December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:39 PM 5/20/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At 01:05 AM 5/20/96 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >>I was rather impressed by NSA's role in the creation of DES. The >>strengthened it against an attack which was not publicly known, and didn't, >>in the process, reveal the attack. (See AC2.) > >Isn't this partly bad, at least? Given NSA's responsibilities to: (1) Break foreign crypto systems. (2) Make US crypto systems unbreakable. (3) Never Say Anything. I find it remarkable they were that open. They had a technique which helped them with 1. They didn't want to reveal it or foreign systems would be changed hurting NSA's pursuit of 1. They had a (small, DES was public and therefore could be used by foreigners) obligation thru 2 to help with DES. They honored 3 by saying as little as possible, while still strengthening DES. >All in all, I don't think the NSA's near-silence on DES is unambiguously >commendable. If they were cypherpunks, or academic cryptologists I would agree. However, their responsibilities do not involve publishing, so I can't fault the way they skated thru the maze of conflicting responsibilities given what we know. I can not fault them for following their charter. (Faulting their charter is a different matter.) When designing crypto systems, it is worthwhile to consider NSA as the opponent, because as far as I know, they are the best there is. If your system is secure from NSA, then it is secure from everyone except insiders. However the government always skates between the horns of the dilemma that acting on the results of NSA intercepts may cause their opponents the change their crypto systems, cutting off the intercepts. This logic says the government can always act on the results of 40 bit key intercepts because everyone knows they are insecure. If they acted on a 56 bit key intercept, it would make concrete what we already know theoretically. If they acted on a 96 bit key intercept, people would abandon the underlying crypto system because of the unfeasibility of brute forcing a 96 bit key. (When considering what to abandon, the random process used to generate the 96 bits should be at least as suspect as the crypto system.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by Rev. Mark Grant, ULC 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 21 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > The Church of Clams can simply send messages addressed to themselves > through the Alice remailer and see immediately that they appear to come > from Bob. Good point... oops ;-)... Mark

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Re: MixMaster fair use
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem is RSAREF. I can't chose license terms for that. -Lance At 7:00 AM 5/21/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Hi all, > >Perhaps I am confused about what MixMaster's license allows. I have joined >the confusing part (for me anyway)... > >README.no-export : > >All the files in this archive contain crpytographic code which is >restricted by the ITAR regulations on munitions. >These files may only be retrieved by US citizens, and only on condition of >agreement not to export any of this software or dats, and to extract >a similar agreement from any person they may transfer it to. > >To access the export-controled materials on >this site, you must agree to "THE AGREEMENT" >below. If your email address ends in one of the following: > >.edu .com .edu. .gov .mil .org .net .us .ca > >Do this by sending "THE AGREEMENT", >exactly as it appears, to > > mix-request(a)jpunix.com > > >If it does not, but you qualify to retrieve >Mixmaster under "THE AGREEMENT", then send mail >to perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com, explaining your >situation. > >In either case you will be sent a message containing >the name of a hidden directory in which you will >find the controlled software. The name of the directory >changes frequently, so you must get the name >each time you want to access the hidden directory. > > -John A. Perry 5/6/95 > >-------------------------------------------------- > THE AGREEMENT: >I am a citizen or national of the United States, >or of Canada, or have been lawfully admitted for permanent >residence in the United States under the >Immigration and Naturalization Act. > >I agree not to export Mixmaster, or RSAREF >or any other software in this archive, >in violation of the export >control laws of the United States of America as implemented >by the United States Department of State Office of >Defense Trade Controls. > >Before I download Mixmaster, I will read >and agree to the terms and conditions of the RSAREF >license (in ftp://ftp.jpunix.com/pub/rsalicen.txt) > >I will use Mixmaster solely for non-commercial purposes. >---------------------------------------------------------- > >Directory name last changed at: Wed May 1 09:00:01 CDT 1996 > > >End README.no-export > > >What confuses me is the part above that states that I agree to use Mixmaster >for solely non-commercial use. This is NOT GNU or copyleft. > > > > > Jim Choate ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Lance Cottrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 21 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > At 6:16 PM 5/21/96, Lance Cottrell wrote: > > >I had thought of that. Unfortunately, if the coin is of a special form > >which identifies the message as being a cover message, then they are of no > >use against the attacker who is running a remailer. The cover messages > >really have to be indistinguishable from real messages, even to the > >remailers. One could do some kind of accounting, where every remailer would > >refund to the traffic generators their share of the postage, but there is a > >lot of trust required for that system since it is impossible (very > >difficult) to verify. > > First, it's not clear to me that "The cover messages really have to be > indistinguishable from real messages, even to the remailers." > > The "slug messages" will be indistinguishable to all outside observers. I think the "enemy controled remailer" is an important part of the threat model. In many ways it is easier to do than to monitor all the traffic. > Only by colluding with other remailers will Alice be able to tell Bob, > Charles, etc. which were slugs and which were not. True, but it is folly to think that only one remailer would be compromised. > Second, I was thinking of the model in which all remailer usage is by > tokens or slugs, anyway, in which case Alice would not know if an incoming > message was by a "paying customer" or by one of the other remailers. There has been a lot of discussion of this. It is difficult to make slugs which can be purchased in bulk (since you want to buy them using anonymous mail), can not be used to connect messages from a one person, and do not infringe on Chaum's patents. It is not acceptable for a remailer to see a message and know which other messages came from that same person. If it is ever the first remailer, it knows who you are. If it is the last, it knows who you mailed to. There has been discussion of secondary markets for the slugs, but I don't think it is going to happen. > This discussion belongs on the list, not in private e-mail. Oops, I must have hit the wrong key. I ment to have a copy go to the list. > --Tim -Lance ------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)infonex.com President Infonex Internet Services http://www.Infonex.com -------------------------------------

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST (fwd)
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Zed, sorry to send this twice -- forgot to add the list address, and I have additional info...] On Wed, 22 May 1996, Zed wrote: [snip] > Now to try to get this back on-topic, there was one NOTS document which was > posted anonymously before the whole pack made it to > alt.religion.scientology. It described a process(or "ritual" if you prefer) > designed to help _physical_ affliction. It _may_ violate an FDA ruling > prohibiting the Church from practising medicine. It is _definitely_ a > violation of copyright to post it and one person, Keith Henson, is getting > sued for quoting it. Now, was sending this NOTS document through an > anonymous remailer a good or a bad thing to do? I'm confused. I thought Keith had admitted posting the document, but claimed that the materials describe illegal acts (as you mentioned) and that posting is in the public interest, or something like that. How are they suing him if he posted anon? I've been away from a.r.s. for a while, but I'm back there now and am trying to get back up to speed... Bye :) Rich p.s. Okay, I hit Ron Newman's web page, and it seems my suspicion was correct. Here's a quote from Keith's post, which contained NOTS 34 -- he posted it from his own account, not via a remailer: : I had not been inclined to look at this : material before (it's *boring*), but your TRO inspired me. Assuming : this is real, I can see why the "Church" of Scientology is trying to : suppress this material. If carried out, the instructions in this : particular bulletin amount to *criminal* acts, to wit, the practice of : medicine without a license. I reproduce this widely available : document in its entirety for your edification. Had he posted it through a remailer, I think it would have been well justified. He was obviously blowing the whistle on what he saw as illegal activities. That's a much different matter than posting the entire NOTs series, though. The wholesale copying is what most people seem to object to, though my observations tell me that the "Church" objects to any copying, even for fair use... ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: AP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:28 PM 5/20/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: [quoting Jim Ray>>] >Interesting. Has AP ever popped-up in the conventional medias? Other than the article I quote in its entirety in Part 8 of AP, an article from the Asahi Evening News (an english-language daily newspaper in Japan), no. >Then, again, I know an awfull lot of people who would applaude Bell. >But most of them are not computer litterate. They are from another >generation, not brainwashed by "Don't ask what your country can >do for you; ask what you can do for your country"... Unfortunately, it generally takes knowledge of at least computer networking, with a little knowledge of encryption and a vaguely passing familiarity with digital cash, to understand AP with enough detail to be useful. But I'm constantly amazed at how many people really APPRECIATE the idea, and its ramifications. >> This kind of thinking might authorize a massive Cherokee >> massacre if it spread, IMO. > >Please, do point out the similarities and the differences... I think >that the context is very different. If anything, I think AP would have allowed Indians to defend themselves, had they had access to it. >> We must, as >> Libertarians, face the fact that taxation we object to is not seen >> by many people as coercive. I don't think this is necessary: They need not see that something is wrong to be deterred by the possibility of their agents getting killed doing something that they see as "non-coercive." >> Even then, I prefer the judicial process to the oligarchy >> this scheme would entail > >This scheme is *not* an oligarchy. Pay a visit to any good dictionary >near you. Words have precise meaning and it is *much* better to >stick to it... > >Actually, since it is ruled by money, it might be a "buckarchy", but >again, everybody can spare a few bucks, so it might be a democracy >too if you insist on twisting the meaning of words. Yes, I think it would be a good idea to name the resulting society... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety
by pfarrell＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in the Global Information Infrastructure Thanks to Ed Roback, John Young, and "DN", the NIST draft report is now available. URL: http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nist/kmi.html I will work on making it prettier this evening, but I figured that people want to get it as soon as possible. Also, as of a couple of hours ago, the paper copy of this was _not_ available at the OMB publications office (the address in Ms. Frye's posting.) I recommend not trying to call them, as after you spend time working through their flooded inbasket, you still won't get it. So, if you want hard copy, print my file :-) Pat Pat Farrell grad student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Infor. Systems and Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer

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Re: Remailer extensions
by Jay Quinby 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 09:17 AM 5/21/96 -0500, you wrote: >> >>Hi all, >> >>In pondering the last few days of discussion it occurs to me that a test >>might be possible. In short: >> >>Is it legal for a business to anonymously remail physical mail? >> >>The process I propose is as follows: >> >>1. Some party mails an envelope to 'Remailers-R-Us'. >> >>2. Inside that envelope is the real mail addressed and stamped along >> with say a $1 money order for processing. >> >>3. The people at Remailers-R-Us simply take the dollar and deposit it >> in the bank while depositing the letter they received in the local >> mail drop. This is my first post to the list. Aren't there mail drops already in operation that do just this? I seem to recall that the only way to get QSL cards (non-radio folks bear with me) from pirate SW stations was to go via their mail drops. The section of Monitoring Times magazine that deals in pirate radio has a list of mail drops used by the stations (or it used to, anyway). Seems like I saw them in the classifieds of Rolling Stone or some such place. -JQ |<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>| |James Quinby | Atlanta, GA | PADI/153KHz-896MHz/PGP262/EADBGE| Phl4:8-13| |jquinby(a)fivepaces.com (work) | Own a 45 MPH couch potato:- | |jrq(a)ix.netcom.com (home) | Adopt a greyhound today. Write for details.| |<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>| |Public key fingerprint: 9ACC4C28478018E1 372DC06A9452A477, MIT's keyserver| |*****Opinions expressed are mine. They are *not* those of my employer*****| |<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>|

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mixmaster nsa@omaha.com going down Jun 4th.
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm closing my mixmaster, nsa(a)omaha.com, on the 4th of June. There wasn't an incident that triggered this, but Hal's post about the FBI sort of spooked me, as have the lawsuits. I don't have a lot of assets myself, but I do have partners. My lawyer tells me that there's no reliable way to separate my personal net activities from those of the company my parnters and I own, and that I could even be exposing my parnters to personal liability. I can't speak for anyone else, but for me the problem with running a remailer is that it's an inherently altruistic enterprise. That in itself wouldn't be so bad, but the liability makes the extent of the altruism open ended. If I knew that the worst case scenario would be $1k or even a $5k personal loss I could do it, but an open ended liability that's shared by my partners is unacceptable. I'm sorry for the inconvenience this will cause. -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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Re: NIST Draft Key Escrow Paper
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>We've just heard back from Ed Roback of NIST that he'll fax us a copy of >the Draft Key Escrow Paper, which we'll scan and send to Pat Farrell for >his Web site. I'll ask Pat to announce it's availability when ready. To follow up: I think EPIC is putting last week's draft online, not this week's. -Declan

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