December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: FTC online workshop on privacy
by Deranged Mutant 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

On 22 May 96 at 11:16, Rich Graves wrote: > I'd have to see the bill, but I think it's a good general idea, provided > there's the caveats KNOWINGLY and WITHOUT THEIR [parent/guardian's] > KNOWLEDGE. As much as I hate direct marketers, I don't want them subject > to malicious and arbitrary prosecution because one address out of > thousands happens to belong to a kid. When I was on the FTC privacy list a while back there were more details about that. Companies would set of very commercial web sites oriented towards kids, for the main purpose of getting the kids to give information about themselves. So imagine if somebody set up a Barney fan page with all sorts of links and goodies but with the encouragement (if not requirement for access) to fill out personal information, even personal info about family members. Ok... maybe that's within one's right. But while (most) adults would be suspicious, it's not necessarily so with some children... (who'd give out parent's CC#'s if they knew them). Teaching kids basic privacy issues is a whole lot better than legislation. (Caveat emptor aside, fraud and cons are still illegal...). I haven't seen the legislation so I won't rant for or against it (at least not on the list) for now. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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[SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 5:53 PM 5/23/96, jim bell wrote: >Well, he must have learned it all in the last few months, because his bill >was the closest thing to DOA that we've seen in a long time, exceeded only >by GAK 3. I'd like to hear from him what the source of the text of the >Leahy bill on encryption really was: Who pressured him to make it so bad? "If you only knew what we know..." ("...you wouldn't support encryption, you wouldn't push for privacy legislation, you would order all citizen-units to have tatooed ID numbers on their arms...") Though I normally avoid "Wired," I did pick up the latest issue to skim through. A couple of good things, actually, including a nice summary of the state of crypto laws, etc. (I don't recall the author, as I didn't buy the issue.) A great discussion of the Deepest and Darket Secret in Washington, the special "If you only knew what we know..." briefing given to legislators, staffers, etc. to convince them of the Evils of Cryptography. Paraphrasing the "Wired" item, "No person who has ever received "The Briefing" has ever again argued forcefully for the rights of citizens to use strong cryptography." I surmise that either Sen. Burns has not yet been given The Briefing, or he is for some reason more resistant than most other burrowcrats to the scare tactics used in The Briefing. I sure would like to know what's in this briefing. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: (Another) alternative to
by Jay Haines 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Reply to: RE>(Another) alternative to remailer shutdowns Where would these message parts be put back together/decrypted? Wouldn't this require the receivers mail program to re-generate the original message? -------------------------------------- Instead of having the last remailer in the chain store the plaintext of an encrypted anonymous message, it might be more convenient to have the sender split the message into two messages and send these. The first message would contain random characters, and the second would contain the xor of these random characters with the anonymous message. By themselves, each piece would, of course, be harmless random text, so remailer operators greatest crime would be spamming. If the two pieces were sent through chains with different last remailers, no one operator could be held accountable, and, of course, it would be ridiculous to suggest that one operator could be held responsible for that fact that another sent some random text which happened to be the xor of the random text another had sent with a harassing message. (For instance, the other operator could be trying to frame the first, with the help of the receiver.) It seems to me that the only way to deal with a remailing scheme of this kind would be outlaw anonymous remalining in general. Leonard

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subpoenas coming against 2 anon remailers?
by Jim Byrd 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

This was posted by henri(a)netcom.com to alt.religion.scientology: ---------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have just received urgent email from Grady Ward regarding the case against him by the cult of $cientology. Apparently, the depraved and insane cult of degenerates and reprobates has decided that Grady Ward is responsible for the recent posting of the NUTS scriptures, the final secret of the crime cult. Many of these 'scriptures' are simply recipes for crime, including how to practice medicine without a license and get away with it, in defiance of Judge Gessell's order demanding that they cease that fraud immediately. Nevertheless, this demented nut-cult has demanded a third-party expedited subpoena to obtain the records from the University of Maryland which they claim will prove their preposterous allegations. Two unnamed anonymous remailers will also be harassed in this bizarre fashion, though news on that is sketchy. The deranged and idiotic cult cites as 'evidence' of their ludicrous allegation that Grady filed a Motion to Dissolve the injunction against him after the NUTS pack was posted, on the grounds that it was then moot. This is the sole 'proof' they have. Bullshit and lies. So the nut-cult intends to rape remailers with no evidence at all. - From the criminal cult's filing: ". . .strong inference that defendant (1)is or is acting in concert with SCAMIZDAT; (2) has made postings of Plaintiff's Advanced Technology works; (3) may have made or been acting in concert with those who made the May 6 postings of the NOTs works for the express purpose of undermining the injunction entered herein. Defendant certainly let no grass grow under his feet in attempting to take advantage to [sic] those postings by asserting the invalidity of the injunction four days later. "As the collusion become more and more apparent with the latest blatant attempt to destroy RTC's trade secrets, the need for complete and expedited discovery of defendant becomes even greater." Not a scrap of evidence is offered that Grady Ward had anything to do with SCAMIZDAT, is SCAMIZDAT, or even knows who SCAMIZDAT is. Just brazen lies, bizarre accusations, and increasingly shrill and hysterical court filings, now even including sloppy grammar, as the cult lawyers are obviously working without sleep, and possibly under the influence of mind-altering drugs. In further proof of Grady Ward's guilt, the clam-cult offers the fact that Grady Ward has exchanged email with Alex de Joode, who operated the now-defunct remailer at utopia.hacktic.nl. Obviously, anyone who would associate with such a nefarious remailer operator must also continually post NUTS packs. In more absurd claims of the cult, they actually have the gall to accuse him of "taking advantage" of not having a lawyer while facing a worldwide criminal organization which has retained dozens of lawfirms simultaneously in order to fight its frivolous lawsuits against everything in existence. They are claiming that Grady Ward is somehow at an advantage over them because he doesn't even have a lawyer. They are also claiming, this cult which filed hundreds of lawsuits against the IRS alone, to dodge their taxes, that somehow the net "tricked" them into suing everything in sight. They also claim that Grady Ward (and everyone on the net) obviously keeps huge archives of mail and news, because "it is inherently unbelievable that defendant retypes several paragraphs of identical wording in message after message." In short, what the cult is claiming is that quotes ">" in USEnet followups prove that you keep huge archives. Apparently, these invidious cretins have never heard of the "F" key on a keyboard. One wonders how they manage to type a single word. "uck you you motherucking uckhead" just doesn't have the same "zip" without an "f" in there now and again, does it? They also accuse him of keeping huge archives, despite the fact that he doesn't keep any, because he had a list of cancelled messages that were feloniously cancelled with forged control messages, despite the fact that Ron Newman's web page at http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/home.html keeps a complete tally of all the forgeries. The cult then tries to impugn all of Grady Ward's exhibits as "unauthenticated and hearsay," because they're USEnet posts, while submitting as exhibits all of Grady Ward's posts, which by their own claims are ALSO "unauthenticated and hearsay." In other words, they've blown their own case out of the water! Well, their case is doomed, but it's still entirely possible that this imbecilic cult of droolers could cause some damage to remailers in their last dying thrashings. h - -- fuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuck f f u "When you can't say 'fuck,' you can't say u c 'FUCK THE CDA!' -- Lenny Bruce rephrased c k k fuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuck ObURL: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/erlich/defense-fund [ For Public Key: finger henri(a)netcom.com ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.i Comment: PGP signed with SigEd v1.3.1 - http://www.nyx.net/~pgregg/siged/ iQCVAgUBMaKFP2130hVrA/MJAQFaDgQAmWYgLr78HTeH7uNF9pcWnu862IokSt1d sIR9jjlKRApSSjiOPkNInDf4XwTHUsx6VxpAV16f4d2lEJrNcoRH1sizEKnNeEi3 +V5tqsdaawzYWi6kncHfONTqElshmWnRvXh5Zs1cjW11xjoXlWn2GEViKKO8UHtm vsK3PXuJEsg= =+ybQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Matts Kallioniemi 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 15:04 1996-05-22 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >However, accounting systems DO NOT use 32 bit fixed point arithmetic. > >One client of mine had around $10Billion under management. Do you >think they were doing their accounting on a system that could only >deal with fixed point numbers of 45Million or so? Hell, individual >trades are larger. Sure, but we were really discussing Ecash(tm), not accounting. To quote from the FAPI: /* An EC_Amount is a signed 32-bit integer. It represents an amount * of money in units of the coinage's base value. */ >Accounting systems require exact math -- down to the cent. Come on, we're not talking cents here. Question is, how do you represent a one ITL coin in Ecash(tm) with a USD mint? We are way below the cent level, where no accountant has ever gone before... Regards, Matts

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Re: PROPOSAL
by Jay Haines 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Reply to: RE>>PROPOSAL Thirded, with bilateral agreement. -------------------------------------- >Motion: To create the alt.politics.assassination.politics newsgroup and >the "AP" mailing list so as to clear the meaningless traffic (for which I >am significantly responsible) out of this forum. >Any seconds? So long as the AP list is specifically for debates about the ethics of such, seconded. If it would remove from cypherpunks discussion of implementation or of social consequences, that wouldn't be good, since the implementation of this is definitely cypherpunks material. -Allen

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TILT! Counterfeit pachinko cards send $588 million down the chute.
by pcw＠access.digex.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

The WSJ of Wednesday, May 22nd, 1996 (A18) reports that two Japanese firms lost about 55 billion yen when criminals counterfeited the stored money cards that they manufactured. These cards are used to pay for pachinko games, but you can get refunds wired to an account if you cash in a card. If my memory serves me correctly, there is a certain amount of skill involved. If you play well or are lucky, you might even add money to the cards. But I'm not sure about this detail. In any case, the people with the counterfeit cards could get refunds when they didn't pay for the original card. The Journal mentions three interesting details. First, the cards were pushed by the police as a means to track the flow of cash and stop money laundering. Obviously, there wouldn't be these losses if they could really track the flow. Second, the convenience of the new cards initially boosted profits because it was so much easier to play with the cards that automatically kept track of your money. Finally, the Journal reported that there are 18,244 pachinko parlors in Japan.

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SURVEY: Trading on the Internet
by Robert Hettinga 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> (by way of Rachel Willmer) Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 12:37:41 +0100 (BST) From: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> (by way of Rachel Willmer) To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: SURVEY: Trading on the Internet Following on from The Spring Street Brewery's successful IPO, I am researching the nature of Internet issues of debt and equity. This envisages the use of electronic token value systems such as Digicash and the digital bearer bonds that Bob talks about. The topic is for a management report that I am writing as the final deliverable in my MBA, and has a lot of bearing on what we are trying to do within the embryonic Internet Financial System. So, making whatever assumptions you like (but please mention them), here goes with some questions: ----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<---- Would your company be interested in the idea of issuing on the Internet? What specifically would attract you to issuing on the Internet? What specifically would worry you? Would you prefer Debt (bonds) or Equity (shares) (or something more exotic)? What sort of products/services does your company sell? Do you think Internet users would be attracted enough to your company to give you money (e.g. are you the Netscape of '97)? If not the general Internet community, who would buy your shares or bonds (local community, funds, family+friends, business contacts...)? ---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---- That's it, thanks in advance for your patience. Please forward to me directly, rather than posting (but post any deeper questions as they will, no doubt, be welcome). I am not interested in direct marketing anything (and please don't ask for a list of respondents), but any interesting answers I would like to follow up by email to develop them. Indicate if you want some summarised feedback (won't be for a few weeks). -- Ian Grigg iang(a)systemics.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: MixMaster fair use
by Bill Stewart 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 12:14 AM 5/22/96 EDT, you wrote: >From: IN%"loki(a)infonex.com" 21-MAY-1996 17:19:02.59 > >>The problem is RSAREF. I can't chose license terms for that. > > Oof... I see the problem. No, it's not you, it's them. The Agreement, as written, covers all of Mixmaster; it would be easier for people to adapt Mixmaster code if you either release a bones version or a license that clarifies that you can't use the RSAREF portions commercially but can do whatever you want with the rest of Mixmaster (if that's what you want) or however much freedom you want to grant (e.g. you may want to say some disclaimerish words about obeying ITAR etc.) Consensus.com is doing commercial licensing for RSAREF now; there may be some reasonably-priced approach to the problem. RSAREF has at least three kinds of legal protection: - contract (if you're using a licensed version) - patent (on doing RSA-method encryption, not on the code itself) - copyright (on the RSAREF code itself.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by Bill Stewart 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 03:05 PM 5/21/96 -0500, you wrote: >To make it easy, how about a two part MIME message with the key and the >PGP-encrypted message. The message text would be directions on opening >it up, and breaking the "seal", which constitutes acceptance of the >remailer terms... Is that really any different than delivering the message rot-13? One of the reasons people object to getting anonymous email is spam; sending "You have mail; pick up message-id #2718281828 by midnight tonight!" encourages you to go to some effort to pick up the message, so you'll be even more annoyed if it's spam. Similarly, for hate-mail. PROPOSAL -------- On the other hand, a pickup system could reduce directed spam, if people generally don't pick up remailer pickups unless they recognize the messageid, leaving the remailer system to people who actually want to communicate with each other anonymously, which _had_ been one of the original goals of remailer systems. Protocol support requirements:? We could build in a fancy header, or we could just use the Subject: line, which many remailers know how to paste in anyway, and let the remailer do a messageid. Response mechanisms should probably be an email message to the remailer :: Deliver-Message: 2718281828 A secondary concern is handling multi-casts - should the remailer create one copy for each recipient (secure, easy, space-wasteful), or should it try to get fancy and keep the message for N recipients or D days? Two ways to implement the fancy version are to keep a flag that says not to delete the article upon receipt, while the normal behavior deletes it, or to use different keywords for picking up delete-after-pickup and shared messages. NEGATIVES --------- The big negatives with this approach are that it doesn't support PGP-encrypted messages, since they don't easily fit into one line, while they also encourage people to forget that the header of their message will be delivered insecurely. But it's probably close enough for non-anti-government work. Of course, it also doesn't do chaining; that either needs to be implemented by recognizing well-known remailers and forwarding directly instead of pickup, or by using a standard message format, so other remailers could do pickup. It's probably worth doing both, to support other remailer types transparently and to allow remailers to use pickups without having to be well-known. Adding automatic remailer registration is easy, but requires care to avoid spammers falsely registering victim(a)wherever.com as a remailer and then spamming. SPAM POSSIBILITIES ------------------ That still allows 1-line spams like Subject: <Expletive Deleted>! You <perjorative deleted><ethnic slur deleted>! or Subject: Our new Remail-Spam(tm) system lets you fit 1015 characters in a Subject: line, just like this one, so your whole message can fit through those anti-marketing filters! You can MAKE M0NEY REAL FAST building your downline - send e$1 of Bank Foo ecash to the top three addresses in the Cc: line but at least it cuts down on the annoyance level. It also supports messages like Subject: Secrets of the Scientologists for Sale! Pick up message for free sample and price list! Operate your own Thetan today! which permit direct-e-mail spams, or as some people prefer to call them, marketing opportunities. An interesting security/legality wrinkle is that if somebody is trying to multicast-publish unencrypted contraband data, it's sitting around in the mail-pickup spool, it can be seized by Bad Guys / courts / sheriffs / etc. As with most remailers, there's also a risk that outgoing unicast mail could be seized while in the spool, which is higher for a pickup system because the data may be in the spool longer. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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