:48 97.25% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -- --- --- 2:58:14 96.19% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ********** 16:40 95.51% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com -*#-**#* 13:17 57.14% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Bombs & bomb threats in LA
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"picric acid is indeed more powerful than TNT. it was the primary explosive used in WW-I. it was also the primary cargo on a ship, i think it was the "Montblac", that exploded in Halifax harbor and nearly wiped-out the city. this was in the 1917 - 1919 timeframe. -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Fri Aug 2 19:04:53 1996 > Date: Fri, 2 Aug 1996 13:12:30 -0500 (CDT) > From: Sean Walberg <umwalber(a)cc.UManitoba.CA> > To: Conrad Walton <conrad(a)walton.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Bombs & bomb threats in LA > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type> : > TEXT/PLAIN> ; > charset=US-ASCII> > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 1357 > > I remember seeing an item on TV that had mentioned an acid bomb (it was a > news report about a public access TV show that was showing people how to > make bombs). In this example, some common chemicals were mixed together, > tightly closed, and moments later an explosion occured. They never said > the chemicals, for all I know it could have been lemon juice and baking > soda in a sealed container, a la Dry Ice bomb... It didn't look like a > bomb of mass destruction, more of a loud bang and a smallish explosion... > > Sean > > > On Fri, 2 Aug 1996, Conrad Walton wrote: > > > >and everyplace else all the news.answers FAQs are stored. What, precisely, is > > >an acid bomb? Also note the standard blame-the-Internet (not, say, increased > > >irritation with government after the Republicans failed to reduce it) > > >rhetoric. > > > > i'm not exactly sure what an acid bomb is, but according to my book, The > > Anarchist Cookbook, that I bought in 1972 (was the internet around back > > then?), there is a compound called "picric acid" that is "more powerful > > than TNT, but has some disadvantages". > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Sean Walberg umwalber(a)cc.umanitoba.ca > The Web Guy http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~umwalber > UNIX Group, U. of Manitoba PGP Key Available from Servers > >

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:10 04/08/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >At 2:06 AM -0400 8/4/96, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >> As long as they are doing any kind of usage-based >> charging, that actual act of charging will continue to cost >> considerably more than the data transmission. > >Ah. So, why settle the transactions for digital cash and skip all that >overhead? Yet another application for micromoney. True, though even better would be simply to charge you a flat rate. If billing is that expensive, why bother? What happened to the proposals asking for flat-rate pricing before the FCC? Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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Re: Tolerance (fwd)
by peter honeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh writes: > This is attempted proof by credentalism. I call him on it. > > Okay, Jim, what _do_ your lawyers say on this? Have you asked them? I, > too, have an attorney, a civil liberties specialist and a graduate from > Princeton law. So what? declan, you are a fucking liar, and i am calling you on it. princeton does not have a law school. peter

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Re: Freeh slimes again: Digital Telephony costs $2 billion now ...
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:52 AM 8/2/96 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote: > >On Thu, 1 Aug 1996, Ernest Hua wrote: > >> Louis Freeh is now asking the Congress for $2 billion to fund >> Digital Telephony. Yes, that is FOUR TIMES what he said it >> would cost the taxpayers to give up their own privacy. Score >> one for the cynics who said $500 million was not enough. > >I broke the story about how much Digital Telephony would *really* cost in >CyberWire Dispatch more than two years ago. The price tag in my piece: >"... at least $2 billion..." In that Dispatch I wrote that the Clinton >White House had made the decision to support the bill based on a flawed >cost/benefit analysis study the FBI had done. Which should remind us... While the costs are going up, so far undetermined is the "benefits" that are supposed to accrue from this bugging ability. How many crimes, approximately, are going to be solved or prevented by the expenditure of this $2 billion dollars? One hundred? A thousand? Even if it were 10,000, that would still be $200,000 per crime. Is there no cheaper way to prevent those crimes? And, moreover, do we REALLY want to prevent those "crimes"? If they are attacks on an illegitimate government that is violating our rights, as far as I can see we want to see those "crimes" succeed, not fail. Let's put their feet to the fire: They should be required to show a reasonable estimate of the benefits as well as an apparently phony initial estimate of the costs. If they respond that they can't estimate the benefits, then why do they want us to incur the costs. However, the real answer is even simpler. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Again, disappointed in Gingrich
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:17 PM 8/1/96 EDT, you wrote: : Again, I'm disappointed in Gingrich. This amplifies the earlier :comments. : -Allen I have never been disappointed in Gingrich; he has always been what he seems--just another politician, albeit a front for the "religious" right. Why expect anything different? Alec (from Ga.)

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Re: Tolerance
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:46 PM 8/1/96 -0800, you wrote: :Just a comment to all of the 'true libertarians' out there, especially :the "defend to the death" types: How many of you defended Mr. :Sternlight's recent membership? : Beautiful. Alec

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