December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Message pools _are_ in use today!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I must be missing something....: At 3:28 AM 7/2/96, David Wagner wrote: >Someone sniffing the Berkeley 'net can tell when I receive an >alt.anonymous.messages message by when I download an article from >the NNTP server; they can tell when I send such an article by when >I upload an article to the NNTP server; they can list all the >``subversive'' Berkeley folks who have read alt.anonymous.messages >lately. > >The local NNTP server must be trusted. I'm not following your "upload an article to the NNTP server." Don't most people use mail-to-News gateways to post anonymously? (If not, they should, of course.) This way, the posting of an article has the anonymity provided by the chain of remailers used to reach the terminal site, the mail-to-News gateway. The posting is anonymous (within the usual limits we discuss here), and the reading is "pretty hard" to focus on, for several reasons: 1. Hard to gain access to local ISP without sending alerts out (it would be for my ISP, at least). This is admittedly not cryptographically interesting, but is a very real practical difficulty. 2. Many who browse alt.anonymous.messages probably "glance" at many of the oddly-named message pool messages. I know I do. Again, makes it a "needle in a haystack" to know which of several hundred folks who glanced at "ToBear" or "TheRealMessage"--assuming the NSA could ever identify these hundreds--is the real intended target. 3. And I recall that many have newsreaders which download _all_ messages in a newsgroup automatically. Again, this makes the pool of potential readers quite large and meaningless to try to track. The use of public posting areas for message pools (what I called "Democracy Walls" several years back) seems to me have several compelling advantages over "reply-block" approaches. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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"gov runs anon remailers"
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

fallout from that old, lame Strassman & Marlow paper. a bit on the new Puzzle Palace. ------- Forwarded Message Date: Mon, 1 Jul 1996 06:11:41 -0400 (EDT) From: "Donna J. Logan" <revcoal(a)pcnet.com> To: snetnews(a)alterzone.com, liberty-and-justice(a)pobox.com, act(a)efn.org Subject: CAQ: CIA Spying on EMAIL (fwd) - - -> SearchNet's snetnews Mailing List - - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 30 Jun 1996 15:19:38 -0700 (PDT) To: Recipients of pol-abuse <pol-abuse(a)igc.apc.org> Subject: CAQ: CIA Spying on EMAIL From: Bob Witanek <bwitanek(a)igc.apc.org> Posted dadoner(a)chesco.com Thu Jun 20 23:46:55 1996 From: Ronnie Dadone <dadoner(a)chesco.com> Subject: CIA Spying on Re-mail? http://www.worldmedia.com/caq/articles/remail.html > ARE THE FEDS SNIFFING YOUR RE-MAIL? > > by Joh Dillon > > THE RULES OF PRIVACY ARE CHANGING WITH ELECTRONIC > COMMICATIONS, THE EAGERNESS OF GOVERNMENT TO PRY INTO OUR > COMMINICATIONS, APPARENTLY, IS NOT. > > Foreign and domestic intelligence agencies are actively monitoring > worldwide Internet traffic and are allegedly running anonymous > re-mailer" services designed to protect the privacy of electronic > mail users. > > The startling claim that government snoops may be surreptitiously > operating computer privacy protection systems used by private > citizens was made earlier this year at a Harvard University Law > School Symposium on the Global Information Infrastructure. The > source was not some crazed computer hacker paranoid about government > eavesdropping. Rather, the information was presented by two defense > experts, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Strassmann, now > a professor at West Point and the National Defense University in > Washington, D.C., along with William Marlow, a top official at > Science Applications International Corp., a leading security > contractor. > > Anonymous re-mailer services are pretty much what the name implies. > By stripping identifying source information from e-mail messages, > they allow people to post electronic messages without traceable > return address information. > > But Strassmann and Marlow said that the anonymous re-mailers, if > used properly and in tandem with encryption software pose an > unprecedented national security threat from information terrorists. > Intelligence services have set up their own re-mailers in order to > collect data on potential spies, criminals, and terrorists, they > said. *1 > > Following their Harvard talk, Strassmann and Marlow explicitly > acknowledged that a number of anonymous re-mailers in the US are run > by government agencies scanning traffic," said Viktor > Mayer-Schoenberger, a lawyer from Austria who attended the > conference. Marlow said that the [US] government runs at least a > dozen re-mailers and that the most popular re-mailers in France and > Germany are run by respective agencies in those countries."2 > > Mayer-Schoenberger was shocked by the defense experts' statement and > tried to spread the news by sending an e-mail message to Hotwired, > the online version of Wired magazine. Although the story did not > make headlines, his note quickly became the e-mail message relayed > 'round the world, triggering over 300 messages to Strassmann and > Marlow. It was followed by the electronic version of spin control. > > Strassmann quickly posted a denial. In an interview, he said the > Austrian completely misunderstood what he and Marlow had said. That > was false," Strassmann said of Mayer-Schoenberger's message. That > was the person's interpretation of what we said. ... We did not > specifically mention any government. What we said was that > governments are so heavily involved in this [Internet issues] that > it seems plausible that governments would use it in many ways." *3 > (Marlow did not return a call for comment.) > > But Harvard Law School Professor Charles Nesson, who heard the > original exchange at the Harvard conference, recalls the > conversation as Mayer-Schoenberger described it. *4 > Mayer-Schoenberger also stands by his story. I remember the > conversation perfectly well," he e-mailed from Vienna. They said a > couple of additional things I'm sure they don't want people to > remember. But the statement about the re-mailers is the one most > people heard and I think is quite explosive news, isn't it?" *5 > > Marlow said that actually a fair percentage of re-mailers around the > world are operated by intelligence services, Mayer-Schoenberger > recalled in a subsequent interview. Someone asked him: `What about > the US, is the same true here as well?' Marlow said: `you bet.' > > The notes for the Harvard symposium, posted on the World Wide Web, > also lend credence to Mayer-Schoenberger's account. The CIA already > has anonymous re-mailers but to effectively control [the Internet] > would require 7,000 to 10,000 around the world," the notes quote > Marlow as saying. *6 > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > @EASE WITH EAVESDROPPING > > Prying into e-mail is probably as old as e-mail itself. The Internet > is notoriously insecure; messages are kept on computers for months > or years. If they aren't stored safely, they can be viewed by anyone > who rummages through electronic archives by searching through the > hard drive, by using sophisticated eavesdropping techniques, or by > hacking in via modem from a remote location. Once e-mail is > obtained, legally or not, it can be enormously valuable. Lawyers are > increasingly using archived e-mail as evidence in civil litigation. > And it was Oliver North's e-mail (which he thought was deleted) that > showed the depths of the Reagan administration's involvement in the > Iran-Contra affair. > > Moreover, it's easier to tap e-mail messages than voice telephone > traffic, according to the paper written by Strassmann and Marlow. As > e-mail traffic takes over an ever-increasing share of personal > communications, inspection of e-mail traffic can yield more > comprehensive evidence than just about any wire-tapping efforts, > they wrote. E-mail tapping is less expensive, more thorough and less > forgiving than any other means for monitoring personal > communications. 7 > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > @ RISK > > Two kinds of anonymous re-mailers have evolved to protect the > privacy of users. The first, and the less secure, are two-way > database re-mailers," which maintain a log linking anonymous > identities to real user names. These services are more accurately > called pseudonymous" re-mailers since they assign a new name and > address to the sender (usually a series of numbers or characters) > and are the most vulnerable to security breaches, since the logs can > be subpoenaed or stolen. The most popular pseudonymous" re-mailer is > a Finnish service at anon.penet.fi". > > I believe that if you want protection against a governmental body, > you would be foolish to use anon.penet.fi," said Jeffrey Schiller, > manager of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology computer > network and an expert on e-mail and network security. Last year, in > fact, authorities raided anon.penet.fi to look for the identity of a > Church of Scientology dissident who had posted secret church papers > on the Internet using the supposedly private service. *8 > > The second kind of re-mailers are cypherpunk" services run by > computer-savvy privacy advocates. Someone desiring anonymity detours > the message through the re-mailer; a re-mailer program removes > information identifying the return address, and sends it on its way. > Schiller says that a cypherpunk re-mailer in its simplest form is a > program run on incoming e-mail that looks for messages containing a > request-re-mailing-to" header line. When the program sees such a > line, it removes the information identifying the sender and remails" > the message. *9 Some re-mailers replace the return address with > something like nobody(a)nowhere.org." > > Further protection can be obtained by using free, publicly available > encryption programs such as Pretty Good Privacy and by chaining > messages and re-mailers together. Sending the message from re-mailer > to re-mailer using encryption at each hop builds up an onion skin > arrangement of encrypted messages inside encrypted messages. Some > re-mailers will vary the timing of the outgoing mail, sending the > messages out in random sequence in order to thwart attempts to trace > mail back by linking it to when it was sent. > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > @ISSUE: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY > > Linking encrypted messages together can be tricky and > time-consuming. So who would bother? A. Michael Froomkin, an > assistant professor of law at the University of Miami and an expert > on Internet legal issues, says anonymity allows people to practice > political free speech without fear of retribution. Whistleblowers > can identify corporate or government abuse while reducing their risk > of detection. People with health problems that are embarrassing or > might threaten their ability to get insurance can seek advice > without concern that their names would be blasted electronically > around the world. *10 A battered woman can use re-mailers to > communicate with friends without her spouse finding her. > > The Amnesty International human rights group has used anonymous > re-mailers to protect information supplied by political dissidents, > said Wayne Madsen, a computer security expert and co-author of a new > edition of The Puzzle Palace, a book on the National Security > Agency. Amnesty International has people who use re-mailers because > if an intelligence service in Turkey tracks down [political > opponents] ... they take them out and shoot them," he said. I would > rather err on the side of those people. I would rather give the > benefit of the doubt to human rights." *11 > > Strassmann and Marlow, on the other hand, see the threat to national > security as an overriding concern. Their paper, Risk-Free Access > into the Global Information Infrastructure via Anonymous Re-mailers, > presented at the Harvard conference, is a call to electronic arms. > In it, they warn that re-mailers will be employed in financial fraud > and used by information terrorists" to spread stolen government > secrets or to disrupt telecommunication, finance and power > generation systems. Internet anonymity has rewritten the rules of > modern warfare by making retaliation impossible, since the identity > of the assailant is unknown, they said. Since biblical times, crimes > have been deterred by the prospects of punishment. For that, the > criminal had to be apprehended. Yet information crimes have the > unique characteristic that apprehension is impossible. ... > Information crimes can be committed easily without leaving any > telltale evidence such as fingerprints, traces of poison or > bullets," they wrote. *12 > > As an example, they cite the Finnish re-mailer (anon.penet.fi), > claiming that it is frequently used by the ex-KGB Russian criminal > element. Asked for proof or further detail, Strassmann said: That > [paper] is as far in the public domain as you're going to get." *13 > > At the Harvard symposium, the pair provided additional allegations > that anonymous re-mailers are used to commit crimes. There was a > crisis not too long ago with a large international bank. At the > heart of the problem turned out to be anonymous re-mailers. There > was a massive exchange around the world of the vulnerabilities of > this bank's network," Marlow said. *14 > > But David Banisar, an analyst with the Washington, D.C.-based > Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) downplayed this kind of > anecdote, saying that such allegations are always used by > governments when they want to breach the privacy rights of citizens. > I think this information warfare stuff seems to be a way for the > military trying to find new reasons for existence and for various > opportunistic companies looking for ways to cash in. I'm really > skeptical about a lot of it. The problem is nine-tenths hype and > eight-tenths bad security practices," he said. Already existing > Internet security systems like encryption and firewalls could take > care of the problem." > > The public should not have to justify why it needs privacy, he said. > Why do you need window blinds? Privacy is one of those fundamental > human rights that ties into other human rights such as freedom of > expression, the right to associate with who you want, the right to > speak your mind as you feel like it. ... The question shouldn't be > what do you have to fear, it should be `Why are they listening in?' > With a democratic government with constitutional limits to > democratic power, they have to make the argument they need to listen > in, not the other way around." *15 > > Froomkin, from the University of Miami, also questioned Strassmann > and Mayer's conclusions. First of all, the statistics about where > the re-mailers are and who runs them are inaccurate. I can't find > anybody to confirm them," he said. I completely disagree with their > assessment of facts and the conclusions they draw from them. ... > Having said that, there's no question there are bad things you can > do with anonymous re- mailers. There is potential for criminal > behavior." *16 > > Banisar doubts that intelligence agencies are actually running > re-mailers. It would entail a fairly high profile that they tend to > shy away from, he said. However, it is likely that agencies are > sniffing" monitoring traffic going to and from these sites, he said. > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > @ WORK SNIFFING THE NET > > Not in doubt, however, is that the government is using the Internet > to gather intelligence and is exploring the net's potential > usefulness for covert operations. Charles Swett, a Department of > Defense policy assistant for special operations and low-intensity > conflict, produced a report last summer saying that by scanning > computer message traffic, the government might see early warnings of > impending significant developments." Swett added that the Internet > could also be used offensively as an additional medium in > psychological operations campaigns and to help achieve > unconventional warfare objectives." *17 The unclassified Swett paper > was itself posted on the Internet by Steven Aftergood of the > Federation of American Scientists. > > The document focuses in part on Internet use by leftist political > activists and devotes substantial space to the San Francisco-based > Institute for Global Communications (IGC), which operates Peacenet > and other networks used by activists. IGC shows, Swett writes, the > breadth of DoD-relevant information available on the Internet." > > The National Security Agency is also actively sniffing" key Internet > sites that route electronic mail traffic, according to Puzzle Palace > co-author Wayne Madsen. In an article in the British newsletter > Computer Fraud and Security Bulletin, Madsen reported that sources > within the government and private industry told him that the NSA is > monitoring two key Internet routers which direct electronic mail > traffic in Maryland and California.18 In an interview, Madsen said > he was told that the NSA was sniffing" for the address of origin and > the address of destination" of electronic mail. > > The NSA is also allegedly monitoring traffic passing through large > Internet gateways by scanning network access points" operated by > regional and long-distance service providers. Madsen writes that the > network access points allegedly under surveillance are at gateway > sites in Pennsauken, N.J. (operated by Sprint), Chicago (operated by > Ameritech and Bell Communications Research) and San Francisco > (operated by Pacific Bell). *19 > > Madsen believes that NSA monitoring doesn't always stop at the US > border, and if this is true, NSA is violating its charter, which > limits the agency 's spying to international activities. People > familiar with the monitoring claim that the program is one of the > NSA's `black projects,' but that it is pretty much an `open secret' > in the communications industry," he wrote. > > Electronic communications open up opportunities to broaden > democratic access to information and organizing. They also provide a > means and an opportunity for governments to pry. But just as people > have a right to send a letter through the post office without a > return address, or even to drop it in a mail box in another city, so > too, electronic rights advocates argue, they have the right to send > an anonymous, untraceable electronic communication. And just as the > post office can be used maliciously, or to commit or hide a crime, > re-mailers can be used by cruel or criminal people to send hate mail > or engage in flame wars." And like the post office, the highways, > and the telephone, the Internet could be used by spies or > terrorists. Those abuses, however, do not justify curtailing the > rights of the vast number of people who use privacy in perfectly > legal ways. > > Robert Ellis Smith, editor of the Privacy Journal newsletter, said > government agencies seem obsessed with anonymous re-mailers. They > were set up by people with a very legitimate privacy issue, he said. > Law enforcement has to keep up with the pace of technology as > opposed to trying to infiltrate technology. Law enforcement seems to > want to shut down or retard technology, and that's not realistic. > Anonymous re-mailers are not a threat to national security. *20 > -END-- > > SUBSCRIPTION INFO - - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)alterzone.com - - -> Posted by: "Donna J. Logan" <revcoal(a)pcnet.com> - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Net and Terrorism.
by snow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I took a few days to think about this stuff, and I am replying to these in bulk rather than seperately. T.C. May wrote: Can anything be done? To stop the likely effects of lots more surface-to-air missiles, lots more nerve gas available on the black market, and so on? In a word, "no." /* I disagree. Terrorism, political terrorism is fear. There are ways to protect military targets that are quite cost effective, unfortunately they are politically unpopular. (What just happend in Saudi is on my mind. STUPID military commanders getting the same pie in the face time and time again. There is NOTHING so unchanging as the military mind set.) Civilian targets are harder to protect, but certain steps can be taken to lessen chances of a sucessful attack. Another method, and this would be very unpopular (and hypocritical of the US) would be simply to announce that we (the Country) are going to hold the _manufacturing_ nation responcible for the use of weapons of mass destruction. So if Soviet Nerve Gas is used, we gas a city in the Soviet Union. MAD carried to a lower level. A third option is quite simply to buy as much of it as possible. */ I expect a city or two to get nuked in the next decade or so. (Haifa or Tel Aviv would be my leading candidates.) To me, this is unsurprising. /* My bets in the following order: Paris New York Rome London LA (by home brewed idiots) Chicago Berlin. I don't think that terrorists in the middle east will pop a nuke as they would get as many of their own as the "enemy". One of the things a terrorist needs more than money is a place to hide, and if you are killing your own people, they won't shield you. */ moderate economic or physical crises. (No, I am not a "survivalist," just mentally and physically prepared to deal with a major earthquake, economic dislocation, or terrorist incident in San Jose, which is 30 miles north of me.) /* Sounds like a "survivalist" to me. */ examples of how the Net can be used to undermine governments (what those governments of course refer to as "terrorism," even when it is mostly not). I'm not advocating such "terrorism," by the way, merely telling it like it is. /* If you want to define terrorism as in the above paragraph, them I am, and you do too. The biggest problem with terrorism is that there isn't a good defination that looks the same from both sides. In otherwords the old saw about one mans terrorist being anothers freedom fighter. Any defination sufficiently inclusive so as to cover all "terrorist" activities will also include uniformed soldiers. The lines get very thin and blurry. */ Keep your head down, avoid crowded downtown areas, prepare for moderate disruptions, and reject arguments that an American Police State will do anything to stop terrorism. /* The american police state (and if we aren't one yet, it isn't for lack of trying) IS an instrument of terrorism in some parts of this country. */ (Remember, terrorism is just warfare carried on by other means, with apolgies to Von Clausewitz.) /* Terrorism is when the other side hits with out warning. */ From: frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Thanks Tim for your essay. The only thing I would add is that terrorist attacks on pure information resources (e.g. the banking system) are likely to result in many fewer casualties than terrorist attacks on physical entities (e.g. major cities). Another way of saying it is, email bombs are preferable to snail mail bombs. /* I don't think so. One objective of terrorism is/could be to lessen a populations faith in "The System". Some possible situations (can't remember how to spell scenireo): Trash a multi-store pharmacy database and people can't get their prescriptions, or worse get the wrong one. Cause disturbances in certain parts of certain cities, then attack the 911 system to route officers and firemen to _wealthy_ neigborhoods at the expense of the poor neighborhoods. Then complain to the papers about it. Gain control of the power grid (I don't know how possible this is) and selectively brown out certain sections of the city during peak demand periods. Make it obvious, then do the preceeding idea. In all of these people will, or could die, but are much more effective in undermining the faith people have in the structures that run the country. If a bomb blast goes off, people get pissed off at the bomb makers, if the power fails, people get pissed at the electrical company. If you can create a large enough disturbances they will be better than bombs. */ From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> [TCM] >Can anything be done? To stop the likely effects of lots more >surface-to-air missiles, lots more nerve gas available on the black market, >and so on? >In a word, "no." try to have a warfare, siege-like mentality imho, and a continual "trying to stay ahead of the criminals". we do not have regular open terrorism in the streets of the US and I see no reason to think there ever will be as TCM suggests. /* Depending on how you define "terrorism" I would like you to visit my neighborhood, and then we can go to a couple other here in chicago where the cops terrorize the citizens, the gangs terrorize the cops and the citizens, etc. It hasn't hit the national level yet, but it will. */ nevertheless what his essay misses, and many in law enforcement miss, are the root reasons for crime. I'm not going to sound like a liberal /* There is a big difference (IMO) between a terrorist and a common criminal. Money and Ideology. In *MOST* instances the terrorist is attempting to acheive a political, social, or long term (as in decades/generations) economic change. A criminal is simply trying to get rich or get stoned. IMO the root cause of crime is a lack of self disipline, and it is as far as I can tell part of the human condition. */ in reality. it seems to me no nation-state has ever experimented with trying to take away the root causes of violence and discontent. why? /* Is it possible that to a large degree the nation-state IS the problem? */ because a policeman holding a gun is so much more visceral and the public responds to this image readily. other "programs" that try to decrease discontent among the budding terrorists of tommorrow are usually ridiculed. it is very difficult to prove that they work /* Rightly so. Most of these programs amount to hand-outs or paternalistic pandering. People need to work, not get paid for doing nothing. */ terrorists invariably have a patricular pathological psychological profile that sees the world in terms of "martyrs vs. villians" with the villians in the government, and the villians taking away or abusing respectable citizens. /* Often they are right. */ the "problem" of terrorism will be solved when we take the view that insanity and violence is *not* a natural aspect of human behavior (as TCM tends to suggest), and that /* It is. Insanity is a condition that occasionaly crops up in humans. Sometimes the problem is chemical, sometimes not, however it _is_ natural. So is violence. People want things, and some don't care what they have to do to get these things. */ >(Remember, terrorism is just warfare carried on by other means, with >apolgies to Von Clausewitz.) disagree. the purpose of warfare has traditionally been to seize something tangible like territory. terrorists are after intangibles-- namely, terror itself, disrupting a "peace process", etc. /* Or forcing a certain group to the discussion table. */ Any Obcrypto I could add at this point would be preaching to the choir. Petro, Christopher C. petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> snow(a)crash.suba.com

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Re: The Net and Terrorism
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 0:54 7/2/96, snow wrote: >On Mon, 1 Jul 1996, Simon Spero wrote: > >> I want my, I want my, I want my Atropine > > No, you don't. Simon, you got to be more careful when synthesizing that Sarin. Always check that the vent is working first. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own.

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But what about the poor?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:25 PM 7/1/96 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >Current government "Key Escrow" systems cost $200/key/year. [Craig Mundie] >These systems can best be described as key-rental systems. This is shocking, shocking. It never occurred to me that our government would charge us for the benefit of being tapped. What about the poor. I'm going to write Senator Kennedy and see if maybe we can get the selfish Republican Congress to free up some cash so that less fortunate Americans can afford to be tapped too. This argument against key escrow never made it onto that long list of questions we made up in the Spring of '93 when Key Escrow was first proposed by the Admin (it was probably Vince Foster's fault). We showed a lack of imagination. DCF "Gee Ossifer I'd love to let you read my files but I just couldn't afford expensive socialistic key escrow so I bought cheap efficient private key escrow instead."

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LOS_tit
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7-2-96 UST, page one: "Companies fear losing privacy, customers' trust." In a show of self-reliance reminiscent of the old West, companies are taking matters into their own hands, hiring security firms to protect their computer systems and ignoring the convention that law enforcement is the best defense. It's a stance that has implications for law enforcement and commerce, raises broad questions of privacy and control, and pits the philosophy of the Clinton administration directly against that of many Fortune 500 companies. "An organization has very little to gain" by reporting, says Lloyd Hession, of IBM's Business Recovery Services. There seems to be universal agreement that the strongest means for securing computer data against theft lies in cryptography, but the Clinton administration, citing fears that criminals would use cryptography to cloak their activities, is setting regulations slowing development of cryptography software. The Clinton administration is to announce, as early as this week, a commission to determine the federal government's role in securing cyberspace, from terrorism to petty crimes. http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/lostit.txt (13 kb) Go via www.anonymizer.com. Pipeline now belongs to Mindspring, an Atlanta company. LOS_tit

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PGP secret keys
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone post a pointer to a FAQ that tells what to do if you loose your secret key file? How can you regenerate your private key so that the userid number still matches the public key that has been distributed??

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hard drive encryption
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What is the best utility freely available for encrypting an entire drive that won't be used for a length of time? ie: I'm going away for a period of time and wish to encrypt the drive while I'm gone, but have no interest in actually using it while it's encrypted. I also have no real preference in what algorithm is used, as long as it's relatively secure. Speed is also not a big consideration, as it will be used once when I leave to encrypt, and once when i return to decrypt. Thanks in advance for the help... //cerridwyn// btw, the OS is Win95 if that matters...

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Re: hard drive encryption
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Currently, SecureDrive seems to be the most reliable under Win95. Check out: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/cryptbk.html I just published a cookbook on how to build a "CryptoBook" (a secure PC laptop with all sorts of crypto goodies). Details on SecureDrive are included. Joel At 07:53 AM 7/2/96 -0700, you wrote: > >What is the best utility freely available for encrypting an entire drive >that won't be used for a length of time? ie: I'm going away for a period >of time and wish to encrypt the drive while I'm gone, but have no interest >in actually using it while it's encrypted. I also have no real preference >in what algorithm is used, as long as it's relatively secure. Speed is >also not a big consideration, as it will be used once when I leave to encrypt, >and once when i return to decrypt. >Thanks in advance for the help... >//cerridwyn// > >btw, the OS is Win95 if that matters... > > >

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TRI_cks
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7-2-96. FiTi: "A Japanese engineer's box of tricks is helping detect forged banknotes." Counterfeit dollar bills are judged on a scale of one to nine, with the crudest at level one. The detector machines that existed before Matsumura's could only pick out bills at around level five or six. Supernotes are ranked between seven and nine and have been almost impossible to detect. Matsumura says supernotes do have flaws, though, and his machine can spot differences in the printing by referring to a histogram, or statistical graph, of patterns on real US notes. Each supernote tends to have two or three minute aberrations. Consequently, sensors check for any variations at 12 points on the note. A 0.9-second scan also monitors the thickness of the paper and the printing ink. The company can only produce 500 units a month, but already has orders for 45,000. http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/tricks.txt (4 kb) TRI_cks

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