December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A guide to self control (Was funny underwear)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A Guide to Self-Control Subject: Steps in Overcoming Masterbation Excerpt from a Mormon missionary guide, circa 1970: Steps in Overcoming Masterbation, Mark E. Petersen 1. Never touch the intimate parts of your body except during normal toilet processes. 2. If you are associated with other persons having this same problem, YOU MUST BREAK OFF THEIR FRIENDSHIP. Never associate with other people having the same weakness. Don't suppose that two of you will quit together, you never will. You must get away from people of that kind. Just to be in their presence will keep your problem foremost in your mind. The problem must be taken OUT OF YOUR MIND for that is where it really exists. Your mind must be on other and more wholesome things. 3. When in bed, if that is where you have your problem for the most part, dress yourself for the night so securely that you cannot easily touch your vital parts, and so that it would be difficult and time consuming for you to remove those clothes. By the time you started to remove protective clothing you would have sufficiently controlled your thinking that the temptation would leave you. 4. If the temptation seems overpowering while you are in bed, GET OUT OF BED AND GO INTO THE KITCHEN AND FIX YOURSELF A SNACK, even if it is in the middle of the night, and even if you are not hungry, and despite your fears of gaining weight. The purpose behind this suggestion is that you GET YOUR MIND ON SOMETHING ELSE. You are the subject of your thoughts, so to speak. 5. Never read pornographic material. Never read about your problem. Keep it out of mind. Remember -- "First a thought, then an act." The thought pattern must be changed. You must not allow this problem to remain in your mind. When you accomplish that, you soon will be free of the act. 6. Pray. But when you pray, don't pray about this problem, for that will tend to keep [it] in your mind more than ever. Pray for faith, pray for understanding of the Scriptures, pray for the Missionaries, the General Authorities, your friends, your families, BUT KEEP THE PROBLEM OUT OF YOUR MIND BY NOT MENTIONING IT EVER -- NOT IN CONVERSATION WITH OTHERS, NOT IN YOUR PRAYERS. KEEP IT _OUT_ of your mind! 7. Be outgoing and friendly. Force yourself to be with others and learn to enjoy working and talking to them. Use principles of developing friendships found in books such as _How to Win Friends and Influence People_ by Dale Carnegie. 8. Make a pocket calendar for a month on a small card. Carry it with you, but show it to no one. If you have a lapse of self control, color the day black. Your goal will be to have _no black days_. The calendar becomes a strong visual reminder of self control and should be looked at when you are tempted to add another black day. Keep your calendar up until you have at least three clear months. 9. In the field of psychotherapy there is a very effective technique called _aversion therapy_. When we associate or think of something very distasteful with something which has been pleasurable, but undesirable, the distasteful thought and feeling will begin to cancel out that which was pleasurable. If you associate something very distasteful with your loss of self-control it will help you to stop the act. For example, if you are tempted to masturbate, think of having to bathe in a tub of worms, and eat several of them as you do the act. 10. Keep your bladder empty. Refrain from drinking large amounts of fluids before retiring. 11. Reduce the amount of spices and condiments in your food. Eat as lightly as possible at night. 12. Avoid people, situations, pictures or reading materials that might create sexual excitement. 13. It is sometimes helpful to have a physical object to use in overcoming this problem. A Book of Mormon, firmly held in hand, even in bed at night has proven helpful in extreme cases. 14. In very severe cases it may be necessary to tie a hand to the bed frame with a tie in order that the habit of masturbating in a semi-sleep condition can be broken. 15. Do not let yourself return to any past habit or attitude patterns which were part of your problem. Satan Never Gives Up. Be calmly and confidently on guard. Keep a positive mental attitude. You can win this fight! The joy and strength you will feel when you do will give your whole life a radiant and spiritual glow of satisfaction and fulfillment. --

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New type2.list/pubring.mix (revisited)
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Everyone, The corrected (downed remailers deleted) type2.list/pubring.mix combination is available on jpunix.com. This list now contains only remailers that have responded to pings sent out by myself and by Raph. I'll automate this shortly to insure that the remailers on the list actually respond to traffic. Apologies to ecafe for saying it was down. It was poor eysight on my part. John Perry - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCUAwUBMb1PQ1OTpEThrthvAQHn7gP4rHjupKUM4hWPsbFIxdXWk09KdEZLbpK3 uumHpAlApXfu7n9umOG1evxp9SRy9yUg3PvtV5pHtMGcebv8ngpQEzDekC55RCBz Rghon7Rqknte+9eRbpbqhq1e/LAzebxwJv+vRSOkYEOmiq6KWdhQ0LZyGjV1VfHA D/eWCOf2ig== =w/xe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Fwd: public key expert witness wanted]
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From sci.crypt: Subject: public key expert witness wanted From: schlafly(a)bbs.cruzio.com Date: Mon, 10 Jun 1996 05:37:34 GMT Keywords: public key expert witness wanted Newsgroups: sci.crypt,misc.int-property,talk.politics.crypto Organization: Cruzio Community Networking System, Santa Cruz, CA Reply-To: schlafly(a)bbs.cruzio.com Sender: news(a)cruzio.com (The News User) Xref: beta.nedernet.nl sci.crypt:44606 misc.int-property:17035 talk.politics.crypto:17141 My lawsuit against Public Key Partners has a trial on the scope and validity of the Stanford patents scheduled to begin in San Jose, Calif, on Sept. 3, 1996. I am looking for an expert witness. Requirements: * credentials which will impress the court. * live within driving distance of San Jose. * thorough understanding of Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange, Hellman-Merkle trapdoor knapsack, and related public key crypto. * willing to face hostile lawyers in depositions, and testify in court. * must enjoy this sort of thing enough to do it for free. I am not looking for a mercenary hatchet man. (Contact RSADSI or Cylink if that's what you are.) Just someone to explain the inventions, and give opinions as to what can reasonably be deduced from particular disclosures. For more info on the lawsuit, and on contacting me, see http://bbs.cruzio.com/~schlafly#pkpsuit Roger Schlafly

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Re: Anonymous return addresses
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" <hal9001(a)panix.com> > If the message is split into more than one part (to meet the message size > requirement) there is some potential leakage to each server of what message > is being requested. If User a requested 3 messages, then they MAY be > requesting all three parts of a 3 part message (or 2+1). If a record is > kept of the number of requests over time, then there can be some regression > checking based on the ID (ie: If the number of new messages for ANx in the > DB matches the number that User Y requests in the current session). I may > be in error with this thought but it looks like a possible problem. Yes, this is a good point. It might be addressed by having the later parts of a multi part message not be identified with the anon ID of the receiver, but rather with a random message label which is revealed to the receiver in the first part of the message (encrypted, of course). Then the database owner could not tell which message parts went together just by looking at the messages. Arrival times might give this away, though, if all parts of a multi-part message were sent at about the same time. > >Messages would have a finite lifetime and would expire and be removed > >from the database after a while. The authors propose breaking the > >database up into batches with a fixed number of messages, but I don't > >fully follow the reasoning behind this. I guess it reduces the load on > >the server when it does its XOR's. > > This can also affect the "attack" I speculated on above since it can "leak" > more info. Multi-part messages (or multiple messages to the same recipient) > which are retrieved in one session can be correlated between the groups > (ie: User Y asked for 5 messages [Selected from Groups 1&5] and ANx is the > one AN? that has the requested number of messages in each of the Groups > [ie: 3 from G1 and 2 from G5]). Yes, there is a tradeoff with the batch size between efficiency and privacy. The multi-part message issue does seem to make the problem potentially worse. Maybe it would be necessary for anonymous receivers to mostly receive small messages, and/or make the message granularity relatively large. Some of these kinds of volume- or correlation-based traffic analysis techniques can be countered by requesting dummy messages, ones which the receiver won't be able to read. If he asks for five messages every day from that day's batch then it doesn't leak any information about which ones are for him. Asking for a random number averaging five may work even better, if occasionally he really needs to read six. Hal

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Re: Terrorism Hysteria on the Net
by Dale Drew 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we are in violent agreement.... The item of issue, between physical and virtual terrorism attacks is the fact the government either is, or wants to give the distinct perception that they are, ill-prepared to counter for the types of potentials wide-spread Internet-based virtual attacks. And that the intelligence channels they have in place to detect possible movement of physical attacks may not fit the "Internet" model. In addition, the US legal system is ill-prepared to deal with the prosecutory issues surrounding this type of "terrorism". =============================================================== Dale Drew MCI Telecommunications Manager internetMCI Security Engineering Voice: 703/715-7058 Internet: ddrew(a)mci.net Fax: 703/715-7066 MCIMAIL: Dale_Drew/644-3335 At 11:02 PM 6/10/96 -0500, snow wrote: >On Mon, 10 Jun 1996, Dale Drew wrote: >> At 07:21 PM 6/10/96 -0500, snow wrote: >> >On Wed, 5 Jun 1996, John Young wrote: >> >> "You bring me a select group of hackers and within 90 days I'll bring this >> >> country to its knees, " says Jim Settle, retired director of the FBI's >> >> computer crime squad. >> > Give me 15 well trained soldiers(near special forces level) and I >> >can do it in less than 60 days. Without touching a computer. >> To understand where "They" think they are coming from, you have to compare >> Apples-to-Apples. The concern is the medium of choice; the Internet and it's >> high availability of anonymity, coupled with its access to large amounts of >> computer systems available via one virtual channel. > > Preaching to the choir, but once again it is a case of nothing >new. The potential for economic terrorism is not significantly larger >given the existance of the internet than it was before. This is what needs >to constantly be drummed into the technically dis-inclined, that the same >problems exists off the net that exist ON the net. > >> A well orchestrated and well researched attack by the right folk, as the thought >> process goes, could in-fact, potentially affect large amounts of critical >> computer systems within a short period of time. And while the government >> has inroads available to identify potential physical terrorists threats, >> they do not feel as prepared for the virtual ones. > > I would think that shutting down power to New York City for more >than a couple of days would pretty much throw the economy into a fit. > > I would go so far as to say that you can cause MORE havoc in the >physical arena than the virtual. > > >Petro, Christopher C. >petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> >snow(a)crash.suba.com > > >

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Re: Terrorism Hysteria on the Net
by vin＠shore.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ex-Special-Agent Settle deserves all the derision he has gotten (probably not in the right places) for his LSD-in-the-water-supply threat: >> >> "You bring me a select group of hackers and within 90 days I'll bring >> >> this country to its knees, " says Jim Settle, retired director of the >> >> FeeBee's computer crime squad. snow's jibe about doing the same with a handful of spooky special forces guys (less than 15, if he used snipers) was appropriate. I think, however, Dale Drew went too far when he denied that the demension of the Net added nothing new to the range of social or economic threat. Don't we, as a technical culture, have to acknowledge the burgening nihilism that is exemplified in both the subculture of virus (and other randomly distructive pieces of attack code,) and the larger culture that so often lauds their "creativity" and "ingenuity." Not even lumpen-Libertarianism allows the author of such pain and distruction to escape moral responsibility -- yet the popular tech culture (and the pop culture) does just that! The culture can deal with purposeful terrorism, even purposeful Net terrorism, but a whole subculture of sociopaths who -- like arsonists on a binge, or (to exaggerate slightly) the nerve gas cult in Japan -- toss out distructive code bombs to see who or what gets blown away, is indeed something new. How many wild viruses are now loose? What new corners of the networked infrastructure will be the next forum for these arsonists? Java applets? NT? The nodes of the Net itself? Is this too to be left to police suppression? Are Net Cops inevitable? Are there other forces that could be brought to bear? (Forces that could perhaps be influenced by the tone or substance of comments that originate here or in similar forums?) And isn't this threat unique to a culture which has become so dependant on the structured flow of information products and tools? The sky isn't falling; there are no bodies in the street -- so we have time... but the sense of threat could become so serious that the public would seek shelter, solice, stability. The spooks' wet-dream, the wiretapped Garrison Nation (two-way TV always on; no one allowed to whisper away from a microphone) is one answer. Of a sort. Suerte, _Vin Vin McLellan +The Privacy Guild+ <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, Ma. 02150 USA Tel: (617) 884-5548 <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>

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[Noise] William Safire on the GAK bastards' other privacy violations.
by eric＠clever.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WILLIAM SAFIRE: Shame on the FBI WASHINGTON (Jun 10, 1996 12:00 p.m. EDT) -- Overlooked in the scandal of Travelgate has been the failure of FBI Director Louis Freeh to protect the confidential files of citizens from political snoops. Say what you like about J. Edgar Hoover -- he never let the bureau become a doormat for White House aides. The background: when President Clinton claimed "executive privilege" to keep 3,000 embarrassing documents from investigators, Congress threatened White House Counsel Jack Quinn with criminal contempt. To avoid jail, he forked over a thousand of the least damning documents. One of them illuminates why Clinton has been stonewalling for years on the rest of the subpoenaed files. It is a requisition to the "FBI Liaison," ostensibly from then-White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, for the confidential files on Billy Ray Dale, the travel office employee who had been fired seven months earlier to make room for a Clinton cousin. The FBI disgorged 22 letters and reports on Ray alone; he was then besmeared by White House officials in the press, unjustly prosecuted and financially ruined, before being acquitted by a jury in two hours. The requisition for the confidential FBI files was unsigned. The name typed on it was Bernard Nussbaum, but Nussbaum now says he had "absolutely no knowledge" of such a request, and would presumably swear to that. The reason given on the fraudulent requisition was "access" -- as if Ray were trying to get back into the White House, which was untrue. That was the tip of the iceberg. Despite "executive privilege," Congressman William Clinger learned that as many as 341 such fraudulent, unsigned requests for confidential files and name checks were sent under the Nussbaum typed name to FBI headquarters. Apparently the snoop was a Clinton political appointee who preferred anonymity. The cover story peddled by Clinton aides is that this was a "routine" updating of White House files by a stupid clerk that just happened to focus on holdover Republicans, as well as other Republican political suspects -- including a former secretary of state whose aides once improperly snooped into Clinton passport files. Clinton's lawyers claim that the fraudulently obtained FBI dossiers were put in a White House vault and nobody looked at them. What's being done in response to the most egregious invasion of privacy of U.S. citizens in a generation? Not much. President Clinton says he's sorry, but continues to stonewall on 2,000 documents; the independent counsel adds this mess to his Travelgate list; and the FBI announces a "thorough" investigation by its in-house counsel, who will rebuke some low-level agent and absolve the boss. Not good enough. After FBI agents were jerked around to provide political cover for Clinton patronage moves in 1993, Attorney General Reno and Freeh promised strict scrutiny of White House requests. They failed abysmally to keep citizens' confidential files safe from politicians' eyes. Think of it: Unverified slanders and gossipy tidbits in your FBI file have been vulnerable to an unsigned form letter from a political partisan hiding behind another person's name. Under Freeh, the anti-encryption zealot hand-picked by the man whose name was used on the phony requisitions, the Justice Department's most confidential file room has become a walk-in closet for White House pols. Nobody at Freeh's unbuttoned FBI bothered to ask: What individual wants this and for what lawful purpose? Can any anonymous bureaucrat requisition, rifle through and remove confidential records? How come not one agent was required by bureau policy to ask why not even initials appeared on hundreds of requests to check up on Republicans? What a scandalously sloppy way to run a police agency. To entrust the investigation of this unprecedented hemorrhage of FBI confidentiality to the same easily manipulated Justice Department invites a whitewash. Summer civil libertarians shade their eyes when personal privacy is invaded by political allies, but this top-level failure to resist an abuse of power dismays FBI agents in the field. When Clintonites send over for the file on me, Director Freeh, don't buy their baloney about "seeks access" -- I won't be going to the White House picnic this summer.

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Re: lambda 2.08 (1/2) - Surveillance du contenu : l'oeil biais_
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 10 Jun 96 at 19:08, Jerome Thorel wrote: > DANS LE NUMERO --> 2.08 <-- du bulletin lambda > http://www.freenix.fr/netizen/ <snip> > - Les agents, lors des PV, ne signent plus par leur nom, mais par > des numeros d'immatriculation, a remarque la revue Chroniques Bonjour Jerome! Que signifie PV? Traduction libre par: / non-official translation by: jf_avon(a)citenet.net ... The agents, during PVs(?), are not signing with their own names anymore but with an ID number, pointed out "Chroniques" magazine... La version anglaise de ce texte a-t-elle ete envoye a cypherpunks(a)toad.com? Si non, pourriez-vous l'y envoyer. Aussi, en faire parvenir une copie anglaise a jimbell(a)pacifier.com, ca sera du plus grand interet pour lui. Salutations JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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USS_hit
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

6-11-96. FiTi: "US squares up to cyberterrorists." Until recently, the concept of "information warfare" has been widely dismissed as alarmist rhetoric and viewed as "post Cold War hysteria" generated by those with an interest in maintaining the vast US intelligence apparatus. But the potential use of computer networks to undermine public confidence, disrupt essential services, play havoc with the economy or damage military capabilities is now being taken seriously in Washington. Encryption may be just one of many battlegrounds -- others include: proposals for mandatory reporting of corporate computer intrusions and for exceptions to US laws that prohibit intelligence agencies from snooping on domestic communications; the forthcoming ruling by US courts on free speech on the Internet, in response to laws aimed at stopping distribution of pornographic material; and possible limits on information that marketers may gather and use about children who surf the Internet. Also the Clinton administration is planning a rapid-response team to take charge in the event of a cyberterrorist attack. USS_hit

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Re: USS_hit
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:58 PM 6/11/96 GMT, John Young wrote: > 6-11-96. FiTi: > > "US squares up to cyberterrorists." > > Until recently, the concept of "information warfare" has > been widely dismissed as alarmist rhetoric and viewed as > "post Cold War hysteria" generated by those with an > interest in maintaining the vast US intelligence > apparatus. But the potential use of computer networks to > undermine public confidence, The government is doing an excellent job `"undermining public confidence" all by itself! >disrupt essential services, "essential" in whose opinion? > play havoc with the economy Like maybe massive deficit spending, high taxes, etc for decades? >or damage military > capabilities is now being taken seriously in Washington. How about "damage military NEEDS"? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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