December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: trusting the processor chip
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:01 AM 4/26/96, Christian Wettergren wrote: ... >They "promised" to build their own "processor tester" to try to find >the most obvious ones at least. But it will be very hard to find all of >these bugs, judging from the released bugs. Some of them are only >appearing sporadically under a pretty complicated set of circumstances, >like what is in the pipeline, the cache etc... > >The processor is ever important, if it is illdefined or flakey, it is >almost impossible to build security on top of it. Maybe true in theory, under special circumstances, but not something of immediate importance. Finding bugs is important, but no modern processor chip set (including the peripheral chips) is likely to be "100% secure," whatever that means. (The NSA and its minions put out the "Rainbow Books" to define this, and few machines come close to the top rating...) There was a British plan some years back to develop a "provably secure" microprocessor for life-critical applications, e.g. train controllers. It was called "Viper." Last I heard, the project was not progressing. It seems that most people would rather use the hundreds of MIPS of processing power of a modern, high-density processor that the sub-MIPS power of a Viper-type chip. (I'm not of course saying that processing power and security are inverses of each other, only noting that they haven't gone together so far.) The most famed chip flaw of all time had no security implications, nor would it ever have affected a single life. (Except stock market lives.) I'm glad Intel offered a recall and fixed the bug, but the plain fact is that the bug truly was obscure and could only be demonstrated under contrived conditions. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Click here to become an International Arms Trafficker
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Click here to become an International Arms Trafficker" Offshore Information Services Ltd. has set up a web page to make it really easy for people to become International Arms Traffickers. All they have to do is fill in their name and email address and then click. Check out: http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/ If you think this is half as funny as I do, please make a link from one of your pages to this one. -- Vince

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Re: US law - World Law - Secret Banking
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:13 AM 4/26/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >On Fri, 26 Apr 1996, Michael Loomis wrote: > >> I have been reading this list to get an idea where Declan gets some >> of his lunatic ideas and what Rich Graves says when he is not up to >> Holocaust fetishism. Despite Timothy's claim to the contrary, it seems >> that the basic point of this list is some libertarian notion that tax >> evasion is a good thing. > >That might be one view, but not mine. I think people who evade income >taxes are bad -- they're stealing from the rest of society. If a criminal mugs you for $10 each morning for a month, and on the 32nd day you decide you've had enough and pull a gun and defend yourself, does that mean that you're stealing from him?!?

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Re: trusting the processor chip
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Having penned the response to Jeffrey Flinn on the unlikelihood of processor back doors, I'll comment on jim bell's response: >This analysis seems to assume that the entire production run of a standard >product is subverted. Actually, I perceived two models: either all processors are subverted or a subset of them are. Both require a reasonably complete design team to reliably achieve the objective of a well hidden and reliable back door. The cost effective thing to do is use the original design team since they have the knowledge you need to pull it off. A different and/or much smaller team has a lower likelihood of success. > More likely,I think, an organization like the NSA >might build a pin-compatible version of an existing, commonly-used product >like a keyboard encoder chip that is designed to transmit (by RFI signals) >the contents of what is typed at the keyboard. It's simple, it's hard to >detect, and it gets what they want. Simple, no. Hard to detect, somewhat. Gets what they want, unclear. My experience with processor design and development is rather ancient and my knowledge of IC work is third hand, so I'll gladly defer to someone with closer knowledge of the process (Tim?). However, I've never heard anything to imply that a processor architecture can be cleverly and reliably dinked with in this manner without lots of expensive engineering. Where does the chip real estate come from? Is there room in the microcode for this? Will it destabilize other behaviors? Will the victim detect it through RFI testing? No, it's not impossible. The risk vs reward tradeoff is shaky. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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Re: trusting the processor chip
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My 9th grade classmate Rick Smith wrote: >Having penned the response to Jeffrey Flinn on the unlikelihood of >processor back doors, I'll comment on jim bell's response: >> More likely,I think, an organization like the NSA >>might build a pin-compatible version of an existing, commonly-used product >>like a keyboard encoder chip that is designed to transmit (by RFI signals) >>the contents of what is typed at the keyboard. It's simple, it's hard to >>detect, and it gets what they want. > >Simple, no. Hard to detect, somewhat. Gets what they want, unclear. I haven't been commenting on this part of the thread, but since I am asked to (below), I'll say that I agree with Rick on these points. Though there have been fictional accounts--e.g. the French novel "Softwar"--about replacement of chips with TLA versions, this tack is very hard to pull off. (The Infoworld "April Fool's Day" 1991 report that the NSA had arranged for printers entering Iraq to be modified so as to send intelligence info was gullibly picked up by several outfits that should've known better and reported as fact.) >My experience with processor design and development is rather ancient >and my knowledge of IC work is third hand, so I'll gladly defer to >someone with closer knowledge of the process (Tim?). However, I've >never heard anything to imply that a processor architecture can be >cleverly and reliably dinked with in this manner without lots of >expensive engineering. Where does the chip real estate come from? Is >there room in the microcode for this? Will it destabilize other >behaviors? Will the victim detect it through RFI testing? For high-volume parts, such as the chips in the usual PCs we all use, such a replacement would almost certainly need the cooperation of the chip makers. Not impossible to obtain, but not easy. A new "stepping" of the chip would probably be needed, though I suppose a chip with downloadable microcode could be used. Much more like, in my opinion, would be subversion of the software, a la Thompson's point about subverting compilers. And the work already done on "subliminal channels" that leak information (deliberately in this case) is apropos. I know that such channels were a major concern during the discussions of nuclear arms treaties. Speculatively, if such a hardware replacement is likely, this is where I would look first; but of course the parties to nuclear arms agreements know this as well. Anyway, there are all sorts of "maybes" and "possibles" here. Certainly there is no _technical_ reason why a "Pentium--NSA-enabled" variant of the Pentium could not be made...all things are possible. But how likely? And where in the spectrum of real concerns does it lie? And would Intel dare to cooperate with such a plan? And so on. This'll have to be my last word on this topic. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Guardian angels, anonymity, and the decency brigade
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks, Colin, for replying. I'm glad to learn that you made no legal threats against Jim's CuD. I understand that SafeSurf does not make sofware; I meant that a PICS/SafeSurf-compliant browser is necessary to read and act on such ratings. A few months ago, I went through the back archives of the fight-censorship list and looked for possibly "indecent" material. I found relatively few examples of this language, and all of them had clearly socially redeeming value, like the American Reporter's rather heated essay. The alt.sex.pedophilia story I cited was circulated among the anti-porn groups who fought for the CDA; in context, it was perfectly appropriate for us to discuss here. Further, I believe quite strongly that minors should be allowed and encouraged to participate in discussions on this list -- overbroad net-censorship affects them as well as adults. Yet you write: "Clearly a site with a message like this would not be suitable for children to read." What if I rate <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/> as suitable for children, and a CyberAngel volunteer visits and stumbles onto that alt.sex.pedophilia story. Will my rating be yanked? This is what bothers me -- the undocumented, arbitrary, and capricious nature of ratings by the CyberAngels volunteer decency brigade. I support your right to censor my web site, but I don't have to like it. -Declan (who still wants to be a CyberSeraphim) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [Another reply attached] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 26 Apr 1996 11:20:12 -0400 From: Tom Betz <tbetz(a)pobox.com> Subject: Re: Guardian angels, the decency brigade, and cyberseraphim Colin Gabriel Hatcher wrote: > As for press, we didnt even send a press release until 4 months after we > started, and then only to announce our website. And we've only sent one > more press release out since then. We do believe however that we have > helped to bring the issue of children and the Internet to the forefront and > that is a good thing too. This claim is totally disingenuous. They have the biggest PR whore on the face of the Earth flacking their efforts almost daily on NYC talk radio, and they dare to pretend to have only sent out one press release? What kind of training do these people receive? I heard an NPR story on this organization where every telecommunications term of art a CyberAngel used was used incorrectly, always with a sick misinterpretation. I'll dig up citations if anyone is interested. Despite what they 'believe', CyberAngels have helped to do nothing but inflame the passions of the ignoranti against the Internet, and to make a nearly non-existent threat into a major political football. Oh, and to give Curtis Sliwa one more dead horse to flog on the air. The whole thing disgusts me. -- ---- Tom Betz --------- <http://www.pobox.com/~tbetz> ------ (914) 375-1510 -- tbetz(a)pobox.com | We have tried ignorance for a very long | tbetz(a)panix.com ------------------+ time, and it's time we tried education. +----------------- -- Computers help us to solve problems we never had before they came along. --

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Re: trusting the processor chip
by smith＠sctc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:23 AM 4/26/96, jim bell wrote: > By NSA standards, it is simple. NSA has probably had its own > semiconductor fabs for 30+ years. Yep. Regardless of whether the fabs are government property or not, it's a sure thing that some contractors have appropriately SCIFfed fabs and appropriately cleared staffs. > Even if we assume that > their capabilities lag commercial production in terms of > density or quality, keyboard encoder chips were trivial 20+ > years ago and could presumably be easily > duplicated/modified today by even the oldest operating fabs. > They probably had far less than 10,000 transistors. Even > modern keyboard controllers probably "waste" a > microcontroller with far more capability than you'd need > for the task, and microcontrollers usually have > substantially more code area than would be necessary to add > some sort of surreptitious function. Agree. Keyboard controllers (and other peripheral components of a system) are a much more tractable target than the CPU and may be within the capbailities of such organizations. I'm more inclined towards disk controller subversion myself. Of course, there's also the apocryphal story of the so called "Iraqi printer virus" that disabled the Iraqi air defense system. Subverting the CPU is not simple even by NSA standards. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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Re: [NOISE] What is "laser material"?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:05 PM 4/25/96 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >> Moreover, a laser shot costs $3,000, compared to several >> million dollars for a missile. Army officials envision the >> Nautilus would be beamed from a truck capable of firing 50 >> shots before requiring more laser material. > >Does anyone have any idea what "more laser material" means? It means that the laser burns itself up when fired. Either they are pumping gas into the laser and eventually run out or they are using something that is solid or semi-solid (yes, you can make a laser out of Jello!) that becomes non-functional after a certain number of uses. The plans I have for a somewhat high powered laser (10 watts) requires nitrogen pumped through the tube. Run out of nitrogen and you run out of laser... The problem with laser based weapons is they are weather dependant. Try using a laser in the rain and see how coherent a beam you get. What this has to do with crypto, I have no idea... (Maybe they are going to try and etch RSA in four lines of Perl into the side of the whitehouse.) --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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Re: An idea for refining penet-style anonymous servers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:15 AM 4/25/96 -0700, Alan Bostick wrote: >The other night, while sick and feverish with the flu, a scheme popped >into my head that would seem to make penet-style anonymous servers less >vulnerable to compromise through seizure of the remailer equipment or of >the address database... > >My scheme is the design of the address database. It consists of two >hash tables, one for sending messages (which maps anonymous IDs onto >sender's addresses), and one for receiving them (mapping recipient's >addresses onto anonymous IDs). A cryptographically secure hash (say, >MD5) is used for the index of both tables. > >The index of the sending message table is the MD5 hash of the sender's >address. The table entry the index points to is the sender's anonymous >ID, encrypted by a symmetric algorithm (maybe IDEA). The encryption key >would be a different hash, by another algorithm (let's suppose it's >SHA), of that same address. > >... > >The receiving message hash table is designed similarly, in reverse. The >index of the hash table is the MD5 hash of the anonymous ID; the entry >in the table is the recipient's email address, encrypted with the SHA >hash of the anonymous ID... Assuming you have obtained the address database, it seems to me that this scheme is subject to known address attacks: (1) If you want to find out what newbie(a)slowresponse.com's anon ID is, you just look it up. (2) If you want to find out the real email addresses of all the users, you test all the anon-ids with the reverse lookup table. This attack could be defeated by using sufficiently long random anon-ids. If we assume 5 bits of information/character, a 96 bit anon-id (sufficient to preclude exhaustive search attacks) would require 19 character anon-ids. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: The Joy of Java
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May and Mike Duvos have expresses an enthusiasm for Java which I share. There are a few practical issues which should be addresses. Mike says: >Indeed, with Java, I can put up a Web page which teaches someone >about a cryptographic algorithm, allows him to try it out and run >sample data through it, and provides him with a >platform-independent implementation of it to use as he wishes. >All in one fell swoop. That's a pretty powerful concept. But with the #$%^& ITAR you have to do it outside the USA/Canada, or limit it to USA/Canadians. The patent situation with RSA doesn't help making applications inter-operate with the existing PGP based infrastructure. Perhaps all these applications will appear first on the outside, where these problems do not exist for the developers. (The patent problem would still exist for US/Canadian users. I will be interested to see the patent holder's response.) Tim says: >One interesting remark I read from someone was that the Java distribution >model returns us to an era of easier distribution of small programs. The >"application bloat" of very large programs may be at least partly fixed. >We'll see. I have my doubts about this one. I think application bloat comes from market forces and from the kind of bundling you see in XYZCorpOffice products where you get 4 applications packaged together. This marketing approach maximizes revenue by selling you products you don't need as a matter of convenience. But, we shall see. There are some features of Java which make it less than ideal for crypto applications. These features can be overcome, but they will affect implementors and users. (1) There are not many sources of high-quality entropy available to Java applets. Keystroke timings and scribble windows are probably the best sources, but may represent an inconvenience for users. (2) Java doesn't allow you to define operators as methods of classes. This feature has the advantage that you don't have strange uses of the operators, the classic example being the left shift operator being used to do output. However, if you need to do arithmetic on numbers larger than 64 bits, you can't use common, infix notation. This feature only affects developers, and at worst, qualifies as a pain in the rear and not a show stopper. I too hope to soon see high-quality crypto applications on my desktop in Java. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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