December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Children's Privacy Act
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu" "Rich Graves" 24-MAY-1996 04:18:17.16 >I recognize that criminalizing the free flow of information is like trying >to stick your finger in a dike, but every little bit has an effect. In >this case, I'd call it a positive effect. That's funny, most people would call the German action to censor pro-nazi information a criminalization of the free flow of information with a positive effect. >I was certainly disappointed to hear a couple of cypherpunks the other day >discussing for-profit offshore data havens full of personal information >that is illegal to collect in the US as a business opportunity *they* were >interested in pursuing. I just can't see myself doing that, for anybody. >Gubmint or private, doesn't matter. Why, pray tell, _should_ someone be able to conceal that they declared bankrupcy - e.g., ran out on their debtors that they had freely contracted to repay - more than 7 years ago? Should prison terms to theft be limited to 7 years? Moreover, there are significant negative economic impacts for criminalizing the possession of such information. The above is one instance; another, which is even more of interest to me due to my profession, is that of genetic information and insurance. Genetic screening for insurance purposes decreases the risk to an insurance company. It is therefore possible to issue insurance with less of a pool backing it up (for claims in insurance, for bad debt in the case of credit). This increases the number of businesses who can get into a given market, which will decrease prices for insurance since the current insurance business is quite ogliopolistic. Thus, for the average individual the availablility of such information is beneficial. I would personally be interested in setting up some such business in the future, specifically one with a genetic screening lab. While I would not wish to devote my entire time to it, I would be quite willing to help with setup and updating it - if paid a fee, of course. -Allen

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Alternative to remailer shutdowns...
by MAILER-DAEMON＠kermit.aatech.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are hundreds of machines littered around the net that dont bother adding "received" headers to mail. I dont think that these provide anything near the security and anonymity that a single remailer (much less a remailing chain) provide, but it seems to me that routing outbound traffic from a remailer through one of these sites would provide at least /some/ measure of protection for the remailer-operator. It feels a bit underhanded, but it may be that involving some "innocent" bystanders in the remail process would be useful. Even if the sites being routed through /were/ keeping logs it would still require their participation in any investigation to discover where the mail had originated, and this would introduce the question of whether the (psuedo)anonymous sendmail host should bear any liability for not tracking where mail came from. The operator of the particular smtp host would seem to have a pretty good defense should a charge be raised, but in defending the smtp-host you could also be strengthening the defense of the r-ops. Another possibility is that rather than operating remailers at all, maybe we should be operating non-logging smtp hosts that dont add received headers. Building a client to take advantage of these servers would be trivial (i wrote one last night, and i am not proficient in C) and it could be argued that the situation was not created intentionally to allow anonymous messages, merely to preserve disk space and bandwidth. Flame Away...

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 24-MAY-1996 11:44:01.40 >While a ski-lift ticket could be considered a "license" to use the >property, selling an actual intellectual property ITEM makes the limiting >terms of its purchase a bit easier for a court to stomach. Telling a >licensee that if he gets hurt its too bad, and telling one that he cannot >call a function or copy the work are fairly distinct in this way. Hmm... the first (license vs item) could be argued with by that the remailer operator _is_ sending the recipient a copyrighted work, which the remailer has - so far as it knows - been given proper permission to choose to transfer to the recipient. The second is more bothersome, and is an instance of the unfortunate overuse of liability in the American legal system. As you state, >In the practical world, the plaintiff who is trying to enforce a software >licensing agreement is much better off than a defendant trying to resist >liability for a tort. I would gather that countersuits for violation of a contract - that not to sue - would not be likely to succeed. Unfortunate. >That depends. If there was reason to believe, for instance, that the >message might indeed be four-horseman type (as a plaintiff's attorney I >would jump all over any messages which came from "soandso(a)PLO.com" or >somesuch) then negligence becomes an issue regardless. Perhaps the host >was the site from which other nastiness was mailed? Anything that could >be shown to put the operator on effective, implied, or constructive notice >that something was amiss. A clear reason for demanding that mail come from a recognized remailer before putting it to an output end. In this case, the ouputting remailer never has to worry about it - that's the job of the actual primary inputting remailer. >Remember, technical savvy judges are few and far between. Technical savvy >juries are nearly non-entitites. My concept of what is or is not >suspicious when it comes to such things is going to be much more >sophisticated than that of a judge or jury in most if not all cases. >This is an important point. >The truth of the matter is entirely pointless in the U.S. Judicial system. >The APPEARANCE of the matter is key. >'punks seem to forget this in all their discussion of what a court might >do because, simply put, they know more than 99% of the population about >the subject. The simple way to put this is that juries and, indeed, the voting population, are completely incompetent to be in power. This is always something that one should remember, and an excellent argument as to why democracy is not a good system of government. >From the recipiant? >I would simply put a notice of where complaints can be directed to, and >publish a stated (and carefully worded) policy for addressing abuses. >This will go a LONG way to insulating remailer operators. >"Your honor, my client has made every effort to filter the legitimate >users of his system from the illegitimate. He has a stated policy >regarding complaints and investigates them to the full extent of his >ability in every case in which a complaint is filed. Even as this is so, >he can no more completely assure that harassing messages will never slip >through than can the U.S. post office protect every citizen from mail >bombings." >Or some such. If you can say this in court and back it up, you're in >better shape. Would also doing a respond-back hold harmless agreement, of the form perhaps of: "We do our best to guarantee that this system will not be used illegitimately. Unfortunately, this is not always possible. By responding to this message and requesting us to send you the information in question, you are agreeing to hold us harmless." help any? Or would this be seen by the court as an attempt to reduce liability when the court (incorrectly) believes it should be assigned? -Allen

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middleman remailer available on hacktic
by Flame Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The middleman remailer software is now available for download. The file middleman.tar.gz can be found on ftp.hacktic.nl in /pub/replay/pub/incoming and /pub/replay/pub/remailer. Installation instructions are included. middle-man-admin(a)alpha.c2.org

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No Subject
by remailer＠2005.bart.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Enough already? Please! ---------------------------------------------------------------------- *WARNING* *WARNING* *WARNING* *WARNING* *WARNING* *WARNING* *WARNING* This message has been forwarded using your anon id on the anon.penet.fi anonymous server, but any direct reply will show your real name/address.

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Society and the Future of Computing Conference
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 24-MAY-1996 05:04:37.21 Subject: Society and the Future of Computing '96 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Wed, 22 May 1996 16:14:13 -0600 (MDT) From: Rick Light <rxl(a)lanl.gov> Subject: Important_SFC_Update <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> Society and the Future of Computing '96 June 16-19, 1996, Snowbird, Utah, USA http://www.lanl.gov/SFC <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> The conference structure includes keynote speakers, panels of invited speakers, Net-connected poster presentations, debates, and workshops. The intent is to share ideas in a diverse multidisciplinary environment for mutual enrichment and learning, ultimately to affect the directions of computer science research and applications for the benefit of all. See the conference Web site for details and to register. Contents: --------- * Registration Still Open! * Diverse Keynote Speakers Featured * Unique Workshops Offered * Outstanding Agenda Registration Still Open! ------------------------ *** Only 3 weeks left! *** *** Register today to reserve your place at SFC'96! *** Registration for the conference is still available through the conference Web site "Registration" page. Electronic registrations will be accepted only through June 7th. After that you must register at the conference registration desk in the Cliff Lodge in Snowbird. To register see http://www.lanl.gov/SFC/96/reginfo.html. Diverse Keynote Speakers Featured --------------------------------- We are honored to feature the following prominent leaders from industry and academia as the keynote speakers of the conference: Laura Breeden, Formerly of USDC National Telecommunications & Information Administration Tom Landauer, University of Colorado, Boulder Bob Lucky, Bellcore Charlie Slocomb, Los Alamos National Laboratory Bud Wonsiewicz, U S WEST Advanced Technologies Bill Wulf, University of Virginia Other important leaders have been invited as moderators and panelists. See the conference Agenda Web page for details: http://www.lanl.gov/SFC/96/program.html Unique Workshops Offered ------------------------ The conference is pleased to offer 4 unique and important workshops this year. Each offers intriguing opportunities, and all 4 are very different from each other. The workshops are integrated into the conference agenda throughout the conference so that their study and findings will enhance the participants' experience of the conference as a whole, as well as offering their outcomes to the entire conference attendance. The workshops are as follows: Steve Cisler, Willard Uncapher, Larry Press: "Implications of the Net for Industrialized Countries, Developing Nations, and Indigenous Cultures" Richard G. Epstein: "Emerging Realities, Virtual and Otherwise" Mary A. Meyer: "Anthropology and SFC'96 Computer Technologies" Ben Shneiderman: "The Durango Declaration Continued: Toward A Snowbird Conference Statement" Outstanding Agenda ------------------ The conference technical program is very full and provides a robust, multidisciplinary agenda for a wide range of interesting and important discussions. This program is balanced with hikes in the clean mountain air of Snowbird. Attendees are coming from all over the United States and a few foreign countries as well. Please see the Web agenda page for details: http://www.lanl.gov/SFC/96/program.html Questions? ---------- All conference information and the registration form are available through the Web site (http://www.lanl.gov/SFC/96/) Any questions or comments you might have may be addressed to sfc96(a)lanl.gov. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>

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Re: Children's Privacy Act
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:00 PM 5/24/96, Rich Graves wrote: >Who would control the offshore data havens? What would they have on me? I >am well aware of what TRW et al can do, but at least in theory (cough), >they're legally accountable (cough). Who would control them? Their owners, presumably. What would they have on you? Depends on what you've done and what they can learn. >I know you disagree, but I'm a big fan of statutes of limitations and the >firewalling of unrelated issues. Someone went bankrupt or beat her husband >seven years ago (or whatever), I don't want to know about it. I'd rather If you don't want to know about it, fine. Set your filters to ignore such things. But suppose *I* want to know? (And there are "legitimate" reasons. Isn't it quite plausible for a woman to be interested in whether her prospective husband is a wife-beater? Even if the last incident occurred (or was publically reported, at least) more than the 7-year (or whatever) period ago?) In any case, there are public records, such as arrest records, court transcripts, newspaper articles, and so on. To forbid me from using these (to throw me in jail, ultimately, for this crime) is inconsistent with a free society. And technology is already finding ways to route around such laws. The stuff we are involved with will shatter such laws completely. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Children's Privacy Act
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:00 AM 5/25/96, Hal wrote: >I think the reason (some) cypherpunks support things like offshore data >havens isn't that they think it's great to reduce the amount of privacy >people have. Why would they support crypto and such if that were their >motivation? The real reason is because we expect that such databases are >going to come into existence regardless of legal efforts. They may be >"underground", or for that matter they may be run by governments >themselves, whom we are supposed to trust with our secrets. Yes, this is part of it (at least for me, and many others have expressed similar thoughts). We all as Cypherpunks know about "security through obscurity." Related names are: the _illusion_ of security, the "ostrich effect," etc. (Another key development which informs the CP outlook is the Lotus experience with their CD-ROM database on zipcodes, names, etc. I think it was called "Neighborhoods." Privacy advocates bought themselves the illusion of privacy by getting Lotus to cancel this...even as the data remained available to corporate, credit, intelligence agency, etc. customers.) >The point is that the best countermeasure is to prevent the collection of >the data in the first place. Ecash is better than credit cards for this >reason. People should try to structure their lives so that as little >information is leaked about them as possible. Relying on laws forbidding >people to keep information they have run across isn't likely to be >effective. Indeed, and "privacy laws," besides infringing on the basic freedoms of people to compile public data as they see fit, give people a "security blanket" which lessens their motivation to ensure their own privacy through direct, technological means. I frankly cannot understand how _any_ member of this list could _ever_ support so-called "privacy laws." Such laws fail to actually ensure privacy, and in fact give government new avenues for control. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Layman's explanation for limits on escrowed encryption ...
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:47 AM 5/24/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Wed, 22 May 1996, Ernest Hua wrote: > >> Could someone with some knowledge of NSA/DoS/FBI intentions please >> explain why key length limitations are necessary for escrowed >> encryption? > >To deal with the possibility that someone might slip through the cracks of >the escrow process. However, this escrow process is claimed to be _voluntary._ And good, non-escrowed encryption already exists today, outside the US. It won't be "slipping through the cracks," it'll be like opening the floodgates. So the question is still open: Why key-length limitations on export? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Announcing CryptaPix 1.0
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: KDBriggs1(a)aol.com > Date: Fri, 24 May 1996 13:05:32 -0400 > Subject: Announcing CryptaPix 1.0 > > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Information Contact: > > May 24, 1996 Kent Briggs > kbriggs(a)execpc.com > CIS: 72124,3234 > > > NEW GRAPHICS VIEWER FOR WINDOWS RELEASED > > Hewitt, Texas - Kent Briggs, author of Puffer, One-Page Calendar, > File Maven, and Directory Maven, has announced the release of > CryptaPix 1.0. Available in both 16-bit and 32-bit editions, > CryptaPix is a general purpose image viewer for GIF, JPG, PNG, > PCX, TIF, and BMP graphics files. > > What sets CryptaPix apart from ordinary viewers is its secure > encryption feature utilizing the same technology found in Puffer > 2.0. The encryption feature prevents unauthorized use of your > personal image collection by requiring a password for access. > Images are decrypted directly into memory for viewing. A secure > wipe feature will permanently remove unwanted images from your > disk drive. > [...more stuff deleted...] Expect to be hearing about this being a problem with some child porn case real soon now... <sigh> However - I can see this becoming VERY popular with the teenage crowd wanting to keep mom & dad out of their stash ;-) That being said - Thumbs up to Kent for another crypto program that pushes the "genie" even farther out of the bottle. Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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