December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Security of PGP if Secret Key Available?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With the MD5 collisions, can it be shown that plaintext passphrases are more likely to map to certain hashes than others? (And hence IDEA key search space reduced?) Just speculation. Rob. On 3 Jun 96 at 2:36, Robert A. Hayden wrote: [..] > However, I got to wondering about the security of PGP assuming somebody > trying to read my PGPed stuff has my 1024-bit secret key. ie, if I have > it on my personal computer, and somebody gets my secret key, how much > less robust has PGP just become, and what are appropriate and reasonable > steps to take to protect this weakness? --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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NRC Session Hiss
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

During the Q&A of the NRC public session, it was asked why 56-bit DES was selected as the standard of export over other widely distributed programs such as PGP. The panelists seemed to me uneasy in answering this. Primarily their view was that DES was "ubquitious," well- known and tested by use. However, when pressed by later questioners on this topic, they expanded their view: that if another, stronger, program became "ubiquitous" -- in wide use -- they would support it as the standard of export. When it was pointed out that PGP now fit this definition, the panel merely repeated the statement about ubiquity without specifically affirming or denying the PGP claim. Their poker faces seemed uniformly in place to dampen a potential inflammatory topic. Perhaps other attendees will amplify this odd demeanor, but it seems to me that the panel was attempting to avoid commenting one way or the other on PGP's worldwide ubiquity for unstated reasons. I wonder if this was a nudge to the audience that the informal spread of unapproved encryption is the best way to establish its ubiquity and thereby to set a new standard for export, sort of under the noses of the authorities -- as if PGP was exemplary. Recall that this fits the Clinton administration's way of getting around the Croatian arms embargo -- the "no position" position of sidestepping legality. Also, I wonder if the panel wants avoid an open conflict with the administration, the LEAs and the security agencies about PGP. (Or do they know something about PGP that we don't know, or have been led to think they do?) Peter Neumann had pointed out earlier that crypto was going to be ubiquitous, and fairly soon, no matter what. He noted that it is the NRC's recommendation that LEAs take the "long-term, pro-active" view about this and get on with developing other technologies, and training personnel in them, to fight computer crime -- like traffic analysis, packet trace, etc. -- and to accept that prohibiting and cracking crypto is not effective. (This may have been diversionary, but he seemed sincere.) Perhaps the panel is agreeing the crypto genie is out of the bottle, and are advising the authorities to recognize that stronger and stronger crypto is going to become ubiquitous, and it's time to move on to other, presumably less ubiquitious, cyber-crime fighting technolgies. Perhaps the committee was briefed on these technolgies, or maybe some members are even developing them -- Mr. Neumann, for example, in conjunction with Ms. Denning, et al. Those who plan to attend the June 6 session might want to pursue the "no position" position about PGP's ubiquity, and why. Diversionary sop, say, to cover the promotion of non- crypto invasion of privacy. Further, it would be helpful to learn more about what the the committee members were told about "long-term" cyber- surveillance technologies in the pipeline. What bothered me more than anything else about the session was that individual privacy got such short shrift by panelists and by the audience. While there was a bit of discussion on personal privacy protection, government and business, and their mutual back-scratching, seemed to the the primary focus. Pretty Lousy Privacy appears to be in the works, judging from what was not disclosed in the session (and in the report) about two 800-pounders working in concert at citizen data gathering, mining, selling, controlling, dominating -- at the expense of individual privacy, and, shout it, liberty. Peter Neumann got to me when he described the "downside" of anonymity, encryption and security: how can we know who are the criminals if we don't for sure who is who and know for sure who is doing what? Not a single panelist disagreed with his statement about this, but then I heard only a few snorts from the criminal-fraught-fed audience. I kept mum. Jesus, who knows who was recording every titter and hiss -- besides anonymous beside me and me.

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Idea 'bout banning the internet
by Blake Wehlage 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What if in the future a country banned the internet and all things that had to deal with it (ie- telnet, irc). It would be the "underground" thing. Just a thought, it would really suck! As I think about it it is impossible or is it???? Hell the usa cant even ban porn let alone the whole thing. They could ban it like they did fizzies. Hey there making a comeback did you here now they have nutrasweet in them. If you know what fizzies are than your pretty kewl. I'm only 13 and love then they are the drink of the future!!!! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Blake "Pokey" Wehlage Gaa- 3.69 <jwilk(a)iglou.com> Record- 2-4-4 Age- 13 Final Standings- 2nd Place (Beat in Championship) President & Founder: Revolution Software "I have the fastest glove in the east!" Profanity Software "Hackers never stop hacking they just get caught" VSoft My life- Rarely eat or sleep, Hack til' 7:00a, goto school, play goalie til' 8:00p, hack til' 7:00a Hank Aaron- d:-)!-< Pope- +<:-) Santa Claus- *<:-) The Unabrower |:-) Current Girlfriend(s)- Lindsey Wilcox, Laura Schubring Personal Quote- Mr Plow, thats my name, that name aguin is Mr. Plow -Homer Simpson ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Why PGP isn't so ubiquitous (was NRC Session Hiss)
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 3 Jun 1996, TT <apache(a)quux.apana.org.au> wrote: >I think it is actually easy to use, although granted others may not; but >that people tend not to use it as a matter of course (and it is my belief >this is a desireable thing) due too the time taken to manually sign mail >or sign and encrypt. Lets face it the average user has trouble with a >dos command prompt and until there is a point and click emailer easily >available most people just won't try PGP for email. Most people I have encountered don't use PGP because of the initial learning curve, more than the overall ease of use. I work in a small office that is separate from corporate HQ. I have been trying for over a year to convince people to use PGP for intra-office communication. What I have found is that for people within the office, it is fairly easy - hands-on instruction works well. Convincing folks at HQ has been a royal pain however. Most of the problem appears to be the "you mean I have to learn new software?" variety. Once I have coached someone over the "knowledge hump" (often by phone), they tell me that using pgp is pretty easy. <disclaimer> We use Eudora Light for the Mac, YMMV </disclaimer>. The trick is convincing the user that the benefits associated with using pgp are greater than the initial pain. This is something I have only accomplished with a few people. This educational process will continue to be the stumbling block for widespread use until there is truly seamless encryption. My fear is that seamless encryption will be weak; witness the widespread use of 40bit Netscape and the supposedly 40bit default behavior for S/MIME. I think that export controls are a driver towards weak defaults. OK, that last part was a WA tangent from my "ease of using pgp" thread. It's late and I'm hungry. Sue me. Later, Clay --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clay Olbon II | Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer | ph: (810) 589-9930 fax 9934 Dynetics, Inc., Ste 302 | http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html 550 Stephenson Hwy | PGP262 public key: on web page Troy, MI 48083-1109 | pgp print: B97397AD50233C77523FD058BD1BB7C0 TANSTAAFL ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Why PGP isn't so ubiquitous (was NRC Session Hiss)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 2 Jun 96 at 21:15, Lucky Green wrote: > That PGP is ubiquitous is subject to discussion. PGP is widely available, > but that doesn't mean that it is widely used. What percentage of email is > PGP encrypted? Less than half a percent? In part because it's not well integrated with mailers. That could change with a PGP3 DLL. PGP isn't only used for email: o files distributed over the net that are PGP-signed o signed email o non-emailed file distributions (over BBS, or physical transfer of disks) o personal storage (though other utilities are better-suited for that than PGP) o related utilities that make use of PGP-keys (HPack archiver) The reasons PGP hasn't become widely used are because of it's lack of user-friendliness and poor integration into other tools, irregardless of S/MIME. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Crypto APIs Considered Harmful
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:06 6/3/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >So long as ASCII (or Unicode, increasingly) message blocks can be handled >by a variety of editors, mailers, news programs, browsers, etc., it will be >impossible to stop users from using crypto on these blocks. I agree. But it really doesn't matter. The goal of the governments is not to stop people that are willing to operate a crypto program on blocks of text. That goal would be impossible to achieve. The goal of the governments is to ensure that once Joe Sixpack clicks "Encrypt Mail" in Netscape or MS Mail, the resulting cyphertext can still be read, though not by Joe himself. It is *because* PGP operated on blocks of text and did not provide a decent API that Joe (and even Tim May) are still not encrypting the bulk of their email. PGP isn't being used, because it lacks the API. S/MIME doesn't lack the API and is therefore being supported by all the major players. >But if crypto is tied to specific browsers, mailers, etc., this gives the >NSA and ITAR office a way to impose limits. Crypto should not be tied to specific browsers and mailers. Nor should it be tied to a specific program such as PGP. That's why hooks and APIs are crucial to gaining market acceptance. [...] >Obvious points. But in light of all the recent moves to limit deployment of >crypto by limiting the "crypto API" approaches, it's useful to remember >that for most applications, the message payload is perfectly suited for >carrying digital signatures, encrypted blocks, etc. > >They can't stop the messages, can they? Of course not. Nor do they want to. A little leakage around the edges is fine, as long as the masses don't adopt strong crypto. And that is a given, thanks to PGP's lack of modularity. I am not just slamming PGP. It is not the only CP "friendly" software that was implemented in an outdated, application-centric way. This was fine some four years ago, when people were still using DA/Font Mover to install fonts on their Mac, but it isn't today. Today's realities of software development and customer expectations require that secondary functionality (in this example, sending and receiving mail is the primary functionality) such as encryption, message encoding, etc. are completely transparent and fully integrate in the software that provides the primary functionality. How many of you are still using UUencode (the stand-alone program) when emailing someone a binary file? How many of you are using the "Attach File" button in your mailer? How many more people are sending binary files via email now that you can click "Attach File" than did back when you had to use UUencode? I rest my case. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Saw this on CNN: Anonymous Stock tips over IRC as bad???
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:18 PM 6/3/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Black Unicorn writes: >> There is a simple solution to avoiding liability. Don't trade in your >> own company's stock. > >In reality, of course, you are fairly safe so long as no one is >looking for your head and you aren't trading based on company >secrets. However, in theory, its possible to prosecute almost anyone. I hope insider trading never applies to the Company Stock Purchase plan or Stock Options. Otherwise they will kill the goose that lays Silicon Valley's golden egg. (I am always paranoid when the rules are vague and the penalties draconian.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: NRC Session Hiss
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:58 6/3/96, Raph Levien wrote: > Basically, an exportable S/MIME client can transmit messages up to >1024/40 bit RSA/RC2 (or RSA/DES), and receive messages up to 512/64 bit >RSA/RC2 (or RSA/DES, but in the latter case I would imagine it's actually >restricted to 512/56 because of the keysize of DES). Note that the >asymmetry actually points in different directions for the public and >symmetric keysizes. What will be the maximum keysize for a domestic encryption client? It it is larger than 1024 bits, there will be interoperability problems with foreign clients. If the domestic client is limited to 1024 bits, it would set a bad precedence, since it would effectively require that the encryption key is smaller than the largest signature key. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Saw this on CNN: Anonymous Stock tips over IRC as bad???
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:23 AM 6/3/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >No, I'm afraid they aren't. Under the rules, if you have nonpublic >information, even if you are not a corporate officer, you are an >insider for purposes of "insider trading" and your trades are illegal. Though if I trade based on my non public knowledge that the Gray Aliens will strike at Midnight on 31 December 1999, I am probably safe. Doesn't the non-public knowledge have to have been generated or concern internal company information (or the intentions of a publisher or buyer concerning the company). If info that is too far removed is included then any stock analysis system would be illegal. Note BTW that the Feds lost almost all of the '80s insider trading cases that actually went to trial. They only won 2 or 3 that went through the full trial and appeals process. That is a very poor record since prosecutors usually have an 80-90% success rate in criminal trials. >Securities laws are extremely complex, extraordinarily broad, and >subject to extremely flexible interpretation. I would suggest not >attempting to skate a fine line near them -- the ice is very thin. And like most federal criminal procedures based more on hype than reality. One should emulate the head of Princeton Securities who showed up for settlement negotiations with the Feds wearing a "Shit Happens" baseball cap. All charges dismissed on appeal. I do think though that many actual "inside traders" are pretty dumb since it is not hard to trade securities anonymously. DCF

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Re: Saw this on CNN: Anonymous Stock tips over IRC as bad???
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:01 PM 6/3/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin wrote: >On Mon, 3 Jun 1996, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >[...] >> Securities laws are extremely complex, extraordinarily broad, and >> subject to extremely flexible interpretation. I would suggest not >> attempting to skate a fine line near them -- the ice is very thin. > >Damn good advice, if you ask me. > >A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) However, it is becoming a deregulated industry. Like all the rest. DCF

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