December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu writes: > >He's a Cato fellow. I don't think that implies anything more than > >he he gets some money from them. > > Nope, he is listed in "senior staff". He's listed in the staff section, but he's clearly labeled as a fellow. P.J. O'Rourke is also listed in the same column as a fellow. I suppose he's working at Cato full time and only moonlights at Rolling Stone. The fact that neither of them lives within striking distance of Cato headquarters (O'Rourke lives in New Hampshire) makes your claim ever more interesting. > I'm working on digital signature systems under a DARPA contract. We shall therefore have to declare you to be a U.S. Government employee. .pm

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Fwd: Re: Clipper III analysis
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Thu, 06 Jun 96 16:51:18 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Fwd: Re: Clipper III analysis > ==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Thu, 30 May 96 01:16:32 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: Clipper III analysis > On 29 May 1996 14:53:30 pdt, tcmay(a)got.net wrote: >> A good Questioned Document Examiner will be able to demonstrate >> that the signed document in question was not authored by Joe >> Blow, even if it contains his digital signature. > >I was of course talking about digital signatures, not handwritten signatures. > >I would be very interested to hear how a "Questioned Document Examiner" can >possibly determine that a digital signature was not applied by a particular >person. I believe he was referring to document analysis. By closely comparing a questionable work with those of known authorship, a skilled analyst can hopefully find enough [dis]similarities to say whether a document was authored by a given person. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== /* From Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> on a Warped PC running a proudly unregistered (for now) PMMAIL 1.5! The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! */ This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: OECD http://www.oecd.org/news_and_events/release/nw96-46a.htm
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ms. Kamata wrote: >>The process of drafting the OECD Cryptography Policy Guidelines will >>continue at an experts meeting in June and is due for completion in >>early 1997. Cryptography policy is a matter of vital public interest; while I assume that actual participation will be limited by the need for a small enough group to actually get work done, the World-Wide Web makes it easy to publish working papers, meeting agendas, drafts, and participant contact information so that the public can keep track of what's being done. There's a lot of broad-level material on your web site (I enjoyed the perspective of http://www.oecd.org/dsti/iccp/legal/top-page.html) but it would be a substantial benefit to the community to provide the in-depth material as well. At 08:39 PM 6/6/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote, replying to Ms. Kamata's press release: >>OECD EXPERTS BEGIN DRAFTING CRYPTOGRAPHY GUIDELINES >>Many governments are under pressure within their own countries to >>develop a national position on cryptography, > >If anything, it's exactly the opposite: It is the GOVERNMENTS and >those who hold government jobs who are doing the "pressuring." >I haven't seen more than a trickle of desire for a >"national position on cryptography." What Internet-people want is the >ELIMINATION of a "national position on cryptography," I think. Most governments already have a "national position", restricting cryptography in ways that violate free speech by their citizenry and interfere with commerce to varying degrees. The US has been one of the more egregious violators in this case, since US companies and products dominate the software industry, and national police organs have been strongly opposing the industry's attempts to provide decent security for communications. Industry, on the other hand, has been pressuring government to allow at least enough security to prevent massive fraud and theft and protect proprietary business communications; some parts of industry are willing to compromise if they get this much (perhaps with the added bribe of government contracts to make up for lost opportunities in the free market), while other parts (especially smaller companies, where the costs of bureaucratic compliance have more effect, and where proprietors can speak for the company) take a far stronger view, that freedom of speech cannot be compromised. >>But the needs of global technologies and applications require an >>international --rather than a strictly national -- approach to >>policymaking. The fast-paced development of the Global Information >>Infrastructure adds an element of urgency. The global characteristics of technology render strictly national policymaking increasingly obsolete, because any individual in a free or semi-free computerized country can develop software like PGP which can at most be blocked by vigorous local government action. There are two added forms of urgency - the critical need for security for electronic commerce, which is growing rapidly and increasingly in conflict with nationalist military policies, and the increasing deployment of technology which reduces government control. >>The private sector is closely involved in drafting the Guidelines, >>with business representatives from the Business and Industry Advisory >>Committee (BIAC) participating at the meeting. >>The OECD meeting, which took place on 8 May, was hosted by the US >>Department of State in Washington DC. Was the meeting announced to at least the public in advance? The schedule on the web page mentioned the 8 May meeting, at least after the fact, but does not list any of the following meetings, and there's no identification of your BIAC committee's members or even the member governments participating. Thanks! # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Rescind Authority!

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ID this 31173 NCR keyboard
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

! At 05:46 PM 6/3/96 -0700, you wrote: ! >ncr terminals are the most 31173 D0Dz ! ! I'm guessing that "D0Dz" is a variant on "dudes"; ! is "31173" supposed to be an upside-down "ElliE"? ! Having worked at NCR, I like their cash-machines and cash-registers, ! dislike the Microchannels in some of their PCs, ! dislike the terminals they used to make (I think SunRiver ! is the current manufacturer for that product line) ! and like their Teradata descendants. ! # Thanks; Bill ! # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com ! # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs ! # Rescind Authority! Oops. I wrote that just looking at the keyboard. Picked it up at Seattle's Ex-Pc for $3. It's so old, I think it requires a non-PC BIOS. No manual, labels etc. Anyone have a clue as to what this is: NCR F1 F2 [...] F18 F19 F20/RESET| ESC [...] TAB |[five direction keys] CONTROL Q [...] }/] CONTROL |CLR 7 8 9 / CAPS_LOCK A [...] ~/` |NEW | - 4 5 6 * [up] |/\ Z [...] [upup] |LINE | + 1 2 3 |NEW [space] | 0_ 00 . |LINE It was designed for easily customizing your keytable, being an actual flat terminal with square keys easily pulled out and interchanged. The back of the keyboard has three switches for the boolean selection of languages: US English, UK/Int. English, French, German, Swedish/Finnish, Danish/Norwegian, Spanish, Italian. So, where to get a NEW keyboard like this: FLAT, with a full set of SQUARE, EASILY pulled out keys.

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Re:
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:38 PM 6/8/96 +0200, Anonymous wrote: >Read the entire quote by Donne. *...any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind;...* By protecting Bell's right to speak what he thinks, we serve as an example to the rest of the world of what personal freedom really means. *Those crazy Americans* > >Bell gives me the opportunity to say that his pronouncements are antithetical to the best interests of the _inhabitants_ of this nation, not simply the government itself. >Thank you, Jim. While I appreciate your...uh...appreciation, let me remind you that part of my "pronouncements" are that the current political and social system is sick. Many people around here seem to agree with this assessment. What I advocate is a comparatively simple change in the rules that could have the effect of vastly changing the way things are done. Whether these changes are in "the best interests of the inhabitants of this nation" is still an open question, and many people have agreed with me on this matter. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: How can you protect a remailer's keys?
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> The best solution I could come up with (and was willing to write and use) >> is to specify the passphrase on the command line argument to the compiler >A far better solution would be to have a long-running daemon hold the >secret key. The mixmaster client could talk to the key daemon through >a unix-domain socket with the permission bits set such that only the >mixmaster user can connect. Each time the machine is rebooted, the >operator must start the daemon and give it a passphrase. >Second, if your machine is seized or someone gains unauthorized >physical access to it, the easiest way to get a root shell is by >rebooting single-user. However, if the only cleartext copy of a key >is in memory rather than in the filesystem, once the machine is >rebooted the secret key is lost. How about adding an "Oh s___" feature that would dump the key? You could even tie it to a login attempt (i.e. be sneaky and rename the actual root account to something else. Possibly hack the login client to return "root" as the username, etc, etc to complete the illusion if they are using TEMPEST. Then set it so that a root login makes the daemon dump the password) This would have possibilities, too, if you made it react to a) certain files in certain directories, b) certain signals or c) certain network messages. This would allow you to put in an innocous clear signal. Set it to a temp file created when editing your remailer's configuration (or userlist). Make it so that you have to conciously DISABLE security or it dumps the password. Have an innocent program terminate it. Be able to cancel it by sending an email (or using telnet) - this would be great if you had a trusted friend. Also, with some modification, you could set it to react to an external stimulus - say a panic button? or a card lock? You could even have fun putting all your sensitive stuff on an external hard drive and rigging your panic button to a) stop the remailer and b) activate the thermite charge on the external drive. // This was typed on a Warped PC by an equally warped Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> // The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! // Opinions expressed are not necessarily my own, much less another's. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Fwd: Re: Class III InfoWar
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Sun, 02 Jun 96 18:04:15 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: Class III InfoWar > On 2 Jun 1996 03:06:14 pdt, hal9001(a)panix.com wrote: >At 21:33 -0400 6/1/96, winn(a)Infowar.Com wrote: > > >>The article discussed the advanced information warfare techniques used by the >>perpetrators. "According to the American National Security Agency (NSA), they >>have penetrated computer systems using 'logic bombs' (coded devices that >>can be >>remotely detonated) > >Unless the definition has changed recently, a "logic bomb" is normally a >piece of code in a program that is triggered when a specific event occurs >(such as the programmer's name not appearing in a payroll file for a >designated period of time [which might trigger a salami round off routine >to start cutting checks 2 months after s/he is no longer working for the >company]). I believe that is what they were referring to. However, the press garbled it as usual. It seems like the original was something like 'logic bombs' (bits of code that can be triggered remotely). Probably sounded more impressive the reporter's way... This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== /* From Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> on a Warped PC running a proudly unregistered (for now) PMMAIL 1.5! The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! */ This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: forged addresses
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 May 1996 19:38:16 pdt, nobody(a)nowher.com wrote: >Hi, I'm not sure if there was ever a thread on this, but I was wondering if >anyone can determine your real email address, if you were to fake it to your >email client. > >I hope that this doesn't offend anyone, since this is a high traffic list, but >I was wondering if this would work. To try it out, I setup my client to think >I was someone else, and sent myself an email. I could only figure out what >ISP it came from. > >What I would like to know is, can any of the experts on this list determine my >address from the header of this post?? I didn't receive anything except your nobody@... address. >again, if this is something that I shouldn't have done, just let me know, and >it won't happen again. > Hmmm... I'm going to have to play around with this. I can get outbound email access through my school district's mailserver simply by filling in the appropriate fields in netscape (we have a WAN hooked up to a T1). It would seem to me that this would be rather secure for several reasons, if for no other than that NO logging is made... In a large district, like mine (probably 10-15 thousand potential users), I doubt they would have the resources to track any of the 100 or so Internet machines on my campus alone, even if they could tell it came from here. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: INteresting tidbit
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On the Encryption note, and I swear not along the lines of the 'DOJ' >and 'FBI Snooping' Big-Brother events, I heard another story recently. > ># begin story > >A person working on the MBONE project did an unannounced experiment >across the internet using Triple-DES for MBONE, and the very next day, >'ATF' agents knocked on his door and warned him against exporting >munitions. The experimentor was shaken by the fact that agents >approached him so quickly after the experiment. > ># end story > >Extrapolations of fact: > 1. Internet traffic is monitored. > 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present > 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present > (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) > 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. > (See above). First, this has been loosely confirmed for ages. Someone was mentioning that FBI offices supposedly have software that (on a 486) can crack a DES-1 key in under an hour. Multiply * modern high capacity computers = problem. However, this does not nessesarily follow from #3. First off, you could probably tell the encryption used from a file format; the software on the other end has to know what it's getting. Secondly, you could probably tell quite a lot about what was used by some intense analysis. Finally, if their software cannot read it and analysis suggested it was more than DES-1 then they might go after someone w/o being able to read the document in question. > 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably > also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. Not necessarily. This freemen issue shows that the FBI is getting gunshy about bad publicity, which they were getting. > 6. Using encryption only flags traffic for capture and decryption, > using strong encryption makes you all that more interesting. Sounds like the old argument for encrypting everything... >Sorry, couldn't resist. I'll try not to start a threads about >electro-plasma propulsion craft at Area 51, metallic-ceramic skin >and pulse-jets on the Aurora spy plane, heat-imaging video cameras >on satellites and planes that can watch you through your houses' roof, >etc. :) What??? Now you're going to tell us X-Files is just a TV show? <g> This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:54 PM 6/6/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >(There may be cases people can dig up where some newspaper or newsletter >was "shut down," but I think such cases would be hard to find in the last >several decades. Am I wrong on this?) Not newspapers but a number of radio stations of course. Licensure. Even under CDA, we are not subject to license, however. Though I wonder how the FCC will behave as TV stations join the radio and "radio" stations that are already netcasting beyond its control. DCF

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