December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Is Chaum's System Traceable or Untraceable?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

From: IN%"iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu" 22-MAY-1996 14:51:29.42 >In the "normal" protocol, the payee has to go online. In the "anon" protocol, >the payer has to go online. Since you don't want to go online when you >walk into a shop, you can pay the shop with the "normal" protocol, and >the shop gives you change with the "anon" protocol. >That way, you never need to go online, and your identity is never compromised. However, the shop's still is, although the bank might not be able to determine as much about how much income is coming in. OTOH, we're talking about a physical shop situation; I'm not sure how critical it is to have shop anonymnity with payor cooperation for this, since the payor can break it anyway. -Allen

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by E. ALLEN SMITH 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 22-MAY-1996 18:40:57.71 >On Tue, 21 May 1996, Andrew Loewenstern wrote: >> IANAL, but I have one, and he said (a couple of years ago) that these >> shrinkwrap contracts are practically worthless without a signature. At >> least this was how things were being handled in some districts. Anyone >> care to comment? >I concur. Those (other) lawyers who I have read on the subject would also concur. >> crypto relevance: Can RSADSI __really__ enforce the silly "thou shalt not >> call certain functions" restrictions in their 'license'? I doubt it, but I >> would love for someone to prove me wrong. >This is closer. You're asked to accept the terms of the license or return >the product. It's a stronger issue and more likely to be upheld. Would this be extensible to the remailer question by saying "agree to hold us blameless for the contents of this mail or don't mail it back to us for decoding"? Admittedly, this might not get around the problem of overly long mail used for bombing, but with Mixmaster you'd get such a letter for each section as I understand it. -Allen

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RE: CDT Policy Post 2.20 - Clinton Administration Floats Clipper III Draft
by Blanc Weber 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>From the Proposal: "To participate in the network a user needs a public key certificate signed by a CA [Certification Authority] which 'binds' the user's identity to their public key. One condition of obtaining a certificate is that sufficient information (e.g., private keys or other information as appropriate) has been escrowed with a certified escrow authority to allow access to a user's data or communications." ...................................................................... Along with the escrow requirement, I keep seeing in here somewhere the eventuality of a tie being established between public keys and a national identifying scheme, possibly to update and replace the present Social Security system. .. Blanc

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PROTOCOL: Encrypted Open Books
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 22:25:47 PDT >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: PROTOCOL: Encrypted Open Books >From: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com >Status: OR > >Eric had some good ideas in his protocol for verifying anonymous bank >deposits. One thing wasn't clear to me: what if the bank creates >a fake account? > >It would seem that the bank could explain away a sudden decrease in its >asset reserves (money that the bank officers actually spent on mistresses >and drugs) by creating a fake anonymous account which made a large with- >drawal. The books would still balance. > >It wasn't clear to me in Eric's protocol whether it would be expected that >the identity of accounts which made such withdrawals would be revealed. >Doing so would seem to go against the purpose of the digital bank. But >without that ability it would seem that fake accounts could cover up any >amount of mismanagement. > >Hal Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Layman's explanation for limits on escrowed encryption ...
by Ernest Hua 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Could someone with some knowledge of NSA/DoS/FBI intentions please explain why key length limitations are necessary for escrowed encryption? Please reply by E-Mail. Thanks! Ern

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Re: PROTOCOL: Encrypted Open Books
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 12:45 AM 5/23/96, David Wagner wrote: >Apologies for replying to a reposted article; I wasn't subscribed when >the (very interesting!) open books protocol was originall proposed. ... >Did I miss an important part of the protocol, or does some extra >mechanism need to be added to counter this threat? I only forwarded the original article, not any of the discussion which followed. Inasmuch as the archives at hks don't appear to be coming back anytime soon (the March 18th message said "a few days"), I'll forward to the list the followup articles by Hal Finney and Eric Hughes. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by minow＠apple.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> comments on the responsiblity of prudent persons (in, I presume, the context of threating e-mail sent through an anonymous remailier). I'm still perplexed: what can a "prudent" remailer operator do if a threatening e-mail was sent through a remailer under one or more of the following conditions: -- The remailer operator is legally enjoined from reading messages transversing his system. (For example, the remailer is subject to data privacy laws.) -- The message was encrypted using the intended recipient's public key. (This means that, without access to the private key, the operator has no mechanism to examine the e-mail.) Confused in Cupertino. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Re: FTC online workshop on privacy
by shabbir＠vtw.org 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

There's actually an interesting parallel here. If you look at the Dworkin "ban pornography because speech is action" crowd, they often end up on the same side of things as the Christian Coalition "ban porn because it drives you to ungodly acts" crowd. They both happily support legislation that would ban such images. The left and the right move so far off the edges of the scales that they come around and meet each other on the same side of the issue. -Shabbir J. Safdar * Online Representative * Voters Telecomm. Watch (VTW) http://www.vtw.org/ * Defending Your Rights In Cyberspace "E. ALLEN SMITH" writes: > It's unsurprising that some of the same groups backing the CDA are >backing this, since they used danger to children as an excuse for it. (A >rather transparent one, given the actions vs Compuserve). I am disappointed in >EPIC for cooperating with them. > >From: IN%"declan+(a)CMU.EDU" "Declan B. McCullagh" 22-MAY-1996 17:46:10.71 > >>Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 22-May-96 Re: FTC online workshop on >>.. by Declan McCullagh(a)CMU.EDU >>> The legislation being introduced at 10:30 am will restrict selling >>> mailing lists with childrens' names and other identifying info on them, >>> including email lists. Another attempt to regulate the net, or a good >>> thing? > >>Whoops. I should have said the press conference happened at 10:30 am. >>The bill will be introduced in both houses later this week. > >>Interesting press conference. Enough is Enough! took quite a bit of time >>to rant about the dangers of the Internet. Pedophiles, chat rooms, >>illegal pornography. > >>You get the idea. > > Quite. > -Allen

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INFO: Transcript of Sen. Leahy's RealAudio chat now available! (5/22/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| REALAUDIO TRANSCRIPTS OF LEAHY'S WIREDSIDE CHAT AVAILABLE CLIPPER III RESOURCES AVAILABLE REP. RICK WHITE (R-WA) SCHEDULED FOR HOTWIRED CHAT 6/5/96 9-10PM EST Date: May 22, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News How to receive crypto-news ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS Rave reviews of Senator Leahy's appearance on HotWired's WiredSide chat are coming already. With this appearance, the gentleman from Vermont proves once again that he knows net.politics on a personal level, and can understands the subtleties that we assume many in Congress are just learning. If you missed Sen. Leahy's appearance, arranged by HotWired, the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW), you can still hear the Realaudio transcript from the front page at http://www.crypto.com/ A new Clipper III section has been added to www.crypto.com, with pointers to the online version of the White House proposal and the initial analyses from EPIC, CDT, and John Gilmore of the EFF. DON'T FORGET! Representative Rick White (R-WA) will be on HotWired Wednesday June 5th at 9pm EST at http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ You can tune in and listen to the chat with the RealAudio software (http://www.realaudio.com) You can ask questions of the Representative through a moderator and get real, immediate responses. Rep. White is part of the new breed of legislators leading Congress to make better net policy through his leadership in the Internet Caucus, a vanguard group of legislators who have vowed to provide sound leadership and advice to other members of Congress in the area of net.policy. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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PROTOCOL: Encrypted open books
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 11:28:14 -0700 >From: Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: PROTOCOL: Encrypted open books >Status: OR > >Note: I started this reply last week; I've decided to post what I >know, since I don't have a solution and I've run out of simple ideas >for now. > >Hal' criticism that (real) money could leak out of the system is >correct. The problem is that while the books would still balance, >i.e. sum to zero, some fake depositor would have a negative balance, >the net result of taking out more money than you put in. Negative >numbers just aren't allowed in double-entry bookkeeping, but they were >allowed in the first protocol set. > >The first part of the solution is to allow no private accounts on the >left hand (asset) side of the ledger, in other words, no anonymous >loans. A protocol for doing anonymous loans could be invented, but >since the first problem is merely to run a money exchange and not more >complicated financial services, this is acceptable. Most of the money >that left the S&L's was by corrupt loan practices, so I don't consider >this omission a particularly glaring one right now. > >Therefore all the private accounts must be on the right hand side, >that is, they are all liabilities. In layman's terms, the bank owes >you; should you ask for your money, they have to give it to you. If >we can verify that each of these accounts never goes negative, then we >can be certain that if the books balance, that the amounts of money in >each account are accurate. > >Consider this. If money was transferred from your account to another >one, that transaction shows up in the public encrypted transaction >record. If you have due diligence over this record, you can assertain >that no transaction was performed against your will. This case >corresponds to a debit and credit against two customer accounts, >decreasing one and increasing the other. > >Another way that money might end up in a fake account if it were >credited with assets. A debit to an asset increase its value and the >credit to the account increases that value. This is the case of a >deposit; the bank gets cash (+asset) and credits someone's account >(+account). Now if they want to give someone money this way, they >have to do so by increasing the assets somehow; in other words, they >money has to come from somewhere. It didn't come from any of the >customers because they've already verified that. It didn't magically >appear from one of the other asset accounts because these are all >publically audited. > >In summary, we need to ensure that all accounts have positive balance. >Public accounts can be revealed and seen to be positive. Private >accounts need a cryptographic assurance. > >A private account starts off at zero. This can be publically >revealed. Then to the encrypted transaction log and the public cyclic >balances we add publication of the private balances in encrypted form >that allows us to verify to the blinded balance is positive. This >balance is verifiably linked to previous cyclic balances via the >transaction log. It is therefore linked all the way back to the >beginning balance which was zero. > >Consider all the transaction triples for which the first element is >equal to the private account in question, since the account was >opened. Take a product of all of the second elements and a product of >all the third elements. It is clear that these products can be >calculated inductively from the previous cyclic products and the >activity in this cycle. > >The products on second and third elements are equal to > > g^( Sum x_i,j,t + Sum r_i,j,t ), h^( Sum r_i,j,t ) > >where I've added a time index by cycle which was implicit before. The >notation for the inductive calculation is different, of course, and >also obscures the underlying invariant. > >What we want is a certificate that Sum x_i,j,t is positive. Here it >gets a bit hairy. There are likely other solutions to this technical >requirement; here is the one I thought up yesterday and today. > >I thought I had an idea with promise on how to create such >certificates using quadratic residuosity, but it doesn't work. I'm >still thinking about it; this certificate doesn't seem impossible to >create, but the standard ideas that I know about in algebraic protocol >design don't seem to work. > >If anybody wants to work on this technical point off-line with me, >send me mail. The math involved is advanced enough that I'd prefer to >post summaries of work rather than all the detailed discussion. > >Another non-technical attack on the problem is to require periodic >bank holidays, where all private balances will be revealed to be zero >(preferably), or whatever is actually in the account. This doesn't >prevent owner fraud, but does put an upper bound on the time in which >to perpetrate it. > >Eric

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