December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:32 PM 5/19/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 08:05 PM 5/19/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >>It should occur to all of us that if the NSA was actually doing the job we >>are vastly over-paying them to do, it is THEY who should be finding, >>exposing, and correcting these kinds of cryptography faults. > >They may have; they're just kind of selective in who they expose them to :-) Yes...but... How can the NSA serve two masters? If the NSA has the American public's best interests at heart, then it should have revealed the flaw if it knew of it. (Otherwise, it can't be trusted...) If it did not, then it likewise should admit to this to show that their trustworthiness and reliability isn't particularly high and we shouldn't trust their opinions on Clipper etc. It is at least arguable that the NSA might have a vested interest in allowing an enemy to continue to use a flawed encryption system, as in Enigma. However, MD5 produces what ought to be secure hashes, right? A flaw in MD5 allows the person knowing the secret flaw to fake a file that produces a similar hash. What interest could the NSA possibly have in allowing such faked files to be produced? Is this part of the NSA's job description? >Also, there are expert cryptographers outside the NSA, and outside the US; >you might check where Dobbertin lives. And this is a Good Thing. Yes, it is. But I'd like to think that the NSA isn't acting as if WE are the "enemy." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:44 1996-05-21 +0200, bryce(a)digicash.com wrote: >Matts, you don't want to do floating point for money, because >floating point doesn't give you good control of precision. Yes I do. Several major currency traders in Sweden keep all their money in 64 bit floating point storage. I think that DigiCash will go floating point (get real?) when you start doing currency. If you sell 1 DEM, you don't want to get paid in cents, you want to get paid in 10-15 decimal places. That's where the currency action is right now, and before Ecash(tm) is fully deployed we'll probably see traders going for 15-20 decimal places. Floating point is the way to do it, but are your accountants ready for it? >Keep in mind that only Ecash(tm) Mints can create Ecash(tm) >coins and choose what values the coins have. Sorry, I thought that the client created the coins and the mint just signed them. I guess I should go back to RTFAPI. Regards, Matts

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Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:00 PM 5/21/96, Rev. Mark Grant, ULC wrote: >On Tue, 21 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> Traffic analysis will be quite easy to do, of course, as all mail sent to >> the persistent address comes out of the "disposable(a)foo.com" address. >> Q.E.D. > >Yeah, but the attack model I was assuming was lawyers rather than >intelligence agencies. The NSA could probably easily link the two >together, but the Church of Foobar(tm) probably couldn't. They'd only have >access to the logs on the ISP and the information you gave when you signed >up, not the raw packets on the Net. The traffic analysis on this fixed mapping system needs no access to packets and is childishly simple. Let's call the first site "Alice" and the emanation site "Bob." That is, all messages sent to the persistent site Alice appear to come from the site Bob. The Church of Clams can simply send messages addressed to themselves through the Alice remailer and see immediately that they appear to come from Bob. Q.E.D. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:02 PM 5/20/96 -0700, Hal wrote: >I was contacted by the FBI on Friday due to some threatening mail which >was apparently sent through my remailer. According to 18 USC 875(c), >"Whoever transmits in interstate commerce any communication containing >any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of >another, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more >than five years, or both." I may not be able to continue operating >either of my remailers (alumni.caltech.edu and shell.portal.com) for >much longer due to this kind of abuse. You may recall that when the Leahy encryption bill was proposed, and many people around here were fawning all over it, I raised the issue that it would allow the govt to harrass and prosecutor encrypted remailer operators since their use of encryption allows investigations to be thwarted. What you've just seen, while not directly involving encryption, is the analogous version of such harassment with simple remailers. If there is any need for laws or regulations here, it is one to explicitly exempt remailers from responsibility for email they forward, or decrypt and then forward. (It isn't clear, for example, why a remailer is any more responsible for the contents of a message than any other point on the Internet chain.) Obligatory AP reference: If AP was up and functioning, there wouldn't be a government to fund an FBI to pay agents to come and harass you for forwarding a message that they've probably misinterpreted anyway. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Are there laws against remailing messages?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I've changed the thread title.] At 2:17 PM 5/21/96, Jim Choate wrote: >In pondering the last few days of discussion it occurs to me that a test >might be possible. In short: > >Is it legal for a business to anonymously remail physical mail? ... >I would also like to point out (the obvious I admit) that the founding >fathers apparently embarced anonymous distribution via their 'publius' >handle. It seems to me that a federal prosecutor would have a hard time >claiming there was no precedence for such actions. Such a claim to my way >of thinking would be fundamental in any attempted prosecution for anonymous >remailing. Also, as far as I can find out, there was no persecution of the >newspapers for printing this material anonymously, they apparently were not >held to task for the content. This seems to indicate that English commen law >of that day (and its descendants here today) embraced anonymous speech as >well. Several points: * The Supreme Court formally decided many years ago that leaflets, fliers, articles, handouts, etc., cannot be required to be identified. (Some state had tried to require that leaflets be identifed with the name of the author or distributing group. I don't have the case name handy, but it's pretty famous and is cited in all the books on cyberspace law...I may even have a mention of it by name in the Cyphernomicon.) * This ruling, which is certainly fully consistent with the First Amendment, should of course apply to electronic forms of leaflets, fliers, articles, handouts, etc. Unless, of course, there is an upheld interpretation that the Net is different from print media, which I think it clearly is not. * As to laws against receiving a letter and then resending it to somone else...how could that be a crime? What I receive in my mail is my business. What I do with what I receive in the mail is also my business. Demanding that I process letters or notes to me in certain ways and not in other ways would be interfering with my communications. (Quibblers will likely cite FCC and election campaign laws as a counterexample. Wrongly, I think. Another debate.) * Now if I start doing this remailing on a large-scale basis, various business regulations, tax laws, etc., obviously come into effect. "Remailings Etc." will have to satisfy various regulators, tax collectors, OSHA inspectors, etc...all the things that make it so hard to start a small business in America. However, I can't think of any obvious laws which ban receiving a package or letter, removing the outer addressing, removing the payment, and then resending it. (Not saying there aren't such regulations, though I think they are clearly unconstitutional. The "regulate commerce" language which is frequently cited as justification for meddling in business should not be able to turn a business into a lawbreaker for doing what individuals can do.) In summary, what I receive in my mail, physical or electronic, is for me to do with as I wish. This includes sending it on to another site, commenting on it (*), etc. (* A finesse I thought of a few years ago is this: If remailing is ever banned or if remailers are held liable, use _quotes_. That is, I say: ---- To: foo(a)bar.baz From: Tim-Remailer(a)black.net Subject: Ever seen anything like this? Somebody sent me this: <message> ---- Now, what's a law against remailers going to do? Hold me liable for passing a message on and asking for comment? (Yes, I think this is a pretty transparently cute ploy to circumvent laws about remailings. But it shows, I think, the can of worms that gets opened should such a law ever get passed and then upheld. It would place limits not only on what one could "remail without comment," but on what one could _include_ in one's own messages!) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:36 AM 5/21/96, Adam Shostack wrote: >Lance Cottrell wrote: >| >| An interesting problem with anonymous postage is that it is likely to kill >| cover traffic generators. >| > >Postage is most needed at the point of delivery. > >That is the node that will be taking the heat/paying the lawyers. I'd >operate a remailer if I was never the last node, becuase I don't have >a site that can take the heat/seizure of machines for me. If we pay >those final nodes to do more, than intermediate nodes can still carry >cover traffic for free. > >Adam > >-- >"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." > -Hume This is true. It is also something which would be easy to build into Mixmaster. The Message payload has a much looser format than the rest of the message. The postage could simply be prepended to the subject and destination fields (which are already variable length). Time to actually look at the API :) -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:05 AM 5/20/96 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 8:05 PM 5/19/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>It should occur to all of us that if the NSA was actually doing the job we >>are vastly over-paying them to do, it is THEY who should be finding, >>exposing, and correcting these kinds of cryptography faults. Has anybody >>ever heard any evidence that the NSA has ever acted in this sort of >>responsible role? > >I was rather impressed by NSA's role in the creation of DES. The >strengthened it against an attack which was not publicly known, and didn't, >in the process, reveal the attack. (See AC2.) Isn't this partly bad, at least? Sure, if DES was a working, operational cryptosystem revealing the attack immediately might be arguably irresponsible. But since it was merely a design, exposing the flaw didn't help the enemy or hurt "us." Had DES been in use, the NSA could merely have stated, publicly, that "We see a flaw in DES, and we will tell you all about it in 5 years. Enclosed is an encrypted description of the problem, encrypted using a single key system with a 128-bit key. Save it for your files. In five (5) years we will publish the key to decrypt that file, and you will then know what we know now." At that point, anybody who then was using DES would have a five year warning to replace it. And the NSA would be unable to change the contents of what they were revealing, because they would only be withholding the key. Also, exposing the flaw in DES could have alerted the developers of other cryptosystems to watch for the same attack on their systems. All in all, I don't think the NSA's near-silence on DES is unambiguously commendable. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:39 PM 5/20/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At 01:05 AM 5/20/96 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >>I was rather impressed by NSA's role in the creation of DES. The >>strengthened it against an attack which was not publicly known, and didn't, >>in the process, reveal the attack. (See AC2.) > >Isn't this partly bad, at least? Given NSA's responsibilities to: (1) Break foreign crypto systems. (2) Make US crypto systems unbreakable. (3) Never Say Anything. I find it remarkable they were that open. They had a technique which helped them with 1. They didn't want to reveal it or foreign systems would be changed hurting NSA's pursuit of 1. They had a (small, DES was public and therefore could be used by foreigners) obligation thru 2 to help with DES. They honored 3 by saying as little as possible, while still strengthening DES. >All in all, I don't think the NSA's near-silence on DES is unambiguously >commendable. If they were cypherpunks, or academic cryptologists I would agree. However, their responsibilities do not involve publishing, so I can't fault the way they skated thru the maze of conflicting responsibilities given what we know. I can not fault them for following their charter. (Faulting their charter is a different matter.) When designing crypto systems, it is worthwhile to consider NSA as the opponent, because as far as I know, they are the best there is. If your system is secure from NSA, then it is secure from everyone except insiders. However the government always skates between the horns of the dilemma that acting on the results of NSA intercepts may cause their opponents the change their crypto systems, cutting off the intercepts. This logic says the government can always act on the results of 40 bit key intercepts because everyone knows they are insecure. If they acted on a 56 bit key intercept, it would make concrete what we already know theoretically. If they acted on a 96 bit key intercept, people would abandon the underlying crypto system because of the unfeasibility of brute forcing a 96 bit key. (When considering what to abandon, the random process used to generate the 96 bits should be at least as suspect as the crypto system.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by Rev. Mark Grant, ULC 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 21 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > The Church of Clams can simply send messages addressed to themselves > through the Alice remailer and see immediately that they appear to come > from Bob. Good point... oops ;-)... Mark

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Re: MixMaster fair use
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem is RSAREF. I can't chose license terms for that. -Lance At 7:00 AM 5/21/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Hi all, > >Perhaps I am confused about what MixMaster's license allows. I have joined >the confusing part (for me anyway)... > >README.no-export : > >All the files in this archive contain crpytographic code which is >restricted by the ITAR regulations on munitions. >These files may only be retrieved by US citizens, and only on condition of >agreement not to export any of this software or dats, and to extract >a similar agreement from any person they may transfer it to. > >To access the export-controled materials on >this site, you must agree to "THE AGREEMENT" >below. If your email address ends in one of the following: > >.edu .com .edu. .gov .mil .org .net .us .ca > >Do this by sending "THE AGREEMENT", >exactly as it appears, to > > mix-request(a)jpunix.com > > >If it does not, but you qualify to retrieve >Mixmaster under "THE AGREEMENT", then send mail >to perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com, explaining your >situation. > >In either case you will be sent a message containing >the name of a hidden directory in which you will >find the controlled software. The name of the directory >changes frequently, so you must get the name >each time you want to access the hidden directory. > > -John A. Perry 5/6/95 > >-------------------------------------------------- > THE AGREEMENT: >I am a citizen or national of the United States, >or of Canada, or have been lawfully admitted for permanent >residence in the United States under the >Immigration and Naturalization Act. > >I agree not to export Mixmaster, or RSAREF >or any other software in this archive, >in violation of the export >control laws of the United States of America as implemented >by the United States Department of State Office of >Defense Trade Controls. > >Before I download Mixmaster, I will read >and agree to the terms and conditions of the RSAREF >license (in ftp://ftp.jpunix.com/pub/rsalicen.txt) > >I will use Mixmaster solely for non-commercial purposes. >---------------------------------------------------------- > >Directory name last changed at: Wed May 1 09:00:01 CDT 1996 > > >End README.no-export > > >What confuses me is the part above that states that I agree to use Mixmaster >for solely non-commercial use. This is NOT GNU or copyleft. > > > > > Jim Choate ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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