December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C'punks, At 08:29 AM 6/7/96 -0700, you wrote, re: using ATM machines instead of couriers: >Sounds like you are suffering caffeine withdrawal. Try >wondering again after you have had some coffee. Gosh, I don't even drink coffee and I think Duncan is absolutely right on point. Snide remarks notwithstanding, what substantive critique do you have of Duncan's remarks? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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"EASYSAFE(R) VERSION 3.0
by caal＠hopf.dnai.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought this may be of interest to the list. >[PRNewswire:Computers-0605.14] 6/5/96 > > EASYSAFE(R) VERSION 3.0 FOR DOS, WINDOWS & WINDOWS 95 'FIRST > NOTEBOOK SECURITY PRODUCT' > > CHICAGO, June 5 /PRNewswire/ - EliaShim Safe Software, a leading > provider of network security products and anti-virus protection > systems, announced at Spring Comdex 96 the release of EasySafe, > version 3.0, the first security and encryption product designed > specifically for notebook computers. > > .. EasySafe provides bullet-proof protection that is easy to install. > .. EasySafe prevents unauthorized use or access through boot password > protection. > .. EasySafe prevents removal or transfer of information via full hard > disk encryption. > .. EasySafe provides keyboard locking after three incorrect password > attempts. > .. EasySafe provides screen blanking after a predetermined period of > inactivity. > .. EasySafe denies system level access to hard disk information. > .. EasySafe can be configured to disable LPT, COM, and Floppy ports. > > Upon boot-up, EasySafe asks the user for a password. A > correctly entered password grants the user access to the computer. > Encryption/decryption of data on the hard disk is dynamic and > completely transparent to the user. The system allows for three > password attempts before locking the computer, and only a cold-boot > reset is possible. After entering the correct password, the disk is > unencrypted dynamically, normal boot up takes place, and the user is > granted access to the system without disk access restrictions or > delay. > > EasySafe includes a DOS/Windows screen saving utility which > blanks the screen after a period of inactivity. The only way to re- > activate the computer is to enter the correct password. > > EasySafe offers two encryption methods. The first encrypts all > data on local hard drives. The second method encrypts boot sectors > and partitions. This prevents unauthorized users from booting from > the "A": drive and accessing the data on the hard disk. This > encryption scheme also protects against the use of disk editing > programs (such as Norton Utilities). Thus, valuable company secrets > remain hidden and secure. EasySafe can be configured to disable LPT, > COM, and Floppy ports to ensure that the information contained on > the hard drive cannot be transferred to another system for later > viewing. > > While annual purchases of notebook computers have increased > steadily, the number of notebooks reported stolen each year is much > more alarming. In 1995, 208,000 notebooks with a value of almost > $640 million were reported stolen by a Columbus, Ohio insurance > company that offers coverage for portable computers (Information > Week - May 6, 1996 issue). EasySafe is the perfect product for > those field professionals whose notebooks contain valuable, > confidential, company information and other sensitive data that is > hundreds of times more valuable than the cost of a notebook. > > Founded in 1983, EliaShim Safe Software has been providing PC > security solutions and anti-virus protection for corporate, > government, educational institutions, and program developers in both > domestic and international markets. Over four million computers are > protected worldwide. Product line includes: EasySafe, MasterSafe, > ViruSafe Gold, and ViruSafe LAN. > > -0- 6/5/96 > /CONTACT: Carl Frederick, Jr., Director of Marketing, EliaShim > Microcomputers, 800-477-5177, or at Spring Comdex 96, Booth . C5431, > 312- > 791-6708/ > > CO: EliaShim Microcomputers, Inc. > ST: Florida > IN: CPR > SU: PDT > >

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Internet solution for law enforcement
by caal＠hopf.dnai.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone seen this yet? Looks like it's two weeks old. Internet Police! >[BizWire] 5/20/96 > > (SUN/PSI-INTL)(SUNW) PSI International, Sun partner, unveils Java- > based Internet solution for law enforcement agencies; "Internet in > Blue" Police Internet/Intranet Application Suite Available in July > 1996 > > Business Editors/Computer Writers > > Highlights: > -- Internet in Blue, one of the first Java-based solutions aimed > at fighting crime, is being introduced by PSI International, a > strategic partner of Sun Microsystems Federal, and includes other > Sun products. > > -- Internet in Blue combines the power of Java and Netra servers > to enable law enforcement agencies and police departments to quickly > leverage the capabilities of the Internet and intranets. > > -- This solution is the latest evidence of Sun taking advantage > of the significant market opportunity for crime prevention > technology. Last year, Sun Federal announced a dedicated Criminal > Justice Operation, which is working with police departments and law > enforcement agencies around the world to help them use technology in > fighting crime. > > MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- May 20, 1996--One of > the first Sun(TM) Java(TM)-based solutions aimed at fighting crime > was introduced today by PSI International, a strategic partner of > Sun Microsystems Federal, a subsidiary of Sun Microsystems, Inc. > > Called Internet in Blue(TM), the solution combines the power of > Sun's Java technology, its Netra(TM) Internet servers, its Java > WorkShop(TM) development tools, and PSI's relational database > software. This solution fully leverages the capabilities of the > Internet for the benefit of law enforcement agencies because of the > inclusion of Java, the revolutionary Internet platform from Sun that > makes possible fast, easy, operating-system-independent use of the > Internet. > > To be offered by PSI, Internet in Blue will enable police > departments and other law enforcement agencies to leverage the > latest Internet technology to fight crime and promote citizen > involvement and community-based policing. From a citizen's > perspective, having a local police force with an Internet presence > gives people the opportunity to report problems online and play a > more active role in fighting crime in their neighborhoods. > > Besides utilizing the Internet, the PSI solution also allows > local police to build an "intranet," which is a greatly enhanced > internal information network to handle departmental processes as > well as to speedily access any internal database of interest. > Examples of these databases include local crime data such as > patterns of crimes, gang affiliations, data on previous suspects and > arrests. Currently, many police departments must locate such data > via a paper trail, which is very inefficient. > > "Law enforcement agencies are quickly realizing the power of the > Internet and intranets as strategic tools in fighting crime," said > John Marselle, president of Sun Microsystems Federal. "The Internet > in Blue solution from PSI -- based on Sun technology -- takes > advantage of Java's security features, platform independence and > database access capabilities. It should make it much easier for > police departments and other criminal justice organizations to get > online and to leverage the capabilities of the network." > > With Java WorkShop, a visual development environment for Java > that can be included as part of the Internet in Blue solution, > police departments can design, test, deploy and maintain Internet > and intranet applications based on Java with speed and simplicity. > Java WorkShop runs on the Sun Solaris(TM) environment and Windows > 95/NT. Using Java, the PSIBase relational database management > system can access Web browsers across any hardware platform. > > "The Internet is the next frontier in the development of law > enforcement information systems," said Paul Wormeli, program > director for law enforcement at PSI. "Our Internet in Blue solution > will enable law enforcement agencies to quickly exploit the latest > technologies like Java." > > Internet in Blue includes the following: > > A starter kit with a Sun Netra Internet server and PSI software > and services needed to set up a site on the World Wide Web, as well > as technical assistance from PSI for developing content and training > for a Webmaster. > > A full set of applications to create a police intranet providing > secure internal access to selected crime information, standard > operating police procedures and other infrastructure services. > > An interactive, community-based communications medium to > facilitate crime reporting over the Internet and community-based > policing. > > Suggestions for services that law enforcement agencies can > develop in order to offset the cost of the Internet project, such as > providing online crime reports and accident report information to > authorized outside organizations including legal firms and insurance > companies. -0- > > The Internet in Blue product will be available in July, 1996. > Pricing will vary depending on customer needs. > > PSI International, Inc. has provided systems integration and > services for over 14 years to federal, state and local governments. > The company specializes in law enforcement and public safety > solutions, consulting services, and integration of software and > hardware. With a staff of over 250 professionals in the information > system and services industry, PSI has a team of people that have > both technical and industry knowledge of public safety and justice > applications, including computer aided dispatch, records and > investigative management, imaging, telecommunications, and mobile > computing. > > Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., headquartered in Vienna, > Virginia, is a subsidiary of Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sun Federal's > charter is to develop, deliver and sustain markets for Sun products > in governments worldwide. > > With annual revenues of $6 billion, Sun Microsystems, Inc., > provides solutions that enable customers to build and maintain open > network computing environments. Widely recognized as a proponent of > open standards, the company is involved in the design, manufacture > and sale of products, technologies and services for commercial and > technical computing. Sun's SPARC(TM) workstations, multiprocessing > servers, SPARC microprocessors, Solaris(Tm) operating software and > ISO-certified service organization each rank No. 1 in the UNIX(TM) > industry. Founded in 1982, Sun is headquartered in Mountain View, > Calif., and employs more than 16,000 people worldwide. -0- > > Note to Editors: Sun, the Sun logo, Sun Microsystems, Java, Java > Workshop, Netra and Solaris are trademarks or registered trademarks > of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and in other > countries. All SPARC trademarks are used under license and are > trademarks or registered trademarks of SPARC International, Inc. in > the United States and other countries. Products bearing SPARC > trademarks are based upon an architecture developed by Sun > Microsystems, Inc. UNIX is a registered trademark in the United > States and other countries exclusively licensed through X/Open > Company, Ltd. > > Internet in Blue is a trademark of PSI, International and is > properly written in boldface italics, all lower case. > > Press announcements and other information about Sun Microsystems > are available on the Internet via the World Wide Web using a tool > such as Netscape or NCSA Mosaic. Type http://www.sun.com at the URL > prompt. > > --30--css/sf* > > CONTACT: Burson-Marsteller (for Sun) > Jane Rauckhorst, 212/614-4880 > or > PSI International > Martha Hill, 703/352-8700 > > KEYWORD: CALIFORNIA > INDUSTRY KEYWORD: COMPUTERS/ELECTRONICS COMED > INTERACTIVE/MULTIMEDIA/INTERNET PRODUCT GOVERNMENT > > REPEATS: New York 212-752-9600 or 800-221-2462; Boston 617-236-4266 > or 800-225-2030; SF 415-986-4422 or 800-227-0845; LA 310-820-9473 BW > URL: http://www.businesswire.com >

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Wasting time and bandwidth on Bell
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 7 Jun 1996 08:29:56 -0400 (EDT), Declan McCullagh wrote: >Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 6-Jun-96 Re: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS >by jim bell(a)pacifier.com >> Not quite yet, anyway. I'm very disappointed to have waited over a >>year for >> some slick lawyer to show me how I'd be violating some law or another >>to do so ... >A few observations: >1. Not many readers of cypherpunks are lawyers I've noticed quite a few, actually. I don't know how many are regular readers but there seems to be enough to maintain a steady undercurrent of legal thinking on the issues associated with digital commerce, some anonymity and First Amendment issues, a sprinkling of criminal law topics, and of course, banking, intellectual property, SEC, antitrust, general contract, and related commercial law. >2. Of the laywers who do read cypherpunks, many may not choose to spend >their time researching what laws AP may violate. Or they're not "slick" >lawyers; take your pick. Or they automatically delete any posts that come from or relate to the puerile bullshit Bell is infamous for, and choose not to get dragged into this type of time- and bandwidth- wasting garbage. Of which this post is just another, of course, but i get so damn sick and tired of the constant imposition of 'AP' and related nonsense on this list. Of late, the trolls seems to be particularly effective among people who should know better, and an aura of credence or relevance has developed around some of this crap. Can't we just ignore it, and move on? Maybe if we ignore him he'll go away. >3. Congress would have no problems passing a law outlawing AP, if one >does not exist already. > >-Declan I would be satisfied if they just outlawed e-mail about it.

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Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu writes: > >He's a Cato fellow. I don't think that implies anything more than > >he he gets some money from them. > > Nope, he is listed in "senior staff". He's listed in the staff section, but he's clearly labeled as a fellow. P.J. O'Rourke is also listed in the same column as a fellow. I suppose he's working at Cato full time and only moonlights at Rolling Stone. The fact that neither of them lives within striking distance of Cato headquarters (O'Rourke lives in New Hampshire) makes your claim ever more interesting. > I'm working on digital signature systems under a DARPA contract. We shall therefore have to declare you to be a U.S. Government employee. .pm

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RE: Anonymous stock trades.
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu >The farmers want to get a freebie handout while pretending that they >are not on >welfare. This leads to a mechanism which is attempting socialist >policies ... [etc.] ............................................................. Okay, but what does this have to do with anonymous stock trades? > .. >Blanc

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Re: [NOISE] Banking's Physical Security
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sean T Carnes <crisper(a)ascensionet.com> > We all know that banks are very highly protected as far as their money = > goes but how safe are there computers? I live very close to a computer = > database collecting company that collects the data related to many banks = > in the area. It is all done through land lines and is not very well = > protected. They aren't very careful about who or what they let into the = > building also. If someone were to cut the lines the banks in the area = > would be out for days and they wouldn't have a means to do interbank = > transactions outside of the immediate area. Has anyone else seen this = > in there area or heard of it. Wouldn't it be a better idea to do the = > transactions by satellite. There's a big difference between a real bank and a data collection outfit. I used to work at a major money center bank in the Wall Street area. To get to the data center I had to: 1. Walk into the building, past an armed security guard. 2. Within sight of him, use my badge stripe to get through a turnstile - most employees had badges which were limited in the times they would work. 3. Take an elevator to the (unadvertised) correct floor. 4. Use my badge in a reader to get out of the elevator lobby - most badges were restricted in the floors they would open. 5. Use my badge to get through an unmarked door, into the 'airlock'. In the airlock, I'd hold my photo ID up to a reader, so the guard downstairs could. a. Compare my face against that on the photo ID. b. Check that I was authorized to enter the data center. c. Check that there was no one else in the airlock with me. If he was satisfied, he'd open the inside door remotely. 6. The data center was manned by at least two operators (usually more), 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Only they were permitted to touch terminals connected to operational systems. (There were other security features I won't go into.) Sure, our fiber optic lines to CHIPS and the Fed occasionally went out - that's what backup dialout phone lines are for. If we had phone problems, the lines were fixed in a couple hours, not days. At a pinch, I imagine you could use now a cellphone and modem to keep things moving. Peter Trei

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Remailer thoughts
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Adam, Forwarded message: > From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> > Subject: Re: Remailer chain length? > Date: Tue, 4 Jun 1996 22:57:10 -0500 (EST) > > Jim Choate wrote: > > | > I don't think multiple remailers at the same site help anything. > | > > | > | I agree completely. If traffic analysis is going to be done on a single box > | it isn't going to matter how many remailers are there. The monitor will > | simply grab them all. At this point it simply maps them thusly: > > | incoming message > remailer #1 > .... > remailer #n > outgoing > | > | > | That this really maps to is obvious: > | > | > | incoming message > remailer #1-#n > outgoing > > Analyzing the traffic through three remailers is more > difficult than analyzing the traffic through one. One remailer with > three N messages per day is more secure than an equivilant remailer > with N mesasges. Not if they are on the same box, simply treat the box itself as the remailer. The internal mechanics are for the most part irrelevant to this issue. N messages go in, N messages with (number of remailers)(# of cover traffic/real message) messages of cover. My contention is that it does not matter how many remailers are on a single box. It is the number of connections in and out of the box available. The above equation is clearly linear and therefore not what I would consider computationaly challenging. If I may introduce some terminology (unless their is an existing stnd.), x number of messages y message multiplier N#() remailer number # R#() number of remailers on machine # C() number of cover messages/original messages E# number of connections on machine # T() total traffic through remailer system $i() cost per message, incoming $o() cost per message, outgoing C fixed cost items of operation (eg rent) Note: each of these represent a family of functions. My contention: T(R#(n)) is equivalent to T(R#(N1(x), N2(x)..., Nn(x))) Where, T() = R#(n)(2N#(x) + C(yN#(x))) The term 2N#(x) represents the number of valid messages the remailer handles. x incoming & x outgoing, hence 2x. The total income of such a remailer: $(T(x))=$i(x)-$o(T(x)-x)-C It is important to recognize the profit dependancy on the input/output message ratio. If it gets too high, you got nothing to spend on yourself. Your contention (if I may translate): N1(3x) is more secure than N1(x), assuming identical remailer configuration. Do you consider N#(ax) equivalent to aN#(x)? May I inquire into your reasoning? > [much good thought deleted.] > > | 5. Automaticaly limits spamming unless a remailer allows cloning > | AND all recipients share a commen private key. > > Or unless the remailer mails to a mail to news gateway. This is a limitation of the mail-news gateway and not of the remailer technology. What it points to is a serious shortcoming in mail-news gateway software. The technology required for truely efficient newsgroup handling is something sorely in need of work. > | 6. It maps 1:1 onto the physical remailer model with the same limits > | on information at each stage. This allows one to directly apply > | the current history of precedence involving anonymity and > | physical remailers. > > With physical remailers, you can open the inner envelopes and > read the message, leaving the end user to wonder where the post office > lost the message. With 'real' remailers, the lost message can't be > read, only not delivered. If the encryption technology is secure. The point I am making here is that the encryption envelope is 'secure' only so long as nobody is trying to crack it. Sooner or later somebody is going to decrypt your message, if not the entire encryption system. This is synonymous with the physical model. The paper envelope is secure as long as somebody isn't breaking the law by tampering with the mail. > | This is the basic model that the Austin Cypherpunks are working on at the > | currrent time. The big problem we have right now is determining if the body > | is actualy encrypted. We have done some basic tests of encryption-spoofing > | using pgp and it is looks to be a thorny problem. It simply is not trivial > | to look at a block of characters and determine if they are actualy > | encrypted. You can't rely on the wrapper around the data put there by the > > I'm not sure I see why this matters? If you check that the > message is not obviously readable, why not assume that its well > encrypted? You're rarely required to contort yourself to ensure your > customers are obeying the law (weaponsmiths, cryptographers, and banks > excepted.) Ok. Let's for a moment assume that to send a message to 'president(a)whitehouse.gov' with 'Die Bill!' is a crime. Would it not be a crime to foil a packet of encryption by inserting 'Die Bill!' messages in clear text in the encryption block? To date, provided no attempt at actual decryption is attempted, there is nothing in the standards that prevent this other than digital signatures. And again, a specific program has to be executed. A person might very well look at it as plaintext w/o ever running digital signatures (or they just assume its always right). Would this also be a crime? Jim Choate "Reality is observer dependant" \ \ \\///// | | (.) (.) ===========================oOO==(_)==OOo========================== Tivoli an IBM company CyberTects: SSZ Customer Support Engineer SOHO Consulting/VR/Robotics 9442 Capitol of Texas Highway North 1647 Rutland Suite 500 #244 Austin, TX 78759 Austin, TX 78758 Email: jchoate(a)tivoli.com Email: ravage(a)ssz.com Phone: (512) 436-8893 Phone: (512) 259-2994 Fax: (512) 345-2784 Fax: n/a WWW: www.tivoli.com WWW: www.ssz.com Modem: n/a Modem: (512) 836-7374 Pager: n/a Pager: n/a Cellular: n/a Cellular: n/a ===================================================================

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E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think this has made the rounds here, already. If it hasn't, any comments? Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 15:53:52 GMT X-Sender: jnferree(a)postoffice.worldnet.att.net Mime-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: "J. Neil Ferree" <jnferree(a)worldnet.att.net> Subject: E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643 Has anyone else received the *Amnesty* documentation from E-data Systems of Secaucus, NJ regarding their patent on: ... system for reproducing information in material objects at a point of sale location ... "The patent generally describes the system and methodology whereby products composed of digital data are purchased and embedded electronically at a point of sale location from a host computer. The products are typically delivered in usable form only after payment is made. The purchaser requests delivery after the money requirements are satisfied and authorized for the delivery is granted. In today's vernacular, the patent covers on-demand electronic distribution". [taken from the accompanying brochure] Their licensing agreement (with fee schedules) addresses; 1) Content providers; Owners and sellers of products which are sold and delivered electronically by the provider or through a distribution network owned by another within the scope of at least one of the E-data Systems patent claims. 2) Resellers; Distributors who provide a distribution network for content providers to sell products within the scope of at least one of the E-data Systems patent claims. 3) Service providers for Electronic Distribution Applications; Providers of various services, (ie) encryption, locking, unlocking metering, etc. who provide applications for content providers and/or resellers within the scope of at least on of the E-data Systems patent claims. Contact information for E-data Systems regarding how to obtain a license .... Tele 800-406-1668 Web www.3wnet.com/corp/edata e-mail gift(a)planet.net --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:52 AM 6/7/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >... As >any free market economist would tell you, the way to stop a resource >from being destroyed is not to pray that people won't buy it but to >assure that someone has an ownership stake in the resource, thus >assuring that their investment would be destroyed if the resource >vanished. Thats why, for instance, timber companies happily clear cut >government land that they have leased (after all, not clear cutting >would mean that they wouldn't extract maximum value for their lease >under the idiotic terms that the leases are made under) but will >almost never clear cut their own lands, because that would reduce >their long term value. I find this analysis a bit superficial because it does not consider the difference between short-term and long-term value. To use Perry's example of the timber industry. Before the late 1980s, the lands owned by Pacific Lumber were managed for long-term production. When the company was taken over as part of the "maximize present value" movement in the late 1980s, the management goals changed to increase timber production without regard to long-term production. (I seem to remember that the takeover was one of Michael Milken's deals.) My conclusion from this example is that if your interest is in the long-term preservation of ecosystems, you need institutions that are structured so they take a long-term view, and can not be subverted by short-term trends in markets. As far as I can tell, the US National Park Service, for all its faults, does as good a job of preserving ecosystems as any other institution, and better than most. (If you disagree, please provide examples of institutions that do as well.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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