December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

net-based key archival
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've put a revised version of my "Key Escrow without Escrow Agents" abstract in my ftp directory, in PostScript and Latex formats. ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.tex -matt

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407 Arms Traffickers in first month of training
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the first month the Arms Trafficker Training Page has helped 407 people to become Arms Traffickers. Here are the stats: International Arms Traffickers 407 Public List of Known Arms Traffickers 147 Letters to the president 83 Number of times page was read 2498 So about one arms trafficker for every 6 times the page is read (some people read the page more than once so the real ratio is better). Kind of fun that a web page can turn 1 out of 6 people into criminals. Thanks for your support both as arms traffickers and for linking to this page. It is off to a good start. For anyone who had missed it, the URL is: http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/ -- Vince Cate

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holographic remailing & the scientologists
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

it seems that anonymous remailing has split into two basic areas, each with distinct requirements and demands and problems: 1. private mail, sent to another email address 2. posts to Usenet or other forums such as mailing lists. now, interestingly, apparently most of the extremely heavy political backlash has come against (2), causing Hal Finney for example to advocate or suggest that remailers not be designed for posting but be limited to emailing to individual users somehow. (he didn't mention how mailing lists would be handled, but one might screen out email addresses that are "known mailing list addresses" or something like that) regarding (2), with scientology, I was trying to imagine how one could accomplish the same feature of distributing information anonymously in a "public place", but without giving the scientologists the ability to track a particular origination of the email, even remailers. Chaum's DC net idea is a useful approach. here I'd like to suggest another. some time ago someone had the amusing idea of cutting up the PGP binary code, UUencoded, and putting all the zillions of pieces in peoples signatures. each person would send mail to the signature server to pick up one of the 1/n pieces, and they would put it in their messages. frankly, I think this was a great idea that we could explore some more. in a sense, it stores data "holographically" over all kinds of different people's messages. imagine a system in which the scientology documents are stored in people's signatures, and someone writes software to go and recombine the documents based on finding signatures "out there". this could be applied to one newsgroup by having remailers post only tiny pieces of the material, but with enough on the newsgroup at any time to recombine them all with the software, but far too many pieces for the scientologists to attack all the remailers they are sent through. (people could post them through their regular email addresses). furthermore anyone posting a piece has a sort of minor plausible deniability. ("I just copied the signature from so-and-so as a protest, I have no idea what it refers to") == this all suggests to me the following idea. suppose that some document has been created that someone wants censored. how could net citizens protest this censorship? one scheme would be for everyone to put a tiny piece of the document in their signatures. if you get enough people to do this, it may actually be the case that at any one time, just because of the randomness of all the pieces available, the news server has enough messages archived for a program to scan the message directories and reconstruct the documents from all the pieces that are found. these "pieces" could even be stored solely in the netnews header fields. another idea involves the concept behind "spread spectrum". in this system, little pieces of data are spit out in different places, or channels, and the source and the reciever are scanning the exact same channel at the same time based on exact synchronization. I guess an analogy to usenet would be tiny pieces of data showing up in seemingly random newsgroups, but which are followed or "caught" exactly by the "reconstruction software". some interesting ideas related to steganography that some people might like to play with. == for a model of the scientology problem, it appears that what we have is a set of email addresses (S) and a public forum that essentially reaches some large subset of these people (S2). a person wishes to send out a secret document to S2, but he can't do so by posting to the forum, because then the censors "see" him and shut him down. but what he *can* do is send lots of pieces to a group of people in S, and each of these people individually posts their piece. (the censors have no control over mail sent between individuals, only that posted collectively). possibly, then, there is no single target of "who posted the material" for the censors to clamp down on, and the information eventually can be reconstructed by all S2. == key ways what I am proposing is different than some of the other "cut up the anonymous messages and recombine" proposals out there: 1. the recombination is not done by a remailer. it is done by anyone who can run software on the newsserver (i.e. reading the directories). the scientologists or "censors" cannot tell who is doing this. 2. the messages are not completely comprised of the data to be sent. the data could be stored in headers or the signatures of otherwise "legitimate" messages. note that the same scheme could be applied to web pages. you could store a document "holographically" in which pieces are obtained at all kinds of different URLs. it would be laughable for the censors to try to get court orders against individual pieces. and furthermore, the entire document is not stored anywhere "out there" in particular but recombined by anyone. the scientologists don't know who. note that I am giving the scientologists a lot more credit for their enmity than they deserve. they have mostly lost their war already in many ways, and they aren't a very serious threat to cyberspace in general, imho. they have shown an amazingly unabated aggression & zeal against remailer operators, however, something that could possibly be derailed with a little ingenuity.

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Re: nCognito is Dead..
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Long Live nCognito! Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: "Key Escrow without Escrow Agents"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:56 PM 5/25/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >I can see that you might create a code of law that determines >what procedures that these "distributed key juries" are supposed >to follow. but like our legal system, the interpretation and >application is ultimately left up to them. > >an interesting system, that is commendable for trying to >find a compromise between two seemingly irreconcilable polarities >(privacy and surveillance) but I doubt anyone in law enforcement >(with the mindset, "I can't be stopped from doing my job as I >see fit or criminals will get away") would go for it in the current form. But as long as key-escrow is claimed to be "voluntary," then the police should be happy if it is used at all. If they object that it is possible somebody won't agree that the person involved shouldn't have his data revealed, we can remind them that the jury system prevents conviction if not all of the jury agrees as to guilt. This is no worse than having, say, 12 key-escrow organizations and allowing any one to not reveal the correct key. Naturally, it will be necessary to ensure that they can refuse without anyone else knowing who opted out... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Children's Privacy Act
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:15 PM 5/25/96, Chris Adams wrote: >particularly if he plans to resell it. It does make me wonder whether you could file a suit >against TRW for selling information about you, particularly since it could affect you >adversely and there is no guaruntee it is accurate. Thanks to existing laws, almost certainly not. If they satisfy the government, credit agencies don't have to worry much about what harm they might do to individuals. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- We are pleased to announce the opening of the Czarevna Tatjana Mixmaster Remailer at tat(a)mindport.net. At present the remailer is configured to accept type2 messages only. Questions or comments should be directed to tatjana(a)mindport.net. Please note that some debugging is still in the works. An announcement of our complete confidence in the remailer's full and proper operation will be made presently. All official announcements will be signed with the following PGP key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQBtAzGo67oAAAEDAK/Pr9W3uySr/cb8cxHIEu0rfTGVaulmtFZ5fVN0M+fg9/AA 1ZM1PoJR9f8Oxjmg1+UG69SFLxgJSAZAQDwJjOAfwQG47n08eDjeNnZSezuZEC1L ZIj7KCG7mCX4fe8+7QAFEbQsQ3phcmV2bmEgVGF0amFuYSBSZW1haWxlciA8dGF0 QG1pbmRwb3J0Lm5ldD4= =4ukd - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Mixmaster key information follows: czarevna tat(a)mindport.net 0bd7631f6a2ca8c6a16f3e85a7526f43 2.0.3 - -----Begin Mix Key----- 0bd7631f6a2ca8c6a16f3e85a7526f43 258 AATLWxuW8j90eNaVFGVBMV5rCWT49MOoPTZXpHGb vGbTLUe/K60+bMP6+nIuWU3dbIQORa7ZI0emwRRr EWXVhCZnnDnf+G3O2Vjqw8Py9JoXJufSYig1bV0K kuN4p87Cu6FlWdQFT19fI28B42b0pZYgyVuB9ns0 3VARqmCl5LHziwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB - -----End Mix Key----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMajtQbuYJfh97z7tAQGRGwL/fm9VqOsTxtb61aZi5yq6YNzl05mZu6QU uzsIXz9LPd2J/iWYDx5CKASytDeb9YOY6HxYEec7sLFArjUu2999UcQRGp8uoFmT 9YKiRrwrc4Nr82E2q3LMZzVHgt403Z+U =SXwM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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e-mail gateways to usenet
by O. C. Winton WN1Z 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wonder if anyone would consider posting a list of currently functioning e-mail ways to post to usenet. Would be useful for people like me who often use libraries' access to internet, and the libraries don't give newsgroup access. orrin(a)redshift.com

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Quickremail v1.0b
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have just released Quickremail, a UNIX program that provides an easy interface to install an anonymous remailer. Just unzip and untar in your home directory, execute remailer-install.sh, and then you will have a fully functional remailer. You do not need root access to install it. It is available at http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/quickremail.1.0.b.tar.gz . - -- Mark =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= markm(a)voicenet.com | finger -l for PGP key 0xe3bf2169 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ | d61734f2800486ae6f79bfeb70f95348 ((2b) || !(2b)) | Old key now used only for signatures "The concept of normalcy is just a conspiracy of the majority" -me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMakKLLZc+sv5siulAQFRggP8CUjAKn6WKL73PuPbG+h1DsZKj+K5v0iG 3a01RPmQca3VWa8jeFsX6OfUH6XrI4L+GN8o2W+6nzULur36Fyxovj9NN0A8sGBu Ww1v0wu6MTA/r6HXiaGmPdSCZ5BeUF7TqPI2C9mgsAqlTinffR85aGpjYaev2Ffq MumHbq1wH7g= =4PPV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:23 PM 5/26/96 -0400, Subir Grewal wrote: >On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote: > >:At 09:48 PM 5/25/96 -0400, Subir Grewal wrote: >:How "removed" do they have to be to be innocent, in your opinion? > >If they didn't pull the trigger or give the order, they're innocent. >Making these criteria any laxer will cause problems as more and more >people are drawn into the category of offenders, pretty soon you're the >only victim, everyone else is out there to steal from you or assist in the >theft. Qualitatively, perhaps. But quantitatively, no. I think that blame for any given situation or government behavior will be distributed in a reasonably fair fashion, with those directly responsible for abuse becoming "dead meat" while those on the periphery only marginal targets. Your generous interpretation of their guilt is certainly not binding on me. And in any case the fact that the people involved will usually be able to resign will be a logical "out." >:Nuclear bomb design. Done with funds stolen from taxpayers. Done to >:protect the leadership of this country, not the public. > >Pure mathematics as far as the people working at the lab were concerned. >You really think if the receptionist had died, it would have been >self-defense? A couple of kids died in computer labs at other schools >where this happened, they were there feeding punched cards into the >machines. Somehow that doesn't sound right to me. I agree. Which is why I'd much prefer a method to preferentially target a relatively smaller number of people, and I've invented (discovered?) just such a system. Why not let it work? >:And isn't it immoral for George Bush, for instance, to choose a solution >:that results in the deaths of tens of thousands of comparatively innocent >:Iraqis, both during and after the Gulf war, rather than bumping off Saddam >:Hussein? Think about it. Exactly why does he do the former, rather than >:the latter? > >And the Iranian leaders really think Clinton is an ungoldy kafir for >meeting Rushdie the apostate. Why not kill him, after all various >Americans have suggested this is a valid tactic? Why not kill those Iranian leaders, using AP? And if you're afraid they'll retaliate against "our" leaders, I see nothing wrong with that, either. It's the leaders who maintain the dispute. > Your methods will be used for ends you do not agree with. Hey, I realized that long ago! But I'm not under any illusion that this system can be molded to conform to my wishes alone: If I could, I'd become a dictator and the cycle of tyranny would continue. > From what I've learnt of the Gulf >war (I was reading most of the time, kept away from the TV), they did try >very hard to kill Sadaam Hussein, but got nowhere. "Very hard"? If they'd tried "very hard" they would have succeeded. No, the various leadership groups controlling different countries have far more in common with each other than with the ordinary citizens. They all are perfectly aware that if a precedent is established that killing the leadership is to be used to solve a dispute, eventually they'll all be dead. Thus, they reject this solution like the plague. The government only pretends to not be able to succeed at this task in order to assuage the natural desires of the public. >As is apparent, >political leaders value their own lives more than they do those of the >foot-soldiers. Many among the foot-soldiers belive their lives would be >"brutish, nasty and short" without the mechanism of the state and are >willing to defend it and those who currently operate the machine. They are misled, of course. >Of >course George Bush I don't trust at all because the man was practically >glowing during "his war", anyone who enjoys a war, revels in it, is not >someone I admire, respect, or even talk to. However, when you propose >that we kill this person, I'm not going to stand with you either. Rest >assured, there will be many others waiting to take his place when he is >killed, and some of them will spell potato like the English feudal lords >did. The only reason there might be "many others waiting to take his place" is that assassination is actually a rare event. Make it easily accomplished, and who would want to take any politician's place? >:"Another set of costs"? Yikes! Read the essay, governments as we know them >:can't possibly survive post-AP. > >Oh no, I think they will survive post AP. The odds are quite high that >the people who are convinced to act on the AP philosophy will be branded >terrorists and become the objectives of many witch hunts the world over. Unless I capture the public's imagination, and they realize what kind of improvements it promises. Or, at least they recognize that opposition by those in government is entirely self-serving. >:Well, I disagree. Until recently, public opinion was almost entirely >:manufactured. It was a joint project of the government and the news media. > >I too think Chomsky has perceptive vision when it comes to the media. It doesn't take a great deal of perception to see this. The media and the government are dependent on each other: The media needs access to news, the government needs a pliable sounding board. Chomsky has gotten smart on this subject, a little bit late in my estimation. Chomsky's main advantage is that he's been a public figure for years, which means when HE spouts this stuff it's considered news. When we talk about it, it's ignored. >:Is there any significant likelihood that the people in power today will >:relinquish power absent a system such as AP? I'm not optimistic about that. > >No, noone "relinquishes" power. They fight to keep it, but the struggle >does not always have to be violent, It isn't that it "has to" be violent. Resignation is always an option. Problem is, they don't want to give up their positions of power. > and it hurts our cause to instigate >violence when none has been used directly against us. That depends entirely on what your definition of instigating violence really is. I happen to believe that the act of collecting taxes, involuntarily, IS the "instigation of violence" even if the victim gives up his assets without a fight, if there is the prospect of eventual violence should he refuse to cooperate. Until you see this, you'll have a warped view of the propriety of AP, not to mention the libertarian non-initiation of force principle. (NIOFP.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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