December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Net and Terrorism
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:43 PM 7/4/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >On 3 Jul 96 at 14:48, jim bell wrote: >[..] >> But as I've pointed out elsewhere, there's a big difference between "We're >> gonna do this!" and "Someday we may have to do this." My impression is >> that the government has tried to completely erase the dividing line >> between these two concepts. > >As far as the government is concerned, "gonna do this" and "may have >to do this" is the same, since the "this" is illegal. There is no >dividing line. A couple of decades ago, a relative of mine was in the Army Reserve. Every summer, they went on exercises, and in one particular exercise (this is probably true of all of them, as well), they invented some sort of fictional scenario in which America was bordered by two fictional countries, the one to the south was called "Taco Land" and the one to the north was called "Big Tree Land." I complimented him on the Army's ability to hide the meanings of these fictions so well! B^) Naturally, the Reserve went out and set up camp, etc, and did everything an army was supposed to do under such exercises. So why were they allowed to do this, while ordinary citizens weren't? Now, you may respond, "Hey, they're the Army, that's their job and they're allowed!" Maybe. But then again, as "ordinary citizens" we have a job to do as well. And part of that job may involve ensuring that if the government stops being limited to the strictures of the Constitution, they can take it down and replace it with something better. (See Declaration of Independence, for example.) Frankly, nothing of what I've heard that this Arizona group did ought to be illegal. I interpret the 2nd amendment ("arms") to include the dictionary meaning, "objects used as weapons," so I don't see any legitimate restriction of explosives. As for scouting, practicing, and making possible-but-not-certain plans, I see nothing wrong with this either. (Remember, the Army has plenty of plans, too... few of which ever are carried out.) >I suspect that since they (alegedly) had specific targets >planned it leaned closer to the "gonna do this". Then, unfortunately, your "logic" is atrocious. If you see a likely enemy, it makes sense to identify his assets well in advance of any actual hostilities, even if those hostilities are not certain. (to fail to do so would be completely irresponsible.) That's what these people appear to have done. > From the minimal discussion in the media I have read, ^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ That's a CLUE. The reason there's been "minimal discussion" is because the lap-dog media wants to avoid the entire "we're gonna do this/someday we may have to do this" issue. It's not that they want to put the dividing line in a slightly different location, they want to deny that there is ANY SORT of a dividing line at all! For the media to acknowledge that the people have a RIGHT to simply collect weapons of all kinds, including explosives, for a potential future confrontation with the government would, then, require debate as to how far this could go. I think that would lead to the logical conclusion is that no action is illegal short of actually engaging in an attack. > it appeared to be another >'revenge for waco and ruby ridge' action rather than a 'defense of >civil liberties from a potential totalitarian government' action. I don't really see any valid distinction, here, except in _time_. > (I'm rather skeptical as to how blowing up a specific IRS office would >be effective were the government to change into a totalitarian regime.) > >Rob. Local people can be expected to act locally. They'll take care of their part of town, you take care of yours, right? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Restrictions on crypto overseas
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In many countries there are none. France is pretty bad. > Greetings. > > I am looking for a concise description of the restrictions overseas on the > use of cryptography, and how those restrictions affect the operation of a > cryptographically-enabled web server. > > I have been told that users of programs like PGP in france are required by > law to register their secret keys with the state security apparatus. Does > this mean that users of secure web servers need to register their secret > keys as well? Is anybody doing this? Is the law enforced? > > What about other nations that have recently passed restrictions on the use > of crypto? Other than Russia, which are they? Is there a list anywhere? > > Thanks. > > > ====== > Simson's Summer Info: > > Mailing: 304 Newbury Street, #503, Boston, MA 02115. 617-876-6111 > Summer Salon: 236 Marlborough St. #2 Boston MA 02116. > > -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 Community ConneXion, Inc. FAX: 510-986-8777 The Internet Privacy Provider http://www.c2.net/ sameer(a)c2.net

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Re: What remains to be done.
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> > A. Methods to run secure websites on insecure servers. > [...] > A software solution which permits local decryption makes traffic analysis > less useful, presents the opportunity to use front end and disposable www > pages on domestic ISPs while imposing no liability on the ISP itself, and > opens several more effective traffic analysis deterants. I don't quite understand what is being proposed here. If the information on the web site is encrypted, who is supposed to be able to decrypt it? Just one person, or some select group of people? My concern is the difficulty of keeping keys secret if they are made available to more than one or two people. Once the keys are known to those who would oppose the publication of the information they can go to the ISP just as easily as if the information were not encrypted, and get them to take it down if it is illegal. It would seem that an equally effective method would be to use no encryption, but just a secret URL, one which is not linked to from elsewhere - an "island in the net", so to speak (apologies to Bruce Sterling). Hal

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Re: ecash thoughts
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> But probabilistic payment should be used to allow the minimum average > payment to go way below this, perhaps to an unlimited extent. I just thought of an obvious problem with "probabilistic payments". Suppose someone is surfing the web or whatever, and various sites are charging, say, 0.1 cents per web page, via probabilistic payments. Suppose there is a 1 in 10 chance that the person will pay 1 cent. The person wanders around the web, acting as though he's perfectly willing to pay, and participating in the fair coin tosses. Except, he really has no intention of paying. He will gain free access to 9 out of 10 sites, and on the ones that he loses the 1/10 gamble, he just backs out of the deal and doesn't pay anything. The end result is that instead of seeing all of the web at 0.1 cents per page, he sees 90% of the web completely for free. If everyone does this, the sites will go broke. It's the equivalent of welshing on a bet. The obvious solution would be to require that the person pay the 1 cent, then if he wins the 9/10 bet, he gets the 1 cent back. But that will just move the problem from the user to the server- the site can welsh on the bet and refuse to pay back the one cent. They will get ten times the payment that they are supposed to get. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

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Announce: Private Idaho 2.7b
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I'm in an especially patriotic mood today, I've just uploaded the 2.7b beta release of Private Idaho (which started out life as a Windows PGP shell, but is turning into the "mother of all privacy tools" shell). Significant new additions include: Automated install application - no more installing and updating new releases of PI by hand (many thanks to Colin Tan for writing the Setup application). The install application comes bundled with PGP QuickStart, a utility for helping new users download and install PGP. Expert and user modes - for new users, user mode provides a limited set of commonly used commands. Expert mode gives you access to all of the commands. Steps - again, another feature for new users. Step-by-step information on how to perform common tasks. Change nym account reply blocks - easy way to change nym reply blocks. Anonymizer support - support for C2's new anonymous Web browsing server. Select a URL from any text within Private Idaho and your browser will anonymously access that Web page. Mixmaster support - support for Mixmaster type 2 remailers. Variable word-wrap length - select window size, 65, 70, or 75 character line length. Revised online help HTML version of help Get it at: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi.html And while you're there, as an added 4th of July bonus, check out: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/cryptbk.html For the extremely tacky, and offensive to some, "Building a CryptoBook" page. Comments, questions, etc. as usual to: Joel McNamara joelm(a)eskimo.com

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premail-0.44, WHERE DO I GET IT.
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cpunks: I tried to find the perl script premail (v. 0.44) that is described at the Raph Levien's page. Unfortunately, EVERY place where it is purported to be is screwed up: ftp.csua.berkeley.edu does not respond to FTP commands, Levien's download page returns premail 0.43 instead of 0.44, and ftp.hacktic.nl does not have premail-0.44. WHAT TO DO??? WHAT TO DO??? WHAT TO DO???

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No Subject
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 hIkDPRWysueuweUBA+irExxkMlmCIvGqzCvDUNWtFWbAjJx4JODBCbauj6uYeC62 pF0r72wgDKrncK5Z/oZdF11vaVveW50KrZQQFVL2+etoRTHfLBNgKKYW4cDwTe/f 4jS3+tut2XfRf/y/Ho139zKfNIBdHC0ByHEsIcKU2FPwNzalERc3q+yehKYAAAHF mFeehQHt3/AdVJOueBP+EzxG31y72enxE0lilm9VGzQzLf7sH2354xezhtxsrNgH BEkF9o0EhYy6/3JHDhqcat0fwDBZsBPDH8Lg1m60xBMD8iTLtOT5jUNAQRUwahlf s1acdgoSnx6PgTnHpox4r6SNxeIaC9AH1WTAngfrLvm877/gk5kxjIJV7D7Z7sF8 IQn9BXNPj1/6c9MyqAPQE7w3PpEFkN6/KPZsAhtyEc/ib4IxwMoRoVCRpOY13iVm q1UGaOPsTaom13rCn35fFp71o+Myc+Due3OoTpCC01B95JucbhUMV2pyBdgcafbN vnj/0FUAgWVDkAMWYuZj82qqoi8NWcNhXsBxsnXRBAxemgckmZdo+sx6sUlSLy9u 5JbN+7DNcwbfY5qbUJIVnPNu4BDuN+s9dCVSYalCVL/rGhFwkCvPSHJuFIZF7daE H+uITFUp5D8kmlLj3zHdTaoXkctRA7xc2+JVlgEGAsLuBQ8SSOQQovmJIarmBdhJ g2RiRaGv4CsaSbQiMfy5vAmDjbuJdrL+sYfDI4n4ODVSaBHkGjoOriU8T1kpwJCT qFRDBgQGhMwGplT1FKULqn7D7SFh =v5LU -----END PGP MESSAGE----- I didn't know L.Detweiler's first name was Larry. How did you, tcmay?

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Re: CWD -- Jacking in from the "Keys to the Kingdom" Port
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01.30 PM 7/4/96 -0400, CyberEyes wrote: > The child would also be able to use the Anonymizer at >http://www.anonymizer.com. But, is it that easy to redirect? Just type >that little rd command? What others are there? I've seen &lt and &gt in >use, what do they perform? No, but in things like Yahoo and Alta Vista, when they have those ads, look at the URL assigned to the ad. It redirects you through the service you're using rather than send you straight there. I don't know why. I was just using an example.... Since HTML uses the < and > (less-than and greater-than) characters in the code, you use the < and > to print one of these characters and not use it in the code. =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo o sukoshi dekiru) ----------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu For PGP key 0xD37692F9, finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Anonymous ok, PGP ok. If it's not PGP-signed, you know that I didn't write it. === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === "Truth is stranger than fiction, especially when truth is being defined by the O.J. Simpson Defense Team." -Dave Barry -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMdxKCxguzHDTdpL5AQFyaQP/VevSEcgSOqZ0I0XB7mFX5tKivwEpHQ4+ 8zEBfUJTI7SZjZVSbo7dCa/4IRuk7NBrvI0bGHCyRqO7TPqOEZn9Po1eBFfg2I08 RZEVrE3EN1gm/rW32pJ/ocNLTH45mRqKEQoO8gZle509ZvkhiBzJuK8aXFn7hJn+ cgJeSUTfBmw= =U3zk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CWD -- Jacking in from the "Keys to the Kingdom" Port
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02.09 PM 7/4/96 -0400, you wrote: >On Wed, 3 Jul 1996, Mark Rogaski wrote: > >> I would assume that the filters look for regexp's in the query string, too. >> How about a nice little Nutscape plugin that uses a rot13'd query string? > > Do you have a copy of that plugin? If it exists. > >> http://www.one.site.com/cgi-bin/sneaky-rd?uggc://jjj.cbeab-fvgr.pbz/ >> >> Hmmm, no bad words in the query string. Of course the filter package would >> start looking for rot13'd stuff in the next release. So the next logical >> step is to use the URL encrypted with the redirector's public key ... or >> better yet, a dynamically generated key. Just convert it to radix64 so >> as to avoid ?'s &'s or ='s, and use that as the query string. >> >> The plug-in would only be necessary to generate the first request. Any >> URL preparation could be handled by passing the output of netcat through >> a stream filter before sending it to the client. > > That "creative child" would have to be pretty damn smart to do >what you described. It would actually take less creativity to do the other things, bypass the config.sys, etc. The child would thus be perhaps a little TOO creative. :) =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo o sukoshi dekiru) ----------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu For PGP key 0xD37692F9, finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Anonymous ok, PGP ok. If it's not PGP-signed, you know that I didn't write it. === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === "Truth is stranger than fiction, especially when truth is being defined by the O.J. Simpson Defense Team." -Dave Barry -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMdxKohguzHDTdpL5AQEFIwQAuK9Ca8ImcDka9mYWht35h8NMSr2A/tfB zvusZ8P5HIEYTbQ8GyRDQ3R+X58+k2pQmaCnO66EtI83mrVs+J9C8B7LoobroZpO u2R0SnMMJVU6eQAnkABkgYaMLVamqEMG+n6qmk7NePjsawSBvOdtuH9dmccR1/Pi +sGpQvT6RvI= =vTir -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Net and Terrorism. (blanc@accessone.com)
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Addressed to: blanc <blancw(a)accessone.com> Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> To: blanc <blancw(a)accessone.com> From: attila <attila(a)primenet.com> Reply-To: attila(a)primenet.com Subject: RE: Net and Terrorism. ** Reply to note from blanc <blancw(a)accessone.com> 07/04/96 12:31am -0700 = Could you explain your statement below: = = the first time you witness a small child begging for chocolate = exploded by a remote control pressed by her father, you understand = --you do not necessarily like it, it's just survival. = = Why was the child exploded? To kill the soldier it was requesting = chocolate from? = human life is cheap in many non-Western countries, particularly the orient. Female children are considered expendable (in China where parents are limited to one child; the abortion of a female fetus is common). children in war zones have always begged chocalate from soldiers and even a small child can pack enough plastiques to wipe out an entire patrol. as I said, it is one or the other --the child dies either way, and explosives are very messy. no matter how war movies are glorified for joe six-pack, war is still hell. -- Fuck off, Uncle Sam. Cyberspace is where democracy lives!

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