December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Transforming variable- to fixed-length keys
by Deranged Mutant 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

On 7 Jul 96 at 1:47, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: [..] > I've run into a problem in writing a general-purpose n-byte input to m-byte > output transformation function. What this does is take an arbitrary-length > user key and transform it to a fixed-length encryption key (for example an > entered passphrase into a 112-bit triple-DES key). The constraints on memory > usage are: > > - The input (user) key can't be altered (you can't change data passed in by the > caller) > - The user key can't be copied to an internal buffer (it can be of arbitrary > length, and is sensitive material so shouldn't be copied elsewhere) > > In other words there's no temporary storage available apart from what's > provided in the output key. This is almost always a different length from the > input key. > > Some other constraints are: > > - The transformation must be algorithm-independant (it shouldn't, for example, [..] > - The transformation must be able to be iterated to make a password-guessing > attack harder to perform. Hmm. What about the following: Use a constant (non-weak) key for a cipher (perhaps the hash of the passphrase under certain circumstances?) For iteration-0, CFB (or some other feedback mode)-encrypt the passphrase from the input buffer to the output buffer (assuming the library doesn't require that the plaintext and ciphertext be in the same buffer) For following iterations, repeatedly CFB-encrypt the buffer, using a counter in data bytes. This method could use hash algorithms in MDC or Luby-Rackoff forms as well as block ciphers (and perhaps some stream ciphers). Another method might be to seed a PRNG similar to that used in PGP 2.x with the passphrase, have it stir the bytes a number of times, and then use the output as the key: randPoolAddBytes(passphrase, passlen); for(i=0;i<iterationCount;i++) randPoolStir(); randPoolGetBytes(key, keylen); > Here's my initial approach, if anyone has any comments to make on this or knows > of a better way to do it, please let me know. [..] > The first stage in the key hashing prepends the length of the string as a > big-endian 16-bit count to the user key: > > +------+-------------------------------------------------------+ > |Length| User Key | > +------+-------------------------------------------------------+ > > The aim of the hashing is to reduce this variable-length input string to a > fixed-length key appropriate to the encryption algorithm being used. This is > done by treating the user encryption keys as circular buffers and repeatedly > hashing chunks of the user key and xoring the result into the output buffer. [..] > Since the input to the hash function is much larger than its output, a > significant amount of the user key affects each chunk of the encryption key. > The size of each "chunk" is determined by the hash function being used. For > example with the MD4 hash function, 64 bytes of user key affect each 16 bytes > of encryption key. [..] Questions: Are you using the previous chaining-variables/hash for each successive chunk? How do you pad passphrases that are smaller than the minimum input for a hash function? Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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[RANT] Re: CWD -- Jacking in from the "Keys to the Kingdom" Port
by Alan Olsen 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 03:27 PM 7/5/96 -0400, Mark M. wrote: >> B) Forget the CONFIG.SYS ... what about kids using Macs or some future >> "Kid Safe" system that has the filters in an eeprom? I'm talking >> about bypassing the censorship on the client-server level. Relatively >> platform independent. > >Using a hardware based filter is about as bad as using the IP security header >fields for content descriptions. It's not at the level where filtering >belongs. Filtering should be at the software level where it currently is. >Since this can easily be broken, it might be better to have "Kid Safe" ISP's >that would use a firewall to filter data. Or even better yet, they could actually teach thier children to deal with such information instead of sheltering them from it. I have dealt with a number of parents who have the idea that they can filter everything the kid hears or sees. The type of intelectual and emotional basketcases that result are not very plesant to interact with. They tend to go through alot of rough times when they have to go out into the world and see a wide variety of views, instead of just seeing what mommy and daddy want them to. What happens from there is generally not very pretty or very fun for the person involved. I do not believe that these types of filters are good. If you have that much concern about what your child can see, then you should not give them net access at all. (And remember to also not to leave them at the library where they might find just as much filth...) "If you don't want your kids to be hit by information, then don't let them play on the information superhighway." Without contradictoy viewpoints, children do not learn how to decern between them. They get indoctrinated into the idea that they must accept ideas as they are fed to them. That learning consists of taking what is provided and not to go out and find those ideas which might be "harmful" or "dangerous" without perental supervision. What we are getting is a bunch of emotional cripples who cannot handle anything intelectually sharper than a rubber ball. (And it must be a ball bigger than two inches in diameter, else they might choke on it.) With these sort of tools, we are conditioning our children that it is OK if someone filters their information before they see it. (Without even knowing the *KIND* of information being filtered, because even *THAT* level of knowledge is harmful and/or proprietary.) That it is OK for some parental figure to eliminate all the "nasty" and "awful" information before someone can hurt themselves with it. That itt is OK to prevent others from viewing information to complex for their childlike minds. We are becoming a nation of the babysat. Anything that our nannys deem harmful is hidden away in the bedrooms of the parental units. And maybe it is harmful. They have to scan through it all day long and look what kind of self-righous pricks they have become! At least I am able to instill some sort of love of knowledge and exploration into my daughter. Hopefully it will stick before the control freaks in this culture are able to knock it out of her... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: MacPGP 2.6.3 released
by Zbigniew Fiedorowicz 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

I have changed the method of distribution of FatMacPGP 2.6.3. It is now available by anonnymous FTP from Mike Johnson's ITAR compliant crypto archives at ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/. My web page http://www.math.ohio-state.edu/~fiedorow/PGP now contains detailed instructions and URL links explaining how to obtain the software from Mike Johnson's site, rather than the software itself. In particular, it is no longer necessary to have a previous version of PGP in order to get FatMacPGP 2.6.3. Note: my system administrators have changed the IP address of www.math.ohio-state.edu this weekend. If your DNS server has difficulty finding the site, you might try http://128.146.111.31/~fiedorow/PGP Feel free to redistribute FatMacPGP 2.6.3 to friends, acquaintances, etc and to put it up on local BBS's. It is your personal responsibility to insure you don't to violate any laws or international treaties doing so. Zig Fiedorowicz

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Netscape 3.0b5 can unanonymize Anonymizer
by Ian Goldberg 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The new netscape has this "feature" where the RHS of KEY=value pairs in tags can contain inline Javascript, which is evaluated to get the actual RHS. For example, the HTML: Did you really think you could be <a href="&{window.open('noanon.html','', 'toolbar=1,location=1,directories=1,status=1,menubar=1,scrollbars=1'); '/'};">anonymous</a>? will open a new, unanonymized, window (you don't even have to click on the link). The main problem is that the Anonymizer doesn't filter out the new way of embedding Javascript: &{this.is("javascript code")}; So, if you use the Anonymizer with netscape 3.0b5, _disable_ Javascript until this is fixed (better yet, disable Javascript and Java entirely, but that's another story for another time...). - Ian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMd6/nEZRiTErSPb1AQGEPgQAu9NaxafrQDrqdTLUkzQ7k0D6Pq8FxIx1 7Mo3j6ACs6Flp2Tq+2szh6Ch+U0r21LL5NuC3zQ/BA9j/UmqU+c5XM7NRFFGEEhY f1RakLlaiWp+gnxv3dgWWMUZ30iB01kNbIGcl4X3FPLUpyavK45KoqjRJh13s/K+ ACWmg1pgmXk= =23r4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CCC Crypto Lock
by Tim Philp 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

The fact that this patent was issued indicates to me that the patent office does not understand computer technology. There is nothing new here that I was not using for other purposes at least 20 years ago. Unfortunately, once a patent is issued, it cost a great deal of money to break. Tim Philp At 04:10 AM 7/6/96 -0700, you wrote: >MicroPatent, 4 July 96 > > >Systems and methods for protecting software from >unlicensed copying and use (Assignee -- Convex Computer >Corporation) > > >Abstract: Disclosed systems and methods for protecting a >software program from unauthorized use and copying >through the removal at least one of a plurality of >instructions comprising a software program, and >encrypting the removed instruction utilizing an >encryption algorithm to produce an encrypted instruction, >the encryption algorithm responsive to a randomly >generated key. > >Ex Claim Text: A processing system for protecting a >software program from unauthorized use, said software >program including one or more unencrypted instructions >stored in memory associated with said software program, >said processing system comprising: a processing unit >operable to: remove at least one selected said >unencrypted instruction from an executable area in said >memory associated with executable portions of said >program; encrypt said at least one selected unencrypted >instruction removed from said software program utilizing >an encryption algorithm to produce an encrypted >instruction; store said encrypted instruction within a >first non-executable data area in said memory associated >with said software program; and insert at least one >trappable instruction in place of said encrypted >instruction within said executable area in memory >allowing said software program to be linked with one or >more other programs. > >Assignee: Convex Computer Corporation > >Patent Number: 5530752 > >Issue Date: 1996 06 25 > >Inventor(s): Rubin, Robert J. > >If you would like to purchase a copy of this patent, >please call MicroPatent at 800-984-9800. > >Copyright 1996, MicroPatent > >

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-07-06 14:25:18 EDT, perry(a)piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: << "Perry E. Metzger" writes: > > AwakenToMe(a)aol.com writes: > > I have a util that will create a word list starting from > > aaaaaaaaaaa on up to anythingggggggg basically you could do every > > combination. Let me know if ya want it. > > That would really be of great use for doing wordlist crack runs. It > must have taken you a long time to write -- generous of you to offer > it. I want to apologize to everyone for being gratuitously nasty here. It wasn't called for. >> Thats funny. I thought you were being completely serious and I sent you this file. You are exactly right. it is of GREAT use for doing wordlist crack runs. Why dont ya check out some realllyyy secure systems and find out what utils they use to test their own security. I ALWAYS use created segments of this when trying to brute force my way into my OWN machine. It helps finding bugs that overwrite the stack..etc. But... apology accepted. You may learn from it.

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more about the usefulness of PGP
by bryce＠digicash.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's an idea that I always wanted to implement but never did yet. I thought I'd share and if someone else has already done it let me have a copy. I should be able to execute scripts remotely by sending e-mail to an account. Simple mail-handling scripts at that account should check the PGP signature (and timestamp/counter to prevent replay/delay attacks) and then pass the contents to a full script-language interpreter. Perl is a natural choice of interpreter. Has anybody implemented this (hopefully complete with replay/delay prevention)? Thanks! Bryce P.S. No, actually I can't think of any good use for this trick. But maybe if I had it I would find good uses for it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMd7FIEjbHy8sKZitAQHhRQMAmZoekRgmUKSYv89/QrkzRFdTUZLZHK8a tlaXLtyJXrOjajxJRVvXWY7Rum6mVXe/4eHTPCGzzWQdXMJB/TJSQeRmTuSiSd9i 0DtWcQSmP4q5AFor48NtNvqAOEonf5Vi =My90 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 6:17 PM 7/6/96, Alan Olsen wrote: >With these sort of tools, we are conditioning our children that it is OK if >someone filters their information before they see it. (Without even knowing >the *KIND* of information being filtered, because even *THAT* level of >knowledge is harmful and/or proprietary.) That it is OK for some parental >figure to eliminate all the "nasty" and "awful" information before someone >can hurt themselves with it. That itt is OK to prevent others from viewing >information to complex for their childlike minds. > >We are becoming a nation of the babysat. Anything that our nannys deem >harmful is hidden away in the bedrooms of the parental units. And maybe it >is harmful. They have to scan through it all day long and look what kind of >self-righous pricks they have become! The doublethink and hypocrisy of modern society is astounding. A friend of mine has an 8-year-old son, whom he has custody of on weekends. Sometimes his son wants to have his friend stay over Saturday, as kids like to do. When the mother (a single mother, as this is California) drops her son off with my friend (also single, of course), she includes several "Ritalin" capsules with instructions on how to dose her son with this depressant/behavior modification drug. My friend ignores these Ritalins, which upsets the Mom greatly the next day when she realizes her son has not been given the tranks that are also known as "Mother's little helpers." I've been over visiting my friend to see some of this. The Ritalin-sodden kid arrives like a zombie. When the Ritalin wears off, he's rambunctuous, but all kids are. My friend Paul has had to discipline him a bit to keep him from--as the psychobabbles would say--"acting out." This discipline sets him straight, but it's not something his New Age "supermom" would ever think of doing. Hence the kid throws temper tantrums, acts out, calls her "You fucking asshole" (remember, he's only 8 or so), and so on. So she cranks up his dose of Ritalin and he's zoned out for a while. Frankly, I think telling the kid that if throws a tantrum he'll get punished for it is a whole lot more normal--ever notice that a dog smacks her puppies when they get out of line, or that a cat swats her kittens the same way? It establishes the rules of the game. (No, I'm not talking about "child abuse," the sadistic beltings and lashings which some parents give. However, here in Kalifornia it is essentially illegal for parents to use corporal punishment. Heavy doses of drugs are, after all, the California way!) "Just say no to drugs!" is the mantra of these doublethinkers, as they dose their kids at school and at home with tranquilizers and behavior modification drugs. The kids grow up thinking pills are the answer to everything. Also in California, the public schools dispense these mind control drugs to a growing fraction of the school population. Apparently this has become the largest part of the job of "school nurses." I believe parents are involved in this dosing regimen, but I would not be surprised if this changes. After all, such medical procedures as abortion are now handled "discreetly" by the school nurses, without any requirement that the parent be notified. Whatever one thinks of abortion, this is surely a strange state of affairs, where the public school system is taking on such a role and is actively deceiving a parent. The connection with the themes of our list is that this linguistic doublethink is what allows Big Brother's control of our communications and private files to be called by the relatively benign name of "escrow." --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: NYT/CyberTimes on CWD article
by eli+＠gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0706patrol-reporters.html > "If we believe the encryption scheme has > been compromised, we will make another > one." Heh. It seems that these companies are going to have a problem as long as they use lists of *excluded* sites. Forget insight into company policy; these are global indices of "smut" on the net. (The lists of the more liberal companies are probably most attractive to those not titillated by NOW position papers.) They have to give you the list, and they have to give you software that uses it, so there's no way to achieve complete secrecy. I think the best they can do is to distribute a list of hashed URLs. -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Re: Radiological Survey Meter (fwd)
by David Lesher 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

If you want such for random #'s.... Tony S. Patti <103514.36(a)CompuServe.COM> of Cryptosystems Journal mentioned he'd found a meter as follows: RESOURCES UN-LTD. 800-810-4070. Victoreen Model 1 from 1964, in the original box. $39.00 -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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