December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Accounting costs: the need for better metaphors
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To assess the desirability of a transaction, and to avoid being mischarged, the parties to a transaction have to count up, ie account for, the money paid for particular products and services -- whether making sure that cash payments ar made as promised (eg looking at the display as products are scanned at the store, or the receipt afterwards), or making sure the phone bill is proper. Herein I use "accounting" in this broad sense. I may be paying in cash, but I'd still like to keep track of how and why my cash is going in and out, for many of the same reasons that accountants reconcile and analyze book entries. Right now a transaction log (whether ecash(tm)'s or a credit card's) is the most useful way to do this. There may be other metaphors more appropriate for some circumstances (eg, eg absolute level gauges, rate gauges with high and low water marks, etc.); this is a potentially fertile new field to explore. There may be agents that can do some of the accounting (eg comparing payments made to terms promised, payment limits, etc.), but for the vast majority of products and services software cannot judge the quality or personal desire for the product or service, and thus the net desirability of the transaction. The user must undertake this comparison with whatever information the computer can provide via the display. The user interface and the cognition of the user thus remain the bottleneck to transaction granularity. A big task is to use the power of GUI to come up with new metaphors to make this easier. It is the intuitive yet accurate metaphor that will lower accounting costs. Cryptographic protocols potentially lower only security-related transaction costs such as forgery and extortion. For the normal accounting transaction costs, which are currently too high for micropayments, we need better interactive visual metaphors. For transactions free of records, we need transactions that can be fairly transacted once, immediately accounted for by the parties via a nice visual metaphor, then forgotten. The potential for unresolvable disputes in record-free systems is vast for transactions where this is not possible (probably most of desired commerce: where quality of a product or service cannot be well determined until after the purchase transaction is complete, or where credit is involved). Price is one kind of contractual term; we also need nice metaphors to keep track of other kinds of contractual terms. Lack of observability of the protocol on the part of the user leads to the ability of the counterparty to engage in hidden actions. See "http://www.best.com/~szabo/smart.contracts.2.html" for further discussion of this and other computerized contracting issues. One of the barriers to creating good contracts is determining what the parties want in the first place. People tend to think in terms of standard or stereotyped conditions: payment in dollars, investing in stocks, etc. when there exist a far wider variety of alternative contractual structures that, combined properly, could better meet the parties' needs. I'd like to see tools which allow parties to explore their desires interactively with the computer. In finance this might include interactive personal yield curves, determining the partial order of desires (as in decision theory) for particular alternate securities, derivatives, and synthetics; and so on. Software would then analyze this input, make recommendations, and even undertake automated contracting(*). Metaphors should be developed so that make it easy for lay users to express such desires without extensive knowledge of finance or decision theory. Such metaphors would provide a friendly front end to automated exchanges, auctions, and other online contracting mechanisms. Currently budget programs (like Quicken) provide some of the metaphors, and financial analysis programs provide extensive feedback on the cash flow properties of particular contracts, but a potentially large untapped market lies between in a combination of these two technologies. (*) contracting-like transactions done by automated agents raise interesting questions about what constitutes a "meeting of the minds". Nick Szabo szabo(a)netcom.com http://www.best.com/~szabo/

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.25 - Senate Encrypti
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>In a historic first that demonstrates the increasing power of the Internet >Community as a political force, HotWired, DIGEX, the Voters >Telecommunications Watch, and the Center for Democracy and Technology have >teamed up to provide a live, interactive "cybercast" of the Senate Commerce >Subcommittee encryption hearing on Wednesday June 26. > >The "cybercast" will provide netizens concerned about privacy and security >on the Internet the ability to participate in the hearing, ask questions of >the witnesses, and submit comments for the record. Details on how you can >participate are printed below. > >This hearing is the second encryption hearing held before the Senate >Subcommittee on Science, Space and Technology; the first hearing was held >on June 12. Subcommittee Chair Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) presided over both >hearings. > Of course except for PRZ they didn't invite anyone who cares about privacy (see later in this msg) What a fucking joke. Typical statist. >TELL CONGRESS WHY ENCRYPTION IS IMPORTANT TO YOU - ADD YOUR VOICE TO THE >CONGRESSIONAL RECORD > >Senator Burns, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and the other sponosors of the >Pro-CODE bill want to hear from the Net.community about why encryption is >important to privacy and security on the Internet. > >Please be sure to visit http://www.crypto.com/ and add your voice to the >debate over encryption policy on Capitol Hill. Responses will be tabulated >and the results, along with selected statements, will be included in the >Congressional Record by Senator Conrad Burns. The restults will also be >featured during the Security and Freedom through Encryption Forum (SAFE) on >July 1 (details on that event are attached below). > >To add your voice to the crypto debate in Congress, visit: > > http://www.crypto.com/submit/ > Right. Sure. And then they have a record of all the ppl interested in cryptoprivacy (keep reading) >ATTEND THE SAFE FORUM - JULY 1, 1996 STANFORD CALIFORNIA > >On July 1, 1996, in the heart of California's Silicon Valley at Stanford >University, members of Congress, prominent computer industry leaders and >privacy advocates will meet to discuss the need to reform U.S. encryption >policy. > >The event is FREE and open to the public, but space is limited and is going >fast. To find out more, and to reserve your free ticket, visit the SAFE >Forum Web Page at: > > http://www.crypto.com/safe/ > And sign up for a free trip to the roundup of people who want privacy. Coming soon to a police state near you. WHY THE FUCK DO THEY NEED TO KNOW YOUR NAME FOR THIS SHIT??? WHY IS NO ONE ASKING THIS??? Look carefully at who's sponsoring this. Who are they, and where does the money come from? Hint: three letters. Notice how they don't use PGP to sign the msg? Wonder why? [///// THIS LINE ADDED BY EZBBS-MAIL / DO NOT DELETE / MSGID-33f107 / END /////]

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NS on TTPs
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New Scientist, 22 July 1996, p. 10. Crackdown on Net Crooks 'a charter for state snoopers' Britain and France have become the first European nations to take concerted action against swindlers and other criminals operating on the Internet. The governments of both countries last week announced plans to license Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) to act as "honest brokers" for online business transactions. But civil liberties campaigners fear that the schemes may be snoopers' charters, giving police forces and security agencies unprecedented opportunities to spy on the world of business. The idea is for TTPs to act as "introduction agencies" that will reassure each party to a deal that the other has been vetted and is reputable. TTPs will also hand out encryption software that business partners will use to exchange information in confidence. But in both countries, TTPs will be required to release the keys to this encryption to the police or the security services, on production of an appropriate warrant. Currently there are few safeguards to protect those contemplating buying goods or services over the Internet from fraudsters. "Cyberspace has become the new frontier for scam artists," concluded a report released by the US Federal Trade Commission last month. "The scams are not new but the medium is." John Moroney, a senior consultant at the computer consultancy Ovum, believes TTPs are the best way to drive forward the growth of business over the Internet. As online transactions become commonplace, he argues, banks may be especially keen to volunteer as TTPs, to protect their dominance in the financial services market. "If home shopping takes off they could be left exposed," says Moroney. But Simon Davies, director of the London-based civil liberties watchdog, Privacy International calls the plan "naive". He argues that businesses are perfectly capable of setting up secure systems for electronic trade without government involvement: "What is the government doing in this field in the first place?" The British and French proposals, Davies says, bear a strong resemblance to the failed "Clipper chip" plan in the US. The Clipper scheme involved building a scrambling chip into all new telephones and computers. The keys to the scrambler would have been in the hands of government-appointed agencies. "With Clipper it quickly became clear the agenda was broader than initially stated," says Davies, "and that is exactly what will happen in Europe." He fears that if the scheme takes off, companies not using TTP-approved encryption software will instantly come under surveillance by the police or security services. The Department of Trade and Industry in Britain rejects this claim. "The government licensing of TTPs is just a way of enhancing consumer confidence," says a spokesman, who adds that there are no plans to ban non-TTP software. Banks, trade associations and telecommunications firms are the most likely candidates for becoming TTPs, the DTI says. -- Mark Ward [End]

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RE: info assembly line, "flits" (long)
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Vladimir Z. Nuri "flits" would have an identity irrespective of companies. one could track them moving through different companies if necessary. (the "flits" might therefore also have security aspects associated with them.) the point is that the data must not be disconnected, it must be seen as continuous, and I think a flit-like concept is key to accomplishing this. ................................................................... Wouldn't this accounting of "flits" require that each of them be assigned a tag? Since this would encompass all the "flits" in cyberspace irrespective of who/where used them, whose "flits" would be counted first, beginning where? And once one "flit" was attached to a document which was maintained as a permanent structure somewhere in someone's database, that means it could not be used anywhere else, and how would this work for copies made of that original document? Once a "flit" was used as a copy and then detached and re-associated with some other document several times, would each new copy carry a record of where it had been previously, so that half of the amount of space of a document would be comprised of the historical record of where that "flit" had been? Sounds very costly. .. Blanc

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Re: Sen. Specter and Kerry move to delay crypto legislation
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:15 AM 6/22/96 -0700, someone anonymous wrote: >Don't confuse Kerry and Kerrey. This was not Kerry from >Massachusetts. Kerry from Mass seemed to have mixed feelings about it. One one hand, he wants more business for his state, but on the other, he's got a military background and is concerned about the so-called legitimate needs of law enforcement. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Distract Authority!

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Re: Generation of private key from pass
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Matt mentioned difficulty in finding a public domain dictionary that had > parts of speech. The reason I am posting is because a few weeks ago > Grady Ward announced that he was making his "Moby Lexicon" available for > free, and I seem to recall that this included part of speech information. > If so, this could be an opportunity for someone else to explore this > method. Get the Oxford Learner's dictionary.

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SKIP IP-layer encryption release Beta 2.3
by skrenta＠osmosys.incog.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We are pleased to announce the newest release of our domestic source reference implementation into the public domain. >From this public domain source release, you can build a fully functional IP-layer encryption and authentication package with full key management. Both FreeBSD 2.1.0 and SunOS 4.1.3 are supported in this release. DES, triple-DES and SAFER are supported for encryption and keyed-MD5 is supported for authentication. This source produces a package which contains a loadable module which works with existing TCP/IP stacks. You do not need to replace (or even recompile) your IP stack to use this package. SKIP encrypts traffic at the IP packet layer. Applications do not need to be recompiled or modified to take advantage of encryption. Source and pre-built binaries (for FreeBSD 2.1.0) may be obtained by US and Canadian citizens from http://skip.incog.com/ This software may be used without restriction, for commercial and/or non-commercial purposes. Features of this release ------------------------ o Support for FreeBSD2.1.0 o SKIP V2 compliant implementation using ESP and AH encapsulation. o Support for Authentication using keyed-MD5. o Support for DES, 3DES, and SAFER 128SK for traffic and key encryption. o Support for nomadic users o Support for multiple local identities with different sets of parameters. o Support for multiple CA (Certificate Authority) certificates. o Transport mode is supported. o New Certificate Discovery protocol. o Highly configurable key manager. o Support for RAW AH and ESP protocols. o Diffie-Hellman Public Key Agreement based system. o Support for multiple NSIDs and multiple local certificates. o GUI tool for user friendly manipulation of access control lists and key statistics. o Command line tools for manipulating access control lists, etc. o Implementation of the Certificate Discovery protocol fully integrated into SKIP. o Implementation of X.509 public key certificates. o Implementation of DSA signature algorithm for certificate signatures. o Implementation for MD2, MD5 and SHA message digest algorithms. o Implementation of ASN.1 DER encoding/decoding. o SunScreen(tm) SKIP compatibility mode. o Implementation of hashed public keys as defined in the SKIP draft. Implementation of programs to generate hashed public keys, to convert X.509 Certificates to hashed keys and print both X.509 and Hashed certificates. o High performance Big Number library for Diffie-Hellman calculations. o Implementation is effectively "public domain" and may be used both commercially and non-commercially. o Patent Agreement with Cylink allows royalty-free use of the Diffie-Hellman and other Stanford patents with this package for commercial and non-commercial use. Read README.PATENT for some restrictions. o Inclusion of prime generation program used to generate the primes in SKIP draft.

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Re: Win95 Blowfish Implementation
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Thanks to everyone who replied to my original message. I was confident I could use those algorithms (I wouldn't have spent months on the code otherwise) but I wanted to check one more time before I publicly released software using them. One question though. The following text is quoted from Bill Stewart. > >2. SHA can be used without royalty. > Yup. Use SHA-1 rather than the original SHA, though; the NSA > "updated" it in ways that do appear to strengthen it. > What exactly is the difference between SHA and SHA-1? Is it the left circular shift when generating the W array? I coded the SHA alogrithm according to _Applied Cryptography_ Second Edition. Is that the updated version of SHA? Many thanks. David F. Ogren P.S. Here is the super short description of Hootie: Hootie is a Windows 95 implementation of the Blowfish algorithm. It is a fully graphical interface which includes drag and drop support as well as Explorer launch. It can support both CBC and ECB modes. The passphrase can either be directly entered by the user or the passphrase can be SHA hashed before use. Hootie can optionally add headers at the beginning of the file which automatically select the block encryption mode and confirm good passphrases, or (for people concerned about known-plaintext attacks) omit the headers. Future features include: generation of keys via a TNG (which are then saved to file), using MD5 rather than SHA, and a primitive text editor which which can be encrypted/decrypted to/from. I currently expect to release the alpha version in two to three weeks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMczT+fBB6nnGJuMRAQGcXgP+LcOp17aHIpoyScq9O8MlK+HcNBUsbdxq KoFEqeDJyyL9pOcn9IdMHvZXmzzdBpEdk2q7DrObhk9z8Dy3jqai4t222upJ2kmn blXGW3zIRdyycGg0ij0GCZzUkD6cSLpe4k5/HdhWhcgyDFx6t95sJIQAm/YIoC1R JTTc86tmjss= =iXHL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- David F. Ogren ogren(a)concentric.net (alternate address: dfogren(a)msn.com) PGP Key ID: 0xC626E311 PGP Key Fingerprint: 24 23 CD 15 BF 8D D1 DE 81 71 84 C8 2C E0 4B 01 (public key available via server or by sending a message to ogren(a)concentric.net with a subject of GETPGPKEY)

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Re: CFS Questions (protocol? safer/idea linkings?)
by David Rochberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/cfs.ps is Blaze's CFS paper (which I was silly not to read before my last post to cfs-users). It should answer many of your questions. The answer to your "why so muany keys" question is that CFS uses two keys per attachment (2 * 64 per hybrid-3DES instance * 2 instances = 256). This is an attempt to foil structural analysis of the files---under ECB mode alone, identical parts of the file will be encrypted to identical ciphertext. To encrypt data, CFS first XORs the data with a long (.5 Mbyte, according to the paper) repeated psuedo-random mask. The mask is generated by running the cipher in OFB mode with one of the keys. Then the result of the XOR is encrypted in ECB mode with the other key. (There's some other optional XORing that goes on as well---read the paper). The passphrase->key bit is based on SHS. Take a look at new_pwcrunch in getpass.c in your distribution. -david

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Re: Micropayments: myth?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>don't people get this? with microcurrency, you don't say to a >>seller, "bill me for this item". it would rarely work like that at >>all. instead, it is, "here is my money, please give me the item". > >What is the authentication process for the "money" your are "giving" in this >scenario? Varies with the micropayment system. Some proposals are to use Digicash, either online or offline. Others are to use simpler systems, such as S/Key variants or piles of tokens - you'd use some heavyweight payment system like a credit card / ATM / digicash to buy 100 or 1000 microtokens, which you'd use for the actual payments, and which would require less computation to authenticate. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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